

RIGHTLY DEFINING THE SON OF GOD

Examining the Definition of Chalcedon's Conceptual Apparatus

J. Alexander Rutherford

Doctor of Philosophy


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
Submitted in full fulfilment of a Doctor of Philosophy degree at Moore
Theological College

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, 04/07/2023

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, 10/07/2023

Abstract

Against the background of recent discussion of perceived problems within the *Definition of Chalcedon*, with reference to its conceptual apparatus, and of the growing body of literature on the *Acta* of Chalcedon, this thesis has sought to investigate the conceptual apparatus of the *Definition of Chalcedon*. It has sought to identify its contours and whether there are problems present. To do so, the thesis first establishes the interpretive approach the *Acta* furnish for the *Definition*, namely, three interpretive strategies given for understanding the *Definition*. These strategies are then employed, tracing key terminology and their attendant concepts through the 4th-century authorities indicated by the *Acta* (Athanasius, Basil of Caesarea, and Gregory of Nazianzus) and the two conciliar letters of Cyril (*The Second Letter to Nestorius* and *The Letter to John of Antioch*) with the support of Leo's *Tome*. The concepts of universality and particularity are chosen as the objects of investigation because of their central importance to the debates of the prior centuries and because they are the source of the problems identified by contemporary authors. The fruit of this investigation is then applied to the *Definition*, with the conclusion that there is indeed a conceptual problem in the *Definition*. The *Definition* sought to present itself as an application of the Nicene Creed, interpreted by select 4th-century fathers, to the debates of the previous decades concerning the incarnation of the Son. In doing so, it juxtaposed two ontological apparatuses that are not readily reconciled, namely, the account of a derivative essence used for the Trinity, by which three *hypostases* could be said to have one being or nature (*ousia, phusis*), and the logical account of two natures, by which one *hypostasis* could be said to have two essences or natures (*ousia, phusis*). Potential resolutions drawn from the following centuries and contemporary discussion are evaluated without finding an adequate resolution.

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Acknowledgments

I am thankful for the help I have received from many people to see this thesis completed. Above all, I would not have been able to complete this project without the grace and strength of God through his Holy Spirit. I pray that this work will be to your glory, *solī Deo gloria*.

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Analytical Outline

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Abbreviations

Primary Sources:

Aristotle

Cat. *Categoriae*
Metaph. *Metaphysica*
Top. *Topica*

Apollinaris of Laodicaea

Ana. *Anacephalaeosis*
Kata. ἡ κατὰ μέρος πίστις
Frag. *Fragments*

Athanasius of Alexandria

Ep. Afr. *Epistula Ad Afros*
C. Ari. *Contra Arianos*
Decr. *De decretis*
[Exp]. *Expositio Fidei*¹
Inc. *De Incarnatione Verbi*
Ep. Serap. *Epistulae I-IV Ad Serapionem*
Dion. *De Sententia Dionysii*
Syn. *De Synodis*
Tom. *Tomus ad Antiochenos*

Basil of Caesarea

Eun. *Adversus Eunomium*
Hex. *Homilies on the Hexameron*
Spir. *De Spiritu Sancto*

Dexippus

Cat. *In Aristotelis categorias commentarium*

Eunomius

Apol. *Liber Apologeticus*

¹ This text is thought to be spurious and is not printed in *Athanasius Werke*. Hanson mistakenly identifies the text printed at PG 25 199-208 with the short creed printed in Felix Scheidweiler, "Ein Glaubensbekenntnis Des Eustathius von Antiochien," *ZNW* 44.3-4 (1952): 237-49. R. P. C. Hanson, *The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy 318-381* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988), 221.

Gregory of Nazianzus

Orat. Orations

John Philoponus

Dia. Dialectics

Maximus the Confessor

Op. Opuscula Theologica et Polemica

Ep. Epistulae XLV

Amb. Io. Ambigua ad Joannem

Plato

Theat. Theaetetus

Plotinus

Enn. Enneades

Porphry

Exp. Cat. In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem

Isag. Isagoge

Other works:

ACO: Edward Schwartz, *Concilium Universale Chalcedonensis*, Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum 2, 1933-1938,

<http://archive.org/details/ActaConciliorumOecumenicorum.ConciliumUniversaleChalcedonensiscomplete/>

Part 1.1: Epistularum Collectiones. Actio I (p. 1636)²

Part 1.2: Actio II (Actio III in *CChal*); epistularum collectio B; Actiones III-VII (II, IV, V, VI, [VII omitted] in *CChal*) (p. 1)

Part 2.1: Collectio Novariensis de re Eutychis (p. 172)

Part 2.2: Rerum Chalcedonensium Collectio, Vaticana, Canones et Symbolum (p. 275)

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Part 3.2: Actiones II - VI (Latin) (p. 683)

Part 3.3: Actiones VII - XVI Concilii Adlocutio Ad Marcianum (Latin) (p. 868)

Part 4: Leonis Papae I epistularum Collectiones (p. 1052)

Part 5: Collectio Sangermanensis (p. 1287)

Part 6: prosopographia et topographia, actorum chalcedonensium et encyclicorum, indices (p. 1473)

AL Hans Lietzmann, ed., *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule: Texte und Untersuchungen* (J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1904), <http://archive.org/details/apollinarisvonl01apolgoog>.

A ThR Anglican Theological Review

² Page numbers indicate location in Archive.org.

Aug *Augustinianum*

AugStud *Augustinian Studies*

AW *Athanasius Werke*: Band I, eds. K. Metzler, D. Hansen, and K. Savvidis; Band II, eds. Hans-Georg Opitz and H. C. Brennecke et al.

BLE *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique*

ByzF *Byzantinische Forschungen*

ByzSlav *Byzantinoslavica*

ByzZ *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*

CChal *The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon*, translated by Richard Price and Michael Gaddis, 3 vols., vol. 45 in *Translated Texts for Historians* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005).

CH Church History

CTM *Concordia Theological Monthly*

DRev *Downside Review*

ETL *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*

GOTR *Greek Orthodox Theological Review*

HeyJ *Heythrop Journal*

HTR *Harvard Theological Review*

IJST *International Journal of Systematic Theology*

JECS *Journal of Early Christian Studies*

JES *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*

JETS *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society*

JTS *Journal of Theological Studies*

JTSA *Journal of Theology for Southern Africa*

Klio *Klio: Beiträge Zur Alten Geschichte*

LSJ Henry George Liddell et al., *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996).

NPNF P. Schaff and H. Wace, eds., *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, second series (repr. Grand Rapids; Eerdmans, 1983-1987).

PGL G. W. H. Lampe, ed., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Amen House, London: Oxford University Press, 1961), <https://archive.org/details/patristicgreekle0000lamp/page/n9/mode/2up>.

PG *Patrologia Graeca*, <http://www.patristica.net/graeca/>.
Vols. 25-28, Athanasius

Vols. 29-32, Basil the Great
Vols. 35-38, Gregory of Nazianzus
Vols. 68-77, Cyril of Alexandria

ProEccl *Pro Ecclesia*

RevExp *Review and Expositor*

RevScRel *Revue des sciences religieuses*

RSPT *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*

RSR *Recherches de science religieuse*

RTL *Revue théologique de Louvain*

SJT *Scottish Journal of Theology*

StPat *Studia Patristica*

SubBi *Subsidia Biblica*

SVTQ *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly*

Them *Themelios*

TJT *Toronto Journal of Theology*

TS *Theological Studies*

TynBul *Tyndale Bulletin*

VC *Vigiliae Christianae*

ZNW *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche*

Chapter 1 – Introduction

For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily – Colossians 2:9 (ESV)

Therefore he had to be made like his brothers in every respect, so that he might become a merciful and faithful high priest in the service of God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people. - Hebrews 2:17 (ESV)

1.1 Contextualising the Argument within the Recent Discussion

1.1.1 The Acts as Literature

1.2 Statement of the Argument and Its Limitations

1.3 Outline of Argument

For nearly 1500 years, the language of Christology has been shaped by the idiom of the Council of Chalcedon (451) and its landmark definition of the Christian faith. Though some have dissented from the language and theology of this council, most Western and Eastern churches uphold its claim that Jesus Christ is both fully God and fully human, consubstantial with God and with humanity. The language and theology of “two natures” (φύσεις) in one person (πρόσωπον) or subsistence (ὑπόστασις) remain the dominant way of expressing the biblical doctrine of the incarnation. The trajectory of Christology and theology afterwards was and continues to be shaped by this formula of unity according to person but diversity according to nature.

Chalcedon was not drafted in a vacuum; it consolidated nearly a century of theological debate over the relationship first of Jesus to the Father and subsequently to humanity.³ It was

³ André Halleux observes, “L’événement de Chalcédoine reçoit sa signification de tout le passé qu’il résume, mais aussi, et plus encore peut-être, de l’évolution postérieure qu’il inaugure: le concile ne représente ni une fin dernière, ni un commencement absolu.” (The event of Chalcedon receives its significance from the whole past which it summarizes, but also, and perhaps more so, from the later

explicitly set against three Christological proposals developed in the preceding century. It repudiated the view of Nestorius, whose emphasis on the two natures was thought to divide Christ into two separate individuals or “sons”; the view of Apollinaris, whose emphasis on the manner by which the two natures were united was thought to deny Christ’s full humanity; and the view of Eutyches, whose emphasis on the divinity of Christ in the union was thought to reject Christ’s identity with humanity. All these debates involved two important questions: what does it mean for Jesus, who is genuinely human, to be God, and what does it mean for the Son, who is genuinely divine, to be a human?

The answers given to such questions are, of necessity, conceptually heavy. That is, the answers given to such questions up to and through the 5th century involved assumptions concerning the concepts of “humanity,” “divinity,” and of particulars or individuals, such as Jesus. The nature of “concepts” themselves is an impenetrable subject, but for our purposes, a “concept” refers to the idea signified by technical terminology as distinguished from 1) “meaning,” which refers to the way that a syntagm (or minimal textual unit, such as a word) is used to speak of something; 2) “function,” the syntactical role a syntagm has; and 3) “reference,” the extra-textual or textual thing about which a word denotes something or which is included within the concept it signifies. “Humanity,” for example, refers to “humans,” is functionally a noun, denotes that the thing of which it is predicated is of the class “human,” and signifies various concepts depending on the speaker and their context, perhaps that attributed to Aristotle, “a rational animal” (the genus with differentia). There was no fine

evolution which it inaugurates: the Council represents neither a final conclusion, nor an absolute beginning.) Pelikan puts it at “almost a century and a half.” André de Halleux, “La Définition Christologique à Chalcédoine 1,” *RTL* 7.1 (1976): 3. Cf. Francis X (Francis Xavier) Murphy, “The Dogmatic Definition at Chalcedon,” *TS* 12.4 (1951): 505; Jaroslav Pelikan, “Chalcedon after Fifteen Centuries,” *CTM* 22.12 (1951): 926.

distinction between “philosophy” or “theology” in the 5th-century Christian discourse, so the various concepts employed in and around the 5th-century debates echo concerns raised today in both philosophical and theological discourse.⁴ The vast literature on 4th and 5th-century Christian thought written in the last century and a half has shed much light on the conceptual frameworks or apparatuses that were put to work within Christian discourse.⁵ By “conceptual apparatus,” I intend the presuppositions or concepts that are signified by the technical vocabulary and employed in technical discussion at this time.⁶ Not only has the scholarship given us insight into conceptual frameworks employed throughout the early Church, but the literature surrounding Chalcedon has simultaneously blossomed at a rapid pace, leaving open many avenues for investigation. This thesis stands at the nexus of these two developments in contemporary Patristic thought, the investigation of the conceptual apparatuses employed in theological discourse and the fruit of many decades of research concerning Chalcedon.

The claims of Eduard Schwartz and Evangelos Chrysos that the councils—especially Chalcedon—have not been studied closely enough have been answered by a flurry of studies that have greatly illuminated the Council of Chalcedon and its literary presentation, the *Acta*.⁷

⁴ On the lack of such a distinction, e.g. Eginhard P. Meijering, *Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius: Synthesis or Antithesis?*, Repr. with corrections. (Leiden: Brill, 1974); Johannes Zachhuber, *The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics: Patristic Philosophy from the Cappadocian Fathers to John of Damascus* (Oxford University Press, 2020).

⁵ E.g. George Christopher Stead, *Divine Substance* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977); Meijering, *Orthodoxy and Platonism*; Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of Divine Simplicity*, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Zachhuber, *The Rise*.

⁶ I would define a presupposition, following John Frame, as belief *y* such that if belief *x* presupposes *y*, then *y* must be held to give an intelligible account of *x*. John M. Frame, *Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought* (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 1995), 137.

⁷ Evangelos K. Chrysos, “The Synodal Acts as Literary Products,” in *L’ Icône Dans La Théologie et l’art* (Chambésy-Genève: Centre orthodoxe du patriarcat oecuménique Chambésy, 1990), 86; Eduard Schwartz, “Die Kaiserin Pulcheria Auf Der Synode von Chalkedon,” in *Festgabe Für Adolf Jülicher Zum 70. Geburtstag* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1927), 212.

Sarah Coakley has observed the shallow nature of scholarly engagement with the question of what the *Definition of Chalcedon* is, yet her own proposal to answer this question doesn't cohere well with the *Acta's* presentation of the *Definition* (as we will argue in Chapter 2).⁸ Bruce Lindley McCormack similarly decries the lack of engagement with the meaning of the *Definition*, yet his own effort likewise doesn't match what the *Definition* and the conciliar *Acta* are actually saying (as will be argued in Chapters 2-6).⁹ What is lacking is an in-depth investigation of the *Definition's* conceptual apparatus, a study of the depth behind the words it uses. Now, an objection might be raised at this point: many authors have argued that the *Definition* has a “‘dogmatic,’ rather than speculative character.”¹⁰ Brian Daley claims,

it is a formal agreement on the boundaries of orthodox Christian faith concerning the person of Christ, but clearly not intended to break new theological ground, to solve age-old problems of understanding in creatively crafted new terms, nor even to give unambiguous clarifications of the terms it does use.¹¹

Grillmeier writes, “Even if abstract concepts find their way in, the theological method here consists only in ‘listening to’ the proven witness of the Christian faith.”¹² This is echoed by E. L. Mascall, “in the Definition no particular *philosophical* doctrines are adopted or even

⁸ Sarah Coakley, “What Does Chalcedon Solve and What Does It Not? Some Reflections on the Status and Meaning of the Chalcedonian ‘Definition.’” in *The Incarnation: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God*, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins (Incarnation Summit Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, presented at the Incarnation Summit, 2002).

⁹ Bruce Lindley McCormack, *The Humility of the Eternal Son: Reformed Kenoticism and the Repair of Chalcedon* (Cambridge University Press, 2021), 39.

¹⁰ Brian E. Daley, *God Visible: Patristic Christology Reconsidered*, Changing Paradigms in Historical and Systematic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 12. Referring to Alois Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition Vol. I: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)*, trans. John Bowden, 2nd Revised Edition. (London: Mowbrays, 1975), 545.

¹¹ Daley, *God Visible*, 12–13.

¹² Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition Vol. I*, 545.

assumed, except that of personal identity.”¹³ These claims are similar to those made by Sarah Coakley in the essay mentioned above.¹⁴ However, conceding that the *Definition* does not provide definitions or conceptual elaborations of its key terms and that it does not intend to break new theological ground, it does not follow that the *Definition* is not intended to carry philosophical weight.

Daley claims that “most bishops present would have been hard put to define what ‘substance’ and ‘nature,’ ‘hypostasis’ and ‘prosōpon’ actually meant, when applied to the reality of Christ.”¹⁵ However, when we look at the sources these bishops turn to as their theological authorities, we find these terms elaborated with great philosophical erudition; whether or not each bishop was philosophically trained to engage at this level, the tradition they were self-consciously identifying with employed complex conceptual apparatuses to define these terms as used in theological discourse. This will become clear in the third through fifth chapters. Moreover, though the *Definition* doesn’t provide content for these terms, we will argue in Chapter 2 that it positions itself to be interpreted by sources that provide such content. An example of this self-conscious appeal to the tradition to fill in the meaning of these terms is found in the document *Adlocutio*, which is found in the Chalcedonian *Acta* after the close of the sessions,

the enemy of our nature did not escape the sleepless eye, but it immediately appointed as luminaries for those in error the fathers, who unfold to all the meaning of the creed and accurately proclaim the beneficence of the incarnation So the great Basil, the servant of grace, expressed clearly, for example in a letter, the meaning of the hypostases and transmitted the precise

¹³ E. L. Mascall, *Whatever Happened to the Human Mind? Essays in Christian Orthodoxy* (London: SPCK, 1980), 29.

¹⁴ Coakley, “What Does Chalcedon Solve.” Similarly, Robert Butterworth, “Has Chalcedon a Future?,” *The Month* 10.4 (1977).

¹⁵ Daley, *God Visible*, 13.

teaching about the Holy Spirit, demanding the assent of his fellow pastors through their signatures.¹⁶

Therefore, the absence of definitions for the terms used in the *Definition* is not necessarily evidence for the lack of philosophical concepts associated with these terms; instead, as we will argue in Chapter 2, this is part of the interpretive strategy the Chalcedonian *Acta* furnish for the *Definition*. Thus, an investigation of the conceptual apparatus of the *Definition* is warranted on these grounds, namely, that the tradition the *Definition* appeals to is philosophically rigorous and that the lack of definitions for key terms used in the *Definition* is part of a strategy by which the *Definition* is situated in the conciliar tradition.

Such an investigation is anticipated by McCormack's monograph, yet we will argue that his analysis of the *Definition* and an *aporia* within it resulting from its conceptual dimensions misses the mark.¹⁷ In response to two "sources of pressure" from the preceding decades of theological discussion, McCormack identifies a logical *aporia* in the *Definition of Chalcedon*, "an unresolved contradiction." First, there was a pressure to affirm a *unified subject*: "the great majority of bishops at Chalcedon were Cyrilline, committed to a soteriology of divinization that would require the Logos to act through and upon His human 'nature,' thereby instrumentalizing it."¹⁸ Second, there was pressure from the resolution of the Apollinarian controversy of the prior century: "once Gregory of Nazianzen had declared 'the unassumed is the unhealed,' no account of human 'nature' that failed to give due attention to intellect, memory, and agency could be fully adequate."¹⁹ The logical *aporia* resulting is this,

¹⁶ I will use the abbreviation *CChal* for Richard Price and Michael Gaddis, *The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon*. Translated in *CChal* III.115.

¹⁷ Cf. McCormack, *The Humility*, 52–58.

¹⁸ McCormack, *The Humility*, 29.

¹⁹ McCormack, *The Humility*, 29–30.

“the inability to specify the relation of Jesus to the ‘person [meaning subjectivity] of the union.’”²⁰ That is, McCormack claims that as a result of positing that Christ “instrumentalized” the human nature, the bishops were unable to give an adequate account of Christ’s human personhood, as required by Gregory of Nazianzen’s response to Apollinaris. However, McCormack doesn’t show that these were live issues at Chalcedon. Even if we grant the presence of these pressures at different points in the period leading up to Chalcedon, McCormack does not show that these pressures continued to be felt at Chalcedon. Further investigation is necessary as to what concerns of the preceding centuries endured as live issues for the council of Chalcedon.

The interest in the conceptual apparatus of the *Definition* and potential *aporiai* within it are also present in an essay from Jean-Yves Lacoste and a monograph from Johannes Zachhuber, both of whom identify a conceptual tension arising from the *Definition*’s attribution of dual consubstantiality to Christ, namely, that he is consubstantial with God and with humanity. In his 2010 essay, “Homooousios et Homooousios,” Jean-Yves Lacoste suggested that the *Definition*’s dual consubstantiality formula belies a significant conceptual incompatibility between the use of ὁμοούσιος for the relationship between the Father and the Son and the use of ὁμοούσιος for the relationship between Jesus and the rest of humanity. The problem, according to Lacoste, is that οὐσία must be taken in the secondary sense (i.e. generic) with regards to man but in the primary sense (i.e. individual existent) with regard to God.²¹ However, Lacoste stops short of demonstrating that this tension grounded in the ancient philosophical sources is valid for the conceptual apparatus(es) at play in and around Chalcedon. As with

²⁰ McCormack, *The Humility*, 58.

²¹ Jean-Yves Lacoste, “Homooousios et Homooousios: La Substance Entre Théologie et Philosophie,” *RSR* 98.1 (2010): 85–100.

McCormack's monograph, the question of what philosophical or conceptual background and issues are at play in Chalcedon re-emerges.

In his 2020 monograph, *The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics*, Johannes Zachhuber makes a similar claim, namely, that the *Definition* embodies a conceptual tension between an essence-focused doctrine of God, where unity is that which primarily exists, and the Biblical testimony that one *particular* (the ontological individual, thereto presumed to be the secondary reality) embodied two universals (divinity and humanity), thus taking on the role of that which primarily existed, namely, substance.²² Zachhuber bases his claim on what he identifies to be the 4th-century conceptual apparatus, but if there is indeed a problem at this point, one wonders if there was any effort in or around Chalcedon to resolve it—to adapt the 4th-century apparatus or offer an alternative. Questions also emerge concerning the primacy of the Cappadocian apparatus identified by Zachhuber (based largely on the work of Gregory of Nyssa) for the Council of Chalcedon, where Athanasius, Basil of Caesarea, and Gregory of Nazianzus are more regularly turned to as critical 4th-century authorities (see further §2.2.2).

The brief scope of these three discussions and their independent and not necessarily compatible evaluations of Chalcedon points to the need for a more thorough investigation of the conceptual apparatus employed by the *Definition*; a more in-depth study is necessary to evaluate if any of the *aporiai* identified by these authors are actually present at Chalcedon.

²² Zachhuber, *The Rise*. 103-111. Bruce Lindley McCormack also identifies an *aporia* in the *Definition*, though we will find that the Lacoste and Zachhuber are closer to the mark with their understanding of the problem. McCormack, *The Humility*, 52–58.

Such is the purpose of this thesis, to investigate the conceptual apparatus presupposed in the *Definition of Chalcedon*. In particular, we will consider the *Definition of Chalcedon* within its literary context as part of the conciliar *Acta*, an avenue of interpretation that is opened by the recent literature on the *Definition* as “a literary product.” We will investigate the general concepts of the universal and the particular, with attendant concepts such as “properties” that serve to explain and outline the limits of these concepts and delineate those things that fall under them, and particular concepts such as “divinity” and “humanity.” The reasons for choosing the concepts of the universal and the particular as the objects of this investigation are their significance in the debates up to and surrounding Chalcedon and the presence of these concepts (though not the terms themselves) in the *Definition*. Now, there may be some concern that these concepts are alien to the concerns of 4th-century theology. As is evident in the argument below, there is extensive literature showing these issues are live at this time, and the contours of the 4th-century view of οὐσία and φύσις support our use of these concepts. However, we can give preliminary evidence for this contention by also pointing to several places in 4th-century theology that give explicit support to the use of these concepts. Though they do not employ “universal” terminology in a philosophical sense (καθολικός; καθόλου), Basil, Athanasius, and Gregory of Nazianzus all speak of “common” (κοινός) names pertaining to the Godhead and to humanity, and of “particulars” (ιδίος) with reference to individuals who have the divine or human essence. In *Oration 25*, Gregory of Nazianzus speaks of that which is “common [κοινὸν] to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, that they are not created and the divinity [ἡ Θεότης],” then he speaks of their particularities [ἴδιον], “the Father, unbegottenness; the Son, begottenness; and the Spirit, procession [ἐκπεμψις].”²³ Speaking of

²³ Or. 25 (PG 35, p. 1221 lns 26-31). Κοινὸν γὰρ Πατρὶ μὲν καὶ Υἱῷ καὶ ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι, τὸ μὴ γεγονέναι, καὶ ἡ θεότης· Υἱῷ δὲ καὶ ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς. Ἰδιὸν δὲ Πατὴρ μὲν, ἡ ἀγεννησία· Υἱὸς δὲ, ἡ γέννησις· Πνεύματος δὲ, ἡ ἐκπεμψις.

Christ's identity with Humanity, Athanasius writes, "whatever is written concerning the Saviour in respect to humanity [ἀνθρωπίνως], these are fittingly applied [ἀναφέρεσθαι προσήκει] to the common class [τῷ κοινῷ γένει] of humans; for that one bore our body, and he exhibited human weakness."²⁴ (I take the phrase "fittingly applied to the common class" to mean that the sorts of predicates attributed to the Saviour "according to his humanity" are such predicates as may be applied to any human, any individual who is part of the "common class of humans." The class itself ["humanity"] cannot, for example, suffer on the cross, nor does the phrase "suffered on the cross," when applied to Christ, apply across the whole class, to each individual. However, any human could conceivably suffer on a cross, an example of "human weakness.") Basil expositis the common account in relation to the individual several times in his works.²⁵ He argues in Ep. 189 that identity of activity indicates that those acting have "the community [κοινὸν] of the nature."²⁶ In Ep. 214, he will draw this out further,

But if it is necessary for us to give our opinion in brief, we will say that the explanation which the common has with the particular, this the *ousia* has with the hypostasis. For each of us participates in being by the common account of *ousia* and is so-and-so and so-and-so by each person's unique properties. Thus, here also, the account of *ousia* is common, like goodness, the Godhead, or anything else that is mentally perceived; but the hypostasis is seen in the individual properties of fatherhood, sonship, or the power of holiness.²⁷

²⁴ Apologia de Fugua Sua 13. ἃ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἀνθρωπίνως γέγραπται, ταῦτα τῷ κοινῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀναφέρεσθαι προσήκει· τὸ γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνος ἐφόρεσε σῶμα, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἐνεδείκνυτο. Cf. C. Ar. III, 18.1, lns. 1-5; 18.2, lns 1-6; 32.4, lns 6-8.

²⁵ In Spir. 17.41, lns 6-15, Basil attributes an account of common nouns to his opponents which is reminiscent of Porphyry's tree. Though Basil disavows this movement from being (οὐσία) through genera (τὸ ζῷον, animal) to individuals (Πέτρος ἢ Παῦλος, Peter or Paul) in the case of "subnumerating" the persons of the Trinity, his logic elsewhere relies on a similar use of terms.

²⁶ 189.8, ln. 24.

²⁷ Ep. 214.4, lns. 6-15. Εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς τὸ δοκοῦν ἡμῖν ἐν βραχεὶ εἰπεῖν, ἐκεῖνο ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ὃν ἔχει λόγον τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον, τοῦτον ἔχει ἢ οὐσία πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν. Ἐκαστος γὰρ ἡμῶν καὶ τῷ κοινῷ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τοῦ εἶναι μετέχει καὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτὸν ιδιώμασιν ὁ δεῖνός ἐστι καὶ ὁ δεῖνα.

It is evident that the questions at the heart of Chalcedon, namely, the relationship between Jesus, humanity, and divinity, were treated as questions of the relationship between the particular and the universal. The language used at Chalcedon and in the 4th-century debates over Christ's divinity delineated the particular (ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον) and the universal (οὐσία and φύσις) (as we will discuss in Chapter 3).²⁸ The discussion of ὁμοούσιος at this time employed the tools of contemporary ontology and involved careful consideration of the relationship of the universal to the particular.²⁹ Similarly, the discussion of the relationship between the oneness of God and his threeness, even apart from the term ὁμοούσιος, involved these concepts.³⁰ Basil employed the distinction between universal properties and the individuating properties of an individual (e.g. a human) in his debate with Eunomius.³¹ For the 4th and 5th-century fathers, the question "What does it mean for Jesus to be human" is closely related to the question, "What does it mean for any thing or particular object to be attributed with a universal term?" The fathers freely used the analogy of the universal and particular in relationship with humanity to discuss the oneness of God and his threeness and, consequently,

Οὕτω κακεῖ ὁ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας λόγος κοινός, οἷον ἡ ἀγαθότης, ἡ θεότης, ἡ εἴ τι ἄλλο νοοῖτο· ἡ δὲ ὑπόστασις ἐν τῷ ιδιώματι τῆς πατρότητος ἢ τῆς υἱότητος ἢ τῆς ἀγιαστικῆς δυνάμεως θεωρεῖται. Cf. Ep. 236.6, lns. 11-14; Eun. 2.28.

²⁸ On the use of οὐσία in the preceding century, see Stead, *Divine Substance*. Cf. Johannes Zachhuber, "Universals in the Greek Church Fathers," in *Universals in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Riccardo Chiaradonna and Gabriele Galluzzo, Seminari e Convegni 33 (Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 2013); Hans van Loon, *The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria*, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 96 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009).

²⁹ E.g. Johannes Zachhuber, "Derivative Genera in Apollinarius of Laodicea," in *Apollinarius Und Die Folgen*, Studien Und Texte Zu Antike Und Christentum 93 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 93–114.

³⁰ E.g. Gregory of Nyssa's *Ad Ablabium*. Cf. Kevin Corrigan, "Οὐσία and Ὑπόστασις in the Trinitarian Theology of the Cappadocian Fathers: Basil and Gregory of Nyssa," ZAC 12.1 (2008): 114–34; Richard Cross, "Gregory of Nyssa on Universals," VC 56.4 (2002): 372–410; Johannes Zachhuber, "Once Again: Gregory of Nyssa on Universals," JTS 56.1 (2005): 75–98.

³¹ Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea*.

the relationship of Jesus, a particular, to the universal humanity and the oneness of God.³² In addition to language of particularity (ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον) and unity (φύσις and ὁμοούσιος), the *Definition* also speaks of God's divinity and Christ's humanity, particular examples of universal terms. It is possible that the 4th-century theologians and the *Definition* have a different conceptual apparatus for interpreting the relationship between Divinity and the Trinitarian persons and Humanity and human persons, so we need to investigate these specific universals alongside the more general terms used to refer to individual persons, human or divine, and the unity they share, the divine or human οὐσία. Recognising that the terms used in the *Definition* (namely, ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον, φύσις, and οὐσία/ὁμοούσιος) were technical terms that signified a definite concept (as opposed to the loose or fuzzy-bounded concepts of regular discourse), if we are to understand their role in the *Definition* and the conceptual apparatus attendant to them, we need to investigate the broader concepts that they signify rather than their semantic range, or the sum of their denotative meaning.³³ We will investigate the terms themselves but also their synonyms, attendant concepts (such as properties), and the discussion of the universal and particular and divinity and humanity that occurs in the Acts of Chalcedon and in important texts associated with the council (to be identified in Chapter 2).

A significant problem faces us in performing this investigation, namely, how will we interpret the *Definition*? The recent scholarship concerning the sociological context and the

³² On the relation between the one and the many with reference to God and humanity, see for example, Johannes Zachhuber, *Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance* (Brill, 1999).

³³ On technical terms and the looseness of non-technical concepts, cf. Benjamin Kuwitzky, "Semantics and Translation of Technical Terms: A Case Study on Ἀπόστολος," *Journal of Translation* 12.1 (2016): 12; Vern S. Poythress, *Symphonic Theology: The Validity of Multiple Perspectives in Theology* (Grand Rapids: Academie Books, 1987). On general concepts from lexical semantics informing this discussion, see Moisés Silva, *Biblical Words and Their Meaning: An Introduction to Lexical Semantics*, rev. and expanded ed. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994); Vern S. Poythress, *In the Beginning Was the Word: Language: A God-Centered Approach* (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2009).

broader forces shaping the *Definition*'s formulation has revealed significant complexities involved in interpreting the *Definition*. However, this scholarship has also opened many avenues for further research concerning the *Definition* and the conciliar *Acta* of Chalcedon in general, including the approaches to interpreting the *Definition*.

1.1 CONTEXTUALISING THE ARGUMENT WITHIN THE RECENT DISCUSSION

The literature surrounding Chalcedon is extensive. The 20th century saw a flurry of studies concerning the council and its definition. In 1933, Edward Schwartz released the standard critical edition of Chalcedon's *Acta*, including the Greek *Acta* and a Latin translation along with the documents pertaining to the council.³⁴ The studies of Richard Price, Geoffrey E. M. de Ste. Croix, and Tommaso Mari offer insights into the process of the recording and redaction of the Greek *Acta* and the Latin translation.³⁵ Ernest Honigmann's study on the lists of bishops in the *Acta* is of great value.³⁶ Hagit Amirav's 2015 sociological analysis of the *Acta* provides

³⁴ Most references are to the 2nd tome, containing the Acts of Chalcedon (the *Acta*). All citations to the *Acta* are given as ACO followed by the session number and section number (e.g. ACO II.19). Citations elsewhere in the work will be given as ACO followed by tome (2), volume (1-6), part (1-3), page and section references (where applicable). E.g. ACO 2.1.1, 66 §11.

³⁵ *CChal* I.75-85; Geoffrey E. M. de Ste. Croix, "The Council of Chalcedon with Additions by Michael Whitby," in *Christian Persecution, Martyrdom, and Orthodoxy*, ed. Michael Whitby and Joseph Streeter (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 309–10; Tommaso Mari, "The Latin Translations of the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon," *GRBS* 58.1 (2018): 126–55; Tommaso Mari, "Working on the Minutes of Late Antique Church Councils: A Methodological Framework," *Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture* 13 (2019): 42–59, <https://doi.org/10.18573/jlarc.112>; Tommaso Mari, "Greek, Latin, and More: Multilingualism at the Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon," *Journal of Latin Linguistics* 19.1 (2020): 59–87. Cf. Chrysos, "The Synodal Acts

, " 85–93; Richard Price, "Truth, Omission, and Fiction in the Acts of Chalcedon," in *Chalcedon in Context: Church Councils 400-700*, ed. Richard Price and Mary Whitby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 92–106.

³⁶ Ernest Honigmann, "The Original Lists of the Members of the Council of Nicaea, The Robber-Synod and the Council of Chalcedon," *Byzantion* 16.1 (1942): 20–80.

many insights into the dynamics of the proceedings, particularly the 1st, 2nd, and 6th sessions on which she focuses.³⁷ Many studies in the 20th century concerned the influence of the various streams of theology leading up to the council, usually identified as Antiochene, Alexandrian, or Roman (though the latter is sometimes considered with the Antiochenes because of their similar emphasis on the two natures).³⁸ In particular, there was and continues to be debate over the relative influence of Cyril of Alexandria and Pope Leo at the council.³⁹ In 1986 Georgios D. Martzelos argued that the sources for the *Definition* were predominately Cyril's writings, though he has also argued extensively (most recently, 2015) that "made known in two natures" comes from Basil of Seleucia.⁴⁰ André de Halleux's two-part article in 1976, followed by a 1994 critical review of Martzelos (1986), recognises the dominant influence of Cyril upon the *Definition* and the significant contribution of Pope Leo: "la définition christologique de 451

³⁷ Hagit Amirav, *Authority and Performance: Sociological Perspectives on the Council of Chalcedon (AD 451)*, Hypomnemata 199 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015). Cf. Mari, "Working on the Minutes."

³⁸ Other taxonomies have been employed in the Christological discussion leading up to Chalcedon, such as Word-Man or Word-Flesh, or Norris's substance-attribute or composition models, but the geographical references are primary for the council itself. E.g. Murphy, "The Dogmatic Definition at Chalcedon"; John S Romanides, "St Cyril's 'One Physis or Hypostasis of God the Logos Incarnate' and Chalcedon," *GOTR* 10.2 (1964): 82–107; Richard A Norris, "Christological Models in Cyril of Alexandria," in *StPat* 16, (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1975), 255–68.

³⁹ E.g. David M. Gwynn, "The Definition of Christian Tradition," in *Chalcedon in Context: Church Councils 400-700*, ed. Richard Price and Mary Whitby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 16. Cf. de Halleux, "La Définition Christologique à Chalcédoine 1"; André de Halleux, "La Définition Christologique à Chalcédoine 2," *RTL* 7.2 (1976): 155–70, <https://doi.org/10.3406/thlou.1976.1473>; Patrick T. R. Gray, *The Defense of Chalcedon in the East (451-553)*, Studies in the History of Christian Thought v. 20 (Leiden: Brill, 1979); John A. McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria, The Christological Controversy: Its History, Theology, and Texts*, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 23 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 233–43; Karl-Heinz Uthemann, "Zur Rezeption Des Tomus Leonis in Und Nach Chalkedon: Wider Den Dogmenhistorischen Begriff 'Strenger Chalkedonismus,'" in *StPat* 34, (Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 572–604.

⁴⁰ Georgios D Martzelos, *Γένεση Καὶ Πηγές Τοῦ Ὁρου Τῆς Χαλκηδόνας: Συμβολὴ Στὴν Ἱστορικοδογματικὴ Διερεύνηση Τοῦ "Ορου Τῆς δ" Οἰκουμενικῆς Συνόδου*, Φιλοσοφική και Θεολογική Βιβλιοθήκη 7 (Thessaloniki: Pournaras, 1986); Geōrgios D Martzelos, "Ἡ Καταγωγή Της Δυοφυσιτικῆς Φορμουλας Του Ορου Της Χαλκηδόνας," in "... ὁ νόμος σου μελετῇ μου": *Μελετήματα ὀρθοδόξου θεολογίας καὶ προβληματισμοῦ*, ed. Georgios D Martzelos (Thessaloniki: Ostrakon Publishing, 2015).

constitue une victoire de Léon, non certes sur le Cyrille de 433, reconnaissant l'orthodoxie du dyophysisme antiochien, mais plutôt une victoire sur Eutychès et sur Dioscore, défenseurs d'un cyrillianisme miaphysite intolérant."⁴¹ Throughout the latter part of the 20th century, de Halleux published several significant essays on various aspects of Chalcedon.⁴² In the 2001 essay, "Zur Rezeption des Tomus Leonis in und nach Chalkedon," Karl-Heinz Uthemann looked at the role of Leo, particularly his *Tome*, at Chalcedon, arguing that the *Tome* is measured against Cyril as represented by the *Letter to John of Antioch* (containing the *Formula of Reunion*).⁴³ In the 2019 monograph *Das Konzil von Chalcedon und die Kirche*, Sandra Leuenberger-Wenger incorporates many of the narrative historical insights identified by de Ste. Croix, Price, and Gaddis and the source-critical insights of de Halleux and Martzelos, offering a far-ranging study on the background, nature, and reception of the council. Chapter 3 (esp. 3.2.4) provides a source-critical analysis of the *Definition*, integrating the insights of both de Halleux and Martzelos. Leuenberger-Wenger questions the value of identifying the *Definition* and the bishops involved in its formulation as "Cyrilline" given the significant influence of Antiochene and Roman theology on the final product and the lack of self-conscious identification as such.⁴⁴ The studies of de Halleux, Uthemann, and Leuenberger-Wenger recognise a balance of the

⁴¹ "The Christological definition of 451 constituted a victory for Leo, but certainly not over the Cyril of 433, which recognized the orthodoxy of Antiochene Dyophysitism, but rather a victory over Eutyches and Dioscorus, defenders of an intolerant Miaphysite Cyrillianism." André de Halleux, "À Propos d'une Lecture Cyrillienne de La Définition Christologique de Chalcédoine," *RTL* 25.4 (1994): 445–71; de Halleux, "La Définition Christologique à Chalcédoine 1"; de Halleux, "La Définition Christologique à Chalcédoine 2."

⁴² André de Halleux, "La Réception Du Symbole Oecuménique, de Nicée à Chalcédoine," *ETL* 61.1 (1985): 5–47; André de Halleux, "Le Décret Chalcédonien Sur Les Prérogatives de La Nouvelle Rome," *ETL* 64.4 (1988): 288–323; André de Halleux, "Le Vingt-Huitième Canon de Chalcédoine," in *StPat* 19 (Leuven: Peeters, 1989), 28–36; André de Halleux, "Le Concile de Chalcédoine," *RevScRel* 67.2 (1993): 3–18.

⁴³ Uthemann, "Zur Rezeption."

⁴⁴ Sandra Leuenberger-Wenger, *Das Konzil von Chalcedon und die Kirche: Konflikte und Normierungsprozesse im 5. und 6. Jahrhundert* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), §3.2.4.

views of Leo, Cyril, and the Antiochenes at Chalcedon. Building upon the previous studies, Leuenberger-Wenger's monograph concludes the *Definition* offers a Christology that does not fit readily into any of the schools that preceded it.

In the 21st century, the most significant development in the study of Chalcedon may be the publication of Michael Gaddis and Richard Price's three-volume English translation of the Acts (2005), *The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon*. Prior to this, the only modern language translation available were the partial translations found in NPNF 2.14, with extracts from sessions I-VI and XVI, and Festugiere's *Actes Du Concile de Chalcedoine: Sessions III-VI*.⁴⁵ Not only has this resource proven to be an invaluable tool in the hands of historians, but it also represents a shift in the focus of publications surrounding Chalcedon. This volume reflects the concerns of Gaddis' 2005 monograph *There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ*, in which he draws attention to the various "powers" at work in and around Chalcedon, particularly the secular power of the Imperial authorities and that wielded by the various factions of monks.⁴⁶ He identifies the significant participation of the Imperial authorities at Chalcedon:

The bishops arriving at the first session of Chalcedon, however, found an unprecedented spectacle. Center stage belonged to a committee of no fewer than nineteen of the highest military and civil officials in the empire: the *magister militum*, the praetorian prefect, the urban prefect, the master of offices, the *comes domesticorum* and the *comes* of the *res private*, along with a number of *illustrissimi* senators and patricians also distinguished as former holders of those same offices.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ *Actes Du Concile de Chalcedoine: Sessions III-VI (La Définition de La Foi)*. Translated by O. P. Festugière. Cahiers d'Orientalisme 4. Geneva: Patrick Cramer, 1983

⁴⁶ Michael Gaddis, *There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ: Religious Violence in the Christian Roman Empire*, The Transformation of the Classical Heritage 39 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), chap. 8.

⁴⁷ Gaddis, *There Is No Crime*, 316. On the titles, see Roland Delmaire, "Les Dignitaires Laïcs Au Concile de Chalcedoine: Notes Sur La Hiérarchie et Les Préséances Au Milieu Du ve Siècle," *Byzantion* 54.1 (1984): 141–75.

The essay of Geoffrey E.M. de Ste. Croix (2006; an earlier form of which influenced both Price and Gaddis) likewise identifies the powerful influence of the Empire on the council. De Ste. Croix argues that “the Council of Chalcedon was every bit as much an engine of coercion as the ‘Robber’ Council of Second Ephesus, and that the machinery of compulsion was actually far more powerful at Chalcedon, so much so that actual force did not need to be used, or even visibly threatened.”⁴⁸ He carefully addresses the role of Marcian vis-à-vis the council and observes the prominent roles of the Imperial officials who presided over the Council. For instance, he observes that Anatolius, the key Imperial official, “may have been second in the whole Eastern Empire only to the great Aspar.”⁴⁹ He identifies Anatolius as a successful diplomat, negotiating a peace treaty with Persia (AD 441) and engaging with Attila the Hun (447, 450).⁵⁰ Price, Gaddis, and de Ste. Croix represent a move towards interdisciplinary engagement with the Acts of Chalcedon that has continued throughout the 21st century. All three studies make the astute observation that the Acts are sparse on theology, despite the council’s concern for serious theological matters. As Gaddis puts it, “When one looks closely at the actual workings of [Chalcedon], then the irony of Chalcedon becomes apparent: its theological result [i.e. ‘centrism’] was achieved to a significant degree by non-theological

⁴⁸ De Ste. Croix, “The Council,” 274.

⁴⁹ On the role of Aspar along with Pulcheria in Marcian’s ascendancy, see Holum and Kenneth G. Holum, *Theodosian Empresses: Women and Imperial Dominion in Late Antiquity*, 1. paperback printing., The Transformation of the Classical Heritage 3 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 208–9; Richard W. Burgess, “The Accession of Marcian in the Light of Chalcedonian Apologetic and Monophysite Polemic,” *ByzZ* 86.1 (1994): 47–68.

⁵⁰ De Ste. Croix, “The Council,” 289. Cf. Brian Croke, “Anatolius and Nomus: Envoys to Attila,” *ByzSlav* 42 (1981): 159–70.

means.”⁵¹ A similar perspective on many ecclesiastical events in the 4th and 5th centuries was shared by several historians near these events, namely, Socrates, Theodoret, and Palladius.⁵²

In 2015, Hagit Amirav published a monograph with many similarities to these interdisciplinary approaches. In *Authority and Performance*, Amirav used the tools of sociology and sociolinguistics to analyse the Acts of Chalcedon as a “social event,” seeking to achieve “a better understanding of the social, political, and religious climates which were prevalent in the fifth century in the Eastern Roman Empire, and to see how these climates affected the processes of decision-making in the public sphere.”⁵³ Her conclusions concerning the dynamics at Chalcedon echo the studies of de Ste. Croix, Price, and Gaddis in several ways, particularly in identifying significant imperial influence on the proceedings. Echoing Gaddis’s comments about the lack of theological engagement, Amirav observes (identifying this as part of Marcian’s policy) that there was “a clear preference for declarative and affirmative, rather than deliberative, discourse.”⁵⁴

2011 saw the publishing of a collection of essays, *Chalcedon in Context: Church Councils 400-700*. Richard Price’s short essay “The Council of Chalcedon (451): A Narrative” provides a fair and concise summary of the sessions, to the effect that the Acts “show the human side of what was brought about ‘by the ineffable and secret power of the Holy Spirit.’”⁵⁵ His

⁵¹ Gaddis, *There Is No Crime*, 313. Cf. Gaddis, *There Is No Crime*, 314, 318; De Ste. Croix, “The Council,” 303–4.

⁵² Socrates Scholasticus *Ecclesiastical History* 7.32–33; Theodoret of Cyrillus, *Ecclesiastical History* 1.1; Palladius *Dialogue on the Life of John Chrysostom* 20.579–584.

⁵³ Amirav, *Authority and Performance*, 18–19.

⁵⁴ Amirav, *Authority and Performance*, 166.

⁵⁵ Richard Price, “The Council of Chalcedon (451): A Narrative,” in *Chalcedon in Context: Church Councils 400-700*, ed. Richard Price and Mary Whitby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 90.

second essay is a valuable presentation of the relationship between the *Acta* and the historical events it describes.⁵⁶ Whitby's study "An Unholy Crew" reflects the studies of de Ste. Croix and Gaddis, highlighting the troubling behaviour of various bishops recorded in the *Acta*.⁵⁷

The divergent perspectives among those who met at Chalcedon unearthed in these studies, along with the diverse factors that led to the final document, greatly complicate the relationship between the *Definition* and preceding documents. As it concerns this thesis, these studies complicate even the cautious claims of Gaddis and Price that the *Definition* contains qualified Cyrillianism, particularly the expression of Cyril's theology they brand "moderate."⁵⁸ As it concerns the *Definition*'s conceptual apparatus, it is not clear from the use of Cyrilline terminology or the appeal to key works from Cyril's corpus what aspects of Cyril's own conceptual apparatus (if any at all) are present in the final document; it is not clear that those who framed it were self-consciously adhering to Cyril's thought, as argued by Leuenberger-Wenger, nor that his corpus should be taken as the primary reference point for interpreting the *Definition*.⁵⁹ The ambiguous relationship between the *Definition* and preceding perspectives, including Cyril's, on its core questions raises a more significant issue facing the interpretation of the *Definition*, namely, what is the broader literary or theological milieu within which it should be read? An answer to this question is potentially offered in the extensive literature surrounding the Acts as a literary product.

⁵⁶ Price, "Truth."

⁵⁷ Michael Whitby, "An Unholy Crew? Bishops Behaving Badly at Church Councils," in *Chalcedon in Context: Church Councils 400-700*, ed. Richard Price and Mary Whitby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 178–96.

⁵⁸ *CChal* 1:68-75.

⁵⁹ Sandra Leuenberger-Wenger, *Das Konzil*, §3.2.4.

1.1.1 The Acta as Literature

Schwartz's monumental effort to edit and present the manuscript evidence available in a critical volume of the Conciliar Acts is the foundation for much of the contemporary discussion of the Council of Chalcedon and the account of it given in the Acts of Chalcedon. The second folio of the *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum* concerning Chalcedon is divided into 10 volumes, presenting the 7th-century recension of the original Greek acts as attested in the surviving 11th and 12th-century manuscripts (ACO 2.1.1-2) along with the Latin translation according to the *Versio Rustici* (Φ^r, ACO 2.3.1-3), with the two other historical versions compared in the apparatus (the *Versio Antiqua*, Φ^a, and *Versio Antiqua Correctus*, Φ^c), accompanied by the document collections that accompanied the various copies and recensions (ACO 2.1.1, 2.2.1-2, 2.4-5).⁶⁰ Schwartz, whose argument is widely accepted, assigns the original composition of the Acts of Chalcedon to 454-455 under the direction of Anatolius of Constantinople.⁶¹ Though many would evaluate the record provided by the *Acta* as historically accurate,⁶² the *Acta* are a carefully edited and, therefore, interpretive presentation of the historical event.⁶³ As such, attention to the literary shape of the Acts is a precondition for understanding its presentation of the historical event of the Council and, through its presentation, the event itself.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ See Mari, "The Latin Translations"; *CChal* 3:83-85; *ACO* 2.3.1, vi-xii.

⁶¹ See his discussion in *ACO* and the summary and evaluation in *CChal* 1:79-83, 3:157-188; *ACO* 2.1.3, xxi-xxii.

⁶² Mari, "Working on the Minutes"; Price, "Truth," 105.

⁶³ See Chapter 2 below.

⁶⁴ Thomas Graumann, *The Acts of the Early Church Councils: Production and Character* (Oxford University Press, 2021), 259-60. Speaking of the Biblical narrative and moving to history, Long writes, "literary understanding is a necessary condition of historical understanding" (emphasis in original). Iain W. Provan, V. Philips Long, and Tremper Longman, *A Biblical History of Israel*, 2nd ed. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2015), 81. Cf. Hayden White, *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (JHU Press, 1990), chap. 1; V. Philips Long, *The*

The hand of an editor is present in several ways: there are significant omissions made by the editor, indicated when the context suggests something happened, but it is not recorded. For example, there are two sessions of theological deliberation that are mentioned in the acts but not recorded (ACO III.2, 6, 31; V.7-8); both cases involved the clarification of Leo's *Tome*. In Session V, the protocol (i.e. the editorial comments and framing of the *Acta*) states that the initial draft of the *Definition* was not included (ACO V.3). The objections raised against the draft are also mentioned but not recorded (ACO V.4-8).⁶⁵ Some of these omissions appear to be motivated by the guiding purpose of the editor, such as restricting the presence of theological discussion and the content of theological objections.⁶⁶ Others are literary "blanks," where the absence is noticeable but not meaningful. One example is the absence of a comment on the use of Latin after the first statement of Paschasius in Session I: a comment is present at ACO I.4-5, absent at I.7, I.10, I.72, and used intermittently throughout the *Acta*.⁶⁷ In this case, it appears "the editors of the Acts simply took the information for granted and avoided repeating the same comment at every instance."⁶⁸ The editorial element of the Acts is often called the protocol, the interpretive framework provided by the final editor, weaving together the speech and texts included along with narrative connections and comments. The Greek Acts, both the 7th-century recension and the 5th-century original, along with the Latin Acts, are accompanied by letter collections, collections which provide an insight into the events surrounding the council and provide an interpretive perspective on it. For example, in his 2017 monograph, *The Idea of*

Art of Biblical History, vol. 5 in *Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994).

⁶⁵ See Price, "Truth." Cf. Mari, "The Latin Translations"; Mari, "Working on the Minutes," 44–46.

⁶⁶ See Chapter 2.

⁶⁷ On the omission of notices of Language use, see Mari, "Greek, Latin, and More," 63–65. On blanks, see Meir Sternberg, *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative* (Indiana University Press, 1987), 236.

⁶⁸ Mari, "Greek," 65.

Nicaea, Mark Smith makes much use of the letter *Adlocutio*, which accompanied the published *Acta* but did not feature in the narrative of the council.⁶⁹

The *Acta* are a “literary product,” an interpretation of history, not the bare facts (if such a thing could exist).⁷⁰ As such, the *Acta* provide a specific perspective on the proceedings and its content, including the *Definition* itself. We will argue this further in Chapter 2, attempting to show the perspective they give to the *Definition*. As we will also consider in Chapter 2, there are significant differences between the Latin translation and the official Greek Acts; these differences lead, minimally, to a different interpretation of the role of Leo and the Roman church and, perhaps, have implications for the interpretation of the *Definition*. So, we are faced immediately with a choice of two different traditions of the council and its *Definition*. There are good reasons for us to investigate the Greek *Acta* and *Definition* instead of the Latin.

The Latin tradition certainly has its own value and may preserve insights into the historical event that are obscured in the official Greek publication, but the Greek *Acta* stand out as the appropriate object for this investigation. Though both traditions have their merits, and a study of either would be beneficial and complementary for understanding the Council of Chalcedon and its reception in the ancient Church, the Greek *Acta* are a better starting point. First, though acclaimed as an Ecumenical Council, Chalcedon was, in reality, an Eastern Council with a small contingent representing Pope Leo.⁷¹ From the view of Marcian and Anatolius, it would seem that the council was ecumenical not because of its representation of

⁶⁹ Mark S. Smith, *The Idea of Nicaea in the Early Church Councils, AD 431-451* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), chap. 7.

⁷⁰ Chrysos, “The Synodal Acts”; Graumann, *The Acts*, 259–60. Cf. Long, *The Art of Biblical History*.

⁷¹ Cf. Honigmann, “The Original Lists”; *CChal* 3:202-203.

the Church but its Imperial authority.⁷² The primary language spoken was Greek, and it was a Greek-speaking see, Constantinople, that was responsible for publishing the Conciliar *Acta*.⁷³ Second, as published by Anatolius and Marcian, the Eastern emperor, it was the Greek *Acta* that presented the official interpretation of the council. Price and Gaddis suggest that the pretext for the formal publication of the *Acta* was the continuing tensions between Constantinople and Rome.⁷⁴ The Latin was a translation of the Greek; even though there are independent records of the original Latin words spoken at the council, the Latin *Acta* still follow the Greek *Acta*, following its interpretive presentation of the council.⁷⁵ In these ways, the Greek version is the original, the Latin a derivation. The Greek *Acta* is the primary reference point for the official interpretation of the Council and provides the first reference for the historical event of the Council, being the original language of the events compiled from the authoritative *scheda* of the council.⁷⁶ The originally published copies of the *Acta* were in Greek, and these were the basis from which the *Versio Antiqua* and its recensions derive.

A choice of either tradition has immediate ramifications for answering a question such as ours; the differences in technical vocabulary and the lack of multilingualism in the Eastern and Western churches would lead the reader to consult different authorities for interpreting the technical vocabulary used in the *Definition* and would, in the case of the Latin translation, certainly give a greater priority to the *Tome* than Cyril's letters.⁷⁷ It is beyond the scope of this

⁷² *CChal* 3:202-203.

⁷³ See *CChal* 1:75-85; 3:193-203; Mari, "Greek, Latin, and More."

⁷⁴ *CChal* 1:79; Graumann, *The Acts*, 283-96.

⁷⁵ Cf. Mari, "The Latin Translations," 154.

⁷⁶ On *scheda*, see Chapter 2 below.

⁷⁷ On multilingualism, Fergus Millar, "Linguistic Co-Existence in Constantinople: Greek and Latin (and Syriac) in the Acts of the Synod of 536 C.E.," *JRS* 99 (2009): 92; Mari, "Greek, Latin, and More." Cf. Gustave Bardy, *La question des langues dans l'église ancienne* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1948), 223-29.

thesis to explore what differences might obtain between a Western, Latin reading of the *Definition* and an Eastern, Greek reading. However, the presence of a distinction between the Latin and Greek *Acta*, with their differences in ideological shaping, language, and the relevant authorities for interpretation, necessitates choosing one or the other tradition as the object of focus. In this thesis, we will investigate the original, Greek tradition.

Because the *Acta* set out to offer an interpretation of the *Definition*, an interpretation that has yet to be explored in contemporary literature, this provides a compelling angle from which to approach the question of the *Definition*'s conceptual apparatus. Fruitful investigations of the *Definition* could be undertaken concerning its reception by various individuals or parties in the years after Chalcedon or the meaning it may have had to different participants in the drafting process at the historical council (though there are significant complications facing the latter sort of investigation, some of which will become evident in Chapter 2). However, if the *Acta* themselves provide an interpretation of the *Definition*, then this is as legitimate an avenue of investigation as the others, standing to give, at the very least, insight into the Christology of the Constantinopolitan Church under Anatolius and Marcian. So, in this thesis, we will be looking at the conceptual apparatus of the *Definition as interpreted through the lens of the Official Greek Acta*.

1.2 STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT AND ITS LIMITATIONS

I set out in my research to answer the question, what is the conceptual apparatus employed in the *Definition of Chalcedon* as it seeks to answer the questions, what does it mean for the Son, who is genuinely human, to be God? and what does it mean for the Son, who is genuinely divine, to be a human? I first had to identify a fruitful way to approach the *Definition*; the contemporary scholarship concerning the *Acta* of Chalcedon pointed to the *Acta* themselves as

a literary product with the *Definition* as a portion thereof and pointed towards various ways the *Acta* interpret the *Definition* or lead the reader to an interpretation. Establishing a definite interpretive framework for the *Definition* as found in the Greek *Acta* (for which I will argue in Chapter 2), I have taken the *Definition of Chalcedon* as one element within a greater literary product, the official Greek *Acta* of Chalcedon, published in the middle of the 5th century. To answer the question above, I have followed the reading strategy furnished by the *Acta*. The answer I discovered, and for which this thesis will argue, is that the *Definition* as read within the interpretive context of the *Acta* doesn't have one conceptual apparatus; instead, there are two conceptual apparatuses close enough in appearance to employ the same terminology, relying on similar assumptions about the universal and the particular, yet that are different enough to yield no clear *via media*, no apparent solution that equally upholds the concerns for which these apparatuses were introduced.

Approaching the question in this way provides manageable limits for this study while permitting it to make a significant contribution. First of all, it stands to contribute to our understanding of the *Acta* of the Council of Chalcedon and its *Definition*, developing our understanding of the literary relationship between the two (through the interpretive framework the former provides for the latter, as argued for in Chapter 2) and offering a clearer understanding of the conceptual depth of the *Definition* as interpreted within the *Acts of Chalcedon*, the *Acta*. This "official" interpretation may only shed light on the ontology and Christology of Anatolius and Marcian, the chief designers of the *Acta*, yet having a concrete interpretation of the *Definition* will open doors for further research in the reception of Chalcedon and the development of Christology in the following centuries. This thesis also stands to contribute to our understanding of the conceptual apparatuses of 4th-5th century theology and beyond and our understanding of the development of thought in late antiquity more generally. To do so in a manageable way, this thesis will focus on the *Definition* as part

of the Greek *Acta*; studying the Greek *Acta* invites corresponding investigations of the Latin *Acta* or even of the *Definition* within a historical reconstruction of the council, but these avenues of research will be left to future studies. However, given the priority of the Greek over the Latin *Acta* (as discussed above) and the importance of the *Acta* in giving us a window into the historical event, this thesis will provide an important starting point to answer such questions. Several studies have been performed on the reception of the *Definition of Chalcedon* among the ancient churches.⁷⁸ This study will not continue this work, but the interpretation of the *Definition* within the Greek *Acta* offered in this thesis will provide another avenue for researching Chalcedon's reception, especially among those communities that would have had access to a copy of the *Acta*, such as the Christian community at Constantinople. The actual reception of the *Definition* could be compared with the interpretation the *Acta's* protocol suggests. Finally, by concentrating on 4th and 5th-century ontologies developed by Christians within the interpretive parameters set by the *Acta*, we will not be able to engage with the philosophical predecessors of these positions. Parallels with ancient philosophy will be drawn as is necessary, but the work of situating the ontologies of 4th and 5th-century theologians within the philosophical milieu of these centuries and tracing their dependence on their philosophical predecessors or contemporaries will be left to future studies. However, having clarity on what the fathers were saying will certainly be of benefit for such a study.

⁷⁸ On the reception of Chalcedon, see Alois Grillmeier and Theresia Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition Vol. 2, Part Two: The Church of Constantinople in the Sixth Century*, trans. Pauline Allen and John Cawte (London: Mowbrays, 1995); Leuenberger-Wenger, *Das Konzil*; Zachhuber, *The Rise*.

1.3 OUTLINE OF ARGUMENT

We will first argue in Chapter 2 that the Greek *Acta* are an interpretive record of the Council of Chalcedon and that they provide the reader with a threefold interpretive approach to the *Definition of Chalcedon*. This interpretive framework involves an appeal to a hierarchy of 4th and 5th-century theological authorities and positions the *Definition* as complementary to and interpretive of the Nicene Creed, from which it derives its authority. It will be argued that the Greek *Acta* are different from the Latin *Acta* and contain an ideological bias against Rome and the Western church, thus justifying our claim that these traditions are indeed different. It will also be argued that the Greek *Acta* are the original.

Having established the interpretive framework the *Acta* provide for the *Definition* in Chapter 2, we will then take up the task of interpreting the *Definition* within that framework in the following four chapters. Chapter 3 will begin our analysis of the *Definition*'s conceptual apparatus by considering the key terminology and concepts as they are discussed in Athanasius, Basil of Caesarea, and Gregory of Nazianzus, the preeminent 4th-century authorities provided by the *Acta* for interpreting the *Definition*. Chapter 4 will then consider Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius* and his *Letter to John of Antioch*, the primary 5th-century authorities the *Acta* provide. Chapter 5 will finish the preliminary investigation by looking at the Greek translation of Leo's *Tome* incorporated into the Acts; Leo's *Tome* is the final authority given by the *Acta* for the *Definition*'s interpretation. In conclusion, Chapter 6 will draw together the various strands of the investigation to argue that the conceptual apparatus drawn from the 4th century is cast in similar language to but is significantly different from and not readily reconciled with the apparatus presented by reading the *Definition* in light of Cyril's two letters with the support of Leo's *Tome*. That is, it will be argued that the 4th-century conciliar tradition (from the *Acta*'s perspective) presents a conceptual apparatus where a ὑπόστασις (*hypostasis*) is the particular

in relation to the universal (οὐσία or φύσις), and it is nothing more than the single substantial reality of God or Humanity (οὐσία or φύσις) individuated by distinctive properties (ιδιώματα) (perhaps in addition to matter [ὕλη] in the case of humanity). By identifying the universal as substance, as a singular, fundamentally existing thing, the 4th-century conciliar tradition is able to uphold the substantial unity of the Triune God in its hypostatic plurality (significantly, this unity-in-plurality is true of both God and humanity). However, to meet the challenge of Apollinaris, Nestorius, and Eutyches as interpreted by the conciliar tradition, the *Definition* maintains the identity of the ὑπόστασις with the particular and the φύσις or οὐσία with the universal but now permits a single ὑπόστασις to individuate two οὐσία, with the result, we will argue, that “substance” or the independently existing and countable reality would appear to be associated with the *hypostatic* particular and not the *physic* or *ousiatic* universal. Thus, though similar in their conceptual content, these two apparatuses are notably different, and their differences produce significant conflicts when it comes to resolving the problems addressed by the Nicene Creed and the *Definition of Chalcedon*, which we will explore in the 6th Chapter.

Chapter 2 – The Definition within the Acts of Chalcedon

2.1 *The Greek Acts: Their Occasion and Contours*

2.1.1 *The Occasion of Publication*

2.1.2 *The Shape and Redaction of the Acts*

2.1.2.1 *The Redaction of the Acts*

2.2 *Interpreting the Definition*

2.2.1 *Interpretive Strategy 1 – The Definition Vis-à-Vis Nicaea*

2.2.2 *Interpretive Strategy 2 – Authoritative (Greek) Fathers*

2.2.3 *Interpretive Strategy 3 – The Strategic Placement of the Definition and Its Interpreters*

2.3 *Conclusion*

2.1 THE GREEK ACTS: THEIR OCCASION AND CONTOURS

Adding to Schwartz’s well-known lament that the conciliar acts are seldom read (“*acta conciliorum non leguntur*”), Evangelos Chrysos observes that when they are studied, “We tend to study too superficially the Synodal Acts and this is why we know very little about them as a literary product.”⁷⁹ Schwartz’s own editorial work, followed by the translations of Price and various co-authors, has worked to overcome both lacunae. More recently, Thomas Graumann has published a monograph on the “production and character” of the Conciliar *Acta*, drawing attention to the complexities inherent in the *Acta* as literary documents.⁸⁰ To answer the question, “what is the conceptual apparatus of Chalcedon?” we have chosen to interpret it as a

⁷⁹ Chrysos, “The Synodal Acts,” 86; Eduard Schwartz, “Die Kaiserin,” 212.

⁸⁰ Graumann, *The Acts*.

piece of a broader literary document, the Greek *Acta* of Chalcedon. In this chapter, we will defend this decision by arguing that the *Acta* are an officially published imperial document intentionally shaped under the auspices of Anatolius of Constantinople and the Eastern emperor, Marcian, that offers an interpretation of the historical Council of Chalcedon. The *Definition* is an important piece of this literary product, and the editors make significant efforts to guard the *Definition* from criticism and give it definite meaning through three interpretive strategies. We will argue this by considering the production of the Conciliar *Acta* for Chalcedon and the resulting interpretive framework they provide for the *Definition*. This chapter will first consider the pretext for the publication and the ideological redaction of the *Acta*. We will then turn to the interpretive framework this document provides for the *Definition*, considering the relationship between the *Definition* and the Nicene and Constantinopolitan Creeds, the role of authorities in the *Acta* and those 4th-Century Fathers to which appeal is made, and, finally, select letters of Cyril and Leo, to which the *Definition* itself with the support of the *Acta* attribute interpretive priority.

2.1.1 The Occasion of Publication

Price and Gaddis indicate that official editions of synodical acts require a pretext, an occasion for disseminating the official imperial presentation of the proceedings.⁸¹ From the epistolary evidence, we can place the date for Marcian's official publication of Chalcedon's *Acta* in 454 or 455, intending it for Rome.⁸² The evidence from Chalcedon suggests that the previous councils under scrutiny, namely the Constantinopolitan Home Synod of 448 and Ephesus II

⁸¹ *CChal* 1:79.

⁸² Graumann, *The Acts*, 285.

449, did not have formally published acts, which would have been distributed in the form of a codex.⁸³ Instead, at Chalcedon, their minutes were read from a *σχεδαρίον* (or *scheda*), the authoritative and original (αὐθεντικά) minutes (ὑπομνημάτα) produced from the stenographic notes of the notaries.⁸⁴ These are not the notaries' shorthand notes (*codices notarum*), for they are compiled and written in longhand.

A *σχεδαρίον* was not the final step in the production of conciliar *acta*, but it served as the basis for published copies and legal reference.⁸⁵ In Session 4, the council could read from a *σχεδαρίον* of the earlier sessions of Chalcedon (ACO IV.3, p. 93 ln. 3). At Carthage 411 (an imperially mediated session between the Catholics and Donatists), each side had its own copy of the *scheda*.⁸⁶ A *σχεδαρίον* was not a codex (as were published *acta*) but probably a scroll (*volumen*).⁸⁷ In particular, we find in the *Acta* of Chalcedon that several letters are read from “the codex [κώδικος]” (e.g. ACO I.23 p. 67 ln. 37), distinguished from the acts read from “a document [*σχεδαρίον*].” Minutes from both 448 and 449, as well as prior sessions of Chalcedon, are read from a *σχεδαρίον* (e.g. ACO I.66 p. 77 ln. 6; I.237, p. 103 ln. 4; IV.3, p.

⁸³ Graumann calls the Acts of Chalcedon, “the first centrally ordered publication of authoritative acts of an imperial council.” Graumann, *The Acts*, 288.288

⁸⁴ On the process of moving from stenographic notes to longhand, see Graumann, *The Acts*, 126–79.

⁸⁵ See Graumann's extensive discussion of the *scheda* or *σχεδαρίον*. Graumann, *The Acts*, 35–36, 60–73. cf. *CChal* 1:75.

⁸⁶ *CChal* 1:75. For a detailed account of Carthage, which gives provides important insight into the work of the notaries taking notes on the session and the process of producing a final account, see Emin Tengström, *Die Protokollierung der Collatio Carthaginensis; Beiträge zur Kenntnis der römischen Kurzschrift nebst einem Exkurs über das Wort scheda (schedula)*, Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis: Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 14 (Göteborg: Elanders boktr. aktiebolag, 1962); H C Teitler, *Notarii and Exceptores: An Inquiry into Role and Significance of Shorthand Writers in the Imperial and Ecclesiastical Bureaucracy of the Roman Empire (from the Early Principate to C 450 A.D.)* (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben Publisher, 1985), chap. 2; Brent D. Shaw, *Sacred Violence: African Christians and Sectarian Hatred in the Age of Augustine*, Cambridge Books Online (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

⁸⁷ Graumann, *The Acts*, 43.

93 ln. 3). The *σχεδάρια* at Chalcedon contained the full protocol (e.g. ACO I.270), namely, the material content of the Acts with the editorial comments and narrative that weave them together into a complete document. The documents referred to were not merely drafts, as the word *σχεδάριον* was used non-technically.⁸⁸ Instead, they appear to be a complete edit of the raw notes into a protocol. The publication of Chalcedon's *Acta* would be made several years later when a specific issue demanded it (as noted above). "Whereas the primary session record had conventionally been in the shape of a scroll, copying involved the transformation into a bound-up codex or codices—probably already from the very earliest stages of this process."⁸⁹ In the 6th century, Rusticus consulted a codex of the *Acta* for his Latin recension.⁹⁰

Price and Gaddis suggest that the pretext for publishing Chalcedon's *Acta* was the ongoing tension between Rome and Constantinople over the council, particularly Rome's concern over Canon 28, declaring Constantinople the "New Rome."⁹¹ They draw on the evidence of the letters attached to the *Acta* to argue this; the letters contain evidence that their compilers downplayed Leo's prominence and removed testimony Leo provided for his position of ecclesiastical pre-eminence. There are also some indications (considered below) that the editors of the session minutes downplayed Papal objections to Canon 28 and undermined Leo's episcopal claims.⁹² Price and Gaddis, following Schwartz, attribute the official publication to the end of 454 or early 455 under the oversight of Marcian and Anatolius of Constantinople.⁹³

⁸⁸ LSJ, s.v. *σχεδάριον*.

⁸⁹ Graumann, *The Acts*, 283.

⁹⁰ Graumann, *The Acts*, 283, fn. 1.

⁹¹ *CChal* I:79.

⁹² *CChal* I:79-82.

⁹³ *CChal* I:79; Graumann, *The Acts*, 285.

Therefore, the *Acta* appear to have a pro-Constantinople, anti-Rome bias; they have an agenda and are not simply a verbatim record of debate.

2.1.2 The Shape and Redaction of the *Acta*

The original *Acta* has not survived to our day. Instead, we have copies of several later recensions. Our primary witnesses are two manuscripts from the 11th and 12th centuries attesting to a 7th-century recension, namely, Codex Venetus 555 (M) and Codex Vindobonensis his. gr. 27 (B).⁹⁴ We also have manuscripts attesting to the 6th-century Latin translation *Versio Antiqua* (Φ^a) and two recensions, *Versio Antiqua Correcta* (Φ^c) and *Versio Rustici* (Φ^r). Further evidence of the early form of the *Acta* is provided by Rusticus' apparatus, providing notes on the Greek manuscript and Latin manuscripts used for his recension of the previous Latin translation. Discussion of these manuscripts and the Latin translation is provided by Schwartz, Price & Gaddis, and Mari.⁹⁵

If we are to understand the purpose of the *Acta* and, consequently, the interpretation it gives for the *Definition*, attention to the shape of the *Acta* is essential. The redaction of the different sessions and their final order stand to provide us with insight into the purposes of the editors.

2.1.2.1 The Shape of the *Acta* – Concerning the Order of Sessions II and III

The extant manuscripts present us with a problem concerning the shape of the *Acta*. The Latin Acts place the 27 canons of the Council (not explicitly discussed at Chalcedon but added later,

⁹⁴ ACO 2.1.1, v.

⁹⁵ Mari, "The Latin Translations"; *CChal* I:79-85. See the prefaces to each part of ACO.

probably by Anatolius and his attendants) before the final session, discussing Canon 28. However, the Greek *Acta* places them after the 5th session; according to Schwartz, this follows a standard practice of placing the canons after a creed or definition.⁹⁶ The placement of the canons is of less interpretative significance than the problem presented by the order of the sessions in the extant manuscript tradition of the Chalcedonian *Acta*.

The Latin *Versio Antiqua* and the 7th-Century recension of the *Acta* have the sessions labelled II and III, situated on the 13th and 10th of October, respectively, in a different order than the *Versio Antiqua Correcta* and *Versio Rustici*, whose order is preserved in Price and Gaddis's translation (following the chronological order of the sessions, 10th then 13th of October).⁹⁷ The dates recorded in the *Versio Antiqua* and the 7th-Century Greek Acts indicate that the sessions have been moved out of their chronological order (13th October for Session II, 10th October for Session III); that is, they have been dischronologised. Price and Gaddis argue that the 7th-century manuscripts preserve the original, dischronologised order of the Sessions as presented in the *Acta*, which would have brought together the discussion of the faith for logical reasons without the intervening session concerning Dioscorus.⁹⁸ The *Versio Antiqua Correcta* and *Versio Rustici*, followed by the English translation, would then present the sessions in their appropriate chronological order (placing session "III" (Oct 10th) before session

⁹⁶ ACO 2.1.3, xxvii. See *CChal* I:81, ftn. 278.

⁹⁷ Vindobonensis hist. gr. 27 (B) has this order (II, III) printed; Venetus 555 (M) has session III (dated Oct. 10th) placed before Session II (dated Oct. 13th). In the margins of Session II, M reads, "ἀνάγνωθι πρότερον ταύτην και οὕτως τὴν γ̄" (read this first and, thus, read the 3rd) and before Session III, "ἴσθι ὁ ἀναγινώσκων ὡς κατὰ σφάλμα προτέθειται ἡ γ̄ πρᾶξις τῆς β̄ και δεῖ πρότερον ἐκείνην ἀναγινώσκειν μετὰ ταύτην γραφεῖσαν, ἔνθα τὸ σημεῖον" (Let the reader know that it was because of an error that the third session was placed before the second, and that it is necessary to read that one first, though written after this one, where there is a sign). M also states "τέλος τῆς τρίτης" at the end of session III (as its introduction states and according to the order of ACO) yet was corrected to "τέλος τῆς δευτέρας" (ACO 2.1.2, p. 84).

⁹⁸ *CChal* I:81; 2:1-2.

“II” (Oct 13th)). We need to consider what the order of the original *Acta* was because the order of the sessions at this point has important ramifications for our understanding of the redaction of the sessions. Not only will it be important to be consistent in our reference to the sessions in the *Acta*, but the sort of editorial change evidenced in the manuscript tradition, where sessions are in a non-chronological order, would indicate a deliberate and interpretively significant action taken by the editor.

Editorial dischronologisation such as Price and Gaddis suggest happened during the redaction of the Greek *Acta*, namely, placing the chronologically later session before the earlier session for the sake of logic, would not be a minor adjustment. In narrative theory, dischronologisation is a significant editorial move: that the dates are out of sync with the order of the sessions would invite a more significant interpretation than merely the demands of logic.⁹⁹ If the editors had dischronologised the narrative, then it would be appropriate to seek the purpose of this action and incorporate the resulting data into an account of the interpretative presentation of the *Acta*. Moreover, the data we have concerning ancient acts and minutes attest to the importance of chronology. The authoritative *σχεδάριον* would have had a complete protocol, including the narrative dates stringing together each session and the various documents and speech excerpts. Though there is evidence of minor dischronologisation in the protocol, this involves moving the (edited) discussion of key texts that were read to the end of the reading instead of interspersing the comments within the reading, as they would have occurred in the discussion of the text.¹⁰⁰ There is no other instance of large-scale

⁹⁹ Cf. W. J. Martin, “‘Dischronologized’ Narrative in the Old Testament,” *Congress Volume Rome 1968* (1969): 179–86, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004275409_012; Seymour Chatman, *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 62–67; Jean Louis Ska, “*Our Fathers Have Told Us*”: *Introduction to the Analysis of Hebrew Narratives*, Subsidia Biblica 13 (Roma: Editrice Pontificio Instituto Biblico, 1990), 9–12.

¹⁰⁰ Graumann, *The Acts*, 232–36.

dischronologisation in the *Acta*, such as the rearranging of a numbered session.¹⁰¹ Against the possibility of such editorial action, Graumann had put forth evidence that dating was of utter importance. In contrast to creeds, for which a date was not appropriate (Graumann cites Athanasius' disparagement of the "dated creed"), the dating of a conciliar session "was essential. No undated document could command validity." Imperial legal texts state as much, but "Christian writers were equally clear: without proper dating, conciliar *gesta* were open to the accusation of 'falsification' or outright fictitiousness."¹⁰² It seems unlikely, therefore, that the editors would have intentionally rearranged the sessions, especially if the only discernible value was logical ordering. However, if the evidence supported the presence of dischronologisation, as Price and Gaddis have argued, then we would need to seek a more significant reason for this editorial action than mere logic. If the dischronologised order were original, we would need to take it into account as we consider the redaction of the *Acta* and, therefore, the approach it offers for interpreting the *Definition*. However, we will argue that the original order is not dischronologised and, therefore, that there is no interpretive significance to the ordering of these sessions (they follow the order of their chronological occurrence).

Against Price and Gaddis' argument that the Greek *Acta* were intentionally dischronologised in their presentation of Session II and III, Evangelos Chrysos has argued that the date given to the third session in its opening remarks (viz. Oct. 10) is mistaken, for, in the fourth session, the *Acta* attributes Session III to the 14th of October (one day before the Ides of

¹⁰¹ There were two "sessions" that chronologically occurred between Sessions IV and V, on 20 October, the "Session on Carosus and Dorotheus" and "Session on Photius and Eustathius." However, these sessions were not included in the original *Acta*, so their absence at that point of the *Acta* is a case of a blank rather than dischronologisation (contrary to what their inclusion in Schwartz's edition of the Greek Acts may suggest). See Price, "Truth," 100; *CChal* II.164-182.

¹⁰² Graumann, *The Acts*, 257.

October), not the 10th of October (six days before the Ides in *Versio Rustici*). The three steps of Chrysos' argument are well summarized in Price and Gaddis,

(a) the demand of the Oriental Bishops at II.36, 38, 43 [ACO III.36, 38, 43] that Dioscorus be exiled implies that he had already been condemned; (b) the Greek MSS at IV.3 *fin.* (though not the Latin MSS or the Greek MSS at II.1 [ACO III.1]) date the second session [ACO III] to 14 October; and (c) the granting by the chairman at the end of the second session [ACO III] (31) of an adjournment of five days before the debate over the faith was resumed fits better a three-day interval (which would have been reckoned as four) than the seven days that would have elapsed if the second session [ACO III] had been held on 10 October.¹⁰³

Price and Gaddis dismiss Chrysos' argument, putting forth the demand for Dioscorus to be reinstated in Section 34 of Session III (which is their Session II) as definitive evidence against Chrysos' argument. They argue that these demands "were a natural response to [Dioscorus'] suspension at the end of the first session (I.1068) but would have been inconceivable after his formal trial and deposition in the third [ACO II]."¹⁰⁴ However, taken as a whole, Chrysos' argument is more persuasive and can be complemented with several other considerations.

In response to Price and Gaddis, the exclamation they cite (ACO III.34) need only refer to the reinstatement of Juvenal, Thalassius, Eusebius, Basil, and Eustathius, who were temporally removed from the council in Session I for their role at Ephesus II. However, these bishops had affirmed Leo's *Tome*, referenced in Session III, section 34; Dioscorus did not. Dioscorus' return is *explicitly* asked for in Session III sections 39 & 41 by the Illyrian bishops, but this proposal is roundly denounced (e.g. ACO III.35, 36, 38, 40, 42, 43). Section 35 does not appear to be a response to section 34, for the protocol states that the request in section 34

¹⁰³ *CChal* I:2 fn. 1. See Evangelos K. Chrysos, "Η Διάταξις των Συνεδριών της εν Χαλκηδόνι Οικουμενικής Συνόδου," *Kleronomia* 3.2 (1971): 262–66.

¹⁰⁴ *CChal* I:2.

(granted in Session IV) is made by all the bishops and is (according to the Latin versions) based on stated agreement with Leo, which Dioscorus never gave. Instead, section 35 suggests that though the entire council requests the return of Juvenal et al., several bishops (“only a few”) request Dioscorus as well, a request which has been omitted from the *Acta*.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, the cry that “God has deposed Dioscorus” (ACO III.40) is more appropriate for the situation after Session II; the fact that the bishops were convinced *Dioscorus had already been deposed* undermines Price and Gaddis’ argument that the Illyrian bishops would not have asked for him to be restored if he had been deposed. It appears, rather, that these bishops disagreed with the judgment given in Session II, which is consistent with the absence of these bishops and other supporters of Dioscorus from this session (7 out of 31 Illyrian bishops listed in Session I attended Session II).¹⁰⁶

Moreover, the Greek order for the sessions is attested elsewhere; it is employed at the 5th Ecumenical Council (Constantinople 553) and seems to be reflected in Evagrius’ *Ecclesiastical History*.¹⁰⁷ In the latter document, Evagrius states, “Accordingly, after this assembly [i.e. session I] was indeed terminated thus, the most holy bishops were alone assembled for a second one.” The details given by Evagrius, that this second session concerned Dioscorus and involved the bishops alone, is consistent with the Greek Session II.¹⁰⁸

In addition to this evidence, there is a significant issue in determining which order is original that is not discussed by Price and Gaddis. To determine which order is original, it is

¹⁰⁵ On such omissions, see Price, “Truth.”

¹⁰⁶ *CChal* 2:36.

¹⁰⁷ Chrysos, “Ἡ Διάταξις,” 264; Evagrius, *The Ecclesiastical History of Evagrius Scholasticus*, trans. Michael Whitby (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), ii.4 & 18, pp. 69–72, 105–107.

¹⁰⁸ Evagrius, *The Ecclesiastical History of Evagrius Scholasticus*, ii.18, pp. 106–7.

necessary to explain the disparity of the present manuscripts. There is a text-critical question raised by the different manuscript evidence we have, namely, what was most likely the original reading of the Greek Acts to explain the variants present in the Greek Manuscripts and Latin translations?¹⁰⁹ The reading that best explains the variants among the extant manuscripts appears to be an original with the date 14th of October at the head of Session III, the same date attributed to Session III in Session IV, and the present Greek Order, thus giving a chronological presentation of the Sessions (Session II, 13th October; Session III, 14th October; Session IV, 17th October). Presuming the *σχεδάριον* was correct when it was completed, all the extant manuscript traditions present a chronological problem (at least relative to one another).

We have two Greek manuscripts (B and M corr) and the Latin Φ^a that have an order matching the date for Session III given in the Greek manuscripts of Session IV (II, Oct 13th; III, Oct 14th); this date does not match the date given in any manuscript of Session III (given as Oct 10th) or the date for Session III stated in the Latin of Session IV (Oct 10th). So, our present manuscripts present us with two variants at IV.3 (ACO 2.1.2, p. 93, ln. 5), *μῑς* (one = Oct 14th) or *ἑκτῆς* (six = Oct 10th), and an order (employing the numbering printed in ACO) of either II (Oct 13th) then III (Oct 10th) or III (Oct 10th) then II (Oct 13th). The Greek Manuscripts appear to be dischronologised (as argued by Price and Gaddis), having Act III dated prior to Act II, and contain a contradiction between the date given at Session III (Oct 10th) and then at Session IV (Oct 14th). Φ^a is dischronologised with no contradiction: the date in Session IV and Session III are the same, Oct 10th, but the session labelled in the Greek manuscripts as “III” (Oct 10th) is placed after the later dated Session II (Oct 13th). Φ^c and Φ^r are chronologically

¹⁰⁹ “Perhaps the most basic criterion for the evaluation of variant readings is the simple maxim ‘choose the reading that best explains the origin of the others.’” Bruce M. Metzger and Bart D. Ehrman, *The Text of the New Testament: Its Transmission, Corruption, and Restoration*, 4th Edition. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 300.

consistent and give consistent dates for Session III, namely Oct 10th at both III and IV (see fig. 1).

Figure 1 – The Extant Variants of the Date for Session III

Manuscript	Order	Date at III	Date of III in IV
B and M ^{corr}	II (13 th Oct), III (10 th Oct)	10 th Oct	14 th Oct
Φ ^a	II (13 th Oct), III (10 th Oct)	10 th Oct	10 th Oct
Φ ^c and Φ ^r	III (10 th Oct), II (13 th Oct)	10 th Oct	10 th Oct

Given the rigorous editing evidenced within the *Acta*, it is unlikely that the state of the 7th-century Greek recension represents the Council's *σχεδάριον*, involving a contradiction in both position (Session III with a date discordant with its position) and the dates given in Session III and Session IV. Assuming a consistent original, the 7th-century Greek *Acta* represent a copy of an original that diverged in one of two ways.¹¹⁰ Either 1) the original was dischronologised (i.e. Session III on October 10 was placed after Session II on October 13th) and had the proper dates at Session III and Session IV (= Φ^a), with the date at Session IV corrupted in the copying process, or 2) the original had the proper chronological order with the date of 14th October in Session III and Session IV, but the date at Session III was corrupted in the copying process (See Fig. 2). This assumes that Φ^c and Φ^r do not represent the original reading (though, at this

¹¹⁰ An error may have occurred when shorthand notes were transcribed in longhand; if so, our lack of knowledge of the stenographic notation makes it difficult to trace such an error. Against this hypothesis, the longhand original, the *σχεδάριον*, was thoroughly edited and was the authoritative copy; it is hard to believe it would have contained a blatant error in chronology. Graumann, *The Acts*, 167–69.

point, we cannot state whether they represent historical reality): as we will consider shortly, it is hard to explain a move from the order and dates of the Latin tradition to the state of the 7th-century manuscript; additionally, as corrections of Φ^a , it is evident how the state of Φ^a would be rearranged to produce Φ^c and Φ^r .

Figure 2 – The Possible Original Readings of the Date for Session III; [] represent transcription error

Manuscript	Order	Date at III	Date of III in IV
Hypothesis #1	II (13 th Oct), III (10 th Oct)	10 th Oct	10 th Oct [14 th Oct]
Hypothesis #2	II (13 th Oct), III (14 th Oct)	14 th Oct [10 th Oct]	14 th Oct

We agree with Chrysos that the internal evidence (considered above) favours the second hypothesis. In addition, the external evidence appears to be in its favour. That is, #2 is a better explanation of the variants in our extant traditions (see Figs. 1 & 3). If #1 were original, it is very difficult to explain how the reading in the extant Greek manuscripts at Session IV emerged (πρὸ μιᾶς Εἰδῶν Ὀκτωβρίων ἐν Χαλκηδόνι); there is no clear motivation for an intentional change nor an easy explanation for an unintentional one. However, there is at least one possible cause of an unintentional transcription error in Session III, explaining how τῇ πρὸ μιᾶς Εἰδῶν Ὀκτωβρίων ἐν Χαλκηδόνι (ΤΗΠΡΟΜΙΑΣΕΙΔΩΝΟΚΤΩΒΡΙΩΝΕΝΣΑΛΚΗΔΟΝΙ) might have become τῇ πρὸ ἑξ Εἰδῶν Ὀκτωβρίων ἐν Χαλκηδόνι (ΤΗΠΡΟΕΧΕΙΔΩΝΟΚΤΩΒΡΙΩΝΕΝΣΑΛΚΗΔΟΝΙ).¹¹¹ There is significant aural similarity (and some visual similarity in 6th-century Uncial script) between the earlier date (πρὸ ἑξ Εἰδῶν) and the title of the session, τρίτη πρᾶξις τῶν ἐν Χαλκηδόνι

¹¹¹ The text in parentheses is given in the Sinaiticus Uncial Greek Font, which is the closest open font I could find to 4th-6th century uncial script, as used in ecclesiastical and legal contexts (cf. *Analecta*). It is based upon and, therefore, most similar to the uncial script of Codex Sinaiticus. Available at, <https://fonts2u.com/download/sinaiticus-greek-uncial.font>.

(ΤΡΙΤΗΠΡΑΧΙΣΤΩΝΕΝΣΑΛΚΗΔΟΝΙ). Though there is visual similarity and proximity between these phrases (the title being only 70 characters prior) and homeoteleuton with “ἐν Χάλκηδόνι,” the aural similarity appears to be the most likely source of an unintentional transcription error. Aurally, “[trě.tě] [prak.sěs] [ton]” is very similar to “[tě] [pro] [éks] [ě.θon].”¹¹² In a setting where the text was heard and then transcribed or where it was read, remembered, and transcribed, the proximity of these two similar phrases may have led the copyist to insert the date “τῇι πρὸ ἑξ Εἰδῶν,” an expected date accommodated to the vocalisation of the proximate title, instead of the actual date, “τῇι πρὸ μιᾶς Εἰδῶν.”¹¹³ There is no contextual evidence at this position for an error in the opposite direction, nor can I identify comparable opportunities for an error moving from πρὸ ἑξ Εἰδῶν to πρὸ μιᾶς Εἰδῶν at Session IV section 3, which is where such an error must have occurred to create the manuscript tradition as we have it from a manuscript with πρὸ ἑξ at both points. Thus, the internal evidence, as presented by Chrysos, and the possibility of an unintentional error in Session III section 1 supports the hypothesis that the *σχεδάριον* from which the officially published codices were copied had πρὸ μιᾶς Εἰδῶν at Session III section 1 and at session IV section 3 (ACO 2.1.2 p. 93 ln. 5). It is unclear whether the transcription error suggested happened at the stage of publication, where one or more of the officially published copies of the Acts contained the error, or if it entered as these copies were subsequently copied.

On the account we have given, the *Acta* did not dischronologise Session II and III but copied them in their proper order. At some point, a copyist transcribed the 10th of October as

¹¹² Pronunciation for 5th century Byzantine Greek is based on several resources, primarily Guglielmo Cavallo, “The Greek and Latin Languages in the Papyri,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Papyrology*, ed. Roger S. Bagnall (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 152–53.

¹¹³ On the various transcription processes, see Metzger and Ehrman, *The Text of the New Testament*, 16–31.

the date for Session III in its opening lines, which was reproduced in the 6th-century Latin translations and the 7th-century recension of the *Acta*. The translator of *Versio Antiqua* corrected Session IV in light of its reading of Session III; *Versio Antiqua Correcta* and *Versio Rustici* then corrected the order of the sessions in light of the dates provided in the *Versio Antiqua*. Thus, the alternate order present in the Greek tradition of Chalcedon's Acts is not evidence of an editorial agenda or an effort to provide a more logical arrangement of the events. However, there is evidence of theologically motivated editing elsewhere in the *Acta*, editing that is pertinent to the interpretive lens given for the *Definition*.


Figure 3a – A Simplified Genealogy of the Dates for the Third Session¹¹⁴


Figure 3b – The Readings of Extent and Proposed Manuscript Traditions for the Date of Session III, [] indicate variant as compared to parent manuscripts.

Manuscript	Order	Date at III	Date of III in IV
Σχεδαρίον (ΣΞ)	II, III	Oct 14	Oct 14
Early Greek Copy (EG)	II, III	[Oct 10]	Oct 14
<i>Versio Antiqua</i>	II, III	Oct 10	[Oct 10]
<i>Versio Antiqua Correcta</i>	[III, II]	Oct 10	Oct 10
<i>Versio Rustici</i>	III, II	Oct 10	Oct 10
7 th -Century Greek (7 th G)	II, III	Oct 10	Oct 14

¹¹⁴ Rusticus worked from a Greek Manuscript he had access to in Constantinople (Acoemete Codex). It is not clear if the error suggested at EG occurred within one generation of copying or later. Neither *Versio Antiqua* nor the 7th-Century Recension needs to have been copied directly from the proposed errant manuscript; they may have been copied from it or any manuscript descendant from it.

2.1.2.2 The Redaction of the *Acta*

Many of the studies concerning Chalcedon have identified different aspects of the editorial work performed on the *Acta*. Price and Gaddis identify the status of Constantinople over against Rome as a significant issue at and after Chalcedon. This is attested in the letters attached to the *Acta* proper and in the editorial decisions demonstrated in its protocol. The 27 canons inserted after the promulgation of the *Definition* (Session VI) were thought to be drafted by Bishop Anatolius and are not discussed in the sessions.¹¹⁵ The 28th canon, on the other hand, is the subject of the 17th and final session. Price and Gaddis suggest that its placement separate from the other canons and at the end of *Acta* gives it added emphasis.¹¹⁶ The declaration of Constantinople as the New Rome was, of course, opposed by Pope Leo and is thought to be one of the reasons for the delay in the Pope's recognition of the official acts.¹¹⁷ In comparison with the original protests of the Roman delegations, preserved in Latin, the protests recorded in the Acts are relatively muted,

The apostolic see has given instructions that everything should be transacted in our presence, and therefore, if anything contrary to the canons was transacted yesterday in our absence before this court, we ask your sublimity to order that it be nullified, so that no contention on our part be recorded in these minutes, and to let us know clearly what to report to the apostolic bishop, leader of the whole church, so that he may be able to pass sentence on either the insult to his own see or the overturning of the canons. (Greek)

The apostolic see ought not to be humiliated in our presence, and therefore we ask your sublimity to order that whatever was transacted yesterday in our absence in prejudice of the canons or rules be nullified. But if otherwise, let our formal objection be recorded in the minutes, so that we may know what we ought to report to the apostolic man the pope of the universal church, so

¹¹⁵ In ACO VI.16, the emperor asked for a session concerning the 27 Canons. *CChal* 1:79, 81 fn. 277; ACO 2.1.3, xxvii. Price, "Truth," 98–99.

¹¹⁶ *CChal* 1:81.

¹¹⁷ *CChal* 1:84.

that he may pass sentence on either the insult to his see or the overturning of the canons. (Latin) (ACO XVII.45 [*CChal* III:91, ftn. 51])¹¹⁸

At several other places, in comparison to the Latin accounts recorded in the letters and translations, the *Acta* appear to tone down language attributing to Leo a status exalted above the other archbishops (ACO II.94; II.97).¹¹⁹ However, this is not entirely consistent; for example, in Pascasinus' signature at Session VI (§9), the *Acta* downplay the status he claims, which is synodical president in *Versio Rustici*, but maintain the acclaims for Leo as the "apostolic bishop of the universal church."¹²⁰ Mari views the "downgrading" of Leo's status throughout the *Acta* and of Pascasinus' status here as consistent with the overall tendency of the *Acta* to "undercut the role of the Roman See at the Council."¹²¹ Price and Gaddis observe that the editors of the letter collections "seem to have gone out of their way to diminish Pope Leo's prominence by emphasizing instead the complaints of the western emperor Valentinian II and the imperial princesses Galla Placidia and Licinia Eudoxia against Ephesus II, and their demands for a new council."¹²² For example, the first letter in Collection M has various passages removed in which the Pope makes appeals to canonical authorities concerning his authority in the East.¹²³ There is, therefore, tangible anti-Roman bias present in the *Acta*, which affects the interpretive strategies it furnishes for reading the *Definition*.

¹¹⁸ Cf. ACO XVII.1-16. Cf. ACO 2.1.1, xxiv.

¹¹⁹ Cf. ACO 2.3.2, 72 lns. 1-2. See the original Latin for Session II.94, at ACO 2.4, 156, lns. 21-22, "*caput uniuersalis ecclesiae*." Mari, "The Latin Translations," 142-43.

¹²⁰ Cf. Mari, "The Latin Translations," 150-51.

¹²¹ Mari, "The Latin Translations," 144, 150-51, cf. 129-30.

¹²² *CChal* 1:80. Cf. ACO 2.1.1, x.

¹²³ This letter appears again in its full form as Letter 12 in the same collection. *CChal* 1:81; ACO 2.1.1, x-xi.

There are other instances of editorial work that appear to remove material that could be used to undermine the *Definition*. In Session III and again at Session IV, we are told of a private meeting where theological objections to Leo's *Tome* were answered (ACO II.31-33; IV.9.98, 114), yet we are given no other information on this meeting.¹²⁴ In Session III and again in Session V are also told about the initial meeting that created the draft *Definition* but are not given details on its activities (ACO III.2, 6, 31; V.7-8).¹²⁵ The protocol explicitly states that this draft is not included (ACO V.3). We are told that "the Romans and some of the Orientals" objected to the draft *Definition* (ACO V.6); the objection of John of Germanicia, representing the Oriental party, is mentioned but not recorded. We are told that "the most devout bishops" requested the inclusion of the θεοτόκος formula, which we may infer was absent from the draft (ACO V.8).¹²⁶ The Roman delegation makes a more significant objection, apparently seeking to bring the *Definition* more in line with the *Tome* of Leo (ACO V.9, 26-28). As a result, Anatolius (the imperial official) demands that the bishops include key terminology from Leo's *Tome* (ACO V.17, 20-21).¹²⁷ There is then a committee to finalise the *Definition*, the workings of which are again not included (ACO V.10, 29). Thus, there is evidence that there was theological discussion and debate during the council sessions, but the actual content of these debates and discussions was removed in the Acts. Price and Gaddis plausibly suggest that the

¹²⁴ At sec. 9 of session IV a list of signatures is appended, the 98th and 114th signature are cited here.

¹²⁵ Cf. Price, "Truth," 97–98.

¹²⁶ Cf. *CChal* 2:184-185.

¹²⁷ Anatolius is a significant figure in the Byzantine Empire, de Ste. Croix describes him as "a most distinguished and successful diplomat." See Croke, "Anatolius and Nomus: Envoys to Attila"; de Ste. Croix, "The Council," 289–91.

reason for omitting the draft (and for other noticeable omissions) was to remove any fodder for the Council's critics.¹²⁸

There are two more significant omissions (or fictions) in the *Acta*. The *Acta* did not include the sessions dealing with several monks ("Session on Carosus and Dorotheus") and concerning metropolitan rights ("Session on Photius and Eustathius").¹²⁹ Price and Gaddis have translated these at the end of Session IV, which is the chronological position of these sessions. It is not clear why the two incidents were omitted from the *Acta*.¹³⁰ More significantly, many of the attendance lists in the *Acta*—"all but one"—are derived from the subscription list for the *Definition*, which was carefully compiled.¹³¹ Honigmann has refined Schwartz's initial analysis of the lists.¹³² According to Price, the manufactured lists for the sessions "disguise... the poor attendance at Sessions II [ACO III] and IV." "This was a sufficiently large number [of absentees] to dent the ability of the council to claim to be the voice of the whole church."¹³³ In Price's opinion, the bishops' actions to try Dioscorus and restore the bishops deposed in Session I saw the attendance for the crucial Session V restored to an acceptable level.¹³⁴

In the same essay cited above, Richard Price argues that the editors of the Acts had the difficult task of presenting final unanimity on the *Definition* (presumed to be necessary for a council) while maintaining sufficient evidence of disagreement to avoid the charges levelled

¹²⁸ *CChal* 2:196 fn. 33.

¹²⁹ Price, "Truth," 100.

¹³⁰ ACO 2.1.3, xxii-xxx.

¹³¹ The "one" is Session II (Session III in the English translation). See Price, "Truth," 101–4.

¹³² Honigmann, "The Original Lists." Cf. *CChal* 3:196–201.

¹³³ Price, "Truth," 104.

¹³⁴ Price, "Truth," 104.

against Ephesus II, of complete coercion and false unanimity.¹³⁵ “The emperor Marcian was therefore concerned that at Chalcedon there should be free debate and faithful minutes that recorded disagreements—within, however, certain limits.”¹³⁶ Beyond the omissions that are evident, “The sheer brevity of the record is proof of extensive omissions.”¹³⁷

The two sides of the editorial agenda revealed from a close reading of the Acts, namely, to support the authority of the *Definition* and to assert the authority of Constantinople over against Leo, affect our interpretation of the *Definition*. On the one hand, because the *Definition* must be presented as a unanimous document, there are deliberate omissions of conversation and debate that would give insight into theological transformations allowing previously disagreeing parties to come to an agreement. Furthermore, the Acts must overcome any objection recorded. In particular, it must uphold the antinomy of Ephesus’s Canon 7 (prohibiting new creeds after Nicaea) and the production of a statement or clarification of the faith. The latter dynamic has been explored extensively in the literature, particularly in Mark Smith’s *The Idea of Nicaea*, Chapter 7 (see below).¹³⁸ On the other hand, the efforts to undermine Leo’s authority are reflected in the *Definition*’s own placement of the *Tome* vis-à-vis Cyril (see below). The *Acta* and the *Definition* express a delicate balance of honouring Leo, ensuring his support and the support of the West, while not undercutting the council’s distinctly Eastern agenda and provenance. Having identified the broad interpretive perspective provided

¹³⁵ Price, “Truth,” 92–95.

¹³⁶ Price, “Truth,” 96.

¹³⁷ Price, “Truth,” 96. Cf. Thomas Graumann, “Orthodoxy, Authority and the (Re-) Construction of the Past in Church Councils,” in *Invention, Rewriting, Usurpation: Discursive Fights over Religious Traditions in Antiquity*, ed. Jörg Ulrich, Anders-Christian Jacobsen, and David Brakke, Early Christianity in the Context of Antiquity v. 11 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2012).

¹³⁸ *CChal* 3:105; Price, “The Council of Chalcedon (451): A Narrative”; Smith, *The Idea*, chap. 7; De Ste. Croix, “The Council,” 284–294.

by the *Acta*, we will now turn to the question, what interpretive lens does the *Acta* give to the *Definition of Chalcedon*? We will see how the details we have thus far considered, especially the two-sided editorial agenda they reveal, affect the interpretive lens the *Acta* give for the *Definition*. It is a lens shaped by an agenda of simultaneously placating the West while upholding the primacy of distinctly Eastern themes and giving universal, binding significance to the *Definition* without incurring the charge of violating Canon 7 and Nicene priority.

2.2 INTERPRETING THE DEFINITION

The need for an explicit interpretive strategy arises from the picture presented by the *Acta*'s protocol. Despite their carefully crafted, ideological presentation, the *Acta* do not disguise the troubles facing the production and reception of the *Definition*. Not only was the idea of a new exposition of the Faith—even a *Definition* (ὁμός)—abhorrent to the bishops (e.g. ACO III.2-8), but the *Definition* is also our only evidence of theological agreement among the bishops. As noted above, there is very little substantive theological discussion in the Acts: the minutes of the key meetings where matters were clarified and the *Definition* was produced are not included in the *Acta*, and there is evidence of the suppression of what theological debate occurred in the sessions themselves. So, though we are *told* that various parties were satisfied with the clarifications of Leo's *Tome*, and they give their signatures to the *Tome* and the *Definition*, we are repeatedly *shown* examples of the significant theological disagreement or ambivalence among the members of the Council, including those who would sign the *Definition*. For example, there are numerous bishops who were present at the Constantinople

home synod of 448, Ephesus II of 449, and Chalcedon; these bishops expressed opposing views at each meeting.¹³⁹

Furthermore, before the initial meeting to draft the *Definition*, Atticus of Nicopolis requested the controversial *Third Letter of Nestorius* (ACO V.14, cf. III).¹⁴⁰ His request is ignored by the officials, and the letter is not mentioned again at Chalcedon. With its twelve anathemas, the letter would appear to be at odds with the *Definition* itself, with its conciliatory approach to the Antiochenes. Thus, we have evidence that Atticus would not have agreed with the strongly dyophysite *Definition* and no evidence that he changed his mind prior to Session V; however, he was part of the committee that produced the final *Definition*, along with 12 others who had supported Dioscorus at Ephesus II (ACO V.29, cf. I.298; I.884(26); II.29).¹⁴¹ It is certainly possible that he changed his mind, as attested by his participation here and signature, but we are reminded of Geoffrey de Ste. Croix's observation, quoted above (pg. 32), that this Council was as much "an engine of coercion" as Ephesus II. This conclusion is consistent with the bulk of contemporary scholarship on the council.¹⁴² The evidence of this coercion is, perhaps, most clearly seen in Session V itself.

We are told that the draft of the *Definition* was not included in the final *Acta* (ACO V.3), but the discussion at Session V, sections 13 and 26-29, indicates that the draft *Definition* contained the "from two natures" formula favoured by Eutyches and Dioscorus. This *Definition*

¹³⁹ See Session I. See Honigmann on the participants of Chalcedon and the other Councils. Smith, *The Idea*, chap. 7; de Ste. Croix, "The Council," 303-4; Honigmann, "The Original Lists."

¹⁴⁰ Price and Gaddis observe that no clear charge emerges from the 2nd session (III in their numbering). *CChal* 2:30-35. Cf. Gaddis, *There Is No Crime*, 318.

¹⁴¹ See the discussion in *The Acts* for the character of the final committee. *CChal* 2:188-189. Cf. *CCHAL* Vol. 1, 298 fn.199.

¹⁴² De Ste. Croix, "The Council," 274. Cf. Price, "The Council of Chalcedon (451): A Narrative."

is proclaimed completely satisfactory (V.6, 11-12), with nothing lacking (V.18). There is some discussion concerning the inclusions of θεότοκος (Theotokos) (V.8), and John of Germanicia voices objections twice (V.4; V.12). However, the most sustained objection is that of the imperial officials (V.13-21, 26-28; cf. III.2-8). They will not have “from two natures”; instead, despite the repeated protestations of the bishops, they demand that this phrase be replaced with “two natures in Christ” (V.26, 28). In this discussion, the bishops declare that Dioscorus was not deposed for his theology (V.14), thus, they were comfortable with a conciliatory *Definition* (the draft) that contained “from two” without the contentious language of Leo’s *Tome* (cf. ACO II.31-33; IV.9.98, 114). However, under pressure from the officials and Marcian himself (V. 21-22), forcing them to choose who they followed, “the Most holy Leo, or Dioscorus?” (V.26) they declared, “We believe in the same way Leo did; those who speak otherwise are Eutychians. Leo gave an orthodox exposition” (ACO V.27).¹⁴³

Until this point, there is evidence of disagreement on this issue and willingness to accept both idioms, yet under imperial pressure, “from two natures” is now declared heterodox. Thus, we have good reason to think that at least some bishops would have wanted to construe the *Definition*, in the both the draft and final form, in a way different than the Imperial authorities would have. This is the case even though Dioscorus was an ardent defender of Eutyches and an opponent of Flavian and Leo’s two-nature theology. There is evidence from the following century of the willingness for bishops to practice what Gray calls the “double movement,” simultaneously revising their own prior beliefs and those of their authorities while denying the

¹⁴³ Ὡς λέων, οὕτως πιστεύομεν. οἱ ἀντιλέγοντες Εὐτυχανισταί εἰσιν. Λέων ὀρθοδόξως ἐξέθετο.

change and expressing complete continuity.¹⁴⁴ Some of the bishops here may have been ready to engage in such interpretive manoeuvres after the council.

Thus, the *Definition* and its drafting process are opaque in such a way as to open the door for interpretive plurality and ambiguity after the *Definition*'s dissemination, a problem only compounded by the tensions between the bishops and the Imperial authorities. The silence of the *Definition* as to the interpretation of its own terms has heightened the sense of ambiguity for some, leading Richard Norris to posit that the *Definition* does not have explicit content, that it furnishes regulatory language, and Sarah Coakley to the conclusion that it presents both a boundary ruling out aberrant views and "a 'riddle' of negatives by means of which a greater (though undefined) reality may be intimated."¹⁴⁵ However, at the very least, Marcian was concerned to avoid this outcome. Concerning the draft, it could very well have been interpreted in a Dioscorian light; however, the Imperial officials took significant measures to correct that specific outcome. Having acted at this point, we could expect that they would take action at the later point of the publication of the *Acta* and its *Definition* to ensure their reading was secured. This is indeed what we see. There has been significant effort in the editing of the *Acta* to give concrete content to the *Definition*.

The ambiguity of the *Definition* may have been mitigated by the novelty of the *Definition*: though it uses language clearly identified with preceding documents, it is not self-

¹⁴⁴ Consider, for example, those who were at all three councils. Patrick T. R. Gray, "Covering the Nakedness of Noah: Reconstruction and Denial in the Age of Justinian," *ByzF* 24 (1997): 193–205. Cf. Patrick T. R. Gray, "'The Select Fathers': Canonizing the Patristic Past," in *StPat* 23 (Leuven: Peeters, 1989), 21–36.

¹⁴⁵ Richard A Norris, "Chalcedon Revisited: A Historical and Theological Reflection," in *New Perspectives on Historical Theology: Essays in Memory of John Meyendorff* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 140–58; Sarah Coakley, "What Does Chalcedon Solve," 160–61.

evident that the document fits into any one of the pre-Chalcedonian paradigms.¹⁴⁶ It incorporates language from a range of documents, as observed by de Halleux, Martzelos, and Leuenberger-Wenger; thus, all paradigms would need adjustment to accommodate the *Definition*.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, the way the *Acta* bring together the prior sources and relate them may alter the construal of each part independent of this whole, requiring a further adjustment as old terms may take new connotations in combination with the content of the *Definition*. It is not just the *Definition* itself that would move towards a unique construal of its parts vis-à-vis prior schools, but the protocol shapes our interpretation of the documents and events it records as much as the documents and recorded speech shape our understanding of the whole.¹⁴⁸ As we are reminded, “The protocols were never the portrayal of an event but the representation of its significance”; “every protocol must be understood, ultimately, as an editorial product which serves the overarching intentions of the conciliar authorities.”¹⁴⁹ The intentionality of this editorial effort, along with the bishops’ own self-conscious acknowledgement of and effort to mitigate potential difficulties involved in interpreting the *Definition* (ACO V.34), stands to overcome this ambiguity. This is what we will argue in the final section of this chapter.

Though the bishops appear to have tolerated some level of divergence among themselves and, so, would perhaps have been comfortable with a *Definition* that was to some extent ambiguous or polyvalent, along the lines of Norris and Coakley’s claims cited above,

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Leuenberger-Wenger, *Das Konzil*, 241–58.

¹⁴⁷ Martzelos, *Γένεση Καὶ Πηγές Τοῦ Ὁρου Τῆς Χαλκηδόνος*; Martzelos, “Ἡ Καταγωγή Τῆς Δογματικῆς Φορμουλᾶς Τοῦ Οἰκουμενικοῦ Συνοδίου τῆς Χαλκηδόνος”; de Halleux, “À Propos d’une Lecture Cyrillienne de La Définition Christologique de Chalcédoine”; de Halleux, “La Définition Christologique à Chalcédoine 1”; de Halleux, “La Définition Christologique à Chalcédoine 2”; Leuenberger-Wenger, *Das Konzil*, chap. 3.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Graumann, *The Acts*, 258–62.

¹⁴⁹ Graumann, *The Acts*, 259, 262.

this would not have suited the aims of Marcian.¹⁵⁰ In Session III, the imperial officials declare that the particular reason for this council was the confirmation of the true faith (V.2) so that those who didn't think as everyone else did "would be restored to unanimity."¹⁵¹ They were to produce a common exposition "so that if everyone comes to an agreement, every controversy would be resolved, which is our wish, and if anyone thinks something contrary, which we do not anticipate, that their opinions would be made evident" (ACO III.6).¹⁵² To do this, the *Definition* would need to have definite meaning; indeed, the openness permitted by the draft *Definition*, with the affirmation of Leo's *Tome* along with the phrase "from two natures," would be contrary to the purpose of ideological harmony here stated, explaining why the Imperial Officials so forcefully intervened at this point. Not only did the *Definition* need to withstand the scrutiny that would be given it, but there also needed to be clear interpretive parameters securing this end. As we have seen, the protocol offers an interpretation of the historical council; through its narrative and selection of materials, the protocol also leads us to an interpretation of its contents, including the all-important *Definition*. Reading closely, we find three interpretive strategies furnished by the *Acta* for the interpretation of the *Definition*: first, the *Acta* overcome the challenge of Ephesus's Canon 7 by situating the *Definition* as an exposition of the sufficient Nicene creed, not an addition. Second, the *Acta* offer a list of authorities for interpreting Nicaea and its technical terminology. Third, drawing on the council's discussion of Cyril's two conciliar letters and Leo's *Tome*, the *Definition* states that it is to be interpreted by Cyril's letters and Leo's *Tome*. These letters are identified as

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Price, "The Council of Chalcedon (451): A Narrative"; De Ste. Croix, "The Council of Chalcedon with Additions by Michael Whitby."

¹⁵¹ ὥστε καὶ τοὺς δοκοῦντας μὴ ταῦτὰ πᾶσιν πεφρονηκέναι τῇ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπιγνώσει ἐπαναχθῆναι εἰς τὴν ὁμόνοιαν.

¹⁵² ὥστε εἰ μὲν σύνθοιντο πάντες, λυθῆναι πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν, ὅπερ εὐχόμεθα· εἰ δέ τινες, ὅπερ οὐχ ἡγούμεθα, ἐναντία φρονήσαιεν, ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων φανεράς καταστῆναι γνώμας.

refutations of those errors denied in the *Definition* and as an interpretation (ἐρμηνείαν) of the Creed. We will argue for each strategy in turn.

2.2.1 Interpretive Strategy 1 – The Definition Vis-à-vis Nicaea

First, the *Acta* overcomes the challenge of the so-called Canon 7 of Ephesus I by situating the *Definition* as an exposition of the Nicene creed, not an addition. The statement in the 22 July session of Ephesus I, which came to be known as Canon 7, had forbidden the creation of any new creed other than the Nicene creed, “The holy council laid down that no one is allowed to produce or write or compose another creed beside the one laid down with [the aid of] the Holy Spirit by the holy fathers assembled at Nicaea”¹⁵³ (cf. ACO I.943). In practice, this declared the Nicene Creed to be a sufficient rule of orthodoxy, “it is pious and sufficient to secure the benefit of the world under heaven” (a similar claim is made in the *Definition of Chalcedon*).¹⁵⁴ To overcome the charge that it was an addition to the Nicene Creed and, therefore, in violation of Canon 7, the *Acta* presents the *Definition* as an exposition of the Creed.

In his 2017 monograph, *The Idea of Nicaea in the Early Church Councils, AD 431-451*, Mark Smith “seeks to analyse the ways in which the idea of ‘Nicaea’ functioned in the conciliar context of the mid-fifth century.”¹⁵⁵ We are not concerned here with his entire thesis; rather, our interest lies in his discussion of Chalcedon in Chapter 7. Smith argues that Nicaea presented both a problem and a solution: it could be appealed to by radically different parties as the

¹⁵³ 22 July Session, §77, translated in Richard Price and Thomas Graumann, eds., *The Council of Ephesus of 431: Documents and Proceedings*, Translated Texts for Historians 72 (Council of Ephesus Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, presented at the Council of Ephesus, 2020), 469. For the place of this excerpt in Acts of Ephesus at this point, see *The Council of Ephesus*, 431-443.

¹⁵⁴ 22 July Session, §4, translated in *The Council of Ephesus*, 447.

¹⁵⁵ Smith, *The Idea*, 2.

standard by which they were orthodox, and it could be employed to unite disparate parties.¹⁵⁶ This was a period of “self-conscious formulation of tradition,”¹⁵⁷ within which appeals to Nicaea were “neither irredeemably vacuous, nor drearily static.”¹⁵⁸ Smith’s study of the reception of Nicaea and its interpretation at Chalcedon identifies a significant problem that Chalcedon was called to address and the “reading strategy,” or narrative, the *Definition* employs to solve that problem.¹⁵⁹ At Chalcedon, “Nicaea” or “Nicaea and Ephesus” functioned as declarations of orthodoxy and continuity with the Church, despite being uttered by parties with significantly different Christological views or by those who apparently switched their position from Constantinople to Ephesus II and back at Chalcedon.¹⁶⁰ He observes how the Nicene Creed had a certain “plasticity” in these confessions, for those at the council appealed to their fidelity to Nicaea in order to justify their alternating theological positions, such as the condemnation and then acceptance of Eutyches: “‘Nicaea’ proved sufficiently flexible to encompass the wide variety of the theological positions that these bishops had successively adopted.”¹⁶¹ In this way, Nicaea was too broad to settle the present debates, yet Canon 7 from Ephesus I was cited by the bishops against any effort to produce another authoritative document that could function in this way (e.g. ACO III.7).¹⁶² So, the challenge Marcian faced in bringing theological unity to his Empire, as the heir of Constantine and Nicaea, was to say something

¹⁵⁶ Smith, *The Idea*, 2.

¹⁵⁷ Richard Lim, *Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity*, Transformation of the Classical Heritage 23 (Berkeley: Univ of California Press, 1995), 228.

¹⁵⁸ Smith, *The Idea*, 1.

¹⁵⁹ “Reading strategy” is a term used throughout the monograph, along with the related language of “hermeneutic” and “narrative.” Smith, *The Idea*, 23–24, 32, 185–86.

¹⁶⁰ Smith 172–185, esp. 173–177.

¹⁶¹ Smith, *The Idea*, 173, 173–75.

¹⁶² Smith, *The Idea*, 183–93, 209–11.

Nicaea did not say while simultaneously affirming Nicaea's authority and sufficiency.¹⁶³ Smith draws attention to several places in the *Acta* and surrounding letters where an answer to this problem is presented by appeals to interpretive traditions that reapplied the originally "sufficient" Creed to new circumstances. The primary example of this was the hitherto unrecognised Creed of Constantinople, a significant example of expanding the scope of Nicaea without overturning its sufficiency in the eyes of the bishops.¹⁶⁴ The move of appealing to interpretive authorities and applications of Nicaea made room for the *Definition of Chalcedon*, a document that did not move beyond Nicaea but gave an authoritative application of it to the particular Christological crisis the Church faced.¹⁶⁵

The *Definition* was thus not an addition to the Creed in violation of Canon 7, as Constantinople was not, nor was it restricted to merely reiterating what was said at Nicaea. The *Definition* presents itself as an exposition or application of the sufficient Nicene Creed against a new threat, much as Constantinople employed the resources of Nicaea to address errors concerning the Spirit. A key piece of evidence to which Smith appeals for this argument is the letter "Address to Marcian" or *Adlocutio*.¹⁶⁶ The letter was incorporated in the Acts as "an appendage."¹⁶⁷ The *Adlocutio* is concerned with defending the *Tome* against the charge of novelty. Price dates it prior to the 4th session, Smith to somewhere between the 2nd and 4th sessions.¹⁶⁸ The *Adlocutio* gives "a narrative of subsequent clarifications to the Nicene faith, in

¹⁶³ Smith, *The Idea*, 177, 182, 187–91; Leuenberger-Wenger, *Das Konzil*, 213–14. Cf. *CChal* 1:90.

¹⁶⁴ E.g. Leuenberger-Wenger, *Das Konzil*, 241. Cf. *CChal* 1:365 ftn 520; 2:191–194; J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2006), chap. 10.

¹⁶⁵ Smith, *The Idea*, 200–203.

¹⁶⁶ ACO 2.2.1, 469–475

¹⁶⁷ *CChal* 3:106. Cf. Leo to Theodoret 11 June 453. Ep. 120 in ACO 2.2.4, 80.

¹⁶⁸ *CChal* 3:105–107; Smith, *The Idea*, 193.

order to show that the *Tomus* was not innovatory, but rather stood in a noble tradition.”¹⁶⁹ The framing of the problem on the opening pages of the *Adlocutio* is similar to the challenges raised against the proposal for the *Definition* and its final form (cf. ACO sessions III.3-5; V.24). This narrative of the continued application of Nicaea while affirming its complete sufficiency is found in the *Definition* itself. The *Definition* first states,

We therefore decree—we ourselves upholding the order and all the decrees of the faith of the holy synod formerly taking place at Ephesus, over which presided the most holy in memory Celestine of Rome and Cyril of Alexandria—on the one hand, that the exposition of the right and spotless faith by the 318 holy and blessed fathers at Nicaea, gathered together by the pious in memory Constantine who was then Emperor, shines forth preeminent and, on the other hand, that the decrees of the 150 holy fathers in Constantinople give support for the uprooting of heresies that then sprung up and the confirmation of the same universal and apostolic faith which is ours. (ACO V.31 [2.1.2, 127 lns 1-8])

They then continue, affirming “this wise and saving Creed of divine grace was sufficient for complete knowledge of and confirmation of godliness” (ACO V.34 [2.1.2, 128 lns 15-16]). After citing recent “nonsense” concerning the incarnation, they then decree “firstly that the faith [πίστιν] of the 318 holy fathers is to remain inviolate. Because of those who made war against the Holy Spirit, [the council] confirms [the teaching of Constantinople vis-à-vis the Spirit]” (ACO V.34 [2.1.2, 129 lns. 1-6]). The Nicene Creed is stated to be sufficient and pre-eminent; the Constantinopolitan Creed has the role of supporting the Nicene Creed, which gives the content of the universal, apostolic faith by removing specific heresies and confirming the faith expressed by the 318 fathers. Thus, Nicaea is sufficient, but documents such as the Constantinopolitan Creed have a role as applications of that faith to new issues. As argued above, the *Definition* is given such a role in the *Acta*.

¹⁶⁹ Smith, *The Idea*, 193.

This strategy of situating the *Definition* as an application of Nicaea allowed for the *Definition*'s acceptance despite Canon 7 and provided the first strategy for interpreting the *Definition*. The *Definition* is positioned vis-à-vis Nicaea as an interpretive application. Nicaea did not itself address the issues addressed by the *Definition*, but the latter uses conceptual tools inherited from the Nicene tradition to combat the new errors. It does not define these conceptual tools, such as ὁμοούσιος, but employs them, assuming their meaning. Positioned downstream of Nicaea and using the same tools as Nicaea, the *Definition* invites us to interpret its conceptual apparatus in the same way as Nicaea. However, the history of Nicaea's reception in the 4th century was by no means simple; giving conceptual content to the key terms used in the Creed requires the second interpretive strategy employed by the Acts.

2.2.2 Interpretive Strategy 2 – Authoritative (Greek) Fathers

Second, the *Acta* offers a list of authorities to which reference could be made. Throughout the minutes and the accompanying letters, Fathers from the decades prior are invoked for various purposes. Christological *florilegia* appear at numerous points in the documents surrounding Chalcedon, including as an attachment to Leo's *Tome*.¹⁷⁰ Most significantly for our purposes, at several points, Fathers are referred to for the interpretation of Nicaea and its technical language, including ὑπόστασις (a term that gained significance in the discussion after Nicaea). In the minutes of Ephesus I, referenced but not quoted in the Greek acts,¹⁷¹ Peter (*primicerius*

¹⁷⁰ On the beginnings of this pattern of theological argument here and its development, see Gray, "The Select Fathers."

¹⁷¹ *CChal* 1:297 fn. 339.

of notaries from Alexandria) puts it this way, introducing a florilegium in favour of Cyril's Christology,

because certain people, while pretending to profess and accept it, misinterpret the force of the ideas according to their own pleasures, and distort the truth, being sons of error and children of perdition, it has become absolutely necessary to set out statements by the holy and orthodox fathers that can show convincingly in what way they understood the creed and had the confidence to proclaim it, so that, evidently, all who hold the correct and irreproachable faith may also understand, interpret, and proclaim it accordingly.¹⁷²

The florilegium goes on to quote from Peter (the 4th century bishop of Alexandria), Athanasius, Julius of Rome, Felix of Rome, Theophilus of Alexandria, Cyprian, Ambrose, Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Atticus of Constantinople, and Amphilochius of Iconium. I do not include this list in the following table and considerations because it is absent in the Greek manuscripts of Chalcedon's *Acta*.

At Chalcedon itself, the officials instructed the bishops to give an account of their faith, "recognizing that the beliefs of our most divine and pious master [Marcian] accord with the creed of the 318 holy fathers at Nicaea and the creed of the 150 fathers after that, with the canonical letters and expositions of the holy fathers Gregory, Basil, Hilary, Athanasius and Ambrose, and with the two canonical letters of Cyril which were approved and published at the first Council of Ephesus" (*ACO* 1.1072 [*CChal* I, pp. 364-365]).¹⁷³ In response to the push for a new exposition of the faith in Session III, Cecropius of Sebastopolis stated, "The faith was well defined by the 318 holy fathers and confirmed by the holy fathers Athanasius, Cyril, Celestine, Hilary, Basil, Gregory, and now again by the most holy Leo" (*ACO* III.9 [*CChal* I,

¹⁷² *CChal* 1:300-301. It can be found in *ACO* 1.1.2 (*Concilium Universale Ephesenum*), 63-64.

¹⁷³ Repeated at *ACO* IV.3.

p. 11]). Just before this, Florentius of Sardis cited Cyril, Celestine, and the *Tome* of Leo (ACO III.8). Eusebius of Dorylaeum and Dioscorus provided lists of Fathers in support of their Christology (ACO I.225, 230, 229, 891). When the Bishops of Egypt at Session IV brought their petition to be recused from subscribing to the *Tome*, they cited the orthodox faith of “our holy fathers Athanasius, Theophilus [of Alexandria] and Cyril,” which they hold “in accordance with the definitions of the 318 at Nicaea and of the most blessed Athanasius and Cyril” (ACO IV.25 [*CChal* 2:248]).

In the *Adlocutio*, an appeal is made to Basil’s *Epistle* 125 as an example of an exposition explaining Nicaea, in this case, the meaning of ὑπόστασις and concerning the Holy Spirit.¹⁷⁴ The presence of comments directing the reader to the sources for interpretation, as in this case, shows that the editors of the *Acta* were not interested in leaving the concepts of the *Definition* undefined, though the *Definition* itself does not give them explicit content.¹⁷⁵ Athanasius’ letter to Epictetus and Gregory of Nazianzus’ letter to Cledonius are also cited in the *Adlocutio* as examples to which appeals are made “to clarify the belief of the church in relation to each question” (*CChal* 3:116). The florilegium that follows cites Basil, Ambrose, Gregory Nazianzus, Athanasius, Amphilochius, Antiochus, Flavian, Chrysostom, Atticus, Proclus, Cyril, John of Antioch, and John of Constantinople. In a letter to the monks of Alexandria, Marcian appeals to three Alexandrian bishops, “the holy catholic council at Chalcedon made absolutely no innovations in respect of the apostolic faith but followed in all things the teaching of Athanasius, Theophilus and Cyril of devout memory.”¹⁷⁶ Finally, the florilegium attached

¹⁷⁴ *CChal* 3:115, cf. fn 35.

¹⁷⁵ Contra Coakley, “What Does Chalcedon Solve and What Does It Not? Some Reflections on the Status and Meaning of the Chalcedonian ‘Definition,’” 148; John Hick, ed., *The Myth of God Incarnate*, 1st ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), 178.

¹⁷⁶ *CChal* 3:154.

to the *Tome* has 18 passages from Hilary, Gregory of Nazianzus, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Augustine, and Cyril.

Figure 4 Lists of Authorities from the conciliar parties at Chalcedon (italics, Latin; underline, most frequent)

Session I (Eusebius of Dorylaeum)	Session I and IV	Session III (Florentius and Cecropius)	Adlocutio	Adlocutio Florilegium	Tome Florilegium
1. <u>Cyril</u> 2. <u>Athanasius</u> 3. Gregory the Great (Illuminator) 4. <u>Gregory</u> (<u>Nazianzus</u>) 5. Gregory (Nyssa) 6. Atticus 7. Proclus	1. <i>Ambrose</i> 2. <u>Athanasius</u> 3. <u>Basil</u> (<u>Caesarea</u>) 4. <i>Celestine</i> 5. <u>Cyril</u> 6. <u>Gregory</u> (<u>Nazianzus</u>) 7. <i>Hilary</i> 8. <i>Leo</i>	1. <u>Athanasius</u> 2. <u>Basil</u> (<u>Caesarea</u>) 3. <i>Celestine</i> 4. <u>Cyril</u> 5. <u>Gregory</u> (<u>Nazianzus</u>) 6. <i>Hilary</i> 7. <i>Leo</i>	1. <u>Athanasius</u> 2. <u>Basil</u> (<u>Caesarea</u>) 3. <u>Gregory</u> (<u>Nazianzus</u>)	1. <i>Ambrose</i> 2. Amphilochius 3. Antiochus 4. <u>Athanasius</u> 5. Atticus 6. <u>Basil</u> (<u>Caesarea</u>) 7. Chrysostom 8. <u>Cyril</u> 9. Flavian 10. <u>Gregory</u> (<u>Nazianzus</u>) 11. John (Antioch) 12. John (Constantinople) 13. Proclus	1. <i>Ambrose</i> 2. <i>Augustine</i> 3. Chrysostom 4. <u>Cyril</u> 5. <u>Gregory</u> (<u>Nazianzus</u>) 6. <i>Hilary</i>

The four persons most cited in these lists of authorities are Athanasius, Basil Caesarea, Cyril, and Gregory of Nazianzus. The Latin fathers Hilary and Ambrose are a close second. This is consistent with the lists of Eusebius, Dioscorus, and the florilegium from Ephesus I (absent in the Greek manuscripts of Chalcedon). That florilegium and the lists of Eusebius and Dioscorus are authorities appealed to for certain Christologies. The lists in Session I (repeated in Session IV), Session III, and in the *Adlocutio* are explicitly authorities explaining the received interpretation of Nicaea. In each of these, the names Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory are given in common.

Given their status as prominent and prolific defenders of Nicaea and their significant roles in the Arian controversies of the 4th century, the prominence of these three makes sense. The presence of the Latin fathers in the lists is consistent with the efforts of the Greek-speaking council to present itself as ecumenical; however, given the lack of multilingual proficiency in the East and the West, it is likely that the majority of Greek bishops could not read the Latin fathers except in translations, likewise for the Latin bishops (the *Tome*'s florilegium would come from Latin translations of the Greek Fathers).¹⁷⁷ Thus, though the *Acta* presents a broader array of the authorities, for practical purposes as a Greek document for the Greek-speaking Empire, the authorities that would be at hand for interpreting Nicaea and the *Definition* are Athanasius, Basil of Caesarea, and Gregory of Nazianzus. Cyril is cited along with these three, but reference is made to the Christological letters and his refutation of Nestorius, not his Trinitarian writings. Thus, as authorities for interpreting the Nicene Creed, the former three are pre-eminent.

In addition to the lists given above, Cyril and his conciliar letters, along with Leo's *Tome*, are put forth throughout the *Acta* as the primary interpretive references for the Christological teaching of the *Definition*: we find readings, affirmations of, and subscriptions to Leo's *Tome* and Cyril's two conciliar letters (*Second Letter to Nestorius* and *Letter to John of Antioch*) in Sessions III (§§18, 19, 22; cf. 23-28) and IV (§§6-8, 30, 39, 46). These three letters are also given a prominent position in the *Definition* itself, giving us the third interpretive strategy for reading the *Definition*.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Bardy, *La question des langues dans l'église ancienne*, 223–29; Millar, "Linguistic Co-Existence in Constantinople"; Mari, "Greek, Latin, and More."

2.2.3 Interpretive Strategy 3 – The Conciliar Letters of Cyril and Leo as the Definition’s Interpreters

As noted above, the committee producing the *Definition* appears to have been conscious of potential interpretive difficulties involved in the document they drafted. In addition to relating the *Definition* to the Nicene Creed, as argued above, they identify Cyril’s two conciliar letters and Leo’s *Tome* as the proper recourse for interpretive help.¹⁷⁸ This is what we will argue in this section; we will also argue that Leo’s *Tome* is subordinated to Cyril’s two letters. In this way, they explicitly state the method of interpretation that ought to be adopted.

As discussed in section 2.2.1 above, the *Definition* itself states that the Nicene Creed is entirely sufficient “for complete knowledge of and confirmation of godliness,” identifying the Constantinopolitan Creed as support for Nicaea. Together, these Creeds are given the first place in *Definition*’s hierarchy of authorities, if you will. In light of this strong affirmation of the sufficiency and necessity of the Nicene Creed with the “support” of Constantinople, they continue,

And, because of those who seek to destroy the mystery of the economy and shamelessly speak with frivolity to the effect that the one born from the virgin Mary was a mere man, [the council] accepted (ἐδέξατο) the conciliar letters of the blessed Cyril, who was the shepherd of the church of Alexandria, both to Nestorius and to those of the Orient as being fitting for both the refutation of Nestorius’ madness and the interpretation (ἐρμηνείαν) of the saving creed for those who with pious zeal seek understanding (ἐννοῦν). To these is also suitably attached (συνήρμωσεν), for the confirmation of sound doctrine, the epistle of the president of the great and senior Rome, the most blessed and holy Archbishop Leo, which he wrote to Archbishop Flavian (now among the saints) for the removal of the perversity of Eutyches since it agrees with the confession of the great Peter and is a

¹⁷⁸ Graumann, *The Acts*, 234.

universal pillar against those with false beliefs. (ACO V.34 [2.1.2, 129 lns 6-16])

This second position occupied by the letters of Leo and Cyril solidifies the importance of these documents and their role already presented in the *Acta*; they are to be used for the interpretation (ἐρμηνείαν) of the creed (συμβόλος). Given that the *Definition* is presented as an application of the meaning of the creed and that the content of the three documents cited pertains specifically to the *Definition*, these documents interpret the Nicene tradition as it is seen to culminate thus far with the *Definition*.

Several comments are due on the three documents cited in section 34. “The Letter to those of the Orient” is unequivocally the *Letter to John of Antioch* containing the *Formula of Reunion*.¹⁷⁹ This letter was read and affirmed in the minutes of the Chalcedon and in the source for the *Definition*’s dual consubstantiality formula. Identifying the letter to Nestorius is more controversial since Cyril wrote three Christological letters to Nestorius, and the third letter to Nestorius was significant to many Cyrillians at this time. Accordingly, some claim that the letter mentioned here is the Third Letter (with the Twelve Anathemas, or Twelve Chapters).¹⁸⁰ However, the evidence is decisively in favour of the *Second Letter*. First, as we have already considered, though Bishop Atticus explicitly requests the *Third Letter* prior to the gathering of the draft committee, his request is ignored (ACO III.29). The *Third Letter* was not read in the Acts, nor is it amicable to the final *Definition* (with its strong denunciations of Antiochene Dyophysitism, it was a favourite of Cyrilline Monophysites).¹⁸¹ Furthermore, the short

¹⁷⁹ Regarding the *Second Letter* as well, see Murphy, “The Dogmatic Definition at Chalcedon”; Hans Boersma, “The Chalcedonian Definition: Its Soteriological Implications,” *WTJ* 54, no. 1 (1992): 48–49; *CChal* 1:67–68; Smith, *The Idea*, 192–193.

¹⁸⁰ E.g. Romanides, “St Cyril’s ‘One Physis or Hypostasis of God the Logos Incarnate’ and Chalcedon,” 82.

¹⁸¹ Cf. *CChal* 1:65–75.

discussion of the Twelve Chapters around Ephesus II did not end favourably for the document (ACO I.240, 246, 261, 265-269). Therefore, the *Third Letter* is not likely to be referenced in the *Definition*. Second, the *Second Letter* to Nestorius is amicable to the *Definition*'s final form and is read during the Council's proceedings, receiving unanimous acclaim (ACO III.18-19). Third, as observed by Gaddis and Price, *The Second Letter* is written to show "that the Nicene Creed itself proved Nestorius a heretic," suitable to the aim of the *Definition*.¹⁸² In addition to the two letters of Cyril, the council also "attaches" (συνήρμωσεν) the *Tome of Leo*.

It has been argued that Leo's *Tome* is to be understood as subordinate to Cyril's letters: Cyril's letters are to be consulted for interpretation with the help of Leo's *Tome*.¹⁸³ Συναρμόζω simply means to "fit together" or "join," the specific nature of the union to be supplied by the context.¹⁸⁴ However, Cyril's conciliar letters are accepted (ἐδέξατο) for the interpretation of the creed; Leo's *Tome* is then attached (συνήρμωσεν) to these letters to confirm (βεβαίωσιν) sound doctrine and refute (ἀναιρέσει) Eutyches error. The direct connection of Cyril's letters to the Creed and the *Definition* with Leo's *Tome* then attached to these letters suggests the prominence of the former. In addition, Leo's *Tome* is "suitably" (εἰκότως) attached to Cyril's letters, or as in keeping with them. Cyril's letters are directly stated as the proper recourse for interpretation; Leo's *Tome* is only attached to these letters, not directly related to the Creed as were Cyril's letters, and Leo's *Tomes* is measured (εἰκότως) against Cyril's letters.

¹⁸² *CChal* 2:185.

¹⁸³ E.g. Smith, *The Idea*, 200–203; Uthemann, "Zur Rezeption"; *CChal* 1:67; Richard Price, "Fathers and the Church Councils," in *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Patristics*, ed. Kenneth Parry, The Wiley Blackwell Companions to Religion (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 404. Cf. Graumann, *The Acts*, 234.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. LSJ and PGL, s.v. Συναρμόζω.

This interpretation of the relationship between these letters is strengthened by the parallel relationship the *Definition* gives to Nicaea and Constantinople. Just as Constantinople gives support (κρατεῖν) and is useful for “uprooting” (ἀναίρεσιν) and “confirmation” (βεβαίωσιν), so Leo’s *Tome* is joined (συνήρμωσεν) fittingly (εἰκότως) to Cyril’s letters and is to be used for “confirmation” (βεβαίωσιν) and for the “removal” (ἀναιρέσει) of heresy. In both cases, the chief document is given with a secondary (though nevertheless important) authority attached (see §2.2.1 above on the status of Constantinople vis-à-vis Nicaea). The asymmetry between Cyril’s letters and the *Tome* finds significant support outside of the *Definition*. Whereas Cyril’s conciliar letters receive unanimous acclaim when they are mentioned, the *Tome* is met with hesitancy (cf. ACO IV.98, V.26-28), and it was necessary for the *Adlocutio* to defend it against novelty, something that was not necessary for Cyril’s letters.¹⁸⁵ This is consistent with the anti-Rome bias found throughout the *Acta*. Thus, Leo is simultaneously given a prominent position yet is put in his place. His letter is recognised as valuable, but it is not the decisive authority he hoped it would be. Instead, primacy is given to Cyril’s letters.

Therefore, though Cyril’s letters and the *Tome* are resources for interpreting the Creed, one should move from the former to the latter, giving Cyril’s letters interpretive priority. Price and Gaddis suggest that doing so leads one to a different conclusion than if one were to start with Leo’s *Tome* and move the other way.¹⁸⁶ Thus, the interpretive strategy presented by the *Definition* is to begin with the Nicene tradition as a necessary foundation, employing the three

¹⁸⁵ Cf. de Halleux, *La Définition* 2, 163.

¹⁸⁶ *CChal* 1:67.

letters as “authoritative guides ‘for the instruction of those who with pious zeal seek the meaning of the saving creed.’”¹⁸⁷

2.3 CONCLUSION

Careful attention to the editorial shaping of the *Acta* has helped us to identify three interpretive strategies for reading the *Definition* in its literary context. Adopting these three interpretive strategies gives us the tools to identify the conceptual apparatus at work in the *Definition*, the original problem we set out to resolve in this thesis. We can bring together the first two strategies (for our concern is not that of the *Acta*, to defend the consistency of the document with Nicaea and Ephesus), drawing on the authoritative interpretations of Nicaea provided by Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory of Nazianzus (the most prominent Greek authorities appealed to in the Acts for this purpose) to give a conceptually thick interpretation of the key Nicene concepts used at Chalcedon, namely, identity in substance, the universal analogue, expressed with ὁμοούσιος and οὐσία (with their synonyms) and individuality or thingness, the particular analogue, expressed with ὑπόστασις and (occasionally) πρόσωπον. We will do this in Chapter 3. Then, in Chapters 4 and 5, we will examine these concepts in the authorities given by the third interpretive strategy, the conciliar letters of Cyril (Chapter 4) and Leo’s *Tome* (Chapter 5). In conclusion, Chapter 6 will bring the expositions of the preceding three chapters together to interpret the *Definition*’s conceptual apparatus.

¹⁸⁷ Smith, *The Idea*, 203.

Chapter 3 – Conceptual Apparatuses of 4th-Century Greek Theology

3.1 Homoousios in Athanasius

3.1.1 Homoousios as Substantial, Undivided Unity

3.1.2 The Substantial, Homoousiatic Unity Is Not Aristotle's Primary Substance

3.1.3 Homoousios as Generic Identity

3.1.4 Conclusion

3.2 Homoousios and the Hypostases in Basil of Caesarea

3.2.1 Ontological Parity and Causal Subordination in Basil's Use of Homoousios

3.2.2 Objections from a Stoic Background

3.2.3 An Objection from Divine Simplicity

3.2.4 Conclusion

3.3 Homoousios and the Hypostases in Gregory of Nazianzus

3.3.1 The Common Structure with which Gregory speaks of God's Tri-Unity

3.3.2 Divine Monarchia in Gregory's Theology

3.3.3 Gregory's Use of Homousios

3.4 Conclusion

The *Definition of Chalcedon* presents itself as a faithful exposition of the Nicene Creed, which is incorporated into the *Definition* alongside the later Constantinopolitan Creed (ACO V.32-33). In addition to the incorporation of these Creeds, central terminology from both the Creeds and their conciliar interpreters is employed in the *Definition*, particularly the terms ὁμοούσιος and ὑπόστασις.¹⁸⁸ The meaning of these terms is not

¹⁸⁸ I am using the term “conciliar” to describe those Fathers who, from the perspective of the *Acta*, are seen to be faithful expositors and adherents of the Nicene Creed and who are seen to stand within a tradition stretching from the Council of Nicaea through Constantinople I (381) and Ephesus I (431).

discussed directly in the letters of Cyril or Leo but is well established in the conciliar tradition. In particular, these terms feature prominently in the work of the three figures we identified in Chapter 2.2, Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory Nazianzus.

In this chapter, we will begin interpreting the *Definition* through the lens furnished by the *Acta*; it will be argued that ὁμοούσιος is not only aligned with the universal but that it also identifies a specific relationship between particulars and the universal, which we could describe as “derivative substance.” That is, in Athanasius and Basil—supported by Gregory though he does not use this term as often—ὁμοούσιος particulars were not ἀδελφὰ (“collateral”), they are not unconnected but ontologically equal individuals, like siblings. Instead, working with the father-son analogy, something is ὁμοούσιος when it is identical in essence with another because it derives therefrom; furthermore, this “derivation” does not involve partition but is the organic extension of the substance from the first member to all those who derive from it. For Athanasius, we will argue, every ὁμοούσιος individual has the same substantial reality as that with which it is ὁμοούσιος; they are one substance (οὐσία or φύσις). Not only do individuals of the divinity partake of a “common class” (κοινοῦ γένου), but they are also one substantial reality; this is true of both divinity and humanity. Similarly, ὑπόστασις is aligned with the particular but has definite content. That is, a ὑπόστασις is a particular instantiation of the οὐσία not as an οὐσία or substance itself, nor as if receiving identity from the *univerale ante rem*; instead, it is a particular as the one οὐσία individuated by a distinctive characteristic or property (ιδιώμα). By “property” I intend the attributes or characteristic of a particular thing or a class of things; ιδιώμα, ιδιότης, and (occasionally) ἴδιος are used in the literature we are considering for distinctive, characteristic, or identifying properties of particulars or universals. Different accounts are given for the “property-role” or the “ontological story”

(to use phrases employed by Timothy Pawl) that explains why a property is aptly predicated of a thing or class.¹⁸⁹ We will argue for this interpretation by examining the meaning of ὁμοούσιος in the works of Athanasius, followed by the use of οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, and ὁμοούσιος in Basil and Gregory. We will seek to identify their use of these terms and associated concepts to discern the conceptual apparatus they are employing in their theological arguments.

It must be acknowledged that neither the use of these terms by these fathers nor the broader theological and conceptual trends within which they fall have their origin here. 4th-century theology was dependent in many ways on its 3rd-century predecessors, among whom Origen could be identified as especially significant.¹⁹⁰ The word οὐσία has a long history, aptly traced through the 4th century by Christopher Stead.¹⁹¹ Ὁμοούσιος itself was discussed in the 3rd century, and the earlier uses of the term became problematic in the 4th-century conflicts over the relationship between God the Son and God the Father.¹⁹² Similarly, ὑπόστασις had been used in a way that was contrary to its use in the late 4th century; the anathemas at Nicaea treated it as a synonym with οὐσία!¹⁹³ However,

¹⁸⁹ Timothy Pawl, *In Defense of Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay*, First edition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 52–53.

¹⁹⁰ E.g. Giulio Maspero, “Isoangelia in Gregory of Nyssa and Origen on the Background of Plotinus,” in *StPat* 84 (Leuven: Peeters, 2017), 77–100; Ilaria Ramelli, “Gregory Nyssen’s and Evagrius’ Biographical and Theological Relations: Origen’s Heritage and Neoplatonism,” in *StPat* 84 (Leuven: Peeters, 2017), 165–231.

¹⁹¹ Stead, *Divine Substance*.

¹⁹² G. L. Prestige, *St Basil the Great and Apollinaris of Laodicea* (London: SPCK, 1956); Hanson, *The Search*, 190–95; John Behr, *The Nicene Faith: Vol 2 of Formation of Christian Theology* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2004), 69–70, 152–61.

¹⁹³ “But those saying ... or who assert that the Son of God is from a different reality [ὑποστάσεως] or substance [οὐσίας] ... persons such as this the Catholic and Apostolic church anathematizes.” Τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας ... ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας φάσκοντας εἶναι ...

Athanasius and the Cappadocians were well received by all parties in the late 4th and 5th centuries. As the florilegia and authorities listed in Chalcedon attest, Athanasius was influential not only on his fellow Alexandrian Cyril but across the Eastern and Western churches. The Cappadocians had a broad influence through the philosophical articulation of the relationship between the members of the Trinity, which was widely received.¹⁹⁴ As we will see, there is significant commonality between the positions reached by Athanasius and the Cappadocians concerning the meaning of ὁμοούσιος and the related terms.

3.1 HOMOOUSIOS IN ATHANASIOS

As noted above, there is no single theology shared by those who took up the task of defending what would become conciliar Christology and theology in the middle to late 4th century.¹⁹⁵ However, by the end of the 4th century, it is clear that the formula one οὐσία or φύσις in three ὑποστάσεις or πρόσωπα became standard for explaining God's unity

τούτους ἀναθεματίζει ἡ καθολικὴ καὶ ἀποστολικὴ ἐκκλησία. Cf. Hanson, *The Search*, 167–68, 181–83.

¹⁹⁴ See Zachhuber, *The Rise*, 73–93; H. Ashley Hall, “The Cappadocian Fathers,” in *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Patristics*, ed. Kenneth Parry, The Wiley Blackwell Companions to Religion (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2015); Joseph T Lienhard, “Ousia and Hypostasis: The Cappadocian Settlement and the Theology of ‘One Hypostasis,’” in *The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity*, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

¹⁹⁵ Lewis Ayres, in response to the common interpretation of de Régnon’s thesis, argues for a shared “Pro-Nicene” life of the mind; John Behr (among others) has argued that there is more diversity between the East and West than Ayres acknowledges. Lewis Ayres, *Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology*, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Lewis. Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010); John Behr, “Response to Ayres: The Legacies of Nicaea, East and West,” HTR 100.2 (2007): 145–52; John Behr, “Calling upon God as Father: Augustine and the Legacy of Nicaea,” in *Orthodox Readings of Augustine*, ed. A. Papanikolaos and Dema Copoulos (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2008), 153–65.

and plurality in Eastern Conciliar theology and that, after initial reluctance, the term ὁμοούσιος was embraced and employed at further councils, such as Constantinople (381) and Chalcedon (451).

It has often been argued in recent literature that the term ὁμοούσιος was employed at Nicaea not for its positive value but because it was a word that Arius refused to employ.¹⁹⁶ The theological antecedents for the term are not clear, though many parties objected to the term because of its regular use in a generic sense, where the ὁμοούσιος parties were collateral, that is, individual instances of a universal having identity merely in their shared essence or properties characterising the genus. This would seem to imply, in the case of God, a transcendent Form above God the Father and Son. Whether or not collatorality were explained by a transcendent Form, true collatorality would mean the Father and Son were both distinct “gods,” without a relationship of dependence or substantial unity.¹⁹⁷ A dark cloud also hung over the term because of its association with Paul of Samosata and the Council of Antioch’s rejection of the term.¹⁹⁸ Athanasius was initially reluctant to use ὁμοούσιος (though he never disavowed it), but he would strongly advocate for it later. The Cappadocians, particularly Basil of Caesarea, were also initially reluctant to adopt the term. A young Basil raised his concerns concerning ὁμοούσιος with

¹⁹⁶ Cf. Hanson, *The Search*, 202; Rowan Williams, *Arius: Heresy and Tradition*, 2. ed. (London: SCM, 2001), 68–70; Behr, *The Nicene Faith*, 157.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2008), 209; Stead, *Divine Substance*, 242–44; Hanson, *The Search*, 190–97; Williams, *Arius*, 134–35; John Behr, *The Way to Nicaea*, *The Formation of Christian Theology* v. 1 (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2001), 187–88, 218–20; Behr, *The Nicene Faith*, 137.

¹⁹⁸ Behr, *The Way to Nicaea*, 207–36. Cf. Athanasius, *Syn.*, 43.

Apollinaris, then a renowned conciliar theologian.¹⁹⁹ However, because of its significant place in the Creed, they eventually adopted and defended it.²⁰⁰

3.1.1 Homoousios as Substantial, Undivided Unity

Athanasius distinguished the way we participate (μετέχομεν) in deity from the way Christ is ὁμοούσιος (*Syn.* 51.1) and has his divinity, namely, ἐξ αὐτοῦ (“from [the Father]”). After dismissing the idea that the Father and Son are generated from the single οὐσία and are therefore ἀδελφά (“collateral”) (for this would imply that the transcending οὐσία is different in essence from the two which are generated) (*Syn* 51:1), he then argues,

but if each are *homoousios* with the *ousia* that generated them, it is clear that the thing generated from anything is *homoousios* with the thing

¹⁹⁹ Cf. Prestige, *St Basil the Great and Apollinaris of Laodicea*. The authenticity of this correspondence and of the letters that are printed in Basil’s letter collections have been compellingly defended by Prestige and Riedmatten. However, some still express reserve over the authenticity of the letters because of stylistic differences and the paucity of manuscript evidence for these letters, e.g. Fedwick, who cites Pouchet as a fellow sceptic. Nevertheless, few of Basil’s authentic letters have the recipient addressed in the first line with the dative and a respectful epithet, as both Eps. 361 and 363 have. However, Eps. 92 and 264 have the same style of address, so it is not unheard of in Basil’s corpus. Indeed, a forger would have had to imitate an introduction found only twice elsewhere in Basil’s extant letters, which seems unlikely. Prestige, *St Basil the Great and Apollinaris of Laodicea*; Henri de Riedmatten, “La Correspondance Entre Basile de Césarée et Apollinaire de Laodicée I,” *JTS* 7.2 (1956): 199–210; Henri de Riedmatten, “La Correspondance Entre Basile de Césarée et Apollinaire de Laodicée II,” *JTS* 8.1 (1957): 53–70; Robert Pouchet, *Basile Le Grand et Son Univers d’amis d’après Sa Correspondance: Une Stratégie de Communion*, *Studia Ephemeridis “Augustinianum”* 36 (Rome: Inst Patristicum Augustinianum, 1992), 112–17; Paul J. Fedwick, “Spuren Der Alten Liebe: Studien Zum Kirchenbegriff Des Basilius von Caesarea (Review),” *JTS* 44.1 (1993): 361–67; Paul J. Fedwick, *Volume 1: The Letters*, vol. 1 of *Bibliotheca Basiliana Universalis: A Study of the Manuscript Tradition of the Works of Basil of Caesarea* (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1993), 606–8.

²⁰⁰ J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1958), 245–47; Stead, *Divine Substance*, 260; Hanson, *The Search*, 436–37; Zachhuber, *The Rise*, 77.

generating. And it is no longer appropriate to inquire concerning three *ousia*, but to inquire only if it is true that this is from that.²⁰¹ (*Syn.* 51.1)

The essence from which the Son is generated is the Father, and so ὁμοούσιος is properly predicated of the one generated, who receives perfect identity from the Father, and not of the Father himself.²⁰² Behr clarifies that ὁμοούσιος, for Athanasius, “is used specifically to describe the perfect continuity of the being of the Father in the Son, who is from his essence and so *homoousios* with him; although there is identity and unity of nature, there is also proper order.”²⁰³ The Father is uniquely the Father, the source and cause of the Son, who is thus causally subordinate to the Father, though ontologically equal. Though Athanasius reserves the term ὁμοούσιος almost exclusively for the Father-Son relationship, with the analogy of human begetting, there is one instance where he applies the term to the Holy Spirit (*Ep. Serap.* 1:27). In that text, he does seem to have a particular order in mind (the Spirit is “proper to the Word” and “proper to God”), but his emphasis is on the oneness between the three; the Spirit falls on the God side of the creator-creature distinction.

The use of ὁμοούσιος with an emphasis on oneness, in opposition to plurality, occurs elsewhere in Athanasius’ corpus. In *De Sententia Dionysii* 10.3, Athanasius writes, “On the one hand, the vinedresser is alien [ξένος] to the vine according to *ousia*; on the other hand, the branches are in fact *homoousios* with, akin to [συγγενῆ], and undivided

²⁰¹ εἰ δὲ τῆς γεννησεως αὐτὰ οὐσίας ἐστὶν ἕκαστον ὁμοούσιον, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ἐκ τινος γεννώμενον ὁμοούσιον ἐστὶ τῷ γεννήσαντι. καὶ οὐκέτι χρὴ ζητεῖν τρεῖς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ μόνον ζητεῖν, εἰ τόδε ἀληθές ἐκ τοῦδε ἐστὶ.

²⁰² Cf. Behr, *The Nicene Faith*, 244–45; Stead, *Divine Substance*, 260.

²⁰³ Behr, *The Nicene Faith*, 244. Cf. Hanson, *The Search*, 436–44.

[ἀδιαίρετα] from the vine, and both they and the branch truly have one and the same origin [γένεσιν].”²⁰⁴ In context, Athanasius is arguing that certain predicates are made of Christ according to his human nature; in the case of John 15:1-2, it is spoken of the human nature because the vine is alien in essence from the vinedresser, but Jesus as the vine is consubstantial with humans, the branches. Athanasius identifies continuity between the vine and branches; he includes in their shared οὐσία the fact that they are *undivided* [ἀδιαίρετα] from one another. This indivisible union is linked with their identical origin [γένεσιν]. Again, in *De Decretis* 23.1, he writes of the Creed’s use of “radiance” (ἀπαύγασμα), “that they might make clear the indivisibility and propriety of the ‘from the substance’ [τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας] and his unity with the Father.”²⁰⁵ In the Creed, “ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας” follows the claim that Christ is ὁμοούσιος: he is “begotten from the Father as only begotten, that is, from the substance of the Father” (*CChal* 2:12).²⁰⁶ Lewis Ayres argues that in *De Decretis* 19-20, ὁμοούσιος reinforces what is already present in the phrase ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός (“from the Father’s *ousia*”).²⁰⁷ This terminology is explained in sections 21-24, indicating their “indivisible” (ἀδιαίρετον) continuity or oneness, thus excluding any foreign elements.²⁰⁸ Though he will only use the word ὁμοούσιος once in his three *Orations Against the Arians*, Athanasius will exposit the sense of substantial unity for the “one Divinity in Triad” (τὴν μίαν ἐν τριάδι Θεότητα)

²⁰⁴ Ὁ μὲν γεωργὸς ξένος ἐστὶ κατ’ οὐσίαν τῆς ἀμπέλου, τὰ δὲ κλήματα ὁμοούσια καὶ συγγενῇ καὶ ἀδιαίρετα τῆς ἀμπέλου τυγχάνει ὄντα καὶ μίαν ἔξει καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν γένεσιν ταῦτά τε καὶ ἡ ἄμπελος.

²⁰⁵ ἵνα τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ἴδιον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ἐνότητα δηλώσωσι.

²⁰⁶ γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενῆ, τουτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς.

²⁰⁷ Lewis Ayres, “Athanasius’ Initial Defense of the Term Homoousios: Rereading the *De Decretis*,” *J ECS* 12.3 (2004): 341, <https://doi.org/10.1353/earl.2004.0035>.

²⁰⁸ Ayres, “Athanasius’ Initial Defense of the Term Homoousios,” 348.

throughout the *Orations*. In the *First Oration*, Athanasius denies that the Son is a creature or created thing, but instead is “true Son of the Father, natural and genuine, proper to his substance [ἴδιος τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ]” and “an offspring proper to the Father’s substance [ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας γέννημα] because “he is true God, being *homoousios* with the true Father” (*C. Ari.* I.9)²⁰⁹ Here ὁμοούσιος appears to indicate the Son’s relation to the the Father as proper possession or being proper to the Father’s οὐσία, a theme which will be explicated elsewhere in the *Orations* (*C. Ari.* I.29; III.5-6), especially the *Third Oration* 16-17. In these chapters, Athanasius revisits similar themes as in the *First Oration* ch. 9, specifically arguing that there is one God. Athanasius claims that there is one God, the Father, and the Son alone has his nature: “There is one [God], not many, and this one’s Word is one and not many; ‘the Word is God,’ for this one alone has the Father’s nature [εἶδος]” (*C. Ari.* III, 16).²¹⁰ Earlier in this same oration, he states that there is “one nature of Divinity, which is also in the Word, and one God the Father who exists of himself [ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ ὢν] as he is above all and also appears in the Son as he extends through all things and also in the Spirit as he works in all things by him through the Word” (*C. Ari.* III.15)²¹¹ Athanasius identifies the Father as the One God who pervades all things, and a Divinity or Divine nature/essence that is possessed by the Word as also by the Father. Their unity is not only through a shared essence, nature, or form (εἶδος) of Divinity but also substantial: “the Son is proper to and inseparable from that One

²⁰⁹ οὐκ ἔστι κτίσμα οὐδὲ ποίημα, ἀλλ’ ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας γέννημα· διὸ θεὸς ἐστὶν ἀληθινὸς ἀληθινὸς πατὴρ «ὁμοούσιος» ὑπάρξων.

²¹⁰ εἷς γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ πολλοί, καὶ εἷς ὁ τούτου λόγος καὶ οὐ πολλοί· καὶ «θεὸς ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος», μόνος γὰρ οὗτος ἔχει τὸ πατρικὸν εἶδος.

²¹¹ ἐν γὰρ εἶδος θεότητος, ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ εἷς θεὸς ὁ πατὴρ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ ὢν κατὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πάντων εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ νύμφῳ δὲ φαινόμενος κατὰ τὸ διὰ πάντων διήκειν, καὶ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐν ᾧ πασι διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνεργεῖν.

according to the propriety and connection of the οὐσία” (C. Ari. III.16).²¹² Earlier in the same oration, Athanasius will state, “And the form of Divinity is not in part, but “the fullness of the Father’s Divinity” is the being of the Son, and the Son is the whole God” (C. Ari. III.6).²¹³

Making a similar point as he did with the use of οὐσία, Athanasius elsewhere wrote, “humans are ὁμοφυεῖς[of the same nature]”; they are “ὁμοφυεῖς and ὁμοούσιον” (*Syn.* 53.3; cf. *Ep. Serap.* 2.3).²¹⁴ He draws this analogy very closely, indicating that corporeality and the resulting separation of individuals is the point of disanology in the sort of union enjoyed by ὁμοούσιος humans and the Godhead (*Syn.* 41.8, lns. 1-3; 41.5 lns 3-4; *Tom.* 5). In *De Synodis* 52, he draws this analogy from the Sun and its radiance,

or let a person dare to make a division and to say there are two lights, the Sun and its radiance, or that it is a different essence, or that the radiance has been added and is not a simple and pure offspring from Sun so that, on the one hand, the Sun and the radiance are two and, on the other, the light is one on account of this offspring being from the Sun.²¹⁵

The Father and Son are even more indivisible than this (μαλλον ἀδιαίρετου) (*Syn.* 52). In the following section, Athanasius will state that “likeness” (ὅμοιος) obtains between similar things that nevertheless lack natural or substantial identity, as humans are “made

²¹² τοῦ γὰρ ἐνὸς ἴδιος καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς κατὰ τὴν ιδιότητα καὶ οἰκειότητα τῆς οὐσίας.

²¹³ Οὐκ ἐκ μέρους δὲ ἡ τῆς θεότητος μορφή, ἀλλὰ «τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς θεότητός» ἐστι τὸ εἶναι τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ ὅλος θεὸς ἐστιν ὁ υἱός.

²¹⁴ “ὁμοφυεῖς εἰσι”; “οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ὁμοφυεῖς καὶ ὁμοούσιον.”

²¹⁵ ἢ τολμησάτω τις διελεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν δύο φω·τα εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα ἢ ἐτέραν τινὰ εἶναι οὐσίαν ἢ ὅτι ἐπισυμβέβηκε τὸ ἀπαύγασμα καὶ μὴ ἀπλοῦν εἶναι καὶ καθαρὸν γέννημα ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου τοῦτο, ὥστε δύο μὲν εἶναι ἥλιον καὶ ἀπαύγασμα, ἐν δὲ τὸ φῶς διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου εἶναι τοῦτο γέννημα.

like God” though this is by participation (ἐκ μετουσίας), indicating likeness by resemblance to the reality, not in reality [οὐκ ἀληθεία, ἀλλ’ ὁμοιώσει τῆς ἀληθείας λέγεται ὅμοια]. One human is not *like* another, for they share identity (ταυτότης) as those who “are ὁμοφυεῖς in the οὐσία.”²¹⁶ Whether or not Athanasius is using ὁμοφυές as a synonym with ὁμοούσιος or means only generic identity with the former term, he proceeds to identify a human as ὁμοούσιον with another, which he had just explained meant unity through generation in the case of the Sun and even more so with the Godhead. Thus, οὐσία in the above quote indicates that despite division resulting from corporeality (as in the Sun and its radiance), there is still a continuity of substance or being between a human father and son. In *Tomus ad Antiochenos*, Athanasius reports the enquiry made of the those who spoke of three ὑποστάσεις, asking whether they meant to indicate (among other possibilities), that the Persons were “divided each according to their own ὑπόστασιν, *as are other created things and those begotten of men*” (emphasis added) or “different οὐσίας, as are gold, silver, and copper.”²¹⁷ There is, thus, a sort of division among created ὑποστάσεις that is not valid for the Trinity, which *De Synodis* indicates is a result of corporeality (*op. cit.*). Taking away these connotations, ὁμοούσιος is “fitting for God” (θεῷ πρέπουσα) on analogy with its use for human father-son relationships because it expresses both “likeness in essence” (ὁμοιουσίος) and “from the substance” (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας) (*Syn.* 41.5, 7-8). In addition to the analogy of a human generation, Athanasius uses the images of the radiance of the sun or a stream as from a fountain to

²¹⁶ τη γὰρ οὐσία ὁμοφυεῖς.

²¹⁷ ἐκάστην καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ὑπόστασιν διηρημένην, ὥς ἔστι τὰ τε ἄλλα κτίσματα καὶ οἱ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γεννώμενοι, ἢ ὥσπερ διαφορούς οὐσίας, ὥσπερ ἔστι χρυσὸς καὶ ἄργυρος καὶ χαλκός.

express this sense of continuity among those things ὁμοούσιος (e.g. *Syn.* 42; cf. *Syn.* 48, 51-52).

3.1.2 The Substantial, Homoousiatic Unity Is Not Aristotle's Primary Substance

From Athanasius' use of ὁμοούσιος in terms of oneness, some earlier studies argued that the οὐσία the members of the Trinity share is a concrete essence or *substantia*.²¹⁸ Prestige employs Aristotle's distinction between πρώτη οὐσία, meaning the concrete thing, and δευτέρα οὐσία, the commonality of things taken universally or the genus.²¹⁹ Though I would not dismiss the possibility that Athanasius was acquainted with Aristotle, there are several problems with this analysis.²²⁰ This identification is accurate in the sense that as with Aristotle's πρώτη οὐσία, the Trinitarian οὐσία is a substantial reality, yet it is also communicable: the "fullness of deity" is *in* the Son. Athanasius' use of "generation" and its analogy with human begetting not only indicates the distinction of the persons but also

²¹⁸ So far as I can tell, Bethune-Baker does not use these terms, nor quote Aristotle to this effect, but throughout the relevant section, he distinguishes between οὐσία's "secondary sense of nature" and "the stricter concrete sense of being or existence—*substantia* (p. 27). J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Meaning of Homoousios in the Constantinopolitan Creed*, 1901, 27–30. Cf. George Christopher Stead, "The Significance of the Homoousios," in *StPat* 3 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961), 398.

²¹⁹ See Stead, "The Significance," 398-399.

²²⁰ See, for example, *Ep. Afr.* 8. There is ample evidence for familiarity with Aristotle and writings influenced by him in this period, including those close to Athanasius. Cf. Zachhuber, "Derivative Genera." Contra Stead, "The Significance of the Homoousios," 411. Charles Kannengiesser has argued that *Ad Afros* is inauthentic, but Jörg Ulrich has refuted his arguments and Anette von Stockhausen has made positive case for its authenticity. Charles Kannengiesser, "(Ps-)Athanasius, *Ad Afros* Examined: Logos: Festschrift Für Luise Abramowski Zum 8 Juli 1993," in *Logos: Festschrift Für Luise Abramowski Zum 8 Juli 1993*, ed. Hanns Christof Brennecke et al. (Berlin, 1993), 264–80; Jörg Ulrich, *Die Anfänge Der Abendländischen Rezeption Des Nizänums* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), 274–80; Patriarch of Alexandria Athanasius Saint, *Epistula Ad Afros: Einleitung, Kommentar, Und Übersetzung*, trans. Annette von Stockhausen, *Patristische Texte Und Studien* 56 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002).

the communication of being from the Father to the Son which does not involve partition or division. The Father is in the Son and is the Word's being, so the substantial reality unifying the Trinity is able to be predicated of a subject, the persons: the Word has/is the Divine Substance. This is contrary to definition of primary substance as "that which is neither able to be predicated of a subject nor present in a subject" (Aristotle, *Cat.* 4). Πρώτη οὐσία in the *Categories* is the basic subject of predication, "the individual man or horse" (*Cat.* 4): this is appropriate for Trinitarian persons, yet in other senses they are not primary substances, they are not form-matter compounds as expounded in the *Metaphysics* nor are they each a purely Actual Form, but they do share the same essence and substantial reality. There are, thus, significant parallels in Athanasius account with *substantia* and πρώτη οὐσία, but "οὐσία" in ὁμοούσιος is not the equivalent of either. To underscore this point, we find that Athanasius is willing to draw the analogy between humans and the Godhead, the former being similarly ὁμοούσιος and ὁμοφυῆς ("the same nature") (*Syn.* 53.3). Φύη or φύσις (Nature) is used synonymously with οὐσία in Athanasius's works: in *De Synodis* 48.2 and 53.3, it is parallel with ὁμοούσιος.²²¹ Athanasius seems to claim with Apollinaris (whom we will consider below) and Gregory of Nyssa (see *Ad Ablabium*) that humanity shares a substantial unity as the divinity does. Thus, just as Athanasius is not claiming that all humans are one concrete essence (πρωτή οὐσία), neither is he claiming that God is so.

Thomas Weinandy cites the *Expositio Fidei* to this effect, where the author denies the view attributed to the Sabellians that there is a "Son-Father," who is μονοούσιος ("one

²²¹ Cf. ὁμοφυῆ in *Syn.* 48.2 and 53.3.

substance”).²²² The author of the *Expositio* distinguishes ὁμοούσιος from this position of μονοούσιος, which would be the appropriate word if he envisioned the Godhead as a single πρώτη οὐσία.²²³ However, the authorship of this text has been debated, being attributed to Eustathius or Marcellus instead of Athanasius.²²⁴ Though the MSS ascribe this work to Athanasius, it is thought to echo the theology of Marcellus and employs the term “κυριακὸς ἄνθρωπος,” which Jerome and others associated with Athanasius but is only found in other works thought to be falsely attributed to Athanasius, such as *Sermo Maior De Fide*.²²⁵ If this text were authentic, it would support our argument. However, if it is indeed spurious, there is sufficient evidence in Athanasius’ other works to maintain the present argument, namely, that though ὁμοούσιος is used to indicate the unity of the Father and the Son, it does not mean that they are a single concrete substance (πρωτή οὐσία). His use of οὐσία does not fit comfortably into Aristotle’s schema of πρώτη and δευτέρα οὐσία.

²²² [Exp.] 2.

²²³ Thomas G. Weinandy, *Athanasius: A Theological Introduction*, Great Theologians Series (Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 77.

²²⁴ F. Scheidweiler, “Wer Ist Der Verfasser Des Sog Sermo Maior De Fide?,” *ByzZ* 47.2 (1954): 333–57, <https://doi.org/10.1515/byzs.1954.47.2.333>; Manlio Simonetti, “Ancora sulla paternità dello ps. atanasiano ‘Sermo maior de fide,’” *Vetera Christianorum* 11 (1974): 333–43; Joseph T Lienhard, “Marcellus of Ancyra in Modern Research,” *TS* 43.3 (1982): 486–503.

²²⁵ Hanson, *The Search*, 221; Scheidweiler, “Wer Ist Der Verfasser Des Sog Sermo Maior De Fide?”; Alois Grillmeier, “Jesus Christ, the Kyriakos Anthropos,” trans. Brian Edward Daley, *TS* 38.2 (1977): 275–93; Simonetti, “Ancora sulla paternità dello ps. atanasiano ‘Sermo maior de fide’”; Martin Tetz, “Les Écrits ‘dogmatiques’ d’Athanasie: Rapport Sur Les Travaux Relatifs à l’édition Des Oeuvres d’Athanasie, Tome 1: Politique et Théologie Chez Athanasie d’Alexandrie: Actes Du Colloque de Chantilly 23-25 Septembre 1973,” in *Politique et Théologie Chez Athanasie d’Alexandrie: Actes Du Colloque de Chantilly 23-25 Septembre 1973* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1974), 181–88. Cf. Lienhard, “Marcellus of Ancyra in Modern Research.”

3.1.3 Homoousios as Generic Identity

There is one more aspect of ὁμοούσιος that emerges from Athanasius's use of the term, to indicate generic identity.²²⁶ In *De Synodis* 52, Athanasius argues that being ὁμοούσιος in the generic sense (Jesus appearing like God and revealing him in truth) follows naturally from the true oneness expressed in the Scriptures. There is one "Form [εἶδους] of the Godhead," or essence in the generic/definitional sense (*Syn.* 52.1). In *De Decretis* 23, he says that they are "not different in kind [ἐτεροειδές]." The Word is different entirely [οὐδὲν ὅμοιον] from originate things, but "all that is the Father's is the Son's" (πάντα δὲ τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐστίν) (*Ep. Serap.* 2.5). From this identity in essential or generic properties (those that are characteristic of the Divine nature), ὁμοούσιος follows. Athanasius clarifies that "His [i.e. God's] properties [ἴδια], by which God is recognized, are such things as omnipotence, being [τὸ ὄν], immutability [τὸ ἀναλλοίωτον], and other things spoken of beforehand" (*Ep. Serap.* 2.5).²²⁷

Meijering has argued that Athanasius was no stranger to contemporary philosophy, using Platonic ontology not as "a purpose in itself, but a tool, which [he uses] constantly."²²⁸ Meijering draws particular attention to the uses of "the Middle-Platonic conception of God" in Athanasius.²²⁹ The above picture of ontology is suggestive of various Neo-platonic theories of the Forms and the relation between Form and its

²²⁶ Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, 215–16.

²²⁷ ἴδια δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν, ἐξ ὧν γινώσκεται ὁ θεός, οἷον τὸ παντοκράτωρ, τὸ ὄν, τὸ ἀναλλοίωτον, καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τὰ προειρημένα.

²²⁸ Meijering, *Orthodoxy and Platonism*, 131.

²²⁹ Meijering, *Orthodoxy and Platonism*, 126.

instantiations. Whether through the influence of these or other sources, Athanasius' account of ὁμοούσιος does not sit comfortably with an Aristotelian paradigm of πρώτη οὐσία and δευτέρα οὐσία. If we take the evidence that ὁμοούσιος meant real, substantial unity among the Father, Son, and Spirit in the same manner as there was unity among human beings, along with the evidence for the importance of organic "generation" to this relationship, and we correlate this with the evidence for a generic interpretation of the term, a consistent picture emerges.

3.1.4 Conclusion

We can summarize that for Athanasius, the term ὁμοούσιος was primarily used to assert identity in quality between the Son and Father, that is, equality in οὐσία where οὐσία means defining essence. However, Athanasius was conscious of the charge that a view of ontological parity in this sense would necessarily lead to the demarcation of three gods or a quaternity, with a transcendent form standing above the ὑποστάσεις (e.g. *Syn.* 51). For this reason, though he does speak of ontological parity, Athanasius' frequently makes recourse to the reason for this parity, through derivation, whereby the Father and Son can be said to be one existent thing, or οὐσία, because the former begets the latter.²³⁰ It may be objected at this point that this does not seem to be what we mean when we speak of human "begetting," but Athanasius does maintain this is the case. "Begetting" and the term ὁμοούσιος as they describe the relation between the begetter and the begotten not only speak to the identity of essence between a father and son (i.e. a son is what his father

²³⁰ Ayres and Prestige identify this dual sense in Athanasius position. Ayres, "Athanasius' Initial Defense of the Term Homoousios," 349; Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, 215–16.

is) but also the source of that identity (“from the substance”) and true unity, as was shown in our discussion above. This claim that humans share the same substantial reality, are one in substance, is clearly articulated in Gregory of Nyssa’s letter *Ad Ablabium* and in the correspondence of Apollinaris with Basil of Caesarea, which we will consider below. The claim is not that humans are one in a tangible, corporeal sense but in an underlying ontological manner: the existence of each individual human is the same so that we are all individual expressions of a metaphysical reality, a Human substance, that unites Humanity across time (encompassing the species past and present) and space. This unification of the concrete thing and the kind or universal that is the unity of several distinct, concrete things taken universally, of Aristotle’s two distinct senses of οὐσία, fits comfortably in the Neoplatonic milieu of the 4th century (though the position of Apollinaris and Athanasius is certainly not identical with those of the Neoplatonists).²³¹ The οὐσία has no existence apart from its particulars, for there is no transcendent norm standing above God. However, the unity of οὐσία among the particulars of the Godhead is genuine, such that they are truly one, sharing not only the same abstract properties (a logical universality) but the same concrete existence as the one God (a concrete universality). The significance of the derivation element in ὁμοούσιος and the resulting unity of those who are ὁμοούσιος is brought out by Athanasius’ associate Apollinaris in his correspondence with Basil of Caesarea.²³²

²³¹ Zachhuber identifies “derivative genera” as important for Neoplatonism of this time. Zachhuber, “Derivative Genera,” 95. Cf. A. C. Lloyd, *The Anatomy of Neoplatonism* (Clarendon Press, 1998), 76–97; Zachhuber, “Derivative Genera,” 101–7. Cf. Porphyry’s *Isa*, p.1 ln. 18 – p. 2 ln. 10; Plotinus, *Enn.* VI.1.3.

²³² On this association, Joseph T Lienhard, “Two Friends of Athanasius: Marcellus of Ancyra and Apollinaris of Laodicea,” *ZAC* 10.1 (2006): 56–66.

Prestige and Riedmatten have persuasively argued for the authenticity of this correspondence.²³³ In response to Basil, Apollinaris argues for the view of ὁμοούσιος as derivation because it removes the need for a transcendent form or antecedent substratum to explain the generic identity of the persons; they have the same essence in the same way a son shares the essence of his father (Basil, *Ep. 362: Apollinaris to Basil*; cf. Athanasius, *Syn. 51.1*).²³⁴ Moreover, because of this derivative sense of οὐσία, there is also one substance for those who are ὁμοούσιος, εἷς Ἀδὰμ (one Adam) and εἷς Δαβὶδ (one David), to use Apollinaris' examples (Basil, *Ep. 362*).²³⁵ Humans do not have a common material (ὅλη κοινὴ), but Adam himself is the foundation (ὑπόθεσις) or “basic stuff” (as Zachhuber translates it) of humanity (Basil, *Ep. 362*).²³⁶ A similar position is found in Basil and is echoed in Gregory's understanding of Divine unity.

Our discussion of Athanasius' view has shown how his theological articulation of the relationship between Father and Son is philosophically robust, employing a conceptual apparatus accounting for the one and many as it regards humans and humanity and God and the Divine persons, the latter explained on analogy with the former. Within this conceptual apparatus, Athanasius identifies certain properties as belonging to the definitional element of a thing, for which οὐσία and φύσις are regularly employed. In

²³³ See fn. 198 above. Prestige, *St Basil the Great and Apollinaris of Laodicea*; Riedmatten, “La Correspondance Entre Basile de Césarée et Apollinaire de Laodicée I”; Riedmatten, “La Correspondance Entre Basile de Césarée et Apollinaire de Laodicée II.”

²³⁴ Cf. Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, I: Faith, Trinity, Incarnation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 336, 342–46; Behr, *The Nicene Faith*, 303; Prestige, *St Basil the Great and Apollinaris of Laodicea*, 40; Zachhuber, “Derivative Genera.”

²³⁵ Cf. Apollinaris, *Kata* in Leitzmann, 173.17–26.

²³⁶ Zachhuber, “Derivative Genera,” 100.

addition to saying that Christ is of the same nature (φύη) or kind (εἶδος) as God, the Spirit and the Son share in God's "properties" (ἰδιώ), which are described as those things that identify God as God (*Ep. Serap* 2.5). There are thus certain god-identifying properties characteristic of the shared substance of the Godhead. Ὁμοούσιος denotes generic identity or shared essence/form. Οὐσία in ὁμοούσιος thus has, in part, the sense of "essence," an object of knowledge that defines what something is and can be considered abstractly in terms of properties.

However, οὐσία is more than just a definitional essence or nature. For Athanasius, it also expresses the existence or being of a thing. The three persons of the Godhead, and humans, similarly, share an underlying reality, an organic and undivided unity of being, a shared existence. This shared reality, οὐσία, is rooted in the fundamental reality (Apollinaris' ὑπόθεσις) of the first member—the Father, Adam, or David—to which the later members are ontologically identical, equally sharing the same essential properties or generic identity, though causally subordinate as from a source (as the ἀπαύγασμα, the "effulgence," is what the Sun is because it comes from the Sun, being caused by it, cf. *Decr* 23-24).²³⁷ Without denying the reality of the persons, Athanasius' use of οὐσία gives concrete reality to the series grounded in its first member; together they are one thing,

²³⁷ We might say "of the same kind," but we don't want to suggest that a "kind" is something that exists above or behind the members (a *universale ante rem*). Apollinaris' *Ep.* 362 contains strongly subordinate language, "it teaches to think of the son as light in an identical form but lower, not changing the substance but seeing the same as being pre-eminent and lower," (ἐδίδασκεν ἐν ὁμοειδεῖ μὲν, ὑφειμένῳ δὲ φωτὶ νοεῖν τὸν Υἱὸν μὴ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐξαλλάττοντας, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπερβεβληκὸς καὶ ἐν ὑφέσει θεωροῦντας). Similar language will be used by Eunomius for the Son's subordination and was denied by Basil (*Eun.* 2.28) and Gregory of Nazianzus (*Or.* 31.9), but Apollinaris follows this sentence by explaining the lesser relation as that of an identical image from the pattern, so "lesser" or "lower" in this sense could be read causally and not with the pejorative connotations present in Eunomius. Cf. Prestige, *St Basil*, 22-24.

though not in the same sense as each person is a concrete thing. The οὐσία in ὁμοούσιος is thus the fundamental reality of a thing, which is in continuity with its originating source, as a river from a well (ἐκ τῆς πηγῆς ὕδωρ); or, like a plant that is “different” (ἕτερον) yet is “in all ways of the same nature with that [from which it came]” (πάντως ἐκεῖνον καθέστηκεν ὁμοφύες) (*Dion.* 18). In *De Decretis* 23-24, Athanasius uses “the example of light and its radiance” to draw out the significance of ὁμοούσιος, “let us not consider division or partition of the Godhead ... let us not introduce division in the unity of nature and or the identity of the light.”²³⁸ In *De Sententia Dionysii*, Athanasius uses the image of branches connected to the vine (*Dion.* 10.3). Οὐσία is an object of human knowledge, the “kind” or “form” (εἶδος), or nature (φύς), which is identified through specific properties (ἴδια).

Thus, the conceptual apparatus Athanasius employs in his doctrine of God and Humanity explains the unity of individual things by their organic and undivided continuity with the first member of the series. Individual things partake of the first member and are what they are because of their unity with them. All members of the series share not only the same being, extending from the first of the series, but also an identity in quiddity, likewise deriving from the first of the series. They are what that first thing is, sharing in its nature of form with its concomitant properties. We will now turn to Basil of Caesarea, in whose writing we find a similar conceptual apparatus.

²³⁸ τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ τοῦ ἀπαυγάσματος ... μὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνθρωπίνους αἰσθήσεις πίπτοντες μερισμοὺς καὶ διαιρέσεις τῆς θεότητος λογιζώμεθα· ἀλλ’ ὥς ἐπὶ ἀσωμάτων διανοούμενοι τὴν ἐνότητα τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὴν ταυτότητα τοῦ φωτὸς μὴ διαιρῶμεν. *Dec.* 12.1 ln.1; 24.1 lns. 6–8.

3.2 HOMOOUSIOS AND THE HYPOSTASES IN BASIL OF CAESAREA

At least as compared to his brother Gregory (and Athanasius, for that matter), Basil's use of οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, and ὁμοούσιος has been called "abstract," focusing as it does on the logic of God's threeness and oneness. Basil articulated the doctrine of the Trinity on analogy with the universal and the particular, employing οὐσία for the universal analogue and ὑπόστασις for the particular.²³⁹ Zachhuber calls this account "abstract,

because it is, as we have seen, based on properties both at the universal and particular level. The 'particular' is here described by means of its individual property (ιδίωμα), while the universal is expressed through a common formula (λόγος). I do not suggest that any one of the Cappadocians ever thought of either divine or creaturely being in purely abstract terms, but it is important to note that it is this abstract or logical account that appears, from the 370s, in all three of them albeit with varying emphases.²⁴⁰

Depending on one's understanding of the universal, such an analogy was fraught with danger.²⁴¹ Though this logical account of the Trinity is frequent in Basil's writing, his account of ὁμοούσιος retains elements of causality and monarchy within the Trinity, asserting the true unity of the persons against unwanted connotations of an analogy with the universal and the particular. Johannes Zachhuber is correct to note the significance of

²³⁹ Basil was apparently familiar with the similar use of ὑπόστασις by Plotinus, yet he intentionally diverges in his account, "let no one think that I am saying there are 'three ultimate principles' [τρεῖς ἀρχικὰς ὑποστάσεις]." *Spirit* 16.38, Hanson's translation, cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* V.I. Hanson, *The Search*, 691. Cf. Salvatore R.C. Lilla, "Neoplatonic Hypostases and Christian Trinity," in *Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition: Essays Presented to John Whittaker*, ed. Mark Joyal (Aldershot; Brookfield: Ashgate, 1997), 127–89.

²⁴⁰ Zachhuber, *The Rise*, 40.

²⁴¹ Cf. the discussion between Apollinaris and Basil on ὁμοούσιος. Prestige, *St Basil the Great and Apollinaris of Laodicea*.

the logical account throughout Basil's corpus, but he does not observe the instances where Basil speaks of causal structuring or order as an important element of ὁμοούσιος.²⁴²

3.2.1 Ontological Parity and Causal Subordination in Basil's Use of Homousios

Though the term is not prominent in his writings, Basil uses ὁμοούσιος in a manner similar to Apollinaris and Athanasius. John Behr cites Basil's Epistle 52, "*To the Canonicae*," as his most significant treatment of the term.²⁴³ Like Athanasius, Basil dismisses the use of ὁμοούσιος to refer to the collateral relation of brothers, which is exactly what is implied by the analogy of the universal and particular without further qualification. His argument in Epistle 52 is that ὁμοούσιος rejects this very thing: it rejects the view that the identity of substance implies the collaterality of ἀδελφὰ (*Ep. 52* 1, ln. 40).²⁴⁴ This would be the case if "substance" were to refer to a transcendent form or pre-existing material.²⁴⁵ Basil identifies the positive value of the term, first, in qualitative identity: "whatever account of light is attributed [ἀποδοῖ] to the Father, this also will be fitting [ἁρμόσει] for the Son" (*Ep. 52.2*).²⁴⁶ Second, he identifies a causal element to the term, "Whenever both the cause [τὸ αἶτον] and the thing which has its origin from the cause [ἐκ τοῦ αἰτίου] are of the same nature [τῆς αὐτῆς ὑπάρχει φύσεως], these are said

²⁴² Johannes Zachhuber, "Basil and the Three-Hypostases Tradition: Reconsidering the Origins of Cappadocian Theology," *ZAC* 5.1 (2001): 65–85.

²⁴³ Behr, *The Nicene Faith*, 303.

²⁴⁴ ἀδελφὰ γὰρ ἀλλήλοις τὰ ἐξ ἑνὸς ὑφειστώτα.

²⁴⁵ Cf. Basil *Ep. 361*, *To Apollinaris*.

²⁴⁶ ὅνπερ ἂν τις ἀποδοῖ φωτὸς λόγον ἐπὶ Πατρός, οὗτος ἁρμόσει καὶ ἐπὶ Υἱοῦ.

to be the same substance [ὁμοούσια]” (*Ep.* 52.2).²⁴⁷ This causal element or order within the Trinitarian use of ὁμοούσιος also appears in *Adversus Eunomium*. There Basil uses the term once in this sense, in 1.20 (in other places, he uses it to emphasise the logical identity of οὐσία, e.g. *Eun.* 2.4).²⁴⁸ Quoting Hebrews 1:3, Basil identifies a natural ordering in God; the Son is the “radiance” (ἀπαύγασμα) and the “representation of his hypostasis (χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως),” from which we understand that he is the same substance (ὁμοούσιος). The order here is “natural (φυσική),” like light to fire; there is an order which follows “from the sequence that is inherent in them according to nature” (ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖς ἐνυπαρχούσης ἀκολουθίας). Though we are cautioned against identifying literary dependence between Basil and Apollinaris,²⁴⁹ the statements made in Epistle 52 bear a resemblance to the answers Apollinaris gave to Basil’s questions in their early correspondence.²⁵⁰

The so-called “abstract” use of οὐσία language that is prominent through Basil’s corpus occurs alongside the hierarchical or ordered use of ὁμοούσιος, again echoing the language of Apollinaris and Athanasius. The Father and Son share the same account of being (τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον); ὁμοούσιος could be replaced by the (preferred) phrase, “alike in essence ... without deviation” (τὸ ὅμοιον κατ’ οὐσίαν ... τὸ ἀπαράλλάκτως) (*Ep.* 9.3,

²⁴⁷ ἀλλ’ ὅταν καὶ τὸ αἷτιον καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ αἰτίου τὴν ὑπαρξιν ἔχον τῆς αὐτῆς ὑπάρχει φύσεως, ὁμοούσια λέγεται. Translated in Behr, *The Nicene Faith*, 303. For the rejection of physical derivation, see *Ep.* 361, *To Apollinaris*.

²⁴⁸ Behr, *The Nicene Faith*, 302.

²⁴⁹ E.g. Stephen M. Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea: A Synthesis of Greek Thought and Biblical Truth* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 88–91; Behr, *The Nicene Faith*, 301–2.

²⁵⁰ For the authenticity of which, see above.

cf. *Ep.* 361). This shared essence is referred to with οὐσία, and its analogy with the universal is made clear by the description of it elsewhere as “the definition of being” (τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον) (e.g. *Eun.* 1:19; *Ep.* 214 4; *Ep.* 236 6).²⁵¹ The analogue of the particular is expressed with ὑπόστασις. In Epistle 125, Basil reflects on the Nicene Creed, asserting that they do not confuse οὐσία and ὑπόστασις but maintained that the Son was “consubstantial [ὁμοούσιος] with the Father” and that each of the three exists “in his own hypostasis” (ἐν ἰδίᾳ μὲν ὑποστάσει) (*Ep.* 125 1).²⁵²

3.2.2 Objections from a Stoic Background

There are, however, some objections that may be raised against correlating Basil’s view with those of Athanasius and Apollinaris. Some have argued that Basil’s understanding of οὐσία is “Stoic,” such that οὐσία refers to the indefinite substratum (ὑποκείμενον) that undergirds existing things.²⁵³ Hildebrand also contends that ὑπόστασις is occasionally synonymous with οὐσία or το εἶναι, though with connotations of “real existence.”²⁵⁴ It is true that the view expressed by Basil does not readily correspond to the first or second substance in Aristotle’s *Categoriae*, but Hildebrand wrongly presumes that the Stoic view

²⁵¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Cat.* 1, Zachhuber, “Basil,” 19–22; Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea*, 154–55. Radde-Gallwitz 154–155

²⁵² *Ep.* 125 1. Cf. *Ep.* 236; Behr, *The Nicene Faith*, 308; Corrigan, “Οὐσία and Ὑπόστασις in the Trinitarian Theology of the Cappadocian Fathers,” 122; Zachhuber, *The Rise*, 38–39.

²⁵³ Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea*, 50. Cf. Ricardo Salles, *God and Cosmos in Stoicism* (OUP Oxford, 2009), 98–101; Samuel Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics*, UPCC Book Collections on Project MUSE (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 1–8, 18–19.

²⁵⁴ Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea*, 59, 62–63.

is the only alternative.²⁵⁵ As Robertson puts it (referring to *Eun.* 2.4), “if this is Stoic conceptuality, then it is either confused or heavily adapted.”²⁵⁶

On the one hand, throughout this and similar passages, οὐσία refers to the common nature shared among particular individuals, which is incompatible with Stoicism’s indefinite, material substratum.²⁵⁷ On the other hand, Basil explicitly rejects the possibility of a Stoic material substratum (ὕλικόν ὑποκείμενον) in God (*Ep.* 361 3-8). Admittedly, it is easier to say that Hildebrand and others are wrong in equating οὐσία with the substratum than to give a coherent interpretation of Basil’s use of the substratum terminology, leading some to conclude that it is *ad hoc*.²⁵⁸ However, acknowledging the difficulty of the task ought not to stop us from trying to give a coherent interpretation.

The instances where Basil employs the phrase “material subsistence” (ὕλικόν ὑποκείμενον) prove most difficult to explain, but they can be explained in light of the wider interplay of οὐσία and ὑποκείμενον in the argument of *Adversus Eunomium* and his corpus. In *Adversus Eunomium* 1.7, Basil seeks to defeat Eunomius’ argument by showing that despite the diversity of names (τὰ ὀνόματα) attributed to Jesus (e.g. ἄμπελον, “vine,” and ὁδόν, “way”), Christ has one, simple (ἀπλῆ) or non-composite (ἁσύνθετος) οὐσία. He writes, “But though one according to subsistence [κατὰ τὸ

²⁵⁵ Corrigan, “Οὐσία and Ὑπόστασις in the Trinitarian Theology of the Cappadocian Fathers,” 122. Cf. Johannes Zachhuber, “Stoic Substance Non-Existent Matter? Some Passages in Basil of Caesarea Reconsidered,” *StPat* 41 (Leuven: Peeters, 2006): 425–31.

²⁵⁶ David G Robertson, “Stoic and Aristotelian Notions of Substance in Basil of Caesarea,” *VC* 52 (1998): 415.

²⁵⁷ Robertson, “Stoic and Aristotelian Notions of Substance in Basil of Caesarea,” 416.

²⁵⁸ Zachhuber, “Stoic Substance Non-Existent Matter Some.”

ὑποκείμενον], and one substance [μία οὐσία], both simple [ἀπλῆ] and uncompounded [ἀσύνθετος], he names himself differently at different times” (*Eun.* 1.7).²⁵⁹ In this instance, subsistence and substance appear to be parallel yet not identical. In the case of substance, Basil’s point is aimed directly at his understanding of Eunomius: according to Basil, Eunomius taught that names with different meanings referred to different essences (for though multiple names might be predicated of the same substance, they had the same meaning) (*Eun.* 1.7-9).²⁶⁰ However, argues Basil, different names with different meanings do not necessarily indicate different substances or different parts of a single substance, for Christ has different names but only one simple substance. If we hypothesize that subsistence (ὑποκείμενον) means concrete reality as opposed to the logical account of being, indicated by οὐσία, then Basil’s use of both terms makes sense. Though there is one thing in question, multiple names with different senses are used; thus, names do not refer to different substances in the sense of defined, concrete realities. The use of both terms thus cuts off Eunomius’ argument (as Basil understands it) in two ways, showing that different names do not necessarily indicate coordinate things (ὑποκείμενον) that share a defining substance (such as Peter and James share humanity) nor do they necessarily indicate separate substances (οὐσία), here meaning the definitional essence. Though Eunomius did not believe Christ was multiple definite things, his thesis that

²⁵⁹ Ἀλλ’ ἐν ὧν κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, καὶ μία οὐσία καὶ ἀπλῆ καὶ ἀσύνθετος, ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἑαυτὸν ὀνομάζει.

²⁶⁰ Cf. Eunomius, *AP* 19: “Therefore, if every name [σημαντικόν] spoken of the substance of the Father is the equivalent according to force of its signification [σημασίας] to ‘the Unbegotten’ because God is without parts and uncomposed, then according to the same reason, so also [names spoken] of the Only-begotten [are equivalent] to ‘the Offspring’.” εἰ τοίνυν πᾶν ὅπερ λέγεται τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας σημαντικόν, ἴσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν τῆς σημασίας δύναμιν τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ διὰ τὸ ἀμερὲς καὶ ἀσύνθετον, κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον κἀπὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς αὐτοῦ τῷ γεννήματι.

conceptualisation (ἐπίνοιαν, which Vaggione translates as “invention”) was vacuous and all names denote the essence would lead to such a conclusion when one thing had multiple names, each with different signification: either the presence of multiple names indicates the presence of multiple things or the presence of multiple substances.²⁶¹ Both being false, the way is opened for Basil’s positive account of conceptualisations.

Ἐπίνοια for Basil referred to the second-order knowledge characterising metaphor, relation, or distinctions not immediately present in apparently simple concepts [ἔννοια] but that become apparent through reflection (*Eun.* 1.7, 2.4).²⁶² In this way, ἐπίνοια are not vacuous as Eunomius had claimed. Basil’s use of ὑποκείμενον has significant parallels with Aristotle’s *Metaphysica*. In *Metaphysica* 9:7, Aristotle distinguishes between two senses for the grammatical subject (τὸ καθ’ οὔ) or substratum (ὑποκείμενον); it may be used for the substratum in which accidents (πάθος) inhere, referring to the concrete thing (τόδε), and the ultimate substratum (ἔσχατον, ἔσχατον οὐσία). The ultimate substratum or substance is what he elsewhere calls “prime matter” (πρώτη ὕλη) or “material substance” (οὐσία ὕλική): in this substratum, an individuality (τόδε τι) and a form (εἶδος τι) inhere (κατηγορούμενον). Early in the *Metaphysica*, in 7.3, Aristotle had considered this use of οὐσία and called it the substratum (τὸ ὑποκείμενον).²⁶³ In the *Metaphysica*, ὑποκείμενον can refer to the individual thing, as it refers to the individual in *Adversus Eunomium* 1.7, and it always has connotations of “substratum,” of the existing thing in which other things inhere, such as accidents. It has

²⁶¹ Cf. Eunomius, *Apol.* 8-9, 10-11, 18-19.

²⁶² Cf. Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea*, 143–54.

²⁶³ Schaff and Wace recognize the similarity between Basil’s argument in the *Hexaemeron* 1.8 and this passage in the *Metaphysica*. NPNF 2.8.

the latter connotations several times in Basils' writing, but it always refers to the individual. Moreover, such a thing (τὸ ὑποκείμενον) has only one substance (οὐσίας) or account of being (τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον).

The interpretation of ὑποκείμενον as the individual, occasionally with the connotations of substratum, also makes sense of the use of ὑποκείμενον in *Adversus Eunomium* 1.19, where both τὸ ὑποκείμενον and οὐσίας are again found in parallel but not used synonymously:

But if someone were to take the common substance [τὸ τῆς οὐσίας κοινόν], understood as one and the same account of being [τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον] perceived in both, so that if (on a hypothesis) the Father is conceived to be light in his subsistence [τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ], the substance [οὐσίαν] of the Only-Begotten will be acknowledged to be light.²⁶⁴

Substance (οὐσίαν) is once again equated with the definition; this account (λόγος) overlaps with subsistence, for a property perceived to be in the Father's subsistence is attributed to the Son who shares his substance. The postulate of light as a common predicate raises several problems, which we will consider below. However, though the substance is shared between the two, the Father's subsistence (τὸ ὑποκείμενον) is not said to be the Son's substance (οὐσίας); thus, our observation that ὑποκείμενον refers to a thing, the particular, holds on this occasion.

²⁶⁴ Εἰ δὲ οὕτω τις ἐκλαμβάνει τὸ τῆς οὐσίας κοινόν, ὥς τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ ἁμφοῖν θεωρεῖσθαι καί, εἰ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν φῶς ὁ Πατήρ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ νοοῖτο, φῶς καὶ τὴν τοῦ Μονογενοῦς οὐσίαν ὁμολογεῖσθαι.

The same interpretation also holds in the case of *Hexaemeron* 6.3, where Basil attempts to differentiate the qualities or characteristics (ποιότητα) and the underlying body (σῶμα) which upholds (ὑποκείμενον) the quality, in this case, the light source (τι τοῦ φωτός) and its brightness (ἡ λαμπρότης).²⁶⁵ Here, ὑποκείμενον is an adjectival participle describing the body as that which supports or gives subsistence to the light (τῷ φωτὶ); the distinction is analogous to whiteness (ἡ λευκότης) and the thing whitened (τὸ λελευκασμένον σῶμα) in Aristotle's *Metaphysica*.²⁶⁶ In these instances, οὐσία is the definitional essence and ὑποκείμενον the subsistent thing.

However, in favour of interpreting οὐσία in terms of the Stoic substratum, Hildebrand argues that οὐσία overlaps with ὑπόστασις and, in certain instances, cannot be construed on the analogy of the universal.²⁶⁷ However, the texts he offers are not convincing in this regard. He claims that *Adversus Eunomium* 2.28 cannot refer to Aristotle's secondary substance because the oppositions of "irrational and rational," for example, cannot exist in the same species.²⁶⁸ However, these oppositions are exactly the sort of differentiae found within a genus, which is also a secondary substance according to Aristotle, so this text would be consistent with interpreting οὐσία as a universal analogue.²⁶⁹ Hildebrand also cites *Adversus Eunomium* 2.19, where Basil argues that various cause-effect related entities, such as a potter and the pot, can be said to be

²⁶⁵ ἄλλο μὲν τι τοῦ φωτός ἡ λαμπρότης, ἄλλο δέ τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῷ φωτὶ σῶμα.

²⁶⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* 9.7.

²⁶⁷ Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea*, 59–63.

²⁶⁸ Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea*, 50.

²⁶⁹ Aristotle, *Categoriae* 1, 5, 14, 15. With reference to Porphyry, cf. Corrigan, "Οὐσία and Ὑπόστασις in the Trinitarian Theology of the Cappadocian Fathers," 122–23.

ὁμοούσιος.²⁷⁰ Once again, a substratum is not the best interpretation of this text. Primarily, Basil finds the identity in οὐσία in their shared properties, such as being “bodies,” “sensible,” and “made of earth”; in contrast, the Stoic substratum is indefinite or property-less.²⁷¹ In contrast, the maker and the thing made can be said to be of the same οὐσία because, at some level, they share a common account. From this example, Basil clearly permits οὐσία to refer to an account on multiple levels, such as species, genus, etc.—as did Aristotle and the commentators. From the evidence given thus far, it is apparent that Basil uses οὐσία for the common essence, in distinction from the individual. However, there are several instances where οὐσία means something else, similar to the Stoic substratum.

In *Hexaemeron* 1.8, *Adversus Eunomium* 1.15, and *Adversus Eunomium* 2.4, Basil uses the terms οὐσία and ὑποκείμενον for Aristotle’s fourth use of οὐσία or the οὐσία ὕλη, the material in which the form and individual characteristics inhere. “Matter” in this sense differs from the Stoic “material substratum” in that for Aristotle, “matter” is nearly always “proximate matter,” or something that is itself a combination of form and matter (such as bronze), not indefinite (except, perhaps, in the case of prime matter). Though Basil’s discussion in *Hexaemeron* 1.7 appears to have a sort of prime matter in view, a similar use in other passages suggests “proximate matter,” not the featureless (ἄποιον) prime matter or Stoic material substratum (Aristotle, *Metaph.* 7.3; 8; 9.7; cf.

²⁷⁰ Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea*, 50.

²⁷¹ E.g. Jacques Brunschwig, “Stoic Metaphysics,” in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 206–32; Michael J. White, “Stoic Natural Philosophy (Physics and Cosmology),” in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Spir. 4.6).²⁷² In *Hexaemeron* 1.7, Basil considers God's original creation of the "substance of the whole" (οὐσία τῶν ὅλων), from which he formed (συναρμόζοντα) everything. In 1.8, he continues with this use of οὐσία, decrying the effort to discern the substance (οὐσία) of the things created. When he proceeds to speak of the οὐσία of the heavens according to Isaiah, he describes it as the material substratum, with a fine nature (λεπτὴν φύσιν) without "solidity or density." Speaking of the earth, it is vain to search for its οὐσία or substratum (τὸ ὑποκείμενον) concealed beneath its qualities. He describes this substance or substratum as devoid of qualities (ἄποιον) in its very definition (τῷ ἑαυτῆς λόγῳ). Everything that we perceive "around it" (περὶ αὐτὴν) concerns its definition (τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον) or those things that complete it (συμπληρωτικά).²⁷³ When these are stripped away, there is nothing. The search for substance in the sense of the basic matter is thus futile. This sense of οὐσία appears at least twice in *Adversus Eunomium* (1.15, 2.14), though each time it is qualified by the phrase ὑλικόν ὑποκείμενον to differentiate it from his regular use of οὐσία for the definitional essence.

In *Adversus Eunomium* 1.15, Basil tries to show that Eunomius' argument for "unbegotten" is not answering a "what question" (τὸ τί ἐστίν) but a question concerning quality (τὸ ὅπως ἐστίν). After showing from the genealogy in Luke 3 that "begotten/unbegotten" describes the "proximate origin" (τὰς προσεχεῖς ἀρχὰς) of humans and not their shared substance (οὐσία), Basil changes the sense of οὐσία to draw an

²⁷² Cf. K Algra, "On Generation and Corruption I.3: Substantial Change and the Problem of Not-Being," in *Aristotle's On Generation and Corruption I Book 1: Symposium Aristotelicum*, ed. Frans de Haas and Jaap Mansfeld (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 91–121.

²⁷³ The latter term is used for essential "complements" in the commentators. E.g. Porphyry, *Exp. Cat.* p. 95, ln. 22; Dexippus, *Cat* p. 24, ln. 8.

analogy. Eunomius is like a person who, when asked “What is Adam’s substance [τίς ἡ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ οὐσία], and what is his nature [καὶ τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ]?” responds with his origin (ἐκ τῆς θείας χειρὸς διαπλασθῆναι). This response is an account of his subsistence (τὸν τρόπον τῆς ὑποστάσεως), but the question regarded the material substratum (τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον = οὐσία) in which humanity (τοῦ ἀνθρώπου = φύσις) inheres.²⁷⁴ The analogy does not wholly apply to God, who has no material substratum (cf. *Ep.* 361), so Basil concludes by clarifying his application, that in this way, Eunomius tells us what God is like but not God’s nature (φύσις).²⁷⁵ Like Aristotle’s account of the material substance (οὐσία ὑλική), here Basil identifies two things that inhere in the material substratum, essence or nature (φύσις) and the “the how something is” (τὸ ὅπως ἐστίν; τὸν τρόπον). This is important because though he rejects the material substratum with reference to God, he wants to maintain that the persons of the Godhead are differentiated by the combination of definitional nature and characteristic marks (ιδίωματα). These elements come together in the second use of “material substratum.”

In *Adversus Eunomium* 2.4, Basil discusses how names relate to substance, beginning with substance in the sense of “material substratum” (τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον),²⁷⁶ Basil argues that names are individuating or characteristic marks (τῶν

²⁷⁴ ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐρωτώμενος τίς ἡ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ οὐσία καὶ τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ, ὁ δὲ ἀποκρίνοιτο τὸ μὴ ἐκ συνδυασμοῦ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς θείας χειρὸς διαπλασθῆναι. Ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἐπιζητῶ, φήσειεν ἂν τις, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον· ὃ πολλοὶ δέω μανθάνειν διὰ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως.

²⁷⁵ Τοῦτο δὲ | καὶ ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀγεννήτου φωνῆς τὸ ‘πῶς’ τοῦ Θεοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν διδασκομένοις.

²⁷⁶ Some unreliable manuscripts add the negative particle, as does Gregory of Nyssa’s quote of this text in his own *Against Eunomius*, but the most reliable manuscripts do not have it. Cf. Basil of Caesarea, *Against Eunomius*, trans. Mark DelCogliano and Andrew Radde-Gallwitz,

ιδιωμάτων) which do not signify the material substratum. They must, then, refer either to the definitional essence or something else. Names differentiate things with a common substance (“one substance for all,” οὐσία δὲ πάντων μία), so they do not refer to the definitional essence. It must, therefore, “mark off the character of [someone] for us” (τὸ ὄνομα τὸν χαρακτῆρα μὲν ἡμῖν ἀφορίζει τὸν Πέτρου). Thus, the characterising traits, such as names, are neither material substratum nor definitional essence, so God, who is not material, may still have differentiating marks (cf. *Eun.* 2.5, 2.28-29).

We see, therefore, that Basil admits a use for οὐσία with reference to the material substratum similar to that of Aristotle, but he prefers to use the term for the universal, with ὑπόστασις or τὸ ὑποκείμενον referring to the individual thing, itself consisting of universal essence (οὐσία, τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον) with individuating characteristics (ιδιώματα).

3.2.3 An Objection from Divine Simplicity

One more problem faces this interpretation, Andrew Radde-Gallwitz’s careful treatment of simplicity in Basil. One of his theses, or at least the supporting evidence he uses for it, affects our argument here. On the one hand, he claims that for several of the above texts, ιδίωμα or ιδιότης do not refer to individuating marks but to *propria*, or the characteristic properties of the essence. He defines *propria* as “properties co-extensive with and

The Fathers of the Church v. 122 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 134–35, fn. 13.

intrinsic to the divine essence, but not individually definitive of that essence.”²⁷⁷ He contrasts *propria* with essential complements, or properties that are part of a thing’s definition,

For instance, ‘rational’ and ‘animal’ are the essential complements of the essence of humanity, in that they are parts of the whole that is the *logos* of humanity. ‘F completes x’s essence’ means that x cannot be x without F (and whatever other complements there are for x); removal of any part of something’s essence destroys the whole essence.²⁷⁸

He goes on to identify the predicates “such as light, life, and goodness,” or those that are predicated of all who share the common account of divinity, as *propria*. These, he suggests, are sufficient to justify claims of knowledge concerning the substance, though it is “incomplete knowledge.”²⁷⁹ Earlier (p. 109), I suggested that the hypothesis that light was a predicate shared in common by those possessing the divine essence was problematic (cf. *Eun.* 1.19); we can now expand upon this.

At the heart of Eunomius argument is the doctrine of divine simplicity, which Basil seeks to uphold, though he clearly understands it in a different manner than Eunomius. A significant problem facing Basil is how one could speak of multiple true and distinct predicates for the simple and uncompounded essence of God, or the common account of being. Radde-Gallwitz argues that he does so by employing the concept of *propria* somehow distinguished from essential complements, the latter of which

²⁷⁷ Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea*, 107. Cf. Aristotle, *Top.* sec. 1.5.

²⁷⁸ Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea*, 84.

²⁷⁹ Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea*, 107–8.

Athanasius and others understood to be precluded by simplicity.²⁸⁰ For Eunomius, Basil could not distinguish common properties like “light” from essential complements, so his view “destroyed the notion of simplicity he is so committed to saving.”²⁸¹ Radde-Gallwitz argues that Basil did intend to distinguish the two but did not do so clearly, a problem which his brother Gregory would rectify.²⁸² I have argued that the *ιδιώματα* are individuating marks, which distinguish the Son from the Father, not distinctive marks of their common substance, as Radde-Gallwitz argues. Though *Hexaemeron* 4.5 does use the term for the *propria*, it identifies these *propria* with the essential complements, something incompatible with Radde-Gallwitz’s understanding of *propria* with reference to the divine substance. Furthermore, the key texts he uses to identify *ιδιώματα* as *propria* and to identify “light” and “life” as such fail to substantiate his argument.

Adversus Eunomium 2.9 and 2.29 are the key texts in question.²⁸³ Radde-Gallwitz identifies 2.29 as the “fullest discussion of these descriptions [those naming *propria*].” He argues that the text concerns “how one can have non-identical (i.e. non-synonymous) substantial predicates without this harming simplicity.”²⁸⁴ We may clarify that the problem enters concerning the basis for the aptness or truth of these predicates: if they are true because of distinct parts of the substance, than God would no longer be simple. If Radde-Gallwitz has rightly identified Basil’s purpose, then Basil is seeking to show

²⁸⁰ Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea*, 157. On Athanasius, see Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea*, 78–86.

²⁸¹ Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea*, 173.

²⁸² Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea*, 173–74.

²⁸³ Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea*, 156–74.

²⁸⁴ Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea*, 156

that despite the multiplicity of true predicates apt of the Divine nature, predicates which are not synonymous, God is not himself composite; there are no distinct truth makers for each predicate. Radde-Gallwitz provides the following translation,

Moreover, in response to the objection that God will be revealed as composite unless the light is understood as the same thing as ingeneracy [ἀγεννήτω], we have the following to say: if we should understand ingeneracy as part of the substance, then there would be room for the argument which claims that what is compounded from different things is composite. But if we should posit, on the one hand, the light, or the life, or the good as the substance of God, claiming that the very thing which God is is life as a whole, light as a whole, and good as a whole, while, on the other hand, we should posit that the life has ingeneracy as a concomitant, then how is the one who is simple in substance not incomposite? For surely the ways of indicating his proprium [ιδιότητος] will not violate the account of simplicity.²⁸⁵

Taken in isolation, the final clause suggests that framing “light,” “life,” or the “good” as predicates of the substance “as a whole” (ὅλον φῶς, etc.) is a way of describing “his proprium” in relation to simplicity. However, the context of this passage requires a different interpretation.

The passage until this point is attempting to distinguish the ontological foundations for predicating “unbegottenness” of God from predicating “light”; Basil is concerned with showing that these terms are apt of God for different reasons. Basil begins with the claim that “unless the ‘light’ [τὸ φῶς] is something other than the ‘unbegotten’ [τοῦ ἀγεννήτου], no longer would one be able to attribute it to the Son, just as they could

²⁸⁵ Ἀλλὰ μὴν πρὸς γε τὸ σύνθετον ἀναγνήσεσθαι τὸν Θεόν, εἰ μὴ ταῦτόν ληφθεῖται τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ τὸ φῶς, ἐκεῖνο εἰπεῖν ἔχομεν, ὅτι εἰ μὲν ὡς μέρος τῆς οὐσίας τὸ ἀγέννητον ἐλαμβάνομεν, εἶχεν ἂν αὐτοῦ χώραν ὁ λόγος σύνθετον εἶναι λέγων τὸ ἐκ διαφόρων συγκείμενον· εἰ δὲ οὐσίαν μὲν Θεοῦ τὸ φῶς τιθέμεθα ἢ τὴν ζωὴν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν, παρεπόμενον δὲ ἔχει ἡ ζωὴ τὸ ἀγέννητον, πῶς οὐκ ἀσύνθετος ὁ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπλοῦς; Οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὐ δεικτικοὶ τῆς ιδιότητος αὐτοῦ τρόποι τὸν τῆς ἀπλότητος λόγον παραλυπήσουσιν·

not attribute unbegottenness itself [ὥσπερ οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγέννητον].”²⁸⁶ In contrast with “light,” “the ‘begotten’ and ‘unbegotten’ are individual properties [ιδιότητες] for identification [γνωριστικαί τινές].”²⁸⁷ He follows this with the claim that these individuating properties cannot belong to the “divinity,” for the latter is common to both the Father and Son; the two cannot be differentiated unless “thought makes a distinction with the help of individual properties [ιδιωμάτων].”²⁸⁸ The passage Radde-Gallwitz quotes follows immediately after this claim. Having just identified “ingeneracy” [ἀγέννητον] as ιδιότης, it is highly unlikely that the passage now transfers this term to “light” and other common predicates from which Basil has sought to differentiate the ιδιότης. Instead, Basil moves past ingeneracy, having argued that it is not a part of the substance but a characteristic property of the Father, to the concern that distinguishing between light, life, and goodness, for example, would make God composite. These common properties, apt of the Son and the Father, are not apt because of distinct parts of the Divine substances but because of the whole, “the very thing which God is is life as a whole.” This doesn’t explain how these properties can have distinct meanings when they have the same ontological basis, but it does maintain that despite the multiplicity of terms employed, the substance of God is simple.

When he speaks of “the life,” he thus refers to the substance and makes “ingeneracy” (as Radde-Gallwitz translates ἀγέννητον) the individuating property that is “concomitant” to the substance. This is consistent with our account of substance and

²⁸⁶ Ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἕτερόν εἴη τοῦ ἀγεννήτου τὸ φῶς, οὐκέτι τῷ Υἱῷ δυνατόν ἐπιλέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγέννητον.

²⁸⁷ τὸ δὲ γεννητὸν καὶ ἀγέννητον γνωριστικαί τινές εἰσιν ιδιότητες.

²⁸⁸ Μὴ τῇ τῶν | ιδιωμάτων προσθήκῃ τῆς διανοίας διαθρουμένης.

individuating properties above. Basil upholds that one who is “simple in substance” is not composite, so the account of simplicity he offers does not attempt to reconcile the plurality of substance and individuating marks but instead denies that ingeneracy is true of the Father according to the divine nature and that light and life are not apt of God because of any *part* of the divine nature but because of the whole. How Basil can hold to simplicity while simultaneously permitting distinct common predicates, such as “light,” “life,” and “good,” is left unexplained in *Adversus Eunomium*. Book 2, section 9 does not help Radde-Gallwitz’s case either.

In this section, Basil speaks of absolute names that “do not communicate the substance itself but delineate certain distinguishing marks [ιδιώματα] in connection with it.”²⁸⁹ Thus, our initial conclusion concerning the use of οὐσία and ὁμοούσιος, along with ὑπόστασις and ιδιότης withstands the objections raised against it.

3.2.4 Conclusion

Basil employs a similar conceptual apparatus as Athanasius in his account of the Trinitarian relations, though the nature of his debate with Eunomius leads to a different emphasis and more philosophical rigour. Basil elaborates on the relationship between the universal and the individual in terms of logic and epistemology: universal properties such as light and life which characterise the divine substance (οὐσία) are shared by all who partake of this substance; the substance is individuated as individual things by the

²⁸⁹ Κάτοι γε μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἐδείκνυτο παρ’ ἡμῶν ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἀπολελυμένα τῶν ὀνομάτων, κἂν τὰ μάλιστα δοκῇ ὑποκείμενόν τι δηλοῦν, οὐκ αὐτὴν παρίστησι τὴν οὐσίαν, ιδιώματα δέ τινα περὶ αὐτὴν ἀφορίζει. Translated in Basil of Caesarea, *Against Eunomius*, 142.

ιδιώματα, or characterising marks. In created things, one may perhaps speak of a material substrate (τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον), but this is not relevant in the case of God. An individual thing (τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὑπόστασις) is, minimally, the common substance (οὐσία) differentiated by the ιδιώματα. Basil's attention to the properties and nature of differentiation obtaining among common things does not come at the expense of the derivative nature of ὁμοούσιος as used by Athanasius and Apollinaris. Basil uses the language of causation to explain the shared account of being, as well as the language of radiance, like the light from the sun. These same elements also occur in Gregory of Nazianzus, different yet again with his emphasis on the monarchy of the Father.

3.3 HOMOOUSIOS AND THE HYPOSTASES IN GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS

Turning to Basil's friend, Gregory of Nazianzus, we find a similar account of the key trinitarian terms, οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, and ὁμοούσιος. However, in Gregory of Nazianzus, the language of monarchy or inter-trinitarian causal ordering is much more prominent. Because Gregory does not devote as much attention to these terms and developing the attendant concepts as Athanasius and Basil do and because of the significant similarities between their accounts as it concerns the concepts we are tracing, this section will be shorter than the previous two.

3.3.1 The Common Structure with which Gregory Speaks of God's Tri-Unity

In his book *Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God*, Christopher Beeley looks beyond the five *Theological Orations* to the orations which contain carefully crafted language of Gregory's theology (in particular, *Orat.* 1.7, 3.6, 2.36-38, 6.22, 20.6-

12, 23.7, 25.15-19, 29.2).²⁹⁰ Throughout his orations, Gregory uses a common structure for speaking of the Trinity, “First he identifies the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as distinct entities, after which he asserts, as a kind of predicate, their shared divine nature and their unity with one another.” He also draws frequently on the monarchy of the Father as “the foundational principle of Trinitarian logic and the fundamental dynamic that contains and gives meaning to the grammatical aspects of unity and distinctness.”²⁹¹ Though οὐσία and ὑπόστασις do play a role in Gregory’s theology, Beeley argues that speaking of the “distinctive Cappadocian achievement” is “an overgeneralization about three diverse theologians, but, in Gregory’s case especially, it is an overstatement of the role that this secondary formulation plays in his work.”²⁹² For the unity of God, Gregory uses various terms such as θεότης (divinity), φύσις (nature), and οὐσία (substance), or even μόνας or ἓν (one thing); for the God’s threeness, he uses ὑποστάσεις along with πρόσωπα (persons), ιδιότητες (individualities), and τρία (three things).²⁹³ Though he uses similar

²⁹⁰ Christopher A. Beeley, *Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light We Shall See Light*, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Norbert Widok discusses the use of trinitarian language in Nazianzus’ “First Oration of Peace,” and Peter Lawrence Gilbert in the theological poems. Norbert Widok, “Eklezjalne Cele Pierwszej Mowy o Pokoju Grzegorza z Nazjanzu [Ecclesial Objectives of the First Speech on Peace by Gregory of Nazianzus],” *Vox Patrum* 75 (2020): 507–25, <https://doi.org/10.31743/vp.6012>; Peter Lawrence Gilbert, “Person and Nature in the Theological Poems of St. Gregory of Nazianzus” (The Catholic University of America, PhD Thesis, 1995), 84–107.

²⁹¹ Beeley, *Gregory of Nazianzus*, 194, 214. Cf. Beeley, “Divine Causality and the Monarchy of God the Father in Gregory of Nazianzus”; Verna E. F. Harrison, “Illumined from All Sides by the Trinity,” in *Re-Reading Gregory of Nazianzus: Essays on History, Theology, and Culture*, ed. Christopher A. Beeley, CUA Studies in Early Christianity (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 17–22.

²⁹² Beeley, *Gregory of Nazianzus*, 222.

²⁹³ Beeley, *Gregory of Nazianzus*, 221–22. Cf. Gregory Nazianzus, *Faith Gives Fullness to Reasoning: The Five Theological Orations of Gregory Nazianzen*, trans. Frederick W. Norris, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae v. 13 (Leiden; New York: Brill, 1990), 43.

terminology in similar ways to Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, he neither makes the same efforts to offer a systematic interpretation of the terms and their related concepts nor to situate them within broader philosophical discourse.²⁹⁴ Unlike Basil and Nyssa, Nazianzus appears to emphasise the mental function of this language,

Lives and life, lights and light, goods and good, glories and glory; true and truth and Spirit of truth, holy ones and holiness itself; each one is God if contemplated alone, with the intellect dividing undivided entities; the three [are contemplated] as one God through their identity of movement (κινήσεως) and of nature (φύσεως) when apprehended with each other. (Orat. 23.11)²⁹⁵

It is, therefore, hard to draw many conclusions from Gregory's orations concerning the connection between the terminology he uses and the reality they signify; however, if in his terminology he reflects Basil's logical account of unity and plurality, his treatment of the Father's monarchy parallels the ontological views of Athanasius and Apollinaris, which we saw had parallels in Basil.

3.3.2 Divine Monarchia in Gregory's Theology

There has been much literature concerning the presence of Divine *monarchia* in Nazianzus' thought and, in particular, the charge of E.P. Meijering of logical inconsistency between the assertion of ontological equality and causal subordination,

²⁹⁴ Nazianzus, *Faith Gives Fullness to Reasoning*, 40–47; Beeley, *Gregory of Nazianzus*, 189, 222–23; Harrison, “Illumined from All Sides by the Trinity,” 17–18.

²⁹⁵ ζῶας καὶ ζῶην, φῶτα καὶ φῶς, ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν, δόξας καὶ δόξαν, ἀληθινὸν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, καὶ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας, ἅγια καὶ αὐτοαγιότητα· Θεὸν ἕκαστον, ἂν θεωρῇται μόνον, τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος τὰ ἀχώριστα· Θεὸν τὰ τρία, μετ’ ἀλλήλων νοούμενα τῷ ταυτῷ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς φύσεως. Translation in Harrison, “Illumined from All Sides by the Trinity,” 17. Cf. Beeley, *Gregory of Nazianzus*, 122–223.

drawing on parallels from Athanasius and Plotinus.²⁹⁶ The presence of monarchy in Nazianzus' thought has been thoroughly argued, and Meijering's argument has been challenged on several points; namely, it is not clear that the position of collaterality attributed to Athanasius or ontological subordination attributed to Plotinus are the only two options.²⁹⁷ Gregory suggests that someone may back up his argument that "greater" in passages like John 14:28 refers to generation without negating equality of nature by asserting "that something from such a cause is not lesser than the uncaused, for it would partake of the glory of the unoriginated because it would be from the unoriginated" (*Orat.* 30.7).²⁹⁸ Indeed, though the persons of the Trinity are equal in their glory, Gregory's view of *monarchia* means "Causality is the Father's very proprium and the root of the inner dynamic of Trinitarian relations"; "the Father alone is the Unoriginate and Uncaused."²⁹⁹

²⁹⁶ Eginhard P. Meijering, "The Doctrine of the Will and of the Trinity in the Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus," in *God Being History: Studies in Patristic Philosophy* (North-Holland Publishing Company, 1975), 103–13; Eginhard P. Meijering, *Geschiedenis van Het Vroege Christendom: Van de Jood Jezus van Nazareth Tot de Romeinse Keizer Constantijn* (Amsterdam: Balans, 2004), 401.

²⁹⁷ Christopher A. Beeley, "Divine Causality and the Monarchy of God the Father in Gregory of Nazianzus," *HTR* 100.2 (2007): 199–214, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S001781600700154X>; Ben Fulford, "'One Commixture of Light': Rethinking Some Modern Uses and Critiques of Gregory of Nazianzus on the Unity and Equality of the Divine Persons," *IJST* 11.2 (2009): 172–89, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2400.2008.00381.x>; Albert C. Meesters, "The Cappadocians and Their Trinitarian Conceptions of God," *Neue Zeitschrift Für Systematische Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie* 54.4 (2012), <https://doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2012-0017>; Elena Ene D-Vasilescu, "Generation (Γενεά) in Gregory Nazianzen's Poem On the Son," *Akropolis: Journal of Hellenic Studies* 1 (2017): 169. Cf. Michel R. Barnes, "Eunomius of Cyzicus and Gregory of Nyssa: Two Traditions of Transcendent Causality," *VC* 52.1 (1998): 59–87.

²⁹⁸ μὴ ἔλαττον εἶναι τὸ ἐκ τοιαύτης αἰτίας εἶναι τοῦ ἀναίτιου. τῆς τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀνάρχου δόξης μετέχοι ἄν, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάρχου.

²⁹⁹ John A. McGuckin, "'Perceiving Light from Light in Light' (Oration 31.2): The Trinitarian Theology of St. Gregory the Theologian," *GOTR* 39.1-2 (1994): 12 fn. 6, p. 27, <https://doi.org/10.7916/D8GF144P>.

In *Oration 29* (the third theological oration), Gregory presents causal subordination within the Trinity without any temporal priority. The Father begets and emanates “In a serene, non-temporal, incorporeal way” (*Orat.* 29.2 [Norris 246]) such that the answer to the question “when did these last two originate” (if an answer must be given) is “when the Father did” (*Orat.* 29.3 [Norris 246]).”³⁰⁰ The Son and the Spirit are not co-unoriginate (συνάναρχα) as the Father is, but they are nonetheless co-eternal (συναιῖδα) (*Orat.* 29.3). In respect to time, all three are unoriginated (ἀναρχά πως τῷ χρόνῳ), but not as it regards cause; they are “from” the Father (εἰκεῖθεν). Though monarchy is central to Gregory’s theology, and occurs alongside ὁμοούσιος in several contexts (e.g. *Orat.* 31.10; 40.43), the latter term does not appear to play a major part in his theology or have the twin connotations of causal origin and essential identity that we saw in Athanasius and Basil.

3.3.3 Gregory’s Use of Homousios

Instead, ὁμοούσιος appears to refer solely to essential identity. Gregory does not follow Athanasius and Basil in their reticence to ascribe ὁμοούσιος to the Spirit; in *Oration 31*, section 10, the Spirit is said to be ὁμοούσιος because he is “God.”³⁰¹ In *Oration 40*, section 43, the persons are consubstantial in that they admit neither greater nor lesser in substance (τῇ οὐσίᾳ μείζον ἢ ἔλαττον).³⁰² Gregory does not appear to give a solution to

³⁰⁰ “ἀπαθῶς, καὶ ἀχρόνως, καὶ ἀσωμάτως.” “Πότε οὖν ταῦτα; ὑπὲρ τὸ πότε ταῦτα. εἰ δὲ δεῖ τι καὶ νεανικῶς εἰπεῖν, ὅτε ὁ πατήρ.”

³⁰¹ Cf. McGuckin, “Perceiving Light,” 20–21.

³⁰² Cf. *Orat.* 29.13; Aristotle, *Cat.* 4.

the problems implicit in the analogy of οὐσία and the universal, as was done with Athanasius, Apollinaris, and Basil. So, though the same elements are present in Gregory of Nazianzus, they are not necessarily linked with ὁμοούσιος, as they are in the former two. In Nazianzus, the individuals who are ὁμοούσιος share ontological parity, admitting neither greater nor lesser. Thus, they share a common account of being. The persons are truly united, even being called μόνως and ἐν, yet Nazianzus does not elaborate this unity in terms of concrete universality, as undivided and organic origin from and connection to a first in the series. He does address the monarchy of the Father and speaks of the atemporal causal origin of the Son and Spirit from the Father. Thus, though he accepts the same theological account as Basil and the Athanasius, that the Son and Spirit are from the Father and identical in essence with him, the conceptual apparatus employed to explain these relations seems to remain that which Zachhuber called “abstract,” concerning the common account and shared properties.

3.4 CONCLUSION

If one were to start from Gregory of Nazianzus and approach the *Definition*, one might adopt a merely logical account of ὁμοούσιος language used there. However, if one were to start with Athanasius or Basil, the conceptual apparatus employed in interpreting the *Definition* would be more developed, involving an account of the relation between the universal and particular that involves both a common account and causal connection. However, though Gregory of Nazianzus does not develop ὁμοούσιος along these lines, the elements of causality are prominent in his orations. Thus, if we read Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory together in order to interpret the *Definition of Chalcedon*, Gregory’s thought

is easily caught up in and contributes with Athanasius and Basil to a unified conceptual apparatus for interpreting the one and the many in relation to the Trinitarian persons and humanity.

Οὐσία refers to substance shared among those things of a common substance, such as a genus, and incorporates both existence, the being of individual things, and essence, the logical account of being. Thus, in a significant sense, individual things (ὑποστάσεις) of the same type share both being and essence; they receive both from the first member in a series of unbroken, organic causal relations. The common account shared by related things involves common properties; the common οὐσία is individuated by, minimally, ιδιώματα or ιδιότητα (characteristic marks) of the individual, along with, perhaps, matter in the case of the creature. Φύσις may refer to the same existential and epistemological reality as οὐσία, or it may refer to the definitional side alone. The key term ὁμοούσιος signifies this conceptual apparatus, by which individuals share a common being and, by extension, a common account as derived from the first of the series. In the case of the Trinity, the Son and Spirit come from the Father, who is the οὐσία that gives them being and quiddity, though their origin is atemporal (there being no time when they did not exist).

In this chapter, we have laid a foundation for employing the first and second interpretive strategies given by the *Acta*, looking at the use of key terminology and their attendant concepts in the select fathers identified by the *Acta*. In Chapter 6, we will use this account of ὁμοούσιος, along with the fruit of Chapters 4 and 5, to interpret the *Definition*. For now, we will look at the conceptual apparatuses employed in the conciliar letters of Cyril that the *Definition* specifies for its interpretation and in Leo's *Tome*, laying

a foundation for using the third interpretive strategy to interpret the *Definition* in Chapter 6. We will begin in Chapter 4 with Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius* and the *Letter to John of Antioch*.

Chapter 4 – The Conceptual Apparatus of Cyril’s Conciliar Letters

4.1 Nestorius in the Conciliar Account

4.2 An Analysis of the Second Letter to Nestorius

4.3 An Analysis of the Letter to John of Antioch

4.4 Conclusion

Cyril has a paradoxical role in the Christological debates that emerge after Ephesus 1; he was considered authoritative by both major parties. Both Eutyches and those who condemned him appealed to Cyril, as did those who defended Chalcedon and Chalcedon’s opponents. Several accounts have been given to explain this tension. Some have thought that Cyril originally expressed a single nature Christology, as is found in the phrase he freely used, μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη (“the one incarnate nature of God the Word”),³⁰³ but capitulated in his struggle with the Antiochene theologians and adopted a two nature Christology, as expressed in his *Letter to John of Antioch*.³⁰⁴ In more recent discussions, it has been argued that the two different modes of describing the incarnation are compatible, though they favour different idioms.³⁰⁵ This appears to be the most defensible interpretation of his work, explaining

³⁰³ Or in the form σεσαρκωμένου, “The one nature of God the Incarnate Word.”

³⁰⁴ E.g. Joseph Lebon, *Le Monophysisme Sévérien: Étude Historique, Littéraire et Théologique Sur La Résistance Monophysite Au Concile de Chalcédoine Jusqu’à La Constitution de l’église Jacobite* (Leuven: Universitas Catholica Lovaniensis, 1909), <http://archive.org/details/Lebon1909LeMonophysismeSeverien>. Cf. Norris, “Christological Models in Cyril of Alexandria.”

³⁰⁵ McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*; Thomas G Weinandy, “Cyril and the Mystery of the Incarnation,” in *The Theology of St. Cyril of Alexandria: A Critical Appreciation*, ed. Daniel A Keating and Thomas G Weinandy (London; New York: T & T Clark, 2003), 23–54; van Loon, *The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria*; Mark Edwards, ““One Nature of the Word Enfleshed,”” *HTR* 108.2 (2015): 289–306.

the use of both idioms even in his early writing.³⁰⁶ A significant example of two nature idiom is the use of so-called “partitive” exegesis in his commentary on John, where certain descriptions of Christ and His activity are predicated according to one or the other nature. Lars Koen describes Cyril’s use of “partitive exegesis” in this way, “Partitive exegesis is used by Cyril to ascribe to the divine nature what belongs to it, and to the human nature what belongs to it.”³⁰⁷ Partitive exegesis was not, of course, unique to Cyril; John Behr observes its usage in various parties in the 4th century.³⁰⁸ In the formula μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη, Cyril does not mean that Christ’s incarnate nature was a mixed nature in the abstract or essential sense (that is, a definition that incorporated elements of humanity and deity and so was neither) but is instead using φύσις to refer to the individual thing; “Cyril did not employ the *mia physis* formula to espouse one nature in the sense of one quiddity, but rather he primarily used it to emphasize that Christ is one being or reality – one entity.”³⁰⁹ However, in formulas expressing two natures (φύσις) in Christ or from which he came, φύσις is used in the abstract or essential sense. The letters read at Chalcedon, the *Second Letter to Nestorius* and the *Letter to John of Antioch*, may be comfortably read as expressing a two-nature Christology and would be read

³⁰⁶ Weinandy quotes from his Commentary on John, “we do not, of course, say that God the Word who is from the Father was transformed into the nature of flesh, or that the flesh changed into the Word. For each remains what it is by nature and Christ is one from both.” The combination of “each remains what it is by nature” and “Christ is one from both” juxtaposes both idioms. καὶ οὐ δῆπου φαμέν, ἢ τὸν ἐκ Πατρὸς Θεὸν Λόγον εἰς τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς μεταπεποιῆσθαι φύσιν, ἢ γουν τὴν σάρκα μεταχωρῆσαι πρὸς Λόγον· μένει γὰρ ἐκάτερον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει, καὶ εἷς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὁ Χριστός. (Pusey, 532 lns. 22-25). In *Jo.* s.v. 6:54 in Daniel A Keating and Thomas G Weinandy, eds., *The Theology of St. Cyril of Alexandria: A Critical Appreciation* (London; New York: T & T Clark, 2003), 27–28.

³⁰⁷ Lars Koen, “Partitive Exegesis in Cyril of Alexandria’s Commentary on the Gospel According to St. John,” in *StPat* 25 (Leuven: Peeters, 1993), 116.

³⁰⁸ Behr, *The Nicene Faith*, passim.

³⁰⁹ Keating and Weinandy, *The Theology of St. Cyril of Alexandria: A Critical Appreciation*, 33. Cf. Thomas G. Weinandy, *Does God Change? The Word’s Becoming in the Incarnation*, Studies in Historical Theology v. 4 (Still River, MA: St. Bede’s Publications, 1985), 46–58.

as such within the context of Chalcedon, as they are juxtaposed with Leo's *Tome* and presented in support of the *Definition*, both of which clearly articulate a two-nature Christology.

Both of Cyril's letters were written to address the events surrounding the First Council of Ephesus.³¹⁰ Controversy was first stirred when Nestorius, a monk from Euprepios, was appointed to the vacant episcopal see in Constantinople (AD 428). Ecclesiastical politics were not simple at this time, which surely contributed to the escalation of the controversy. The particular point of conflict emerged around Nestorius and his fellow Antiochene monks' denouncement of the use (or at least the unguarded use) of the title "Theotokos" for Mary. Cyril entered the controversy stirring in Constantinople with his letter *To the Monks of Egypt* (AD 429), a defence of the use of Theotokos and the full humanity and deity of Christ. This letter makes extensive use of Scripture and the Nicene Creed (e.g. par. 6).³¹¹ A short and unsubstantial exchange followed between Cyril (1st letter to Nestorius) and Nestorius (1st to Cyril).³¹² Cyril received word that Nestorius was "both extremely annoyed and was leaving no stone unturned to vex me,"³¹³ responding with the contemporary equivalent of "you brought this on yourself." Nestorius's response was short and polite, merely reiterating the perceived offence from the pen of Cyril.³¹⁴

³¹⁰ The following account is indebted to McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*; Susan Wessel, *Cyril of Alexandria and the Nestorian Controversy: The Making of a Saint and of a Heretic*, The Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

³¹¹ Following the paragraphs marked in McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*.

³¹² The 2nd and 3rd letter in Cyril of Alexandria, *St. Cyril of Alexandria: Letters 1-50*, trans. John I. McEnerney, The Fathers of the Church v. 76 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1987), 34-37.

³¹³ Cyril of Alexandria, *Letters 1-50*, 54.

³¹⁴ On the difference of style and rhetorical strategies employed by both parties, especially their public addresses, see Wessel, *Cyril of Alexandria*, 183-254.

After further controversial events, Cyril penned his *Second Letter to Nestorius* (Schwartz places it in AD 430).³¹⁵ Cyril's *Second Letter* played a critical role in the Alexandrian side of Ephesus I. Because of its crucial role there, as the pre-eminent rebuttal of Nestorius' thought, it was regarded as "canonical" at the Council of Chalcedon.³¹⁶ Canonical in this context refers to the document's ecclesiological authority as part of a canonical collection or "corpus," "a body of traditionally accepted legal sources."³¹⁷ The events that followed this letter included more writings being circulated (such as Cyril's *Five Tomes Against Nestorius*) and culminated in the contentious 1st Council of Ephesus (AD 431). Perhaps the most significant of these writings for the following tensions was Cyril's *Third Letter to Nestorius*, with his *Twelve Chapters* or anathemas attached. This document would be attacked by the Antiochenes as horridly overstated, with Apollinarian tendencies. When the Eastern emperor, Theodosius II, eventually summoned an ecumenical council, the result was only more division.

At this council, both an Alexandrian, pro-Cyril, and an Antiochene, pro-Nestorius, side were held, but from the perspective of Chalcedon, it was Cyril's side that constituted Ephesus I.³¹⁸ Cyril and the bishops in support of him started the proceedings before the largely Nestorius-supporting Syrian party arrived; Cyril's council condemned and deposed Nestorius and rejected his teaching, but John of Antioch held his own council which confirmed Nestorius' position and excommunicated and deposed Cyril, decrying his *Twelve Chapters* as in

³¹⁵ ACO 2.1.1 104.

³¹⁶ The conciliar sense of the word should be distinguished from its use in discussions of the Bible, e.g. at Chalcedon, I.1072, III.36.

³¹⁷ David Wagschal, *Law and Legality in the Greek East: The Byzantine Canonical Tradition, 381-883* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 52.

³¹⁸ Cf. Price and Graumann, *The Council of Ephesus*, 46-56; McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*, 53-106.

agreement with Arius, Apollinaris, and Eunomius.³¹⁹ The council continued, and after many sessions, the emperor sided with the Cyrilline party (though Cyril himself was for a time imprisoned in Ephesus).

However, the result was not peace but tension between the Ephesian majority, which sided with Cyril, and the Syrians. Only after extensive appeals to the emperor and engagement with one another was a fragile peace achieved with the *Formula of Reunion*, drafted by the Antiochenes and affirmed by Cyril in his *Letter to John of Antioch* (AD 433).³²⁰ But tensions remained between the Sees of Alexandria and Antioch for years to come. However, the *Formula of Reunion* represented a compromise in which the Alexandrians and Antiochenes accepted each other's orthodoxy and acknowledged a shared core of language for articulating the simultaneous deity and humanity of Christ.

At Chalcedon, the *Letter to John of Antioch*, containing this formula, was received alongside Cyril's *Second Letter* as canonical expositions of the conciliar faith. In this chapter, we will argue that Cyril's conciliar letters are oriented to the Nicene Creed and employ its terminology in a similar manner, yet Cyril uses the technical vocabulary of Nicaea to address a different conceptual problem, accounting for Christ's true humanity and Godhood in a true union that would not yield two "sons" or individuals, as Nestorius was thought to have taught. In doing so, Cyril focuses on the use of οὐσία and φύσις for something's essence (the "abstract" use). By doing so, Cyril appears to treat the ὑποστάσις, or "individual," not as the οὐσία with ιδιώματα (the position of the 4th-century fathers we have considered, see Ch. 3) but as a

³¹⁹ See McGuckin detailed account of the events. McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*, 53-106. For a thorough treatment of Ephesus and the Cyril's involvement there, see Price and Graumann, *The Council of Ephesus*.

³²⁰ Wessel, *Cyril of Alexandria*, 255–78.

substantially existing thing capable of individuating the abstract οὐσία and upholding both οὐσία and ιδιώματα.

To argue this, we will consider the conceptual apparatus provided by Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius* and his *Letter to John of Antioch*. Following the interpretive trajectory of the approaches we identified at Chalcedon (see Chapter 2), we will presuppose the account of conciliar ontology provided in the previous chapter. This places significant limitations on the results of this chapter. It is arguable from Cyril's own Trinitarian writings that he employed a merely abstract account of ὁμοούσιος; he also employs developed concepts and technical vocabulary across his corpus.³²¹ However, as argued in Chapter 2, the interpretive strategy of Chalcedon aligns several normative documents that will be mutually interpreting as they are marshalled together to interpret the *Definition*. We are thus concerned with the conceptual apparatus that arises from the letters when read within this corpus. As the primary antagonist in Cyril's writing is Nestorius and because of the significant role "Nestorianism" will play in the *Acta* of Chalcedon, we will begin by considering the view of Nestorius that is found in the Conciliar tradition we are considering, namely, in Cyril's two letters and at Chalcedon.³²² We will then consider Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius* and his *Letter to John of Antioch* more closely, seeking to ascertain their contribution to our interpretation of the *Definition's* conceptual apparatus.

³²¹ See Johannes Zachhuber, "The Philosophical Dimension of the Christological Controversy" (XVIII International Conference on Patristic Studies Oxford, presented at the XVIII International Conference on Patristic Studies, August 2019); Zachhuber, *The Rise*, 78–79, 82; van Loon, *The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria*, 143–79; McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*, 138–39; Lois M. Farag, *St. Cyril of Alexandria, a New Testament Exegete: His Commentary on the Gospel of John*, 1st Gorgias Press ed., Gorgias Dissertations 29 (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2007), 92–101, 103–9.

³²² On the relationship between Nestorius and Leo's *Tome*, see Chapter 5.

4.1 NESTORIUS IN THE CONCILIAR TRADITION

Before the 20th century, our knowledge of Nestorius and his beliefs was limited to brief fragments of his writings and the writings of his opponents. However, with the discovery of a copy of his *Bazaar of Heracleides*,³²³ a more accurate assessment of his views has been made possible.³²⁴ Indeed, Bethune-Baker has gone so far as to argue that in light of the *Bazaar*, Nestorius would have affirmed Chalcedon's conclusions.³²⁵ We have evidence that he not only read Leo's *Tome* but agreed with it.³²⁶ McGuckin argues that the thought expressed in the *Bazaar* comes after the controversies and certainly involves further refinement than would have been expressed early in his conflict with Cyril.³²⁷ However, this is not necessarily the case. Though the *Bazaar* is certainly an apologetic for Nestorius, its language would be as offensive to Cyrilline parties as the language of his earlier writing. Still, it bears a more conciliatory tone, especially in its treatment of the term *Theotokos*. However, our concern at this point is not the

³²³ The authenticity of which has been doubted, but Roberta Chesnut cogently presents the case for accepting the authenticity of its contents, if not necessarily the form in which we have received it. Roberta C. Chesnut, "The Two Prosopa in Nestorius' Bazaar of Heracleides," *J Theol Studies* 29.2 (1978): 392–409, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jts/XXIX.2.392>.

³²⁴ One difficulty in discussing Nestorius is that his work survives in Syriac translation of the original Greek, so discussion of Greek terms behind his theology involves back translation from the Syriac.

³²⁵ Bethune-Baker indicates Nestorius heard and affirmed its conclusions, but though invited to Chalcedon, there is no evidence Nestorius attended; it appears he died before the council began. Bevan argues persuasively for the credibility of Nestorius' invitation. J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Nestorius and His Teaching: A Fresh Examination of the Evidence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908), 190; George A. Bevan, "The Last Days of Nestorius in the Syriac Sources," *Journal of the Canadian Society for Syriac Studies* 7.1 (2009): 39–54, <https://doi.org/10.31826/jcsss-2009-070105>. Cf. Geoffrey E. M. de Ste. Croix, 'The Council', in *Christian Persecution, Martyrdom, and Orthodoxy* (ed. Michael Whitby and Joseph Streeter; Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 280, citing later Nestorian and Monophysite texts. Cf. Evagrius, *HE*, 1.7.

³²⁶ Frag. 308 in Nestorius, *Nestoriana: Die Fragmente Des Nestorius*, ed. Friedrich Loofs (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1905); Nestorius, *The Bazaar of Heracleides: Newly Translated from the Syriac and Edited with an Introduction, Notes & Appendices*, trans. G. R. Driver and L. Hodgson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1925), 337.

³²⁷ McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*, 126–27.

historical question, what did Nestorius believe? Instead, we are concerned with the view attributed to him by his opponents, particularly that refuted in Cyril's *Second Letter* and at Chalcedon.

Through conciliar eyes, Nestorius was viewed as teaching “two sons” and a moral union.³²⁸ That is, he was thought to teach that Christ had two distinct concrete realities held together not by an ontological foundation as a single reality but by will or a moral union. There is certainly language in Nestorius’ texts that would contribute to such a view. In particular, he spoke of a prosopic union, where the πρόσωπα of the divine Son and human son were united in a single πρόσωπον.³²⁹ In his *Second Letter* (2.c),³³⁰ Cyril denies that the union was “according to the will alone or his good pleasure, nor again as with the addition of a façade [πρόσωπον] alone.” He further denies the worship of Christ “as though two sons are sitting in council, but as one according to the union with the flesh” (2.c). When the *Definition* specifies the errors it confronts, Nestorius is guilty of denying “to the Virgin the name of Theotokos,” and he would appear to be one “daring to destroy the mystery of the dispensation of the Lord” (§34.a). He is among “those who set their hand to corrupt the mystery of the economy and frivolously say with intemperance that the one born from the holy virgin Mary was a mere human” (§34.a). The claim that Nestorius believed in two sons is not mentioned here, but the *Definition* asserts that the identifying properties of Christ’s natures came together into “one *prosopon* and one hypostasis”; he is not divided into “two *prosopa*” (§34.b).

³²⁸ *CChal* 1:46-47.

³²⁹ E.g. *Bazaar* p. 157, 179; *Sermon XII*, translated in Bethune-Baker, *Nestorius*, 84.

³³⁰ Following the divisions given in the working translation provided in Appendix 1.

Price and Gaddis see the *Definition* as refuting the twin extremes of Eutyches, who confused the natures of Christ, and Nestorius, who divided “Christ into ‘two sons’ or persons, one divine and the other human.”³³¹ In the discussion around Ephesus II, Theodore of Claudopolis recounts how they were charged with Nestorius’ heresy in these words, “Cut into two those who say two natures! Cleave, kill, and drive out those who say two!” (I.62, cf. I.173-175).³³² These are three main charges that emerge in Cyril’s conciliar letters and at Chalcedon, 1) that Nestorius taught two sons, or distinct and individuated natures (πρόσωπα); 2) that he taught a moral or voluntary union, not an ontological one; and 3) that he denied to Mary the title *Theotokos*, confirming the first charge, that Nestorius divided the Christ. For those at Chalcedon, these three errors result in the corruption of “the mystery of the economy” (§34.a). One section of the *Definition* comes across as a pointed response to these views,

rather the individual property [ιδιότητος] of each nature being preserved and coming together [συντρεχούσης] into one *prosopon* [πρόσωπον] and one *hypostasis* [ὑπόστασις], not being severed or cleaved into two *prosopa* [πρόσωπα], but one and the same Son, Only-Begotten, God, Word, Lord, Jesus Christ, as the prophets formerly and Jesus Christ himself taught us concerning him and the Creed of the fathers has handed down to us. (§34.b)

Here, “one and the same Son” is contrasted with the “severing or cleaving” of the one Christ into two πρόσωπα; a duality of πρόσωπα means two “Sons” without a true union (hence, “severed”).

³³¹ *CChal* 1:61-62.

³³² *CChal* 1:142.

4.2 AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND LETTER TO NESTORIUS

Though Cyril demonstrates familiarity with Hellenistic logic and philosophy and uses them in his other writings, his *Second Letter* does not attempt to lay out a Christological logic or counter in any significant way Nestorius' own Christological logic (which associated predication with the πρόσωπον).³³³ Instead, it is much more like his earlier *Letter to the Monks of Egypt*, focusing on the Nicene Creed (see par. 2) and citing Scripture.³³⁴ His concern, as stated early in the letter, is that Nestorius would “undertake instruction and thinking concerning the faith with all carefulness for the sake of the people.”³³⁵ He is thus not seeking to offer a technical account of the incarnation but to illustrate and exhort carefulness, exhibited by adherence to Nicaea and Scripture:

this will happen—and most correctly so—if, when we encounter the teaching of the holy fathers concerning many things, we would endeavour to occupy ourselves with these things and, ‘by testing ourselves if we are in the faith’—according to what is written—we would very diligently conform our thinking to their correct teachings and blameless doctrines.³³⁶

He orients his explanation to the creed, indicating that the task at hand is to reflect “on what is meant that the Word from God became incarnate and became a man.”³³⁷ Cyril writes as if from

³³³ On his familiarity with logic and philosophy, see Ruth M. Siddals, “Logic and Christology in Cyril of Alexandria,” *JTS* 38.2 (1987): 341–67; van Loon, *The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria*; Marie-Odile Boulnois, “Cyril of Alexandria Reading Porphyry,” *J ECS* 28.3 (2020): 443–65, <https://doi.org/10.1353/earl.2020.0032>.

³³⁴ The paragraphs follow those of the English translation printed in Appendix 1 of this thesis.

³³⁵ τῆς διδασκαλίας τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει φρόνημα μετὰ πάσης ἀσφαλείας ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς λαοὺς.

³³⁶ ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ μάλα ὀρθῶς, εἰ τοῖς τῶν ἁγίων πατέρων περιτυγχάνοντες λόγοις περὶ πολλοῦ τε αὐτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι σπουδάζοιμεν καὶ δοκιμάζοντες ἑαυτοὺς εἰ ἔσμεν ἐν τῇ πίστει, κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον, ταῖς ἐκείνων ὀρθαῖς καὶ ἀνεπιλήπτοις δόξαις τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν ἐννοίας εὖ μάλα συμπλάττομεν.

³³⁷ ἐννοοῦντας τί τὸ σαρκωθῆναι καὶ ἐνανθρωπῆσαι δηλοῖ τὸν ἐκ θεοῦ λόγον.

the perspective of a conciliar tradition, as though the matter is resolved already: he, not Nestorius, represents the right faith. Like the *Definition*, he offers to apply and draw out the implications of the Nicene Creed in response to Nestorius' errors. We can outline the letter as follows,³³⁸

1. Introduction
 - a. Καταφλυναροῦσι μὲν – The circumstances of the letter: malicious gossip. (p. 104 ln. 15)
 - b. πλὴν οὐ πολὺς – Purpose of the letter: not to address the gossip but to urge right understanding. (p. 104 ln. 21)
2. Argument
 - a. Ἐφ' ὅτι – Foundation: We must follow and reflect on the Nicene Creed. (p. 105 ln. 7)
 - b. οὐ γὰρ φησὶν ὅτι – The union: we believe in a hypostatic not voluntary union. (p. 105 ln. 12)
 - c. οὕτω τε λέγεται – The incarnate predicates: how the word can be said to be born in the flesh, to suffer, and die. (p. 105 ln. 20)
 - d. οὕτω Χριστὸν ἓνα – A true union: the flesh is his, taken hypostatically; thus, there are not two sons. (p. 106 ln. 6)
3. τοῦτο πρεσβεύει πανταχοῦ – Conclusion (p. 106 ln. 21)

After raising the issue of malicious gossip directed at Cyril from disreputable parties (§1a), Cyril dismisses the significance of such words and instead urges Nestorius to “undertake instruction and thinking” with care. This is done through engagement with the “teaching of the holy fathers,” to which Cyril will soon attend himself (§1b). In section 2a, he recounts a portion of the Nicene Creed and insists, “We must also follow these words and teachings, reflecting on what is meant that the Word from God became incarnate and became a man.” Thus, he orients the following account of the incarnation as a reflection on the Nicene Creed. In section 2b, he begins by introducing the union “according to subsistence” (καθ’ ὑπόστασιν), which he

³³⁸ See Appendix 1 for a working translation of the full text. The first words of the opening sentence are given in Greek, which will allow the reader to identify where each section I have delineated begins in the Greek text. The page number and line number from ACO 2.1.1 are also given.

contrasts with a merely moral or illusory union. It is because this union maintains true unity without destroying the differences of the natures, Cyril asserts, that partitive exegesis works (§2c). That is, Jesus may be eternally begotten yet be born “according to the flesh” (κατὰ σάρκα), having united “humanity to himself in subsistence” (καθ’ ὑπόστασιν). This is how the various human predicates, such as death, suffering, and birth, may be predicated to the Word.

In the final move of the argument (§2d), Cyril returns to the union: there is no true separation in this union, the two natures according to which partitive predication may be made are united in one subsistence. The unity of subsistence permits true *communicatio idiomatum*, where predicates concerning both natures may be made of the one subject, lest it be

necessary to delimit everything and so, on the one hand, to say that the man, properly speaking, was honoured with the designation of son and, on the other hand, properly speaking—once again—the Word from God naturally possessed sonship in name and propriety.³³⁹

This statement addresses Nestorius’ concerns directly; Nestorius’ doctrine of πρόσωπον dictated that certain titles referred to this or that πρόσωπον, so it was necessary to apply the predicate appropriately; “God” refers to the eternal Son and “birth” to the humanity, so it is improper to say that Mary bore God (θεοτόκος), more properly, she bore “Christ,” the common term (so she was, χριστοτόκος) (Nestorius, *Second Reply*). “Lord,” “Jesus,” “Christ,” and “Only Begotten” are “common names for both the Godhead and the manhood” (*Second Reply*), indicating the unity for predication (the united πρόσωπον), though “these three words indicate the two natures, sometimes this one, sometimes that one, sometimes both of them” (ACO 2.3.1,

³³⁹ ἀνάγκη γὰρ πᾶσα διορίσαι καὶ εἰπεῖν τὸν μὲν ἄνθρωπον ἰδικῶς τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ κλήσει τετιμημένον, ἰδικῶς δὲ πάλιν τὸν ἐκ θεοῦ λόγον υἰότητος ὀνομά τε καὶ χρῆμα ἔχοντα φυσικῶς.

222).³⁴⁰ “Son of God” or “Word” indicated the Divine πρόσωπον. It is Nestorius’ insistence on “delimiting everything” that Cyril has in sight here. In conclusion (3), Cyril asserts that this is the universal account of the faith: in this way, the fathers could call Mary “Theotokos.” He exhorts Nestorius to adopt such teaching for the sake of the church.

In this account of the incarnation, we find the emphases of both the μία φύσις formula and the δύο φύσεις language. Throughout the letter, Cyril emphasises that the Word took on “flesh,” by which he means he became a true human, uniting to himself “flesh ensouled with a rational soul” (σάρκα ἐψυχωμένην ψυχῇ λογικῇ) (§§2b, 3). “Though the two natures brought together in a true union are different, one Christ and son is from both” (§2b).³⁴¹ Although Cyril stresses the true, subsistent (καθ’ ὑπόστασιν) union of the two natures, even that Christ was “from both [natures]” (ἐξ ἀμφοῖν), “one nature” (μία φύσις) is not used in the letter. The manner by which Cyril identifies this union, favouring as it does dyophysite language, when read within the conciliar tradition we have been tracing, points us towards an interpretation of the key term “φύσις” as it was used in Athanasius, Gregory, and Basil, to signify the universal. In the first sentence of section 2b, Cyril denies that the Word’s φύσις was altered or changed into a whole human, which is “from a soul and body,” but positively asserts that the Word united to himself “flesh rationally ensouled”: the unity accomplished “καθ’ ὑπόστασιν.”³⁴²

³⁴⁰ “σκόπησον ὅπως τὸ «κύριος» καὶ «Ἰησοῦς» καὶ «Χριστός» καὶ «μονογενής» καὶ «υἱός» πρότερον θέντες, τὰ κοινὰ τῆς θεότητος καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος, ὡς θεμελίου, ὀνόματα.” First quotation, Nestorius’ *Second Reply*, translated in McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*, 365. Second quotation, “*quoniam haec tria duarum naturarum sunt significations, aliquando quidem huius, aliquando illius, aliquando uero et huius et illius.*” The *Quaternion* 17 quoted in *CChal* Vol. 1, 324 (from the florilegium of Nestorian texts read at Ephesus I, found also in the Latin translation of the *Acta*).

³⁴¹ διάφοροι μὲν αἱ πρὸς ἐνότητα τὴν ἀληθινὴν συνενεχθεῖσαι φύσεις, εἷς δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν Χριστὸς καὶ υἱός.

³⁴² οὐ γὰρ φαμέν ὅτι ἡ τοῦ λόγου φύσις μεταποιηθεῖσα γέγονεν σὰρξ, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὅτι εἰς ὅλον ἄνθρωπον μεταβλήθη τὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος.

There is a nature that is proper to the Word, which is not affected by the union of the flesh; nevertheless, the Word united to himself “flesh rationally ensouled” (σάρκα ἐφύχωμένην ψυχῇ λογικῇ). The union “καθ’ ὑπόστασιν” ensures that the two natures united are “different” (διάφοροι) and their differences are not abolished (ἀνιρημένης). The one Christ is “from both” (ἐξ ἀμφοῖν), and is “accomplished” by them (ἀποτελεσασθῶν): these natures are “divinity” (θεότητος) and “humanity” (ἀνθρωπότητος), the universals. Here, the unity of ὑπόστασις aligns with the grammatical subject and ontological individual, as the term has been used earlier in the conciliar tradition; the natures both accomplish this individual and are possessed by it: the Christ is an individual human, not as though he took to himself an individual human. “He,” the Word and Christ, was born from the Father from all eternity and was also born of Mary, the Divine nature not receiving a second generation but he united to himself “humanity” “in subsistence.” Earlier, when Cyril said that Christ receive a “flesh rationally ensouled,” this was uniting to himself humanity, not a concrete human but the universal humanity instantiated as a concrete individual, with the corresponding metaphysical entailments.

In this letter, it is solely the abstract side of the universal (the definitional essence) that is employed, as it is often (though not exclusively) used in the conciliar writings. That is, the ontological modality of the φύσις is not specified, whether it is a concrete instantiation of the universal or the transcendent reality in which a particular participates, for example. Various properties are attributed to a φύσις, such as incorporeality and impassibility to the divine φύσις. The properties are framed as potentialities to be realised in an individual: the humanity or φύσις itself does not suffer, as the divine φύσις does not perform miracles, but a true instantiation of the nature, a human, can suffer according to the nature, and a divine individual can act with omnipotence. Thus, Christ the individual can be said to experience concrete suffering κατὰ σάρκα, not because the human nature is suffered or can be predicated with suffering but because, unlike the divine nature, the human nature is capable of suffering and so Christ who

is human suffers. That is, suffering cannot be predicated of the divine nature, as if “this experience reached into his nature” (§2c) but is predicated of Christ, the single subject κατὰ σάρκα, that is, because his human nature—his flesh—is capable of suffering. In section 2.c, he continues to employ this partitive exegesis to explain the way in which God the Son as impassible may be said to undergo suffering and even death (this is consistent with the earlier use of this approach in his commentary on John).³⁴³

Though Cyril’s discussion does not elaborate on the technical terminology he uses, it is densely ontological, connecting the key terminology of the 4th-century controversies with the unique challenges of the incarnation. Καθ’ ὑπόστασιν remains undefined (a point which Nestorius will lament in his later work, *The Bazaar of Heracleides*, 156–67), but may be interpreted within the conciliar tradition as “in one individual.” However, what the individual thing is, of what it is constituted (whether φύσις with ιδιώματα, or something else) is not made clear in the letter. This language of καθ’ ὑπόστασιν would become the most distinctive Cyrilline contribution to Christology, being adopted in the *Definition* in terms of two natures in μίαν ὑπόστασιν.³⁴⁴ The phrase used in the *Definition* echoes both the conciliar use of ὑπόστασις and Cyril’s use of καθ’ ὑπόστασιν here. However, this letter does not give us clues for reconciling

³⁴³ Cf. Koen, “Partitive Exegesis in Cyril of Alexandria’s Commentary on the Gospel According to St. John.” Russell, following Liébaert and others, dates the commentary between AD 425 and 428, before the controversy with Nestorius. Norman Russell, *Cyril of Alexandria*, The Early Church Fathers (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 96; Jacques Liébaert, *La doctrine christologique de saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie avant la querelle nestorienne*. (Lille: Facultés Catholiques, 1951), 12–16.

³⁴⁴ Beeley observes, despite later influence of the phrase, “Cyril’s reference to Christ’s ‘hypostatic union’ is ambiguous. He is not making a technical distinction, for example, between a union in hypostasis versus in nature (or in both), as one might expect following the Chalcedonian distinction between these terms.” Christopher A. Beeley, *The Unity of Christ: Continuity and Conflict in Patristic Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 259–60.

the conciliar use of the term with its function in this letter to ground the real, ontological unity of Christ's two natures.

Rejecting Nestorius' union of *προσώπα*, which Cyril seems to equate with a mere appearance of union,³⁴⁵ Cyril asserts that Christ truly became flesh, uniting (*ένώσας*) to himself "in subsistence" (*καθ' ύπόστασιν*), "in an ineffable and incomprehensible manner" (*άφράστως τε καί άπερινοήτως*), "flesh" (*σάρκα*). This union recognizes the difference in the two natures (*φύσεις*) that are united but says that "one Christ and son is from both" (*εις δέ έξ άμφοϊν Χριστός καί υίός*). This language of "from" (*έξ*) is not employed in the *Definition*; "in" (*έν*) is used instead (V.34). This union is not such that "the difference of the natures is done away with" (*ούχ ως της τών φύσεων διαφοράς άνηρημένης*). Because the divine Son truly became flesh, he is said to suffer, "not as though God the Word suffered in *his own nature* scourging nor piercing of nails,"³⁴⁶ but "since what became his own body suffered these things, again he is said to suffer on our behalf."³⁴⁷ That is, God the Word did not change in his own nature, but he became incarnated by taking up flesh capable of suffering so that its suffering might be his own, though as the divine Son, he ever remained incapable of suffering in his own nature (i.e. divinity).

While used to refute a charge of Apollinarianism, the specific formula *σάρκα ένψυχωμένην ψυχῇ λογικῇ* indicates that it is not mere flesh Christ took up but the fullness of humanity, the *φύσις* with its metaphysical entailments. The abstract essence was a key

³⁴⁵ For the scriptures do not say that "The word united to himself a human *prosopon*," but that "he became flesh." *ού γάρ ειρηκεν ή γραφή ότι ό λόγος ανθρώπου πρόσωπον ήνωσεν έαυτώι, άλλ' ότι γέγονεν σάρξ.*

³⁴⁶ Emphasis added. *ούχ ως του θεου λόγου παθόντος εις ιδίαν φύσιν ή πληγὰς ή διατρήσεις ήλων.*

³⁴⁷ *έπειδή δέ τὸ γεγονὸς αὐτοῦ ἰδίου σώμα πεπονθεν ταῦτα, πάλιν αὐτὸς λέγεται παθεῖν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν.*

component of the conciliar account of ὁμοούσιος, though not the whole picture: it was important for Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory to maintain that though the οὐσία taken up by Christ was not a transcendental form or a material substratum, it nevertheless indicated shared essence or account of being between the three Trinitarian persons. Furthermore, both natures must remain distinct in the union, implying that to be truly man or truly God, something must be or have that nature.³⁴⁸

4.3 AN ANALYSIS OF THE LETTER TO JOHN OF ANTIOCH

Turning to the *Letter to John of Antioch*, the abstract or essential account of Christ's divinity continues to be at the fore, but the use of ὁμοούσιος invites us to seek a conceptual apparatus that maintains the pervasive concrete account of shared being from the divine *monarchia* along with the focus on the definitional φύσις that characterises Jesus as truly God and truly man.

The tone of the *Letter to John of Antioch* is the opposite of Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius*. It opens with the famous quote from Psalm 96:11, "Let the heavens rejoice and the earth cry out with gladness." Cyril is celebrating an agreement between himself and the Orientals on Christology. We could outline the letters as follows,

1. Introduction: peace has been attained.
 - a. Εὐφρανέσθωσαν οἱ οὐρανοὶ – The heavens rejoice at peace. (p. 107 ln. 22)
 - b. ἀφικομένου τοίνυν – The arrival of Paul. (p. 108 ln. 2)
2. The Formula of Reunion: an excerpt from Paul's document.
 - a. Περὶ δὲ τῆς θεοτόκου παρθένου – Preamble: a full Statement adding nothing to the Nicene faith. (p. 108 ln. 23)
 - b. ὁμολογοῦμεν τοιγαροῦν τὸν κύριον – Christ, consubstantial with the Father and with us, with a unity of two natures. (p. 108 ln. 31)
3. Addressing the fault finders.

³⁴⁸ If φύσις and ὑποστάσις refer to a particular nature, then it is proper to speak of "being a nature." Whereas if they refer to a thing which individuates a nature or of which a nature is a component, then they "have a nature."

- a. Ταύταις ὑμῶν ἐντυχόντες – Response to Paul’s document. (p. 109 ln. 10)
- b. ὃ ἀνόητοι – Addressing the foolish fault finders. (p. 109 ln. 17)
- 4. τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας – Please rein in those who would charge us with confusing the flesh and the Word. (p. 110 ln. 7)
- 5. ὅτι δὲ ταῖς τῶν ἁγίων πατέρων – Conclusion: affirming the Nicene faith. (p. 110 ln. 21)³⁴⁹

After recounting the reception of and response given to the emissary from Antioch, Paul, Cyril recounts and affirms the statement Paul gave him from John: “...realizing that we think the same..., we glorified God the saviour of us all...” Cyril then offers an account of his own theology, a short response to the “fault finders” who claimed that Cyril was saying “that the holy body of Christ came down from heaven and not from the holy virgin” (§3). Cyril defends his use of θεοτόκος because it was truly the Son of God born from the virgin and explains that saying Christ was “from above” (ἄνωθεν) or from heaven (ἐξ οὐρανοῦ) followed Paul and Jesus’ examples (1 Cor 15:47; John 3:13), indicating that it was God the Word who became incarnate (§3). After dismissing the charge that he believes God the Son changed in his nature, Cyril concludes with an affirmation that he would not dare to move beyond what the Fathers and Scriptures set forth. As in the *Second Letter to Nestorius*, the importance of holding to Nicaea permeates the letter; this is seen especially in the excerpts from Paul’s document (§2a) and in Cyril’s concluding comments (§5).

More so than in the *Second Letter to Nestorius*, Cyril’s affirmation of and reflection on the Oriental confession develops the presence of both natures after the incarnation. The statement from John affirms the infamous dual consubstantiality of Christ, that he is ὁμοούσιος with God and man. The language of “from both [natures]” (*Second Letter*, §2b) is not found in

³⁴⁹ See Appendix 2 for a working translation of the full text. The first words of the opening sentence are given in Greek, which will allow the reader to identify where each section I have delineated begins in the Greek text. The page number and line number from ACO 2.1.1 are also given.

this letter; instead, “a unity of two natures” (δύο φύσεων ἕνωσις) has come about. These two natures are not confused (ἀσυγχύτου). The statement ends with an affirmation of partitive exegesis, recognizing that statements concerning the Lord are common as they pertain to one πρόσωπον but distinguished as they relate to two natures (δύο φύσεων). Πρόσωπον here does not bear the pejorative sense it does in Cyril’s earlier letter—a mere “façade”—nor the technical sense it has in Nestorius’ writing (however we construe that sense). Instead, it appears to signify the individual, as does ὑπόστασις. Knowing that πρόσωπον could mean the individual in contrast with the universal, as we saw in the 4th-century fathers, this sense stands out in the context: Christ is “one with his flesh,” he has a metaphysical unity between his deity and humanity. The same one is both perfect humanity and deity, not a human and a god, but a Godman; there is also a difference in nature perceived, but this is found in the same person, an “ineffable union.” In Chapter 6, it will be argued that this is how πρόσωπον was used in the *Definition*, which has the term in parallel with ὑπόστασις.

In Cyril’s response to the excerpt from Paul’s document (§3), he affirms that Christ remained “what he was” (ὃ ἦν), God “unchangeable and unalterable according to nature” (ἄτρεπτος γὰρ καὶ ἀναλλοίωτος κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν). He is “perfect in deity” (θεότητι) and “perfect in humanity” (ανθρωπότητι), known “in one individual (πρόσωπον).” That πρόσωπον is used with “νοούμενος” may indicate that while signifying the individual, as does ὑπόστασις, it connotes appearance, whereas the other connotes existence. This connects well with the broader semantic usage of πρόσωπον for the external presentation or appearance of something. πρόσωπον would then connote that the one individual is where the two natures are perceived, not independently from the unity; ὑπόστασις connotes that the one individual is an actual thing, a true unity—not a *mere* appearance.

Setting the term within Cyril's corpus, van Loon argues that πρόσωπον is used for the ontological and grammatical person (as opposed to the metaphysical object). Van Loon identifies the grammatical person as the personal subject in language and the ontological person as a personal reality, where "personal" is defined as a rational being capable of interpersonal communion. However, none of the examples he gives justifies the definition of "person" as "rational" (though he is trying to specify that it is generally used for higher-level realities like humans, angels, and God) nor the claim that person refers to a thing capable of interpersonal communication. "Person" in his description is conceptually loaded, yet insufficient evidence is given to sustain this reading. However, the evidence he provides does suggest that the term is used for the grammatical subject, being that which is spoken about, is predicated of, and about which propositions are formed.³⁵⁰ It is important to remember that "person" throughout the fourth-century discussion, and impinging now on the 5th century, "operates with reference to the grammatical distinction between common and particular, identity and difference, not with reference to the content of personhood as such, nor the loving relationship of communion between persons."³⁵¹ The differences of the natures (ἡ τῶν φύσεων... διαφορά) from which the unity came are nevertheless perceived, but unity is recognised (§3). In the following section, Christ is affirmed to be impassible, suffering in the flesh, not "in the nature of his unspeakable divinity" (οὐχὶ τῇ φύσει τῆς ἀρρήτου θεότητος) (§4).

In section 4, Cyril raises the concern of those who attribute to him "mixture," "compound" or "composition" to the incarnate Christ. In response, he maintains that the divine nature cannot experience change, so it cannot be mixed or compounded with the flesh. In this section, φύσις is solely considered in its abstract dimension, in terms of various properties

³⁵⁰ van Loon, *The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria*, 179–85, 509–12.

³⁵¹ John Behr, *The Nicene Faith*, 422 fn. 36.

(impassibility and unspeakability). In conclusion (§5), Cyril affirms with Constantinople that the Spirit is the same as the Son (and, therefore, the Father) according to “the definition of his essence” (τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον). Here is a clear connection between Cyril’s discussion thus far and the abstract language of the Conciliar Fathers. Here he speaks of an essence with a phrase strikingly similar to the Aristotelian phrase (used frequently among the 4th-century Fathers), “τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον” (“the account of being”). He has already used φύσις with a focus on the abstract dimension of essence (§4); here, he uses οὐσία in the same way. “The definition of essence” (τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον) functions in the same way as the “unspeakable divine nature” (τῇ φύσει τῆς ἀρρήτου θεότητος) in the previous section, denominating the ontological identity and properties shared by the divine persons. That Cyril is willing to apply the concept of a “definition” to an essence in a context where essence is parallel to φύσις confirms that the two φύσεις Christ possesses are conceived of as abstract essences. They are not treated as concrete individuals, as instantiations, nor as the concrete substance that is the being of each instantiation. No account is given of the ontological reality that unites disparate individuals of the same essence: there is no concrete account of φύσις as being. Supporting the claim that Cyril focuses on the abstract reality of the two essences, we see that the essence involves properties, as it did for the Conciliar Fathers. The nature of divinity is perfect in Christ, entailing certain properties, e.g. impassibility, and the humanity is perfect, entailing its own properties, flesh and a rational soul (“flesh” and “rational soul” being properties as abstract components of the definition of humanity, as properties of the universal Humanity, which are realised in concrete individuals as a body and a soul; thus, the abstract properties have metaphysical entailments when instantiated). Christ’s sufferings are attributable to the passible flesh so that his impassible divinity is not said to suffer.

In this context, we also get the only hint of the concrete dimensions of ὁμοούσιος in these two letters; the Spirit “proceeds from [the Father]” (ὁ ἐκπορεύεται μὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ), found

in a sentence closely accompanied by a statement of his equality with the Son in essence. Nevertheless, though both natures are united in an individual, they are not confused (ἀσυγχύτου).

The most significant contribution of the *Letter to John of Antioch* to our consideration of the *Definition*'s conceptual apparatus is the positive use of πρόσωπον and the dual consubstantiality formula. The latter introduces some difficulties when we read it within the context of the Conciliar Fathers.

4.4 CONCLUSION

Within the context of the *Letter to John of Antioch*, with its emphasis upon the definitional essence shared by the persons of the Trinity and of the divine nature of Christ, ὁμοούσιος could be read as a simple affirmation of the collaterality of Christ's natures, with God the Father, on the one hand, and humans, on the other. However, this is not how ὁμοούσιος was used in the Conciliar Fathers, nor was this the way they interpreted the term with reference to the Trinity. Indeed, bare collaterality was seen as a deficient interpretation of ὁμοούσιος because, without an account of the shared οὐσία, it tended towards an understanding of οὐσία as transcendent genus or antecedent matter.

To guard against these errors, the 4th-century fathers were explicit that essential equality between the Trinitarian persons was an implication of the organic, ontological unity between the Father and the Son and Spirit who came from him. They were of the same essence because they partook without division from his οὐσία. This same account was also applied to humanity, often as an analogy substantiating the use of this derivative οὐσία for the Trinity. When read within the Conciliar tradition (defined narrowly as the sources we are tracing), the terms are naturally interpreted in this manner. As observed in the introduction to this thesis, Lacoste and

Zachhuber both argue that the attribution of dual consubstantiality raises significant problems.³⁵² Reading the *Letter to John* within this tradition, we are forced to seek a resolution at this point. The problem arises when οὐσία is seen as not merely an essence but as the fundamental reality of something, as *substance*, individuated by properties unique to this or that individual. In such an account, it does not make sense to speak of an individual with two οὐσίαι, for an individual is fundamentally an individuated οὐσία; the presence of two οὐσίαι implies two individuals, not one. We can draw that out a bit.

The ὑπόστασις for the conciliar fathers of the 4th Century was merely the οὐσία with ιδιώματα, so it could not support the sort of union sought here. Instead, unity could obtain on the basis of the only ontological component the natures have in common, the distinctive properties or characteristic marks of the individual (ιδιώματα). If we were to imagine a set of ιδιώματα shared by both οὐσία, a set by which both οὐσία were individuated, we would not have one individual but two individuals (two οὐσίαι with ιδιώματα) sharing the same principle of individuation, that is, two individuals that have in common only the ontological item added to the οὐσία to make it an individual. To put this in other words, if an οὐσία is a substance and when individuated it is not broken up into substances but is the substantial reality of each individual (their individuality merely being the “how” (ὅπως) of that instantiation, the individual properties that separated this instance of the substance from another), if this is the case, then the addition of a common set of properties does not result in an individual but each οὐσία is an individual (an individual of the nature differentiated from other individuals by its characteristic marks), and so there are two substances (οὐσίαι), two countable things, united only by a set of distinctive properties. Because an individual is the οὐσία distinguished by the

³⁵² Lacoste, “Homousios et Homoousios”; Zachhuber, *The Rise*, 103–11.

ιδιώματα, there are also two individuals, the individuated divine nature and the individuated human nature. Concerning the claim that they are countable beings (two, not one), this would follow from the theory of derivative substance. For the 4th-century theologians, the universal was countable, was a discrete reality, but individuals were not because the universal, not the individual, was a substantial being or reality. Individuals were merely that being particularised: there were not three gods, but one God in three individuals, as there were not a certain number of humans, *n*, but one Human (see the discussion of their conceptual apparatus in Chapter 3). This seems counterintuitive to us, yet this was a consequence of the 4th-century attempt to uphold the ontological analogy between humanity and divinity and, on this basis, defend the oneness of God in three persons, as Gregory of Nyssa put it,


We say, therefore, first, that it is a customary misuse of language to call those who are not divided in nature by the same name as the nature in the plural, to say “many humans,” which is as if to say “many human natures.”³⁵³ (*Ad Ablabium*)

The theory of derivative substance guarded against the charge of tri-theism by stating that individuals are not countable beings but universals like Divinity and Humanity as substances are. That is, there is not this or that God, but one God—the divine substance. An individual name, such as Paul, indicated the human substance as particularised by the distinctive properties of this man. As such, “Jesus” would indicate the divinity particularised—one substance—and the humanity particularised—another substance.

³⁵³ Φαμὲν τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν κατάχρησιν τινα συνηθείας εἶναι τὸ τοὺς μὴ διηρημένους τῇ φύσει κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα πληθυντικῶς ὀνομάζειν καὶ λέγειν ὅτι πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὅπερ ὁμοίον ἐστὶ τῷ λέγειν ὅτι πολλαὶ φύσεις ἀνθρώπιναι.

Thus, to avoid such problems, the union καθ' ὑπόστασις must posit a new understanding of ὑπόστασις not as a description of the individuated οὐσία but as something that individuates. Not only is it something that individuates, as with ιδιώματα, but it also simultaneously designates the individual and is the substantial reality of that individual. It, therefore, must be rationally separable from οὐσία as that which receives οὐσία and thereby becomes an individual instance of the universal designated by οὐσία. On this account, we no longer have two individuals sharing a particularising principle but one individual with two natures. We can picture this in contrast with the former account as we have in Figure 5, where ὑπόστασις refers to the Individuated Human Nature or the Individuated Divine Nature on the 4th-century account of ὑπόστασις (a φύσις plus ιδιώματα) but to the entire individual, which has both φύσεις and the ιδιώματα.

Figure 5 – Two Different Models of Individuation



The use of ὑπόστασις for that which gives subsistence to a nature and individuates it, solving the problem of how two natures can come together into one individual, may be suggested in Cyril's *Second Letter*. The use of partitive exegesis and the ὑπόστασις as the individual in which two natures subsist suggests an interpretation of ὑπόστασις as other than an οὐσία individuated with properties. If the predicates are made of ὑπόστασις according to the

natures but not of the natures proper, then the ὑπόστασις seems to be something other than either nature. Moreover, the ὑπόστασις cannot be the individuating properties, for these likewise are predicated to the individual, not to the natures (otherwise, they would apply to every instantiation of the nature, no longer being individual—but they must not “touch the nature”). Thus, both properties and natures inhere in something antecedent to either. The use of ὑπόστασις for this antecedent reality suggests that its role is to give subsistence or existence to the natures, to uphold them.

On this account, the οὐσία or φύσις would no longer signify both the reality and definition of a thing but merely the latter (the “what,” not the “how”). Indeed, it is hard to see how οὐσία could escape being categorised as an accident, for it is no longer separable, nor is its inherence clearly that of a part. That is, in the *Categories*, Aristotle identifies accidents as those which are in something (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ) and are not able to be predicated synonymously with the subject (in the statement “a body is white,” “white” cannot be replaced with the definition of “whiteness,” Cat. 2a, lns. 27-34), “cannot exist apart from that which they are in” (ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν), are not differentia (Cat. 3a20-29), and do not have existence in something as a part (“part” being the sort of “in” enjoyed by a substance, Cat. 3a29-34).³⁵⁴ For Aristotle, Gleede observes, secondary substance was able to avoid being identified as an accident because its inherence was merely conceptual; matter always had form.³⁵⁵ Yet acknowledging this, οὐσία here in Cyril’s letters seems far from the substantial, real existence of a thing as taught by the conciliar fathers; moreover, the fact that two οὐσίαι are present seems to complicate things further, for Christ could have existed apart from one or

³⁵⁴ Cat. 2, 5. See the discussion in Benjamin Gleede, *The Development of the Term Ἐνυπόστατος From Origen to John of Damascus*, *Vigiliae Christianae*, Supplements (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 3.3.

³⁵⁵ Gleede, *The Development*, 70-71.

the other οὐσία: the οὐσία is not only conceptually separable, as with form and matter, but actually separable. Cyril's ontology requires the difference between ὑπόστασις and φύσις to be more than just conceptual: these are ontologically different realities. The ὑπόστασις is also more than matter, applying as it does to the immaterial Godhead, nor does Cyril ever identify it as such, so the inherence of οὐσία in a ὑπόστασις isn't the sort discussed by Aristotle.³⁵⁶ The Son was not always a human, but he was always God. This problem was developed in later Christian thought through the category of ἐνυπόστατος (see §6.3.2.2).³⁵⁷

If οὐσία were reduced to an inhering essence without the connotations of true and real existence, then the Trinitarian errors that the Conciliar Fathers sought to reject seem to be re-introduced. Now the Son would be merely collateral with the Father, not one in being or substance but only equal in essence. Similarly, the analogy of humanity as one thing would no longer be valid. It would seem that the persons are properly counted as three Gods on this account, which became an issue in the "tritheism" controversy.³⁵⁸ If the actual reality of the essence were maintained yet distinguished from the subsistent individual in which it inheres, then it would appear that the charge of a quaternity would re-emerge, there being now three

³⁵⁶ See §3.2 above for matter in Basil, and several authors discuss the status of matter for Christians before and after Chalcedon. Dirk Krausmüller, "Under the Spell of John Philoponus: How Chalcedonian Theologians of the Late Patristic Period Attempted to Safeguard the Oneness of God," *J ECS* 68.2 (2017): 625–49, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jts/flx075>; Gerd Van Riel and Thomas Wauters, "Gregory of Nyssa's 'Bundle Theory of Matter,'" *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 28.3 (2020): 395–421, <https://doi.org/10.1353/earl.2020.0030>; Sarah Byers, "'Consubstantiality' as a Philosophical-Theological Problem: Victorinus' Hylomorphic Model of God and His 'Correction' by Augustine," *SJT* 75.1 (2022): 18, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0036930621000788>.

³⁵⁷ See Gleede, *The Development*.

³⁵⁸ Cf. Marianne Ehrhardt, trans., *Christ in Christian Tradition Vol. 2, Part Three: The Churches of Jerusalem and Antioch from 451 to 600* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2:268–280; Christopher Erismann, "The Trinity, Universals, and Particular Substances: Philoponus and Roscelin," *Traditio* 63 (2008): 277–305; Zachhuber, *The Rise*, 145–69; Alois Grillmeier and Theresia Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition Vol. 2, Part Four: The Church of Alexandria with Nubia and Ethiopia after 451*, trans. O.C. Dean Jr. (London; Louisville: Wobray; Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 107–46.

self-subsistent individuals and a transcendent reality that informs them. However, though the interpretation of ὑπόστασις as the subsistent reality raises difficulties, it does seem to resolve the need for a basis of predication that is genuine (a ὑπόστασις not a mere πρόσωπον) and not either nature.³⁵⁹

As an alternative answer, we could postulate an asymmetrical use of ὁμοούσιος, as Lacoste claims is present in the *Definition*.³⁶⁰ That is, in the case of the Divine Persons, the one οὐσία is individuated by ἰδίος but remains the fundamental existent. In contrast, in human persons, the οὐσία is individuated in something, where that “something” gives existence to an otherwise abstract οὐσία. This must be genuinely asymmetrical: if humanity is an οὐσία in every case but the Christ, then his humanity is in some manner different than or other than ours, so not truly human.³⁶¹ Adopting this approach, we may seize upon Basil’s willingness to speak of a material substratum with reference to humanity, introducing a third element into the composition of an individual, the substratum, the essence or nature, and the individual properties (ἰδίος). In this case, the divine οὐσία is self-subsisting and, therefore, individuated by ἰδίος alone. In contrast, the human οὐσία subsists in a substratum, along with ἰδίος. In the case of the incarnation, The Word is a self-contained ὑπόστασις, οὐσία with ιδιώματα—thus, he is ὁμοούσιος with the Father in the Conciliar sense—who takes upon himself a human

³⁵⁹ This is the solution Zachhuber proposes was reached in the post-Chalcedonian reception of Chalcedon. Zachhuber, *The Rise*.

³⁶⁰ Lacoste, “Homousios et Homoousios.”

³⁶¹ This seems to be the point of several of Apollinaris paradoxical claims, such as *E Kata Meros Pistis*, Frag. 142, *Anakephalaiosis (Recapitulation)* 4 and 16, and *Tomus Synodalis* in Hans Lietzmann, ed., *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule: Texte und Untersuchungen* (J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1904), 171, 241, 243–44, 262–63, <http://archive.org/details/apollinarisvonl01apolgoog>. See the Excursus in §6.3.1.

οὐσία, flesh and a rational soul with the attendant properties.³⁶² This position allows the Trinitarian use of ὁμοούσιος to stand. However, it introduces several of its own problems.

First, the Trinitarian use of ὁμοούσιος was established on analogy with humanity, but on this approach, humanity and the Godhead are now disanalogous: the argument that God is one and not three because humanity is one and not many (as in the first part of Gregory Nyssa's *Ad Ablabium*), or the similar argument that conceptual identity is found in derivation not in a transcendent substance (as in Apollinaris's letter to Basil, Basil's *Ep. 362*), would no longer be valid. Second, in the *Formula of Reunion* and the *Definition of Chalcedon*, the two uses of ὁμοούσιος in parallel must be interpreted differently (as charged by Lacoste).³⁶³ Finally, this approach does not as easily resolve the predication problem as does the solution of reducing both essences to the abstract definition. That is, if the divine nature individuated with ιδιώματα is the ὑπόστασις, then predications κατὰ σάρκα appear to be applied to the divine nature, but Cyril is right to insist in the *Second Letter to Nestorius* that κατὰ σάρκα predication must not reach to the divine nature, lest contradiction ensue (e.g. the impassible divine nature suffers, §2c; cf. *Letter to John of Antioch* §4). Once again, predication needs to inhere in something other than the divine nature. The ὑπόστασις, conceived of as φύσις with individuating

³⁶² There has been significant discussion the development of such a position in post-Chalcedonian theology, especially with regard to Leontius of Byzantium. Though it is probably wrong to associate this development with the term *enhypostatos*, which probably means “existent” without local implications (i.e. “existent in”), this does appear to be a legitimate conceptual development. Brian Edward Daley, “‘A Richer Union’: Leontius of Byzantium and the Relationship of Human and Divine in Christ,” in *Studia Patristica* (Louvain, 1993), 239–65; Grillmeier and Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition Vol. 2, Part Two*, 194–96; F LeRon Shults, “A Dubious Christological Formula from Leontius of Byzantium to Karl Barth,” *Theological Studies* 57.3 (1996): 431–46; U. M. Lang, “Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos: Church Fathers, Protestant Orthodoxy and Karl Barth,” *The Journal of Theological Studies* 49.2 (1998): 630–57, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jts/49.2.630>; Matthias Gockel, “A Dubious Christological Formula?: Leontius of Byzantium and the Anhypostasis-Enhypostasis Theory,” *The Journal of Theological Studies* 51.2 (2000): 515–32; Benjamin Gleede, *The Development*, 61–69, 139–55.

³⁶³ Lacoste, “Homooousios et Homoousios.”

ιδιώματα, could itself be treated as the substratum in which the κατὰ σάρκα predicates inhere, but this does not clearly guard the divine nature against the passible predicates. Because κατὰ σάρκα predication would be analogous to the ιδιώματα, it would, like accidents, not extend to all instantiations of the divine nature. (Now, how the ιδιώματα themselves might inhere in the one nature without dividing the nature or being equally predicated of all is a significant conceptual issue; this issue emerged particularly in William of Ockham's penetrating response to the problem of instantiation in Book 1 distinction 2, questions 3-8 of his *In Libros Sententiarum* and, in particular, his response to John Dun Scotus in question 5. Nevertheless, we will assume the cogency of this account for the sake of the present argument.)³⁶⁴ However, though the ιδιώματα do not extend to the common definition, they must be consistent with it: if the divine nature is light, then all its instantiations are light; it would be a contradiction for the one instantiation to be individuated by darkness. This raises a problem because the inhering human nature entails "passibility," for example, yet the divine nature in which it inheres entails "impassability." Furthermore, the natures which are treated as analogous would now be functioning very differently logically and, apparently, ontologically: partitive exegesis presents predication according to either the divine or human nature as analogous, but on this position, the predicates according to the divine nature are of a fundamentally different sort than those of the human nature, one nature being constitutional of the Word's ὑπόστασις and the other an accident inhering in the ὑπόστασις.

³⁶⁴ Cf. Alfred J. Freddoso, "Ockham on Faith and Reason," in *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, ed. Paul Vincent Spade, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 326–49; Russell L. Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 124–31; Paul Thom, *The Logic of the Trinity: Augustine to Ockham*, 1st ed., Medieval Philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 161–80.

There does not appear to be an easy resolution to the dilemma presented by the dual consubstantiality formula and the broader conception of οὐσία received from the Conciliar Fathers. Either route raises its own difficulties: in the first case, it is no longer clear how one may avoid the charge of Tritheism (if οὐσία is reduced to an individuated essence), as becomes clear in the 6th-century Tritheistic controversy in the Miaphysite church.³⁶⁵ In the second case, having the human essence inhere in the ὑπόστασις of the Word creates several significant issues.

In this chapter, we have argued that Nestorius, according to Chalcedon's conciliar tradition, taught that there were two particulars (both natures individuated separately) in Christ. In response to this, Cyril upheld the reality of both natures in terms of Christ possessing them both in full, with their concomitant properties, in one individual. Thus, both natures were individuated in one individual, thereby avoiding the charge of two sons or particulars. However, this account of two natures in one individual raised tension with the 4th-century conciliar apparatus. From the perspective of Cyril's letters, tension emerges between the need (for the sake of the Nicene account of the Trinity) to preserve the derivative nature of οὐσία and its status as the fundamental reality and between the need (for the sake of Christology) to preserve the co-ordinate, abstract roles for the essences, where neither has being or subsistence apart from an individual in which it inheres.

In Chapter 2, we identified the *Acta*'s third interpretive strategy as moving from Cyril's letters to Leo's *Tome* in the interpretation of the *Definition*. Thus far, we have argued that tracing the key concepts used in the *Definition of Chalcedon* across the authorities commended

³⁶⁵ Zachhuber, *The Rise*, 155–67; Ehrhardt, *Christ in Christian Tradition Vol. 2, Part Three: The Churches of Jerusalem and Antioch from 451 to 600*, 2:268–80; Erismann, “The Trinity.”

in the three interpretative strategies, terminating at Cyril's letters, raises significant conceptual issues. With a framework of a conciliar interpretation of the *Definition*'s concepts incorporating the Nicene tradition and Cyril in place, we can now make recourse to Leo's *Tome* to see what, if anything, this letter will contribute.

Chapter 5 – The Conceptual Apparatus of Leo's Tome

- 5.1 *The Tome's Background, Eutyches*
 - 5.1.1 *Eutyches at Chalcedon*
 - 5.1.2 *Eutyches in the Tome*
- 5.2 *The Role of Leo's Tome at Chalcedon*
- 5.3 *The Style of the Tome*
- 5.4 *An Analysis of the Tome*
 - 5.4.1 *The Purpose of the Tome*
 - 5.4.2 *The Argument of the Tome*
 - 5.4.3 *The Tome's Contribution to the Definition's Conceptual Apparatus*
 - 5.4.3.1 *Nature as Abstract Essence in the Tome*
 - 5.4.3.2 *The Objection that Nature Means Concrete Individual*
 - 5.4.3.3 *Other Terms for the Universal in the Tome*
- 5.5 *Conclusion*

Throughout the Christological controversies surrounding Nestorius and then Eutyches, correspondence was made with the Western church. The Western church had shown some interest in the debate, with Pope Celestine supporting Cyril (though not without careful observance of the politics involved).³⁶⁶ When Leo I (Leo the Great) became Pope in 440, he continued his predecessor's interest in the Eastern struggles. Leo's most significant contribution to the Christological tensions leading to Chalcedon was the *Tome*, his letter to Flavian, Archbishop of Constantinople. The *Tome* was drafted on June 13, AD 449, and

³⁶⁶ See the survey of Rome's involvement in the Nestorian controversy in Bernard Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 23–56. Cf. McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*, 51; Frances M. Young, *From Nicaea to Chalcedon: A Guide to the Literature and Its Background*, 2nd ed. (London: SCM Press, 2010), 276. In his interactions with Rome, Cyril associated Nestorius with Pelagius through the latter's disciple Caelestius, perhaps seeking to stir up Rome against Nestorius. H. van Loon, "The Pelagian Debate and Cyril of Alexandria's Theology," in *StPat* 68 (Leuven; Paris; Walpole, MA: Peeters, 2013), 62–65.

explicitly addresses the concerns surrounding Eutyches. It was received in time for the second council of Ephesus but was not read there.³⁶⁷ Two years later, when Chalcedon convened, this letter was then read in a Greek translation.³⁶⁸ In the *Definition of Chalcedon*, it is cited for the refutation of Eutyches' heresy. For this reason, we will begin with Eutyches. We will consider the conciliar interpretation of Eutyches as seen in *The Acts of Chalcedon* and the *Tome*; the interpretation of Eutyches emerging from these two documents will shape our interpretation of Eutyches as he is refuted in the *Definition*. We will then consider the *Tome* more closely, seeking to ascertain its contribution to our interpretation of the *Definition*'s conceptual apparatus. We will first consider the general characteristics of the *Tome* and its argument, and then we will consider its contribution to the *Definition*'s interpretation.

5.1 EUTYCHES

5.1.1 Eutyches at Chalcedon

The teaching of Eutyches was the focus of Chalcedon, for he was the subject of the previous two councils. The Home Synod of Constantinople (448) had firmly condemned him, but the Second Council of Ephesus (449) had sought to overturn this decision and deposed Flavian, the chair of the Home Synod at Constantinople. Eutyches was a prominent archimandrite in Constantinople, and he had significant influence. He was vocal in the events surrounding

³⁶⁷ See Session I, §83-107. At Ephesus II, the letter is acknowledged but not read (§83-86); at Chalcedon, Dioscorus is interrogated concerning this issue, but no reason is given why it was not read (§87-107).

³⁶⁸ The Greek translation of the *Tome* is found at *ACO* 2.2.1 pp. 10-20. The translation is described by Price and Gaddis as quite literal but accurate. They offer a translation of the Greek in their *CChal* Vol 2 pp. 14-24. The discussion below follows my working translation, presented in Appendix 3 below.

Ephesus I (431) and a firm supporter of Cyril.³⁶⁹ We have no surviving writings from Eutyches; our main testimony to his own beliefs comes from the acts of several councils, particularly the acts of the Home Synod at Constantinople (448). Vasilije Vranic is confident that we can reconstruct Eutyches' position from this data.³⁷⁰ Drawing on the data given in the acts of the Home Synod (which are included in the Chalcedonian *Acta*, Session I), René Draguet concludes that Eutyches was responsible for his own condemnation yet is misrepresented. That Eutyches was ultimately accountable for his deposition, Draguet argues, should not lead us to accept Chalcedon's assessment of him at face value; Eutyches's testimony at the Home Synod suggests, to Draguet, that Eutyches is innocent of the theological charges made against him.³⁷¹ Part of the problem of identifying Eutyches' position may very well be that he was ill-suited for theological debate, as asserted by his critics; in the *Tome*, Pope Leo called him a "great idiot and extremely unlearned."³⁷² This may explain his reluctance to appear before the synod at Constantinople and his desire not to debate his teachings there. However, the account of the parties sent to summon him paints a different picture in this regard; he is presented as eager to push his teachings and to debate.³⁷³ Whether Leo's estimation is true or not, Eutyches does not present himself at the Home Synod as a theologian with a rigorous Christology; instead, he

³⁶⁹ George A. Bevan and Patrick T. R. Gray, "The Trial of Eutyches: A New Interpretation," *ByzZ* 101.2 (2008): 617–18; René Draguet, "La Christologie D'Eutychès D'après Les Actes Du Synode de Flavien (448)," *Byzantion* 6.1 (1931): 456.

³⁷⁰ Vasilije Vranic, "The Christology of Eutyches at the Council of Constantinople 448," *Philotheos* 8 (2008): 208–9.

³⁷¹ "Il est difficile de nourrir de la sympathie pour un homme dont l'intransigeance devait avoir sa part dans la préparation d'un schisme douloureux, mais la responsabilité qu'il porte n'est pas une raison de ne pas faire justice à sa pensée théologique." "It is difficult to nurture sympathy for a man whose intransigence must have had his share in the preparation of a painful schism, but the responsibility which he carries is not a reason not to do justice to his theological thought." Draguet, "La Christologie D'Eutychès D'après Les Actes Du Synode de Flavien (448)," 455, 457.

³⁷² Cf. Draguet, "La Christologie D'Eutychès D'après Les Actes Du Synode de Flavien (448)," 456.

³⁷³ I.451; *CChal* Vol. 1, pp. 213-214.

expresses reservation over the language of the *Formula of Reunion* and the demands of the Synod to anathematise those who would use different formulations.

From his statements, it appears that he would agree to the formulas presented at Constantinople, once explained, but he did not find them natural for his own use and feared anathematising other formulas lest the earlier fathers, such as Athanasius, be condemned as well (ACO I.535, 542-544).³⁷⁴ He preferred Cyril's earlier language of "one nature" (μία φύσις) as found in the phrase "one nature of the Word enfleshed" (μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη) rather than "Christ in two natures" (ἐν δύο φύσεσιν), the view of Flavian at Constantinople (ACO I.513-514, 527). However, he was willing to accept the "from two" formula offered to him. Leo comments on this specific phrase, but Price and Gaddis claim he has misunderstood it to imply that the Logos and the human nature existed independently prior to the union.³⁷⁵ By the end of Chalcedon, Eutyches was condemned for the "Apollinarian" belief that Christ was not fully human, that he was not consubstantial with us according to the flesh. Eutyches was thus thought to teach a single, mixed nature after the union. Though it is debated at Ephesus II, the record of the 448 Home Synod has Basil of Seleucia stating, "If you do not say two natures (δύο φύσεις) after the union (ἔνωσιν), you are saying mixture (σύγκρασιν) and confusion (σύγχυσιν)" (ACO 1.549-551). At Ephesus II, Basil attempts to save face with the clarification that this would only follow if Eutyches did not include σεσαρκωμένην καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσασαν ("incarnated and made human") to describe the single nature (ACO 1.545-548).³⁷⁶ Though the charges against him focus on the rejection of Christ's

³⁷⁴ Gaddis and Price suggest that it is an Apollinarian "forgery" that Eutyches has in mind when he speaks of Athanasius at §542. Cf. *CChal* Vol. 1, p. 224 fn. 244.

³⁷⁵ *CChal* Vol 2, p. 17, fn. 38.

³⁷⁶ Cf. ACO I.160.

humanity, Eutyches own use of “one nature” (μία φύσις) and the charges of “mixture” (σύγκρασιν, σύγχυσιν) suggest that he was also perceived as diminishing Christ’s deity. The problem with teaching one nature or a mixture was that the mixed nature would neither be fully God nor fully Human, only part God and part human. It would not take much to infer the diminution of deity from the charge that Eutyches diminished Christ’s humanity, for if Christ were not truly human yet suffered and died, he would be attributed with predicates incompatible with divinity, yet no recourse could be made to his humanity (as was the route taken by Cyril and others).

Eutyches is regularly railed against in the minutes of Chalcedon, and the conciliar party is clear to affirm the judgment of the Home Synod over Ephesus II. At Constantinople, Eutyches claims that he is upholding the teaching of Cyril (who used the phrase “one nature” to describe Christ after the union), but he was pushed by Flavian to accept a more rigorous two-nature formula. In a letter read at the council, Eutyches was willing to accept “the pronouncements of the holy fathers at Nicaea and at Ephesus and all those of the blessed Cyril” (ACO I.422).³⁷⁷ However, his accuser, Eusebius, was not concerned with what Eutyches might now say but with what he has said (ACO I.423). He accused Eutyches of calling the orthodox fathers heretics and “uttering blasphemy even against Christ the Saviour of us all” (ACO I.225). Eutyches did not shy from confessing “God the Word enfleshed” (ὁ θεὸς λόγος σαρκωθεὶς) and outlines his theology as a full affirmation of Christ’s deity and humanity,

I worship the Father with the Son, the Son with the Father, and the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son, but I acknowledge that his coming in the flesh was from the flesh of the Holy Virgin and that he became a man

³⁷⁷ πᾶσιν τοῖς ἐκφωνηθεῖσιν παρὰ τῶν ἁγίων πατέρων τῶν ἐν Νικαίᾳ καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸν μακάριον Κύριλλον πᾶσιν. Quoting the minutes of the Home Synod.

perfectly on account of our salvation. Thus I confess before the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, and before your holiness. (ACO I.505)³⁷⁸

He is hesitant about the “two natures” language because he fears making any claims about God’s nature. He also expresses reservations about consubstantiality language because he fears it may undermine the full deity of Christ:

If it is necessary to say, ‘from the virgin’ and ‘consubstantial with us,’ I also say this, my lord, but he is the only son of God, Lord of heaven and earth, ruling and reigning with the Father, with whom he is also seated and praised. Nor do I say ‘consubstantial’ in a way that denies that he is the Son of God. (ACO I.522)³⁷⁹

However, when the terms over which he hesitated were explained by the conciliar party, he was willing to admit them (ACO I.522). After much resistance,³⁸⁰ he is also willing to accept the mediating phrase “from two natures” (ACO I.489). Though he does not give a reason for this hesitance, “from two natures” could suggest the pre-existence of the human nature before the union, something he and the conciliar parties were eager to deny (cf. ACO I.522); as observed above, Leo understands the formula in that way.³⁸¹ Kelly claims that φύσις for Eutyches refers to the “concrete existence,” which would be consistent with his hesitation, for confessing “from two natures” where nature meant an individual substance would mean that

³⁷⁸ προσκυνῶ τὸν πατέρα μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τὸν υἱὸν μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ. ὁμολογῶ δὲ τὴν ἔνσαρκον αὐτοῦ παρουσίαν γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς τῆς ἁγίας παρθένου καὶ ἐνανθρωπῆσαι αὐτὸν τελείως διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν ἡμῶν. οὕτως ὁμολογῶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀγιωσύνης. ACO I.505.

³⁷⁹ εἰ δὲ δεῖ εἰπεῖν ἐκ τῆς παρθένου καὶ ὁμοούσιον ἡμῖν, κεῖ τοῦτο λέγω, κύρι, πλὴν τοὺν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ μονογενῆ, κύριον οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς, συνδεσπόζοντα καὶ συμβασιλεύοντα τῷ πατρί, μεθ’ οὗ καὶ συνκαθίσταται καὶ συνυμνεῖται. οὔτε γὰρ λέγω τὸ ὁμοούσιον ἀρνούμενος τοῦ ἔναι αὐτὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ. Cf. ACO I.514, 524.

³⁸⁰ “May it never be that I would say Christ is from two natures or would define the nature of my God.” μὴ γένοιτο ἐμὲ εἰπεῖν ἐκ δύο φύσεων τὸν Χριστὸν ἢ φυσιολογεῖν τὸν θεόν μου. ACO I.451, cf. I.456. Both are hearsay from the presbyter Mamas.

³⁸¹ Cf. Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 226.

Christ was composed of two individuals that pre-existed the union.³⁸² This may also explain Leo's comment that "it is ungodly in the same way to say that the only Son of God is from two natures before the *enanthropation* [ἐνανθρωπήσεως] as it is unlawful to maintain that there is one nature in him after the Word became flesh." However, in Leo's own writing, *natura* and its translation φύσις are used for the abstract essence, as we will argue below. Nevertheless, the possibility of this interpretation would explain Eutyches' hesitancy about the phrase, in addition to his zeal for Cyril's Christology as it was formulated against Nestorius and expounded at Ephesus I.³⁸³ Eutyches expresses his concern to honour the fathers who precede him (namely, Nicaea, Ephesus, and Cyril) and to honour the Scriptures.³⁸⁴

From the Conciliar perspective, Eutyches is deposed for his belief in one nature after the union, despite his acceptance of "from two natures"; his hesitancy towards the statement of dual consubstantiality is also understood as a rejection of Christ's full humanity. In this way, the single mixed nature supposedly taught by Eutyches is akin to the view attributed to Apollinaris, namely, rejecting Christ's true humanity. Leo's understanding of Eutyches' teaching is similar to the conciliar interpretation from the *Acta*.

5.1.2 Eutyches in the Tome

The lengthiest interaction with Eutyches Christology in the *Acta* is found in Leo's *Tome*. Price and Gaddis judge that Leo has misunderstood Eutyches' teaching; nevertheless, his

³⁸² Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*, 333.

³⁸³ ACO I.422.

³⁸⁴ ACO I.535, 542-544.

interpretation aligns with the condemnation of Eutyches at Constantinople.³⁸⁵ From several statements made by Leo, it is clear that he thought Eutyches rejected the humanity or human birth of Christ.³⁸⁶ This is explicit when he writes in section 2, “did he perhaps think, because of this, that the Lord Christ did not have our nature?” Later, he claims that Eutyches “does not recognise our nature in the only Son of God” (§5a), and he charges that Eutyches did not fear John’s words concerning the one who denies that Christ came in the flesh (1 John 4:2-3): “What is it to divide Jesus except to separate the human nature from him and to try to make vain the mystery through which alone we are saved through intemperate fictions?” (§5a) These sentiments are echoed throughout the letter. Though the body of the letter is well known for its juxtaposition of the two natures, Leo casts the whole body of the letter in terms of an argument for the real incarnation. He begins and ends with this argument: if Eutyches does not accept that Christ came as a true human in true flesh, he must reject all of Christ’s redemptive work (§§2a, 5a). Leo assumes that Eutyches will not deny Christ’s deity, such that Christ could be truly God and not fully human yet suffer and die; this assumption is fair given Eutyches’ interest in Christ’s divinity throughout the Home Synod. Leo, at one point, speaks of the “unmixed and perfect nature of a true human,” that Christ was whole in both divinity and humanity (§3), suggesting that he might have picked up on Basil’s charge that Eutyches was proclaiming a mixed nature. This may receive some confirmation in Leo’s letter 31, *To Pulcheria*, where he writes, “he thought the totality of that Word that became flesh was of one and the same substance.”³⁸⁷ Leo is aware and decries the impiety of Eutyches’ claim to believe

³⁸⁵ Price and Gaddis identify one specific place where Leo mistakes Eutyches position. *CChal* 2:17 fn. 38.

³⁸⁶ Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 188, 203–4, 207.

³⁸⁷ “*si ei naturae nostrae ueritatem inesse non diceret, totum illud quod uerbum caro factum est unius atque eiusdem putaret esse sbstantiae.*” The letter is found on pp. 11-15 in ACO 2.4.

in “one nature” after the union (§5b). However, Leo’s argument appears to assume that Eutyches accepts Christ’s true divinity, which agrees with the account in the Home Synod, so the “one essence” and the “one nature” would be the divine nature without genuine humanity, that is, the Son possessed flesh in some sense but not the human nature. This may be a “mixture,” but not one that denies Christ’s divinity. Leo attributes to Eutyches the claim “that the Word was made flesh such that Christ who was brought forth from the virgin’s womb had the form of a man but did not have a true body derived from his mother’s body” (§2) (cf. ACO I.516, 519, 522).³⁸⁸ We will revisit this point shortly in our analysis of the *Tome*, but Leo perceives that Eutyches’ apparent rejection of Christ’s humanity was an effort to guard his divinity (I.522); throughout the letter, Leo stresses that the assumption of true humanity in no way lessens the divinity and that both natures are necessary for redemption. So, according to Leo, Eutyches’ fundamental error is the rejection of Christ’s humanity to guard his divinity.

5.2 THE ROLE OF LEO’S TOME AT CHALCEDON

Having been received but not read at Ephesus II, Leo’s *Tome* was finally read during the third session of Chalcedon, after the reading of Cyril’s *Second Letter to Nestorius* and his *Letter to John of Antioch*. Though it was eventually signed by all, the manner with which the *Tome* was greeted is worthy of comment.

The Bishops from Illyrian and Palestine objected at numerous points, though many signatures for the document had already been gathered.³⁸⁹ There was also a separate meeting

³⁸⁸ σάρκα γεγενῆσθαι τὸν λόγον, ὡς ὅτιπερ ὁ τεχθεὶς ἀπὸ τῆς παρθένου Χριστὸς εἶχεν μὲν ἀνθρώπου μορφήν, οὐκ εἶχεν δὲ τοῦ μητρῴου σώματος τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

³⁸⁹ *CChal* 2:4. See ACO III.23-26.

held to assuage the critics of the document.³⁹⁰ When the document is finally accepted, it is subordinated to the two letters of Cyril (see Chapter 2 above). The Bishops frequently exclaim along with their affirmations and signatures that the *Tome* agrees with Nicaea, Constantinople, and Ephesus “under the most blessed Cyril,”³⁹¹ or that it agrees with “the teachings of the most holy Cyril.”³⁹² They signed it because it was found to accord with these authorities.³⁹³ Furthermore, the original draft of the *Definition of Chalcedon* did not have enough influence from the *Tome* in the eyes of the Imperial moderators; Price and Gaddis observe one phrase from the *Tome* that makes it into the *Definition*, “Accordingly, the properties (τῆς ιδιότητος) and nature (φύσεως) of both were preserved (συνιζομένης) and united (συνιούσης) in one person (ἐν πρόσωπον)” (§3). They also observe that even in this phrase, two changes are made in the *Definition* to bring it in line with Cyril’s terminology, “the replacement of συνιούσης by συντρεχούσης for ‘coming together’, and the replacement of ‘one person’ by ‘one person and hypostasis.’”³⁹⁴ Because of the absence of content from the *Tome*, the moderators told the bishops, who had already given their assent to the *Tome*, “the contents of it must be added to the definition.”³⁹⁵ Though the Bishops responded that nothing was to be added, the officials

³⁹⁰ ACO III.29-33.

³⁹¹ Anatolius, Bishop of Constantinople, writes, Συνάιδει ... τοῖς ἐν Ἐφέσῳ πραχθεῖσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ μακαριωτάτου καὶ ἐν ἁγίοις Κυρίλλου. ACO IV.9.1.

³⁹² Seleucos of Amaseia writes, συνάιδουσιν τοῖς τε τῇ καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τοῦ ἁγιωτάτου Κυρίλλου εὐρήκαμεν. ACO IV.9.12.

³⁹³ Cf. Gwynn, “The Definition of Christian Tradition,” 16. Murphy observes that “the definition itself presents the *Tome* as an appendix to the letters of St. Cyril (‘suitably joined’).” Romanides (though miss-identifying the letters of Cyril in question), writes similarly, the *Tome* “was accepted... only in light of and in subordination to the synodical letters (especially the *Twelve Chapters*) of Cyril to Nestorius and John of Antioch.” Murphy, “The Dogmatic Definition at Chalcedon,” 366; Romanides, “St Cyril’s ‘One Physis or Hypostasis of God the Logos Incarnate’ and Chalcedon,” 82.

³⁹⁴ *CChal* Vol. 2 p. 17.

³⁹⁵ Οὐκοῦν τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐμπερόμενα ἐντεθῆτι τῷ ὅρῳ. ACO V.17.

and the Emperor pushed the point.³⁹⁶ The particular item to be added, in the eyes of the Imperial officials, was “two natures” (δύο φύσεις) instead of the draft’s “from two natures” (ἐκ δύο φύσεων). The officials present this as a change to explicitly refute what Dioscorus taught and to affirm that for which Flavian was condemned at Ephesus II.³⁹⁷ The final definition reflects these changes, using the phrase “in two natures” (ἐν δύο φύσεσιν). The role of the *Tome* was thus not a clear-cut matter at the Council, yet its influence was nevertheless felt. It would have been read through the lens of the Eastern conciliar tradition and Cyril’s conciliar letters.

5.3 THE STYLE OF THE TOME

The *Tome* and Leo’s other letters do not bear the more philosophical mode adopted in many of his Eastern companions.³⁹⁸ Green has argued extensively against the widely accepted thesis that Prosper of Aquitaine wrote at least a draft of the *Tome*. He illustrates that the *Tome* draws on many sources.³⁹⁹ The letter has the tone of explaining received tradition; what Leo teaches is, in his eyes, the universal teaching of the Church. In terms of his overarching approach to Christology, the *Tome* appears to be unique in Leo’s corpus, focusing as it does not on the unity

³⁹⁶ Cf. ACO V.18-22.

³⁹⁷ It is worth noting the response from the bishops, particularly Anatolius of Constantinople: “Dioscorus was not deposed on account of the faith” (Διὰ πίστιν οὐ καθηρέθη Διόσκορος). For Anatolius, the issue was not Dioscorus’ theology but the offence he rendered to Leo and his refusal to show up at the council when summoned. ACO V.13.

³⁹⁸ Hanson notes that Hilary, on whom Leo draws, knew no Greek Philosophy before his exile, “he rejected and suspected all pagan philosophy as likely to lead to error or doubt or atheism and regarded the Scriptures as the source of all true philosophy.” However, Augustine, on whom Leo also draws freely, interacts with philosophical tradition, such as in the first books of *The City of God*, there in critical manner but also elsewhere in a constructive manner. Hanson, *The Search*, 471–72. Cf. Ronald H. Nash, *The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge* (Lexington, Kent.: The University Press of Kentucky, 1969).

³⁹⁹ Cf. Neil. Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 193–201; Bronwen Neil, *Leo the Great* (London: Routledge, 2009), 95–96.

of Christ's πρόσωπον but the presence of the two φύσεις in Christ. As will be discussed below, Green argues that this uncharacteristic emphasis results from Leo's mistaken notion of Nestorius' heresy. He suggests that the second Christological statement of AD 453 is more characteristic of what we see in Leo's sermons.⁴⁰⁰ However, the redemptive focus seen in the rest of Leo's corpus is on display here.⁴⁰¹ The main argument throughout the *Tome* is that the denial of true humanity is a denial of Christ's redemptive work.

Del Val describes the theology of the *Tome* as *segura* (safe) and identifies Leo's approach as shying from philosophical demonstration,

Precisamente por ser un hombre de acción San León no tiene ciertamente predilección por lo especulativo. Su teología es segura y en su caso lo es precisamente por ser la tradicional. Rehuye todo raciocinio humano para aclarar el dogma. No pidamos a San León consideraciones de orden filosófico, porque su repulsa por las cuestiones un tanto curiosas o impertinentes, lo mismo que su descōnfianza por la filosofía y la falsa ciencia está bien clara en los escritos del Papa. Por eso echará en cara a Eutiques que la falsa ciencia crea en él errores. Tiene conciencia de haber recibido en custodia el depósito sagrado de la Revelación, y por tanto, como administrador del mismo, le resulta muy difícil salirse del marco de la Tradición.⁴⁰²

⁴⁰⁰ Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 188–89. See Green for a survey of Leo's theology in the sermons and letter to the monks of Palestine; see Armitage for a survey of Leo's theology of redemption in his surviving works. Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 94–187, 237–53; J. Mark Armitage, *A Twofold Solidarity: Leo the Great's Theology of Redemption*, Early Christian Studies 9 (Strathfield, NSW: St Pauls Publications, 2005).

⁴⁰¹ See Armitage, *A Twofold Solidarity*.

⁴⁰² “Precisely because he is a man of action, Saint Leo certainly has no predilection for the speculative. His theology is safe, and in his case, it is precisely because it is the traditional one. He shies away from all human reasoning to clarify dogma. Let us not ask Saint Leo for considerations of a philosophical nature, for his revulsion over somewhat curious or impertinent questions is very clear in

Matthew Hoskin argues that the *Tome* bears the marks of traditional, persuasive rhetoric.⁴⁰³ His general assessment agrees with del Val that Leo is not seeking to argue in a constructive manner but to present what he perceives to be traditional.⁴⁰⁴ When Leo does identify the received tradition, it is surprising (from an Eastern perspective) that he appeals to the Old Roman Creed (R), not the Nicene Creed.⁴⁰⁵ He claims that this Creed is used throughout the world in baptismal rites (§§1-2a), a claim which Green suggests is built not on actual usage but on the superiority of the Roman church.⁴⁰⁶ It is unlikely that this Creed bore the universal prestige with which Leo credits it. Behr claims that R was used in the West, especially in Rome, by the mid-3rd century, perhaps even for baptism.⁴⁰⁷ The position of Kelly and others that it derives from the 2nd century has been cast into doubt by recent research; Westra argues “Proto-R” evolved out of earlier components in the 3rd century, becoming R in the 4th.⁴⁰⁸ However, though in use by this time, it was not universally prevalent. Thus, Leo’s comments support the view evident in the statements of the Roman party at Chalcedon, in the *Tome*, and in Leo’s letters that the Roman church had pre-eminence and was thus a dependable standard for

the Pope’s writings, as is his distrust of philosophy and false science. That is why he will throw it in Eutyches’ face that false science creates errors in him. He is aware that he has received the sacred deposit of Revelation into his custody, and therefore, as its administrator, he finds it very difficult to get out of the framework of Tradition.” Ursicino Domínguez del Val, “S. León Magno y El Tomus Ad Flavianum,” *Helmántica* 13.40–42 (1962): 194–95.

⁴⁰³ Matthew Hoskin, “Pope Leo the Great’s Rhetoric: Its Use and Misuse in Ep. 28, the ‘Tome’, and the Impact upon ‘Leonine’ Christology,” in *StPat* 74 (Leuven; Paris; Bristol CT: Peeters, 2016).

⁴⁰⁴ As he puts it, “in composing the *Tome*, Leo used every dialectical and rhetorical skill at his disposal to produce a statement of faith that contained nothing new using rhetoric that was not new, either.” Hoskin, “Pope Leo the Great’s Rhetoric,” 319.

⁴⁰⁵ See section 1.

⁴⁰⁶ Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 211, fn. 117.

⁴⁰⁷ Behr, *The Nicene Faith*, 150.

⁴⁰⁸ J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2006), chap. 4. Wolfram Kinzig and Markus Vinzent, “Recent Research on the Origin of the Creed,” *JTS* 50.2 (1999): 534–59; Liuwe H. Westra, *The Apostles’ Creed: Origin, History, and Some Early Commentaries*, *Instrumenta Patristica et Mediaevalia* 43 (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2002), 21–72.

tradition. Because the Roman church used this creed, Leo could presume that it was a universal standard.

Throughout the work, Leo draws on his previous sermons and the works of theologians such as Augustine and Hilary of Poitiers, and he employs Scripture extensively. Though he occasionally cites Scripture explicitly, he “was more likely to quote a text loosely or allusively than verbatim.”⁴⁰⁹ This contributes to his overall method of argument, which is “never to reveal his working but to present his theology as the timeless teaching of the Church. His work is full of allusions and quasi-citations. Writers are skilfully adapted but never named.”⁴¹⁰

5.4 AN ANALYSIS OF THE TOME

Because the majority of participants at Chalcedon would not have been fluent in Latin, the *Tome* was read in a Greek translation.⁴¹¹ The translation is estimated by Schwartz to have been prepared with “the utmost care and accuracy” (*diligentissime atque accuratissime confecta sit*) and, more recently, Price and Gaddis, to be “faithful but not slavish.”⁴¹² Because the Greek Translation is the form of the *Tome* incorporated into the *Acta* and affirmed by the bishops and the only form accessible to the majority of bishops who would only have read Greek, we will engage with the Greek translation in this chapter.⁴¹³ All translations of *The Tome* are the author’s own (for a working translation of the whole letter, see Appendix 3).

⁴⁰⁹ Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 57.

⁴¹⁰ Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 56.

⁴¹¹ The Greek text is found at ACO 2.1.1, 10-20.

⁴¹² *CChal* 2:14; ACO 2.2.1, xv.

⁴¹³ Price and Gaddis’ translation of the Greek text makes extensive notes where the Greek is different from the Latin, so the reader is directed there for comparison. *CChal* 2:14-24.

5.4.1 The Purpose of the Tome

Though the *Tome* explicitly addresses the error of Eutyches, Green argues that Eutyches' error alone is not sufficient to explain the topics which Leo expounds. Instead, he argues that Leo's interest was as much in refuting a mistaken understanding of Nestorius' teaching as it was Eutyches'.⁴¹⁴ Drawing on Leo's extant corpus, Green shows that Leo followed the mistaken understanding of Nestorius the Roman church acquired during the Christological controversy around Ephesus I, especially from Cyril's *First Letter to Nestorius*. On this view, Nestorius' primary error was to deny Jesus' deity.⁴¹⁵ This would explain the single-minded emphasis on the duality of natures in Christ, which would be effective for refuting a view that diminished the one or the other but would sound Nestorian to those who favoured Cyril's "one nature" language.⁴¹⁶ Green goes so far as to suggest that the emphasis on the two natures, especially the controversial opening line of section 4, is out of character for Leo's work.⁴¹⁷ In addition to the sense it would make of the *Tome*'s argument, the primary evidence Green draws on to demonstrate that Nestorius is one of the targets of the *Tome* is the preponderance of references to Nestorius in Leo's other writings; he shows that Eutyches and Nestorius are often set side by side and that letters from around the time of the *Tome* (including Letter 31 *To Pulcheria*) show that Leo viewed Nestorianism as a genuine concern late in the 440s. He concludes, "The only plausible interpretation of the evidence is that when he wrote the *Tome* Leo had two opponents in mind."⁴¹⁸ Though it is important to recognise with Green that Leo had a mistaken

⁴¹⁴ Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 188, 203–4, 207.

⁴¹⁵ Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 23–27, 227–30.

⁴¹⁶ As observed in the previous chapter, Nestorius himself viewed the *Tome* as a vindication of his position.

⁴¹⁷ Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 218.

⁴¹⁸ Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 206.

view of Nestorius during the period when he wrote the *Tome*, Green's argument that Leo was addressing Nestorius' error in the *Tome* fails to persuade.

Though Green succeeds in demonstrating that Nestorius is often juxtaposed with Eutyches in Leo's correspondence, he fails to explain why Nestorius is not mentioned in the *Tome* if his teaching were a serious concern. Leo often writes about the danger of Nestorius' teaching; we know so because he consistently names him and his views as problematic. An excerpt from *Letter 31* serves to make the point,

whilst [Eutyches] imagines himself to appreciate the majesty of the Son of GOD more devoutly, by denying in Him the real presence of our nature, he came to the conclusion that the whole of that Word which "became flesh" was of one and the same essence. And greatly as Nestorius fell away from the Truth, in asserting that Christ was only born man of His mother, this man also departs no less far from the catholic path, who does not believe that our substance was brought forth from the same Virgin: wishing it of course to be understood as belonging to His Godhead only; so that that which took the form of a slave, and was like us and of the same form, was a kind of image, not the reality of our nature.⁴¹⁹

Eutyches is explicitly mentioned at the beginning of the *Tome* and in its conclusion, framing the whole letter as a refutation of his teaching. Green notes that Leo occasionally alludes to Eutyches in his writings without naming him before he was officially condemned, so Leo uses allusion for diplomatic reasons. However, no such diplomatic reason would explain the absence of Nestorius' name if he were a significant concern in the *Tome*.⁴²⁰ Thus, the absence of any explicit mention of Nestorius is conspicuous, and Green fails to explain it. Furthermore, the

⁴¹⁹ In NPNF² 12a, 44. Latin, *ut dum aestimat se religiosius de filii dei maiestate sentire, si ei naturae nostrae ueritatem inesse non diceret, totum illud quod uerbum caro factum est unius atque eiusdem putaret esse substantiae. et quantum Nestorius a ueritate excidit, dum Christum de matre solum hominem asserit natum, tantum etiam hic a catholico tramite deuiarit qui de eadem uirgine non nostrum credit editam esse substantiam, uolens utique eam solius deitatis intellegi, ut quod formam serui gessit et quod nostril similis fuit atque conformis, quaedam naturae nostrae fuerit imago, non ueritas.*

⁴²⁰ Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 204.

argument of the *Tome* can be explained with reference to Eutyches alone, as will be shown below. However, Leo's mistaken view of Nestorius does explain a significant feature of the *Tome*.

It is well known that the *Tome* had a rough reception at Chalcedon and generally in the Eastern Empire. Green describes it as “tone deaf” to the Eastern concerns about Nestorius.⁴²¹ Because of Leo's mistaken belief concerning Nestorius, he did not seem to realise how his *Tome* would sound to Eastern readers. For those in the East, the issue at stake in Cyril's debate with Nestorius was Christ's unity, and they still perceived this to be an issue when the *Tome* was received. To be sure, Leo speaks of the “unity of the person” (e.g. 4b), but without a clear explication of what this unity meant and the strong assertion of Christ's two natures, the letter did not assuage the concerns of those who thought it sounded like Nestorius, who likewise claimed there was a “personal unity” (e.g. Cyril, *Second Letter to Nestorius*, 2c; Nestorius, *Bazaar* p. 157, 179). Elsewhere, Leo does explicate the unity of Christ, but Leo's concern to refute Eutyches through an exposition of the two natures did not require him to do so in this context, and because he misunderstood Nestorius' position, he did not seem to realise that his polemic against Eutyches would appear Nestorian to Eastern readers.⁴²² The result is a document that sounds Nestorian; as observed in the previous chapter, Nestorius himself welcomed the *Tome* as a vindication of his position. Though the emphasis has shifted in its present context, the opening line of Section 4 that proves problematic in the Eastern Empire is lifted from an earlier sermon delivered on Palm Sunday in 442.⁴²³ Thus, the two-natures doctrine of the *Tome* fits comfortably in Leo's theology, but the *Tome* skews the matter by

⁴²¹ Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 222, 227–28.

⁴²² Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 8–49, 109–10, 176–80, 221–22.

⁴²³ Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 218–19.

under-emphasising Christ's unity. This is corrected later when Leo explains Christ's unity with far more clarity in his *Letter to the Palestinian Monks* (AD 453, Letter 124).⁴²⁴

5.4.2 The Argument of the Tome

Green identifies five main parts to the *Tome*, from which the following outline builds.⁴²⁵

1. Ἀναγνόντες τὰ γράμματα – Introduction concerning Eutyches (p. 10 ln. 19)
2. ἀγνοῶν τοίνυν – Jesus Christ was born a genuine human (p. 11 ln. 15)
 - a. ἀγνοῶν τοίνυν – Attested by the Creed (R) (p. 11 ln. 15)
 - b. ἀλλ' εἶπερ – Attested by the Scriptures (p. 12 ln. 5)
3. σωιζομένης τοίνυν – The properties of both natures were united in one person (p. 13 ln. 11)
4. ἐνεργεῖ γὰρ – Each nature effects a distinct work, but Jesus is the subject of both (p. 14 ln. 27)
 - a. ἐνεργεῖ γὰρ – Each nature effects a distinctive work (p. 14 ln. 27)
 - b. διὰ ταύτην – Through the union the one who is a man may be attributed with divine predicates (p. 16 ln. 8)
5. ἥστινος πίστεως – Conclusion: dangers of Eutyches error (p. 17 ln. 13)
 - a. ἥστινος πίστεως – Eutyches denies the Gospel by rejecting our nature (p. 17 ln. 13)
 - b. Πρὸς μέντοιγε – On the error of “from two natures” before and “in one” after the union (p. 18 ln. 24)

Leo presents his teaching as the catholic tradition, drawing on the Creed (R) and Scripture. His argument is framed by the same basic claim, which explains the main argument in sections 3 and 4. In sections 2a and 5a, he specifies what is at stake in Eutyches' error, namely, Christ's salvific work. In section 2a, he states this positively. He writes that the Son, who was equal with the Father, had a temporal birth “in order to save deceived humanity, in order that he

⁴²⁴ Cf. Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 218–19.

⁴²⁵ Cf. Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 210–26. See Appendix 3 for a working translation of the full text. The first words of the opening sentence are given in Greek, which will allow the reader to identify where each section I have delineated begins in the Greek text. The page number and line number from ACO 2.2.1 are also given.

might also defeat death and strike down the Devil.”⁴²⁶ He would not have been able to do so “except that he took up our nature and made it his own.”⁴²⁷ In 5a, Leo makes the point negatively, “What is it to divide Jesus except to separate the human nature from him and to try to make vain the mystery through which alone we are saved ... ?”⁴²⁸ Also, “if he does not also consider the crucifixion of the Lord a lie ... then let him also acknowledge the flesh of the one whose death he acknowledges.”⁴²⁹ Thus, the mystery of salvation is at stake in Eutyches’ error. This argument presupposes that Eutyches would not reject the divinity of Christ. Therefore, it appears that we need to appeal to an opposing error to explain why Leo argues as much for the presence of the divine nature as the human nature; this is the argument made by Green, contending that the *Tome* addresses Nestorius alongside Eutyches. However, another explanation presents itself.

As observed above, at Chalcedon, Eutyches’ primary concern was to preserve the true divinity of Christ. A persuasive answer to Eutyches’ error must demonstrate not only Christ’s humanity but also his genuine divinity at the same time, showing that the former can be preserved without endangering the latter. If only Christ’s humanity were defended, then the error that Eutyches sought to avoid (on the conciliar interpretation) would be opened; it may appear to be a zero-sum game, where only one side of the incarnation could be maintained at any one time. So that this conclusion may be avoided, the argument for Christ’s full humanity must be balanced with an argument for Christ’s full deity, showing that these are compatible.

⁴²⁶ ἀλλ’ ὅλην ἑαυτὴν εἰς τὸ σῶσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον πεπλανημένον ἐκένωσεν, ἵνα καὶ τὸν θάνατον νικήσῃ καὶ τὸν διάβολον τὸν τὸ κράτος ἔχοντα τοῦ θανάτου τῇ οἰκείᾳ καταβάλλῃ δυνάμει.

⁴²⁷ εἰ μὴ τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτὸς φύσιν ἀνέλαβεν καὶ οἰκαίαν εἰργάσατο.

⁴²⁸ τί δέ ἐστιν τὸ διαίρουν Ἰησοῦν εἰ μὴ τὴν ἀνθρώπινην ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἀποχωρίζειν καὶ τὸ μυστήριον δι’ οὗπερ ἐσώθημεν μόνου.

⁴²⁹ καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὸν σταυρὸν τοῦ δεσπότητος ψευδῇ μὴ νενόμικεν ... οὗτινος οὖν ἐπιγινώσκει τὸν θάνατον, ἐπιγινώσκέτω [καὶ] τὴν σάρκα.

This is exactly the argument Leo makes. He continually stresses that Christ did not lessen his divinity in the incarnation: e.g. “just as the form of God did not destroy the form of the servant, thus the forming of the servant did not lessen the form of God” (§3).⁴³⁰ This also explains the insistence that the properties of both natures are preserved in the union (§3). For these reasons, the argument of the *Tome* is a rightly balanced response to the error perceived to be Eutyches’, of abandoning the humanity for the sake of the divinity. Unfortunately, Leo’s misunderstanding of Nestorius’ error blinded him to the way the Eastern readers would perceive his position, a perception that could perhaps have been remedied if he made explicit how he understood the “unity of the person.” In addition to the rhetorical purpose of the doctrine of two natures in sections 3-4, Leo also echoes the *Formula of Reunion* with its similar emphases.⁴³¹

The argument of the *Tome* weaves together traditional and biblical evidence for the presence of both natures in the incarnation with an overarching argument concerning redemption, which we can lay out in syllogistic form (here as a *modus tollens*),

- 1) If (Christ did not have a true human nature and the divine nature is impassible), then Christ did not suffer on the cross and obtain our redemption.
- 2) But Christ did suffer on the cross and obtain our redemption.
- 3) Therefore, it is false that (Christ did not have a true human nature and the divine nature is impassible) (from 1,2)
- 4) the Divine nature is impassible
- 5) Therefore, Christ did have a true human nature (from 3, 4).⁴³²

⁴³⁰ ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὴν τοῦ δούλου μορφὴν ἢ μορφὴ τοῦ θεοῦ, οὕτως τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μορφὴν ἢ τοῦ δούλου μόρφωσις οὐκ ἐμείωσεν.

⁴³¹ Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 210–11.

⁴³² Much thanks to Prof. Timothy Pawl for his assistance in setting out this argument.

To assuage the concerns Eutyches expressed, Leo argues that Jesus received a true human nature without any defilement of sin and in such a way that the divine nature is not diminished: both are equally present and evident in the one person (πρόσωπον) of the Lord Jesus.

5.4.3 The Tome's Contribution to the Definition's Conceptual Apparatus

Despite his lack of attention to philosophical precision, Leo's effort to uphold both natures fits within the conceptual framework of his Eastern peers. Unlike many in the East, an attempt to delineate the implications of "nature" as an ontological concept, especially as it concerns the priority of the universal or particular and their relationships, is noticeably absent. Leo does not address how it makes sense for Christ to have two natures; instead, he argues in the second section, as Armitage summarises, that "the Old Testament prophecies apply to him only if that is what he is."⁴³³ In his discussion of the duality of Christ, Leo considers the Biblical testimony about Christ's unique birth from Mary and solidarity with humanity; he identifies this as the solidarity of nature (φύσις) or race (γένος). Once he speaks of the unity of "substance" (οὐσία) between the Father and the Son, but he does not explicate the sense (§2). In context, the "x from x" formula used here echoes the Nicene Creed; read within the conciliar tradition we have been tracing, the presence of the "x from x" formula with "οὐσία" invites the interpretation of "substance" as identity through unbroken derivation. Leo does not seek to draw this out, so the analogies between the oneness of the human substance and the oneness of the divine substance are absent. The one exception may be Leo's claim that Eutyches said, "the Word was made flesh such that Christ who was brought forth from the virgin's womb had the form of a man

⁴³³ Armitage, *A Twofold Solidarity*, 26.

but did not have a true body derived from his mother's body" (§2).⁴³⁴ Eutyches does not say these words; instead, this appears to be a paraphrase of Eutyches' discussion of Christ's consubstantiality with Mary (cf. ACO 1.516, 519, 522). Here Leo speaks of derivation in allusion to a passage about ὁμοούσιος. However, Leo's point appears to be that the rejection of ὁμοούσιος is a rejection of true humanity in the abstract sense. He will also use ὁμοούσιος once, but as discussed below, the sense of οὐσία in the compound echoes his use of φύσις.

5.4.3.1 Nature as Abstract Essence in the Tome

Leo's use of φύσις focuses on the essence of either humanity or divinity; it is the answer to the question, "what is Christ?" Arguing from the Old Roman Creed, Leo contends that Christ has the same properties as God (co-eternal, almighty) and is "differing from the Father in nothing" (ἐν οὐδενὶ τοῦ πατρὸς διαφέρων). The assumption of humanity took nothing away from His divinity ("exalting the humanity but not diminishing the divinity"; τό ἀνθρώπινον αὐξῶν καὶ τὸ θεῖον οὐ μειῶν). As we have seen in the earlier tradition, when used of the essence, φύσις incorporates the properties characterising every member of a class. In the third section, Leo argues that "the properties (ιδιότητος) of each nature [are] preserved and united in one person (πρόσωπου)."⁴³⁵ The properties with which Leo is concerned are passibility and impassibility.⁴³⁶ Leo follows Cyril and those before him in adopting partitive exegesis, assigning certain events and sayings to one or the other nature, as consistent with and so indicative of it and its properties; "The divine nature was united to the passible nature, in order

⁴³⁴ σάρκα γεγενῆσθαι τὸν λόγον, ὡς ὅτιπερ ὁ τεχθεὶς ἀπὸ τῆς παρθένου Χριστὸς εἶχεν μὲν ἀνθρώπου μορφήν, οὐκ εἶχεν δὲ τοῦ μητρῴου σώματος τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

⁴³⁵ σωιζομένης τοίνυν τῆς ιδιότητος ἑκατέρας φύσεως καὶ εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον συνιούσης....

⁴³⁶ Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 213.

that... the one and the same ... would both be able to die from the one and also be unable to die from the other” (§3).⁴³⁷

The difficult opening line of the fourth section has led to various interpretations of the Latin, attempting to avoid the Nestorian-sounding assertion of two agents. The Greek is unambiguous, “For each form operates in communion with the other according to what is its own.”⁴³⁸ However, Leo is attempting only to reiterate the point that each nature can be distinguished according to the events it permits to obtain for the single person of Christ: “one of these shines through the wonders, but the other has collapsed under the abuses.”⁴³⁹ Green attributes the neglect of the single agent in Christ, an emphasis present in his other writings, to Leo’s interest in the duality; “That urgent preoccupation made him tone deaf to that false note here.”⁴⁴⁰ However, this focus explains why many hard-line Cyrillians at Chalcedon were concerned about the *Tome*. Because of statements such as this opening line and at the end of the letter, where Leo addresses Eutyches rhetorically, “let him examine what nature hung upon the wood of the cross” (5.a), Timothy Pawl concludes that Leo employed “human nature” in a “concrete sense.”⁴⁴¹

⁴³⁷ ἐκτιθῆναι ἡ θεία φύσις ἡνώθη τῇ φύσει τῇ παθητῇ, ἵνα ... ὁ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ... ἀποθνήσκῃ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς δυνηθῇ καὶ τελευτᾷ ἐκ τοῦ ἐτέρου μὴ δυνηθῇ.

⁴³⁸ ἐνεργεῖ γὰρ ἑκατέρα μορφή μετὰ τῆς θατέρου κοινωνίας ὅπερ ἴδιον ἔσχηκεν. Cf. “*Agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione quod proprium est.*” Prestige notes several instances where *forma* is not translated as the nominative subject of *agit* but as Greek dative. G. L. Prestige, “The Greek Translation of the Tome of St Leo,” JTS 31.122 (1930): 183–84.

⁴³⁹ καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν διαλάμπει τοῖς θαύμασιν, τὸ δὲ ταῖς ὕβρεσιν ὑποπέπτωκεν.

⁴⁴⁰ Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 222.

⁴⁴¹ Pawl, *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*, 39–40.

5.4.3.2 The Objection that Nature Means Concrete Individual

By concrete, Pawl means an individual instance of a *infima species*, or as Plantinga puts it, “in the second sense the term ‘human nature’ denotes a *concrete human being* rather than a property.”⁴⁴² Pawl is engaging with Leo and the Christological tradition from an Aristotelian framework, hylomorphism (at least with reference to material beings).⁴⁴³ Pawl describes his position concerning material reality in this way, “the (concrete) nature of a material being is composed of some matter in which the substantial form *inheres*, and which is configured by the substantial form.... On the metaphysical story I am telling, accidents *inhere in* hylomorphic compounds of matter and form.”⁴⁴⁴ For Pawl, a *ὑπόστασις* or *supposit* can be explained in this way, “*X* is a supposit (hypostasis) if and only if *x* is a complete being, incommunicable by identity, not apt to inhere in anything, and not sustained by anything.”⁴⁴⁵ He distinguishes this *supposit* from an abstract nature and concrete nature. Of an abstract nature, he writes, “*x* is an abstract nature of some type, *y*, if and only if *x* is a property or complex of properties the instantiation of which by a thing is necessary and sufficient for that thing’s being (a) *y*.” Of a concrete nature, he writes, “*x* is a concrete nature of some type, *y*, if and only if *x* is an individual instance of *y*, and *y* is an *infima species*.”⁴⁴⁶

Whether or not a hylomorphic ontology of concrete substances (οὐσία) would have been known to or employed by Leo, the use of such an ontology is unlikely, especially when

⁴⁴² Pawl’s full definition is, “*x* is a concrete nature of some type, *y*, if and only if *x* is an individual instance of *y*, and *y* is an *infima species*.” Pawl, *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*, 36; Alvin Plantinga, “On Heresy, Mind, and Truth,” *Faith and Philosophy* 16.2 (1999): 184, <https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil199916221>.

⁴⁴³ Pawl, *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*, 58-59.

⁴⁴⁴ *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*, 58.

⁴⁴⁵ *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*, 32.

⁴⁴⁶ *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*, 35-36.

the letter is read within the Eastern milieu we are tracing. Conciliar theology placed a strong emphasis on the parallel between the account of human οὐσία or φύσις and God's οὐσία or φύσις: in both these cases the universal is treated as strongly real and shared among many individuals. It is concrete, as we have seen, in that it is the fundamental reality and gives reality to the individual, yet it is not concrete in the sense of the individual itself. Οὐσία is not Pawl's *supposit*, for it is not a complete, incommunicable being, yet it neither inheres in something nor is sustained by anything.

Instead, for the conciliar tradition, a complete, incommunicable being is a combination of οὐσία with an ιδιότης, the latter being sustained by the οὐσία. ὑπόστασις was used for this combination of οὐσία and ιδιότης. Furthermore, there is no exact equivalent of an “abstract nature” or a “concrete nature” as used by Pawl: an οὐσία could not (for the 4th-century tradition) be reduced to a “property or set of properties” as Pawl describes, so it is not an abstract nature. Nor is οὐσία a concrete nature, for it is not an individual instance of an “infima species.” Instead, οὐσία is treated as the class or genus itself: the shared οὐσία of the divine persons is divinity, and the shared οὐσία of human persons is humanity. Pawl's account of concrete nature is close to what was meant by ὑπόστασις in the 4th century, though the fathers would be reticent to call the Godhead a species and “an individual instance” could not mean, for them, something other than the one οὐσία distinguished from others by a property or set of properties.

Moreover, within the argument of the *Tome*, the phrases used in section 5.a, which Pawl cites in favour of a concrete-nature ontology, are not evidence of this position but of Leo's two nature rhetoric perhaps overtaking precision. Leo specifies that when he speaks of the natures being united in the one person, he means that the characteristic properties (ιδιότητες) are “preserved and united” in the one person (§3): “Accordingly, the property [ιδιότητος] of each nature being preserved and united in one person [πρόσωπου], lowliness was taken up by

divinity, impotence by power, mortality by immortality, and to pay the debt owed by our nature, the divine nature was united to the passible nature.”⁴⁴⁷ In the first part of this sentence, the paradoxical union of apparently contradictory properties is explicated with a genitive absolute clause [σωιζομένης τούτων τῆς ιδιότητος ...]; the union of these antinomical properties is achieved in the one person, and they are fully “preserved” (σωιζομένης) in that union, none being corrupted or omitted in the union of the “[impassible] divine nature” with the “passible [human] nature.” Leo’s identification of the true possession of a nature with the uncorrupted presence of the properties of that nature in the one person is different from the use of φύσις in 4th-century tradition; nevertheless, if a nature as it is found in the individual is a set of properties making that thing what the nature is (divine or human), the nature is not an individual instance of the Godhead; it is not a “concrete nature.” Instead, the one person (πρόσωπον) is the individual instance of the Godhead and the Humanity. So, nature is used similarly to the sense of Pawl’s “abstract nature” rather than a “concrete nature,” which has as its closest parallel the πρόσωπον in which the properties of each nature are united. The duality of nature does not override the properties of each nature but “preserves” them. In the problematic opening of section 4, “accomplishing” does not indicate the agency of the natures but their relation to the one subject (πρόσωπον): each nature grants certain operations (to use a word common in later theology) to the single subject, such that when actions proper to this or that nature are performed, this or that nature is “exhibited.” Leo speaks of certain actions being “from” or “of” this or that nature, “for though there certainly is one person of God and humanity in the Lord

⁴⁴⁷ σωιζομένης τοίνυν τῆς ιδιότητος ἑκατέρας φύσεως καὶ εἰς ἓν πρόσωπου συνιούσης ἀνελήφθη ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς θεότητος ἢ ταπεινότης, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως τὸ ἀδύνατον, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀθανάτου τὸ θνητόν, καὶ πρὸς τὸ τὸ χρεωστούμενον ὄφλημα τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως ἐκτιθῆναι ἢ θεία φύσις ἠνώθη τῇ φύσει τῇ παθητῇ.

Jesus Christ, nevertheless, that from which the abuse is common in each is one thing and that from which the glory has become common is another” (§4.a).⁴⁴⁸

When we get to section 5.a., which Pawl cites among other texts, this same epistemology of both natures revealed in the one person according to the states and actions they permit to obtain or “accomplish” in the person is expressed again, but the rhetoric is cranked up without the immediate qualifiers in the previous sections: “let him examine what nature hung upon the wood of the cross, being driven through with nails” (5.a).⁴⁴⁹ Given the Greek conciliar context and his previous clarifications in this letter, this is best read not as “Christ’s concrete human nature hung on the cross” but “through Christ’s human nature the hanging on the cross was accomplished in the person of Christ.” For the conciliar tradition, the flesh, or flesh rationally ensouled, is not a concrete nature or individual, for these are metaphysical components of a “concrete nature” (as defined by Pawl), or an individual (in this case, a human). Because of the human nature, Christ has rationally ensouled flesh, making him a human, but it is the subsistence of these components in a person that makes a human, not the components alone. However, on the surface, the claims made by Leo bear a striking resemblance to Nestorius’ language and explain why the Greek Fathers would have perceived this as “Nestorian,” there being two individuals held together in a loose “moral” union designated by “Christ.”

⁴⁴⁸ εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τῷ δεσπότῃ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἓν ἐστὶν πρόσωπον, ὅμως ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ κοινόν ἐστιν τὸ τῆς ὑβρεως, καὶ ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ κοινὸν τὸ τῆς δόξης καθέστηκεν.

⁴⁴⁹ σκοπεῖτω ποία φύσις διαπεπαρμένη τοῖς ἡλοῖς ἐν τῷ τοῦ σταυροῦ ξύλῳ κεκρέμαστο.

5.4.3.3 Other Terms for the Universal in the Tome

For the universal, Leo appears to use several terms interchangeably, namely, φύσις, οὐσία (in ὁμοούσιος, see §4), and μορφή. This coheres with the use of these words (along with “status”) elsewhere.⁴⁵⁰ Armitage argues that these terms are not used with significant metaphysical implications; they indicate solidarity with or a set of *proprietary* Jesus shares with humanity and God. That is, he argues that for Leo, the connotations of “substance” that are to become problematic in Eastern Christology are not at work:

“Solidarity” [for Studer’s interpretation of Leo], is not to be understand [sic] in the weak sense in which Nestorius might say that the Son entered into a relation of solidarity with the human being Jesus of Nazareth, but in the strong sense that Jesus undergoes and experiences everything that is truly characteristic of being the Son of God and everything that is truly characteristic of being a human being.⁴⁵¹

Absent is a robust account of *how* Jesus might share the same essential characteristics as God and how this does not involve a transcendent genus or multiple deities, yet Leo’s concern for properties and proper activities is not absent from the Eastern discussion, as we have seen thus far. Given what we find in Leo’s extant writings, it is probable that Leo was not seeking to parse out the ontological implications of confessing two natures in Christ. Still, his use of φύσις and its synonyms align with the abstract dimensions of the Conciliar conceptual apparatus. That Jesus suffers demonstrates that he is not *merely* God; that he is co-eternal, almighty, and glorious in his earthly activities reveals that he is God. The concept of “solidarity” expresses

⁴⁵⁰ Armitage, *A Twofold Solidarity*, 13.

⁴⁵¹ Armitage, *A Twofold Solidarity*, 9.

the ontological unity of essence that the Eastern Fathers use more philosophical language to express.⁴⁵²

5.5 CONCLUSION

Read as an appendage to Cyril's letters, Leo's *Tome* does not offer a unique contribution to the conceptual apparatus of the *Definition*, nor does it offer a clear way to resolve the tension present in the tradition thus far. However, Leo's focus on the duality of natures with little attention to the way in which the Father and the Son, and the Son and humans, possess ontological equality may reinforce the tendency in Cyril's conciliar letters to focus on the abstract dimension of the οὐσία, asserting unity with God and man without exploring the implications this has for the Conciliar interpretation of the Trinitarian ὁμοούσιος. For Leo, ὁμοούσιος is used simply for collaterality. Leo's use of these terms analogously for the Godhead and humanity points us to a reading of the dual consubstantiality phrase that maintains the same sense in both cases, as was the case in Cyril's *Letter to John of Antioch*. As we argued in our discussion of Cyril, this again pushes towards an interpretation of ὁμοούσιος as indicating collaterality, thus supporting an understanding of essence as abstract. Though the *Tome* sounded Nestorian (see §4.1-4.2), explaining the objections raised against it in the *Acta* (see §5.2), the *Tome* is not arguing for two concrete natures or "sons" in the incarnation. Consistent with the account given in Cyril's letters, where the hypostatic union represented the coming together of two natures or essences in one individual, so also Leo's use of πρόσωπον indicates the single individuation of Christ's two natures.

⁴⁵² Armitage, *A Twofold Solidarity*, 9, 87–91; Green, *The Soteriology of Leo the Great*, 52.

Chapter 6 – The Conceptual Apparatus of the Definition of Chalcedon

6.1 Apollinarius

6.2 Chalcedon's Session V

6.3 The Definition of Chalcedon

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6.4 Conclusion

In the preceding three chapters, we have followed the lead of the three interpretive strategies provided for the *Definition of Chalcedon* by the Greek Acts (as discussed in Chapter 2), asking what conceptual apparatus these sources, when read together, furnish for the *Definition* and how they contribute to the interpretation of the terms and concepts it employs. We are now in the position to bring our conclusions from these chapters to bear on the *Definition* itself, drawing our investigation of the *Definition's* conceptual apparatus to a close. We have thus far identified a tension arising from the statement of dual consubstantiality and the claim that Christ has two natures when these claims are read within the derivative ontology of ὁμοούσιος articulated by the conciliar fathers, namely, Athanasius, Basil of Caesarea, and Gregory of Nazianzus. The predominately abstract dimension of φύσις, ὁμοούσιος, and οὐσία in Leo's *Tome* contributes to such an interpretation of these terms in the *Definition*, namely, as

denominating the abstract essence without the concrete dimensions that were so important in the 4th-century discussion. This interpretation is already suggested by Cyril's conciliar letters and is only strengthened by Leo's *Tome*.

As discussed above, Chalcedon comes at the end of several decades of debate over the question of what it means for Christ to be God and man. In particular, it was convened to deal with the fallout of Ephesus II, at which Leo's *Tome* was neglected, Eutyches was restored, and Flavian deposed.⁴⁵³ Leo famously called this council *latrocinium*, "the Robbers Synod," indicating some of the tensions that simmered after its closure. Theodosius II, the Eastern emperor, upheld the council's decision, but Pope Leo and Valentinian III, the Western emperor, refused to accept it. With the death of Emperor Theodosius II from a riding accident, Marcian ascended to the Eastern throne and called for another council in 451, two years after Ephesus II, to address the concerns raised by that earlier council. The initial location chosen for this council was Nicaea, indicating the emperor's aspiration for this new council. However, it was moved to Chalcedon for the opening of its first session.

The order of business was not at first to draft a new symbol or definition of the faith. Indeed, when the idea was raised during the 3rd session, it was greeted with incredulity:

We will not produce a written exposition. There is a canon [Canon #7 from Ephesus, AD 431] which declares that what has already been expounded is sufficient. The canon forbids the making of another exposition. Let the [will] of the fathers prevail. (ACO III.7)⁴⁵⁴

⁴⁵³ A helpful but short survey of the proceedings is given by Price in his essay "The Council of Chalcedon (451): A Narrative." For a more thorough survey and discussion of the proceedings and their interpretation, the three-volume translation and commentary by Price and Gaddis is invaluable.

⁴⁵⁴ The first interpolation is my own; the second is as translated in *CChal* 2:11.

Florentius of Sardis then asked for a postponement (ACO III.8); the drafting of a new definition (ὁρος) was not raised again until the 5th session.

In addition to the immediate literary context of the *Definition* in Session V, broader anti-Apollinarian themes in the *Acta* contribute to the *Definition*'s rhetoric against misinterpretations of the incarnation. Therefore, to provide some last elements of the literary and thematic context for interpreting the *Definition*, we will consider Apollonaris and then Session V before turning to the *Definition* itself.

It will be argued that the tension we have witnessed thus far reaches its crescendo in the *Definition*; here, the key terms of the 4th-century conciliar conceptual apparatus are employed alongside the Nicene and Constantinopolitan Creeds themselves. This apparatus is juxtaposed with the terminology of Cyril and Leo, invoked against the errors of Nestorius, Eutyches, and (implicitly) Apollinaris. Οὐσία is used for the universal and ὑπόστασις or πρόσωπον for the individual, yet no resolution is readily available to reconcile the two disparate interpretations of these concepts present in the tradition we have considered. First, we will consider the anti-Apollinarian themes implicit in the *Definition*.

6.1 APOLLINARIS

Apollinaris did not shy away from explaining the incarnation in terms of a mixture or combination.⁴⁵⁵ He was clear that Christ is more than just an inspired man, a position which

⁴⁵⁵ Young, *From Nicaea to Chalcedon*, 251; Gregory of Nyssa, *Anti-Apollinarian Writings*, trans. Robin Orton, *The Fathers of the Church, a New Translation* volume 131 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2015), 45.

would make him less than God,⁴⁵⁶ but in emphasising his deity, Apollinaris argued that the Logos took the place of the soul in the incarnate Christ.⁴⁵⁷ Gregory of Nyssa took issue with Apollinaris at this very point, for if Christ did not have a rational soul, he was not human at the very point where humanity is distinguished from the beasts.⁴⁵⁸ At one point, Apollinaris argued that the Christ was “a new creation and wonderful mixture; one [and the same] nature produced from God and flesh” (καινή κτίσις καὶ μίξις θεσπεσία· θεὸς καὶ σὰρξ μίαν [καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν] ἀπετέλεσαν φύσιν).⁴⁵⁹ This claim that Christ is a μίξις θεσπεσία (“a wonderful mixture”) is echoed in the accusations levelled against Eutyches at Chalcedon.

Bruce McCormack identifies the resolution of the Apollinarian crisis as key tension at Chalcedon, yet his account of the problem in the *Definition* fails to convince (see §6.3 below); Apollinaris is important but less so than Nestorius and Eutyches. Eutyches was branded an “Apollinarian,”⁴⁶⁰ so Apollinaris does appear to be the archetypical heretic to which Eutyches conforms, yet when it comes to the content of the polemics made, they primarily address Eutyches’ claims, not those made by Apollinaris. Apollinaris is thus the archetype for the heretic who denies Christ’s humanity, though it is Eutyches’ particular denial of humanity (at

⁴⁵⁶ Gregory of Nyssa, *Anti-Apollinarian Writings*, 47.

⁴⁵⁷ He writes in *Tomus Synodalis*, Σαρκα ὁμοούσιον τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ σαρκί προσεΐληφεν ἀπὸ τῆς Μαρίας ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ ζῶν λόγος καθ’ ἑνωσιν τὴν πρὸς θεότητα ἐκ τῆς πρώτης συλλήψεως τῆς ἐν τῇ παρθένῳ καὶ οὕτως ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν· ὅτι σὰρξ καὶ πνεῦμά ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τὸν ἀπόστολον. Καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ γενέσθαι σάρκα τον λόγον τὸ ἐνωθῆναι πρὸς σάρκα ὡς τὸ ἀνθρώπειον πνεῦμα. Pp. 262-263. (“The living Word of God took to himself flesh consubstantial with our flesh from Mary according to the union with deity from the beginning of conception in the virgin and thus became a man, for a man is flesh and spirit according to the apostle. And this is [how] the Word became flesh, by uniting with flesh like a human spirit.”) This quote suggests that Apollinaris was a dichotomist, but other passages suggest a trichotomist position. Young suggests there is sufficient evidence that Apollinaris did not accept a dichotomist division between soul and body, and Gregory of Nyssa’s criticism cited below is based on an Aristotelian trichotomy. All translations from Lietzmann are my own. Young, *From Nicaea to Chalcedon*, 249.

⁴⁵⁸ *Refutation of Apollinarius* in Gregory of Nyssa, *Anti-Apollinarian Writings*, 109.

⁴⁵⁹ *Kata*, p. 177, ln. 7; p. 177 lns. 5-6; *Frag.* 10, pg. 207 lns. 12-13.

⁴⁶⁰ McCormack, *The Humility*, 29–30.

least on the *Acta*'s interpretation of his view) that is the focus at Chalcedon. However, despite the attention given to Eutyches, there is language in the *Definition* that suggests that Apollinaris' unique account of the incarnation was still considered a problem.⁴⁶¹

Apollinaris is first mentioned by name in the minutes of Ephesus II, read at Chalcedon's Session I. Diogenes of Cyzicus charges Eutyches with omitting a clause added to the Nicene Creed in the Creed attributed to the Council of Constantinople (381); according to Diogenes, this clause was initially made to refute "the evil opinions of Apollinaris" (among others). Omitting this clause, namely, "He came down and was enfleshed from the Holy Spirit and Mary the Virgin," demonstrates that Eutyches was "an Apollinarian" (ACO I.160 [*CChal* 1:157-158]).⁴⁶² For Diogenes, Apollinaris accepted the Nicene Creed but interpreted it so as to avoid a profession of "the union of the flesh" (ἔνωσιν τῆς σαρκὸς). Now, as Price and Gaddis point out, Eutyches could hardly be blamed for relying on the Nicene Creed instead of the Constantinopolitan Creed when the latter did not yet enjoy the status or circulation of the Nicene Creed; nevertheless, Diogenes' claim shows the presence of concerns about Apollinaris in the events leading up to the Council of Chalcedon, especially in association with the charges laid against Eutyches.⁴⁶³ Diogenes' claim of an anti-Apollinarian addition to the Creed contributed to the debate evident at this point concerning Ephesus 1's Canon 7, which

⁴⁶¹ Apollinaris' thought also exerts influence on the Acts through the forgeries propagated by his disciples. See, for example, *CChal* 1:304, quotations 7 & 8 (cf. fn. 367-368).

⁴⁶² Διογένης ὁ εὐλαβέστατος ἐπίσκοπος Κυζίκου εἶπεν· Δολερῶς προέταξεν τὴν ἐν Νικαίαι τῶν ἁγίων πατέρων σύνοδον, ἐδέξατο δὲ προσθήκας παρὰ τῶν ἁγίων πατέρων διὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν τὴν κακὴν Ἀπολιναρίου καὶ Οὐαλεντίνου καὶ Μακεδονίου καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐκείνοις καὶ προστέθεται τῷ συμβόλῳ τῶν ἁγίων πατέρων τὸ κατελθόντα καὶ σαρκωθέντα ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου καὶ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου. τοῦτο γὰρ παρέλειπεν Εὐτυχῆς ὡς Ἀπολιναριστῆς· καὶ Ἀπολινάριος γὰρ δέχεται τὴν ἐν Νικαίαι ἁγίαν σύνοδον, κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρανομίαν ἐκλαμβάνων τὸ ῥητόν, καὶ φεύγει τὸ ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου καὶ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου, ἵνα πανταχοῦ μὴ τὴν ἔνωσιν τῆς σαρκὸς ὁμολογήσῃ. οἱ γὰρ ἅγιοι πατέρες οἱ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ ἐσαρκώθη, ὃ εἶπον οἱ ἅγιοι ἐν Νικαίαι πατέρες, ἐσαφήνισαν εἰπόντες ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου καὶ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου.

⁴⁶³ *CChal* I.158, fn. 113.

prohibited additions to the Creed (ACO I.158-163) (see further §2.2.2 above). Eutyches denies the charge of Apollinarianism at Ephesus II (ACO I.164), but this charge will stick at Chalcedon.

In his letter to Mari the Persian, Ibas of Edessa (whose case was dealt with in Session X) accuses Cyril of overreacting to Nestorius and falling into the error of Apollinaris, namely, “the very God the Word became man in such a way that there is no distinction between the temple and the one who dwells in it. He wrote the Twelve Chapters ... asserting that there is one nature of the Godhead and the manhood of our Lord Jesus Christ” (ACO XI.138 [CChal 2:295-296]).⁴⁶⁴ The post-Chalcedon letter *Adlocutio* describes several heretics used by the Devil, including a view attributed to Apollinaris alongside the views attributed to Nestorius and Eutyches (though none are explicitly named),

Some he persuaded to deny the birth from the Virgin in respect of what was assumed, removing the term Theotokos from the birth as if out of respect and reverence for the dignity of the Saviour [=Nestorius], while he armed others in impiety against the very Godhead of the Only-begotten, inducing them to proclaim in their statements that it is changeable and passible [=Eutyches]. As distributor of evils he apportions out the blasphemies to his worthy servants in the following way: while some have abolished the characteristics of the form assumed, others restrict their confession of the union to the flesh alone; while some deny that the soul is healed, others say that it is present in the body but without a mind [=Apollinaris]. (CChal 3:114)⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶⁴ Κύριλλος δὲ θέλων τοὺς λόγους Νεστορίου ἀνατρέψαι ὥλισθεν καὶ εὐρέθη ἐμπίπτων εἰς τὸ δόγμα Ἀπολιναρίου· συνέγραψε γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁμοίως ἐκείνῳ ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, ὡς μὴ εἶναι διαφορὰν μεταξὺ τοῦ νασῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντος ἐν αὐτῷ. συνέγραψε γὰρ τὰ δώδεκα κεφάλαια, ἅπερ νομίζω καὶ τὴν σὴν θεοσέβειαν ἐγνωκέναι, ὅτι μία φύσις ἐστὶ τῆς τε θεότητος καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ ὡς οὐ χρή, φησί, διαιρεῖν τὰς φωνὰς τὰς εἰρημένας, ἃς ἡ αὐτὸς ὁ κύριος περὶ ἑαυτοῦ εἶρηκεν ἢ οἱ εὐαγγελιστὰι περὶ αὐτοῦ.

⁴⁶⁵ καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἔπεισε τὴν ἐκ παρθένου κατὰ τὸ ληφθὲν ἀπαρνεῖσθαι γέννησιν, ὡς ἐν τιμῇ διῆθεν καὶ φειδοῖ τῆς τοῦ σωτῆρος ἀξίας τὴν θεοτόκος τοῦ γένους ὑποκλέπτων φωνήν, τοὺς δὲ κατ’ αὐτῆς ἀνέδην τῆς τοῦ μονογενοῦς θεότητος ὥπλισε πρὸς ἀσέβειαν, τρεπτὴν καὶ παθητὴν αὐτὴν ὑποπείσας ἀνοικηρῶσαι τοῖς ῥήμασι, μεριστὴς κακῶν ὑπηρέταις ἀξίοις διανέμων τὰ βλάσφημα, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν τῆς ληφθείσης μορφῆς ἀνελεῖν τὰ γνωρίσματα, τοὺς δὲ μέχρι σαρκὸς μόνης ὁμολογῆσαι τὴν

These brief mentions of Apollinaris provide only a bare sketch of the charges against him, yet they are sufficient to elucidate several statements in the *Definition*. The claim made by Diogenes about the clause added by the Council of Constantinople doesn't say much, but the focus on "enfleshed" and our knowledge of Apollinarianism from elsewhere suggests that the problem being addressed was a denial of true incarnation, that the Word took upon himself an entire human nature. According to Diogenes, Apollinaris denied a "union of the flesh," with the emphasis perhaps on *true* flesh, for Apollinaris certainly accepted that Jesus was in some sense human and took upon flesh. In the letter from Ibas of Edessa, Apollinaris is guilty of collapsing the Word who assumes the flesh with that which is assumed, resulting in one nature of both divinity and humanity in Jesus. Finally, the *Adlocutio* brings out a dimension clear in the anti-Apollinarian literature, namely, Apollinaris' account of the incarnation as the Word taking the position of the mind in the flesh. Apollinaris, as the archetype of Eutyches' heresy, is thus guilty of reducing the manhood of Christ by denying a true union of two natures; instead, the Word takes up mere flesh without a human mind.

The charges in the first part of the *Definition* all line up with the conciliar understanding of Eutyches or Nestorius' error, but the qualification that "the same [is] truly God and truly human from a rational soul and body" does not address anything said by Eutyches. The particular description of humanity used here appears to address the error of Apollinaris, denying as he did a rational soul to Christ (for this is what the Logos replaced, cf. *Adlocutio*).⁴⁶⁶

ἔνωσιν καὶ τοὺς μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ἰατρειὰν ἀρνήσασθαι, τοὺς δὲ ταύτην δίχα νοῦ παρῆναι λέγειν τῷ σώματι.

⁴⁶⁶ Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition Vol. I*, 547; Philip Schaff and David S. Schaff, eds., *Creeds of Christendom: With a History and Critical Notes; Vol. II The Greek and Latin Creeds with Translations*, 6th ed., 3 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1985), 64.

According to the 4th-century conciliar apparatus, identity with other humans and participation in the human substance had the concrete dimension of derivation and the abstract dimension of essence. In several places, Apollinaris appears to uphold the true humanity of Christ in the abstract sense while identifying differences in the concrete sense: what Christ did and his unique generation separate him from humanity in an ontologically significant way.⁴⁶⁷

Apollinaris claimed that though Christ was truly human *qua* essence, “humanity” is attributed to Christ equivocally (ὁμωνύμως).⁴⁶⁸ In *Anacephalaeosis*, Apollinaris lays forth several arguments to show the many ways Jesus was unlike us and, therefore, he argues, in some sense, not a human (οὐκ ἄρα ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστός).⁴⁶⁹ In *Fragment* 42, he raises an issue with Diodore of Tarsus along the lines of what we have been following in the definition. He writes,

And he is not ashamed when he says there is the same nature but a different generation; the virgin birth is made vain and superfluous unless the one generated is worthy of the generation, but this conforms him with those generated from a man and a woman. He treats scornfully as the highest impiety the highest union, which the divine writings explain clearly, neither making the humanity the destruction of God nor destroying the humanity by the deity.⁴⁷⁰

That is, though Christ possesses a human nature, he is different at this very significant point concerning what makes us human, our birth. Given the derivative ontology Apollinaris articulates in his letter to Basil, this asymmetry between Christ and humanity takes on added significance (see Ch. 3.1 above). As with Athanasius, Apollinaris draws on the father-son

⁴⁶⁷ See *Frag. 142* and *Ana.* and in Lietzmann, *Apollinaris*, 241, 242-246. (Pg. 241 is missing from the Archive.org version of *Apollinaris*.)

⁴⁶⁸ *Ana.* §16, p. 244 lns. 2-5. Cf. *Ana.* §20, p. 244, lns 12-15; *Kata*, p. 177, ln. 7; p. 177 lns. 5-6; *Frag.* 10, pg. 207 lns. 12-13.

⁴⁶⁹ In *Ana.* §12, p. 243 lns. 22-23.

⁴⁷⁰ Fr. 42 in Lietzmann, *Apollinaris*, 241. Cf. Zachhuber, *The Rise*, 97-99.

analogy to explain consubstantiality: as a son is identical in essence to his father because he derives from him, so also with the divine Son. In his epistle to Basil, Apollinaris expands this into a full ontology of a derivative substance.⁴⁷¹ However, Christ's humanity is conspicuous in this very way, for though he was birthed from a human mother, he had no earthly father: if participation in Adam from paternal descent implicates us in the substance of humanity (as the traditional attribution of ὁμοουσίος to humanity would suggest), Christ is not human at this very point. Thus, if the derivative account of consubstantiality were maintained for humanity, then it would appear that Christ is human in an equivocal way: he would be identical in essence but not of one substance. Though the Church Fathers do not raise or address Apollinaris's objection here, this would contribute to the need for a redefinition of consubstantiality to account for the incarnation, at least regarding Christ's humanity.

Instead of addressing this concrete dimension of Apollinaris' position, the *Definition* focuses on Christ's abstract identity with humanity, asserting the identity of Christ with humanity in terms of properties or definition—possessing “a rational soul and body.” By highlighting the abstract dimension of Apollinaris's error, this move may contribute to the trend we have already witnessed in the interpretive sources towards an abstract reading of οὐσία and φύσις as essence.

6.2 CHALCEDON'S SESSION V

Turning to the *Definition* itself, we find it in the immediate literary context of Chalcedon's Session V. In the *Acta*, there is thus far no mention of a new definition or symbol, not since

⁴⁷¹ Cf. Zachhuber, *Derivative Genera*.

Session III, where the bishops decried the idea. However, the fifth session opens with the Imperial officials calling for the bishops' opinion concerning a definition already discussed. It appears from Anatolius's comments in section 7 that there had been an informal session the previous day where a definition had been presented for the bishops' approval.⁴⁷² This initial draft is not provided in the minutes (the decision to omit it is mentioned in §3); in sharp contrast with the response to the officials' comments in Session III, the bishops express satisfaction over the definition, with only a few exceptions. Several bishops ask for the inclusion of the anti-Nestorian adjective "*Theotokos*" (§§8, 12), which is included in the final document, and the officials request the inclusion of a clause they attribute to Leo, δύο φύσεις (two natures) (§13). After some discussion and the reading of a letter from Marcian, the officials state what they have in mind concerning Leo's language, "there are two natures in Christ, united without confusions, change, or separation in the one only-begotten Son, our Saviour."⁴⁷³ The closest Leo comes to explicitly saying Christ has two natures after the union (though it is implied throughout the *Tome*, especially in his concluding comments about Eutyches' statements at Constantinopolitan Home Synod in 448) is the phrase ἑκατέραι φύσει ("each nature"; Latin, *utraque natura* "each of [two] natures"). Moreover, the adverbs derive from a meeting with Anatolius and the Roman delegates where they assuaged the doubts of several Illyrian bishops concerning the *Tome*; these bishops recount that Anatolius and the others anathematised "everyone... who does not say that what he had that was proper to God and proper to man are without confusion, change, or division."⁴⁷⁴ The form of the "two natures" phrase that is

⁴⁷² Price, "The Council of Chalcedon (451): A Narrative," 79.

⁴⁷³ §26, ὁ δὲ ἀγιώτατος ἀρχιεπίσκοπος Λέων δύο φύσεις λέγει εἶναι ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ ἡνωμένας ἀσυγχύτως καὶ ἀτρέπτως καὶ ἀδιαιρέτως ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ μονογενεῖ υἱῷ τῷ σωτῆρι ἡμῶν.

⁴⁷⁴ ACO IV §9.98, πάντα γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ἀνεθεμάτισαν... καὶ μὴ τὰ θεοπρεπῆ καὶ τὰ ἀνθρωποπρεπῆ αὐτοῦ εἶναι λέγοντα ἀσυγχύτως καὶ ἀτρέπτως καὶ ἀδιαιρέτως. It may be noted that two of the four adverbs that appear in the Definition and which appear here also occur in Cyril's *First Letter to Succensus*, ἀσυγχύτως and ἀτρέπτως. Cf. ACO 1.1.6, pp. 151-157.

included in the final definition has its only appearance in the Acts from Basil of Seleucia, who at Constantinople said, ἐν δύο φύσεσιν γνωριζόμενον, “made known in two natures.”⁴⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the Officials asked for the statement to be added in order to bring the *Definition* into greater conformity with Leo’s thought, if not the exact words found in the Greek translation of his letter.

The bishops are initially reluctant to make this revision to the definition, but they relent under threat from Marcian to have another council held in the West (ACO 1.169, 176, 301). A small group of bishops and the imperial officials then gathered to produce what would be the final form of the *Definition*. The *Acta* do not give us any minutes from the meetings that produced the draft of the *Definition* nor from the meeting that produced the final form of the *Definition*, so we are not given insight into its production nor into the decisions made in that process. After the group of bishops returned and took their seats, Aetius, archdeacon of Constantinople, read the *Definition*. The final words of the session recount the acceptance of what was read, “This is the faith of the fathers. Let the metropolitans subscribe now! Let them subscribe now, with the rulers present. Let not the things well-defined receive delay. This is the faith of the Apostles. To this all of us agree. We all think in this way.” The officials ended the session with a notice that the *Definition* would be shown to the emperor (ACO V.35).

6.3 THE DEFINITION OF CHALCEDON

Unlike the Nicene Creed, the *Definition* did not introduce novel terminology to address the theological errors it was drafted against. Instead, it employs the vocabulary that had already

⁴⁷⁵ ACO I, §169, 176, 301.

found use in the 4th and 5th-century debates.⁴⁷⁶ The *Definition* can be analysed in the following way, following the sections delineated in ACO and divided further according to the major movements in each section (a working translation of the *Definition* is included in Appendix 4):

1. Introduction (§31)
 - a. Ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν – The circumstances of the Definition: in light of errors threatening the Church, God has roused the emperor to dispel falsehood (p. 126, ln. 12)
 - b. ὁ δὲ καὶ – The Definition stands in line with and acknowledges the Pre-eminence of the Nicene Creed. (p. 126 ln. 21)
2. Τὸ σύμβολον τῶν ἐν Νικαίᾳ – The Symbol of Nicaea (§32; p. 127 ln. 9)
3. Καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τῶν ρν – The Symbol of Constantinople (§33; p. 128 ln. 1)
4. Addressing New Errors (§34)
 - a. Ἦρκει μὲν οὖν – Preamble for the positive Christological statement: the Creed addressed specific errors, but new errors have arisen. (p. 128 ln. 15)
 - b. Ἐπόμενοι τοίνυν – The Christological statement. (p. 129 ln. 23)
 - c. Τούτων τοίνυν – Concluding prohibition against any other faith, teaching, or creed. (p. 130 ln. 4)

In previous chapters, we have already made numerous observations concerning the positions against which the *Definition* was drafted and its use of tradition, which are addressed in the *Definition*'s Introduction (§31) and in section 34.a. Thus, the first objects of our interest are the Creeds of Nicaea and Constantinople, embedded within the *Definition* at sections 32 and 33.

There are some differences between the Creeds given here and those read earlier in the *Acta* (ACO I.157; III.11, 14), reflecting a version of the Nicene Creed that is more in line with Constantinople than that given earlier.⁴⁷⁷ The central terminology remains, which immediately draws us towards the conceptual apparatus identified in the 4th-century tradition, of a derivative οὐσία. However, a key phrase is missing from the Nicene Creed as printed here in the

⁴⁷⁶ Daley, *God Visible*, 12-13; Grillmeier, *Christ in the Christian Tradition; Vol. I*, 545.

⁴⁷⁷ See the judicious summary of the conversation between Schwartz and Lebon on the Creed included in the Definition and conclusions based on their work in *CChal* Vol. 2 pp. 191-194.

Definition, in comparison with other versions from this time, especially that found earlier in the *Acta*. The clause “that is, from the substance of the Father” (τουτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς) which was important for Athanasius understanding of ὁμοούσιος in *De Decretis* (see Ch. 3.1), is absent.

It is in section 34.a-b, when the *Definition* turns to address new errors, that the language of Cyril’s conciliar letters and Leo’s *Tome* come into play. Section 34.b is regularly given in contemporary textbooks as the “*Definition*,” for it is where the *Definition*’s claims concerning Christ are given,

Therefore, following the holy fathers, we all harmoniously teach the confession of one and the same son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in Godhead and the same perfect in manhood, the same being truly God and truly human from a rational soul and body, the same consubstantial with the Father according to the Godhead and consubstantial with us according to the humanity, in every way like us apart from sin, before all ages begotten from the father according to the Godhead but in later days the same for our sake and for our salvation from the virgin Mary Theotokos according to the humanity. One and the same Christ, the Son, Lord, and Only-Begotten, made known in two natures without mixture, without change, without division, and without separation, the differences of the natures in no way being removed on account of the union, but rather the individual property [ιδιότητος] of each nature coming together [συντρέχω] even into one *prosopon* [πρόσωπον] and one *hypostasis* [ὑπόστασις], not being severed or cleaved into two *prosopa* [πρόσωπα]. But one and the same Son, Only-Begotten, God, Word, Lord, Jesus Christ, as the prophets formerly and Jesus Christ himself taught us concerning him, and the Creed of the fathers has handed down to us.⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁷⁸ Ἐπόμενοι τοίνυν τοῖς ἁγίοις πατράσιν ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν υἱὸν τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν συμφώνως ἅπαντες ἐκδιδάσκομεν, τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν Θεότητι καὶ τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι, θεὸν ἀληθῶς καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἀληθῶς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα καὶ ὁμοούσιον ἡμῖν τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπινην, κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον ἡμῖν χωρὶς αμαρτίας, πρὸ αἰώνων μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, ἐπ’ ἐσχάτων δὲ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὸν αὐτὸν δι’ ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου τῆς θεοτόκου κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Χριστὸν υἱὸν κύριον μονογενῆ, ἐν δύο φύσεσιν ἀσυγχύτως ἀτρέπτως ἀδιαίρετως ἀχωρίστως γνωριζόμενον, οὐδαμοῦ τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνηρημένης διὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν, σωιζομένης δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς ιδιότητος ἐκατέρας φύσεως καὶ εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συντρεχούσης, οὐκ εἰς δύο πρόσωπα μεριζόμενον ἢ διαιρούμενον, ἀλλ’

We have set out from the beginning to determine the conceptual apparatus at work in the *Definition of Chalcedon*, particularly as it concerns the concepts of universality and particularity. From start to finish, section 34.b is replete with the key terminology used for the universal and particular throughout the conciliar tradition. The shared concern of Cyril's *Letter to John of Antioch* and Leo's *Tome* for Christ's dual nature is complemented by declarations of Christ's unity, which the Eastern bishops perceived to be lacking in Leo's *Tome* and Nestorius' brazen declaration of Christ's two-ness. Significantly, the language for the union of the two natures in the *Definition* is similar to that used by Leo's in his *Tome*, the orthodoxy of which had by this time been defended to the satisfaction of the objecting parties (e.g. ACO IV.9.99-114).⁴⁷⁹

Three times, the phrase "one and the same" (ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν) is written, each as the object of the confession (ὁμολογεῖν) declared in line one. The first set of phrases describing the "one and the same" echoes the language of the creeds closely but emphasises Christ's two natures. At this point, Bruce McCormack argues that the *aporia* he perceives at the heart of the *Definition* emerges. He claims that the *Definition* is unable "to specify the relation of Jesus to the 'person of the union.'"⁴⁸⁰ The problem as he perceives it is that at Chalcedon, the natures are said to subsist in a "person," meaning a subjectivity, and that the *Definition* here identifies

ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν υἱὸν μονογενῆ Θεὸν λόγον κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, καθάπερ ἄνωθεν οἱ προφῆται περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡμᾶς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ἐξεπαίδευσεν καὶ τὸ τῶν πατέρων ἡμῖν παραδέδωκε σύμβολον.

⁴⁷⁹ These are signatures attesting to the harmony between the "definition" of those at Nicaea and Constantinople and the *Tome*. E.g., "Our doubts have been resolved by the most holy bishops Pascasinus and Lucentius, representin the apostolic see, who have explained to us what the wording seemed to separated" (67-98), and "Some statements in it struck us as implying a separation and division for those who wish to think that way. At first in the presence of your clemency we were in doubt about those statements... we were informed ... that [the Roman representatives] teach no division in our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ but on and the same Lord the Son of God. (99-114)" (CChal II.138-139).

⁴⁸⁰ McCormack, *The Humility*, 58.

that subjectivity with the pre-existent Logos, leaving no space for the subjectivity of the human Jesus in the union.⁴⁸¹ Even if this concern of subjectivity were to be found in Cyril's dialogue *On the Unity of Christ* (upon which McCormack draws heavily), we have seen thus far that this is not a concern in the interpretive documents for the *Definition*, nor in the *Acta* itself: the terms *πρόσωπον* and *ὑπόστασις* do not mean "person" in a way analogous to the contemporary use but the individual or particular, as opposed to the universal (see Chs. 3-5).⁴⁸² However, other studies have made a point similar to McCormack's, that the language of "one and the same" refers to the Divine Son as the one *ὑπόστασις* and one *πρόσωπον* of the union, so we will examine this claim more closely.

Gerald O'Collins claims that "An attentive reading of the *Definition of Chalcedon* shows that it did not literally describe Christ as a 'divine person'. It spoke of the one *hypostasis* uniting the two natures, but did not in so many words declare this to be the pre-existent divine person of the Logos."⁴⁸³ He points to the language "one and the same Son" to make this point, that it is the Only-Begotten Word of God who is the one *hypostasis* uniting the two natures.⁴⁸⁴ Price and Gaddis summarise this argument well,

Note here how the Son is defined by some terms that could be applied to both natures (Christ, Son, Lord) and by some that apply only to the divine nature (Only-begotten, God, Word), while none of the terms used is specifically human. This is not, then, a symmetrical definition of the Son, but deliberately echoes the language of the Nicene Creed, where the subject of the incarnation

⁴⁸¹ McCormack, *The Humility*, 29–31.

⁴⁸² McCormack, *The Humility*, 42–58.

⁴⁸³ Gerald O'Collins, *Interpreting Jesus* (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2002), 182; Gerald O'Collins, *Christology: A Biblical, Historical, and Systematic Study of Jesus*, 2nd ed. (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 196–97.

⁴⁸⁴ *Interpreting*, 182. Cf. Jordan Daniel Wood, *The Whole Mystery of Christ: Creation as Incarnation in Maximus Confessor* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2022), 21.

and the human experiences is defined as “one Lord Jesus Christ the Son of God, ...”—that is, as specifically God the Word.⁴⁸⁵

Price and Gaddis, along with O’Collins, are adept in identifying the predominance of predicates concerning the divine nature in these formulas, following the Nicene Creed’s own language (as observed by Price and Gaddis); however, the use of the term “subject” introduces unnecessary ambiguity.

The term “subject” might suggest that the Divine Son furnishes the *subjectivity* or the self-conscious “I” for the union; as O’Collins writes, “the primordial self-consciousness of Jesus [is] an ‘I’ in relation to the ‘Thou’ who is the Father.”⁴⁸⁶ This, we will argue, claims too much. The language is not of self-consciousness but of *ιδιότητα*, distinctive properties: there are not two different logical subjects for the individuating properties, but one and the same thing is the subject of a string of predicates. This fits within the ontological models we have been discussing. There is, notably, a predominance of language associated with the pre-incarnate Son of God, indicating the continuity of the logical subject: the same Son who was “only begotten” was born of the virgin Mary Theotokos. This lends credence to the claim of O’Collins that the one *ὑπόστασις* is not a new creation in the incarnation but is one and the same *ὑπόστασις* of the Only-Begotten Son of God before the incarnation.⁴⁸⁷ However, admitting this does not mean that the statement “the same *Son*” means “one and the same [Divine] Son,” or as O’Collins claims, “Son should be understood as the (Only-begotten) Son of God the Father.”⁴⁸⁸ The use of one “Son” as the grammatical subject for the string of

⁴⁸⁵ *CChal* I.70-71. Cf. Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition Vol 1*, 549, 552.

⁴⁸⁶ Originally, “We shall shortly reflect on the primordial self-consciousness of Jesus as an....” O’Collins, *Interpreting Jesus*, 183.

⁴⁸⁷ O’Collins, *Interpreting Jesus*, 182; O’Collins, *Christology*, 196-197.

⁴⁸⁸ O’Collins, *Christology*, 197.

predicates is a development from the similar language of the Nicene Creed, where it is one “Lord.” There is a ready explanation for this shift: the *Definition* explicitly rules out, as a rebuttal of the views attributed to Nestorius, a “dyad of Sons.” That is, in the incarnation, there is not a human son and divine son, but one individual is both the Son of God and becomes the son of Mary.⁴⁸⁹ Therefore, when it uses the phrase “one and the same son,” the Definition is not claiming that the single ὑπόστασις is the Divine Son, though this claim is consistent with the broader pattern of language used in the *Definition*; instead, it is making the claim that one individual is the Son of God and the son of Mary. It is because the same individual (ὑπόστασις or πρόσωπον) is the Son of God and the son of Mary that there is “one and the same Son” who is the subject of all the individuating properties of the incarnation Jesus Christ.

The language of “one and the same” is prominent in Leo’s *Tome* and is used once in Cyril’s *Second Letter*; in both documents, it is used to indicate the true unity of the natures, though in the *Tome* the details of that unity are not explicated. This is its function here; it is “one and the same son” that is the subject of the duality, yet “one and the same son” is not specifying the subjectivity of the Logos but the oneness of ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον. As our discussion has thus far indicated, and as we will see further below, these terms do not refer to subjectivity but an individual thing (see 4.1-4.2, 5.4.3), though the nature of individuality is parsed in different ways. McCormack and Collins make the mistake at this point of taking the “individual thing” to be a subjectivity. In the Definition, that there is one and the same “son” is intended to rule out the Nestorian “two sons,” or two individuals, in the union. We are told that the two natures come together into one ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον and that it is not cleaved into two; it is this one and the same individuality that is “Son, Only-Begotten, God, Word,

⁴⁸⁹ Anthony Baxter, “Chalcedon and the Subject in Christ,” *DRev* 107.366 (1989): 9.

Lord, Jesus Christ.” Returning to the first set of phrases, the one Son is said to be perfect (τέλειον) in both his Godhead (Θεότητι) and Manhood (ἀνθρωπότητι), Christ’s likeness with God and humanity here being expressed with the universal terms. Humanity, as noted above, is glossed with “from a rational soul and body.”

The following sets of phrases predicate dual consubstantiality, again qualifying humanity with “in every way like us apart from sin” (κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον ἡμῖν χωρὶς αμαρτίας), and the eternal and temporal births to Christ,

the same consubstantial with the Father according to the Godhead and consubstantial with us according to the humanity, in every way like us apart from sin, before all ages begotten from the Father according to the Godhead but in later days the same for our sake and for our salvation from the virgin Mary Theotokos according to the humanity.⁴⁹⁰

Surrounded as it is by the language of universality, namely, ἀνθρωπόποτητι, the interpretation of ὁμοούσιος in terms of essential identity is clear. Immediately followed as it is by the dual begettings of Christ, the component of derivation characteristic of the 4th-century discussion is present.

As in the previous phrases, Christ’s eternal begetting is set in parallel with his human birth, according to his divinity from the Father and according to his humanity from the Virgin. The use of κατὰ here echoes Cyril’s language for bipartite exegesis; the eternal and temporal begettings are attributed “according to” this or that nature. Throughout this section, the humanity and the Godhead are treated as conceptually parallel, fulfilling the same function and being described with the same terminology. Closely connected to the statement about Christ’s

⁴⁹⁰ ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα καὶ ὁμοούσιον ἡμῖν τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον ἡμῖν χωρὶς αμαρτίας, πρὸ αἰώνων μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, ἐπ’ ἐσχάτων δὲ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὸν αὐτὸν δι’ ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου τῆς θεοτόκου κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα.

eternal-begotten-ness and following shortly after the Nicene Creed, both being interpreted within the conciliar tradition of Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory, the derivative component of ὁμοούσιος comes to the fore. Ἀνθρωπόποτης and θεότης are functioning as universals, indicating what Christ has in common with us and the Father and Spirit, respectively, yet the derivative component qualifies the way in which two individuals partake of the universality. In the conciliar tradition, it was through organic unity and derivation. What is missing is the insistence on the unity of Christ with God and with humanity through this derivation. Moreover, as observed above, the portion of the Nicene Creed that most clearly speaks of derivation as the meaning of begotten has been omitted in the version of the Creed embedded in the definition. So, although the interpretative tradition laid out in the *Acta* introduces these connotations for “begotten” and “ὁμοούσιος,” this omission takes away any contextual support for this conclusion, perhaps negating even the minimal intimations of derivation that the use of “begotten” brings to the *Definition*.

Returning to the text, the symmetry between the natures is again declared in the next sentence,

One and the same Christ, the Son, Lord, and Only-Begotten, made known in two natures without mixture, without change, without division, and without separation, the differences of the natures in no way being removed on account of the union, but rather the individual property [ιδιότητος] of each nature coming together [συντρεχούσης] even into one *prosopon* [πρόσωπον] and one *hypostasis* [ὑπόστασις], not being severed or cleaved into two *prosopa* [πρόσωπα].⁴⁹¹

⁴⁹¹ ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Χριστὸν υἱὸν κύριον μονογενῆ, ἐν δύο φύσεσιν ἀσυγχύτως ἀτρέπτως ἀδιαιρέτως ἀχωρίστως γνωριζόμενον, οὐδαμοῦ τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνηρημένης διὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν, σωιζομένης δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς ιδιότητος ἑκατέρας φύσεως καὶ εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συντρεχούσης, οὐκ εἰς δύο πρόσωπα μεριζόμενον ἢ διαιρούμενον.

Christ is “made known” (γνωριζόμενον) in two natures: Christ as an object of knowledge is “in two natures,” associated with their distinct properties, though the conceptual distinction between these natures by no means obliterates the unity. The four adverbs make clear that these are true, genuine natures (ἀτρέπτως, “without change”) that are not mixed up (ἀσυγχύτως), as Eutyches was thought to have done, nor separated (ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως). The use of γνωριζόμενον focuses this clause on epistemology: the reality of the natures is certainly not denied, yet over against Nestorius, ἀδιαιρέτως and ἀχωρίστως indicate that these natures cannot be treated as independent individualities. They are real and genuine, yet intimately connected. This element of connection is then addressed: their properties “come together” (συντρεχούσης) into “one *hypostasis*” and “one *prosopon*.” The focus on the “individual property” (ιδιότητος) of each nature coming together into the ὑπόστασις again points towards the abstract dimension of φύσις or οὐσία; taken by itself, this line would suggest that to be “in two natures” meant merely having the properties of two natures. We will revisit this shortly; for now, we will consider the terms πρόσωπον and ὑπόστασις.

Various authors argue for shades of distinction between πρόσωπον and ὑπόστασις, the former term perhaps drawing on the Antiochene tradition, as in Frederick McLeod’s study of the development between Chalcedon and Constantinople II.⁴⁹² Norman Tanner argues on different occasions that ὑπόστασις means “inner person” and πρόσωπον “outer person” or “subsistent being” and “person.”⁴⁹³ Declan O’Byrne suggests that πρόσωπον is a weaker term

⁴⁹² Frederick G. McLeod, “The Significance of Constantinople II’s Alteration of Chalcedon’s Formula About Christ’s Natures ‘Coinciding in One Prosôpon,’” *ITQ* 77.4 (2012): 365–83, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0021140012454506>.

⁴⁹³ Norman Tanner, “Greek Metaphysics and the Language of the Early Church Councils: Nicea I (325) to Nicea II (787),” *Greg* 90.1 (2009): 55; Norman P. Tanner, “Orthodoxy in Nicaea-Constantinople and Chalcedon,” *Concilium* 2014.2 (2014): 54.

to the synonymous ὑπόστασις, but André de Halleux argues that ὑπόστασις is secondary.⁴⁹⁴ However, as we have seen from the documents we considered in previous chapters, both are used to designate the particular. The significant difference is the use of ὑπόστασις in Cyril's writings and πρόσωπον being Leo's favoured term (as a translation of *persona*). The latter term is used on occasion by Cyril; in section 3b of the *Letter to John of Antioch*, it is used with an epistemological term (νοούμενος, "being known"). Whatever shades of nuance the terms had for the different bishops at Chalcedon, they are both key terms for the individual and together paint a consistent ontological picture: against Nestorius, we are not to imagine two *things*, or πρόσωπα; there is one individuality or particular that is Jesus, though he was "made known in" two perfect natures, possessing the distinctive property of each. The *Definition* confesses two natures, but these two natures cannot be divided into two individuals, a human son of Mary and divine Son of God. However, denying two individuals when there are two natures present sits in uneasy tension with the earlier claims of consubstantiality, if these claims are read as identical conceptually with the apparatus of the 4th-century conciliar fathers.

6.3.1 A Conceptual Tension

As we have argued (Ch. 3), in the 4th-century conciliar tradition, οὐσία was the fundamental reality (though not as the individual): there was one God, not three, because there was one οὐσία. As Gregory of Nyssa put it, it is only colloquially that we can say there are three "humans," for the substance is one.⁴⁹⁵ Though individuated by ιδιότης, the unique property,

⁴⁹⁴ Declan O'Byrne, "From Chalcedon Back to the Gospels: On the Prosopon of the Hypostasis of Christ," *Review of Ecumenical Studies, Sibiu* 11.3 (2019): 392, <https://doi.org/10.2478/ress-2019-0028>; de Halleux, "La Définition Christologique à Chalcédoine 2," 167; Michael Slusser, "The Issues in the Definition of the Council of Chalcedon," *TJT* 6.1 (1990): 68, <https://doi.org/10.3138/tjt.6.1.63>.

⁴⁹⁵ In *Ad Ablabium*.

the thing individuated never became more than one: there was always one thing, nature, though there may be many individuals who organically partook of it. Now, it is important to observe that the term ἰδιότης as used across the 4th and 5th-century discussion can either mean the characteristic properties of the individual (distinguishing this particular from that particular), as it is used in Basil's *Adversus Eunomium*, or the characteristic properties of the universal (distinguishing this nature from that one), as it is used here in the *Definition*. Because the tension we are addressing pertains to individuation, to individuals, we will primarily use ἰδιότης in the former sense, for what distinguishes this individual from that one.

In the 4th-century tradition we have discussed, there was one thing, though many individuals partook of it. As a stream flows from its head, so also the particulars are organically connected to their head (see Chapter 3). It was thus acceptable for the conciliar Fathers to proclaim one οὐσία and three ὑποστάσεις, with unity founded upon οὐσία. However, as Zachhuber observes, we now find the opposite claim made at Chalcedon: two οὐσῖαι or φύσες and one ὑπόστασις, with unity founded upon ὑπόστασις.⁴⁹⁶ On the earlier logic, a nature is the existence or reality (εἶναι), so the presence of two natures implies two realities or beings. When the conciliar logic is traced out, it would appear that the presence of two realities also leads to the conclusion of two individualities.

Gregory of Nyssa's reply to Apollinaris presses into this fact, insisting as it does that full humanity includes a human mind and body, thus the true possession of human nature implies embodied individuality (using "body," σῶμα, here for a corporeal body, so to be embodied is to be corporeal). This view is enshrined in the *Definition* when it glosses humanity as "from a rational soul and body." Thus, a nature exists not only on a purely abstract or logical

⁴⁹⁶ Zachhuber, *The Rise*, 103–11. Cf. Gregory of Nazianzus Ep. 101.

plane; to be human is to have a certain metaphysical constitution. As the *Definition* itself puts it, the distinguishing properties of each nature “come together” into one individual. The Word is bodily κατὰ ἀνθρωπότητι (“according to manhood”), hence in Cyril’s letters human predication is κατὰ σάρκα (“according to the flesh”) not κατὰ τὴν θεότητα (“according to the Godhood”). Yet in regard to humanity, the metaphysical constituents associated with the human nature, viz. a body and human mind—natural ιδιότης—appear to also be ιδιότης in Basil’s sense, that is, unique identifiers of an individual. That is, they necessarily differentiate one human from another while also identifying these things as humans. As we saw in Chapter 3, the ιδιότης of a particular individuate a nature, such that the presence of individual properties and a nature is the sufficient condition for an individual of that nature. By definition, to be human is to be an embodied individual; having a “body” is not like being “light,” where the possession of the latter property doesn’t distinguish one divine person from another. Instead, the body that every human must have to be a human will be different from the bodies of all other humans; it is, therefore, individuating. Therefore, if Christ is truly human, then his human nature alone constitutes an individual, an individual distinct from the divinity because a divine individual cannot be embodied. Let’s draw this out a bit.

6.3.1.1 Corporeality Implies a Human Individual Distinct from a Divine Individual

Though to be human is to have a mind and body, according to Gregory Nazianzus and here in the *Definition*, Humanity itself does not have a “rational soul” and a “body.” Christ’s suffering was not the suffering of Humanity, equally predicated of each individual according to the universal (as “light” is predicated of each Trinitarian ὑπόστασις because it is a property of the divine nature). No, Christ’s suffering in the body was that of an individual human. So, “body” used to describe an essential component of what it means to be human—of the definition of Humanity—is a natural, not a particular ιδιότης. However, “body” here is not describing a

property possessed by Humanity but something which every human necessarily possesses. Humans don't possess a body in the abstract, a "being embodied," but a particular body that differs from every other body possessed by a human. Therefore, body *qua* a particular body (similarly with a rational mind) is a particular ιδιότης, distinguishing one human from another. The genuine individuation of the human nature requires a distinct body and rational mind associated with this human individual, not that one. Thus, these characteristic properties of humanity are, with reference to anything that is human, ιδιότητα or ιδιώματα, individuating properties. In other words, to be embodied or corporeal (these being identical in the sources we are discussing) is part of the distinguishing features, or ιδιότης, of the human nature, yet to be "embodied" is not to have a mere metaphysical property, such as "light," which is identical in Individual A and B (i.e. "light" refers to the same thing in "God the Father is light" and "God the son is light"), but it is to have a unique metaphysical constitution, this body not that body.

That is, Peter and John as humans are both "embodied," yet, "body" in "Peter has a body" and "John has a body" refers to a different thing in each case, in the former to *Peter's* body and in the latter *John's* body, whereas light does not refer to "the Father's light" or "the Son's light" but to the same thing, a property which they both share (one cannot distinguish the Father from the Son according to the "light" they possess). In this sense, to be "embodied" involves ιδιότης in both senses, as an identifying property of the human nature and an individuating property of this human: as *a body* it is a natural ιδιότης, but as *this body* it is a particular ιδιότης. A problem emerges at this point, for the body and the soul are associated with the ἀνθρωπότης ("manhood"), not the θεότης ("Godhood"); God doesn't have a body, but the Son, who is God, has a body. So, these ιδιώματα inhere in or individuate the one nature,

not the other, making the nature an individual, at least according to the 4th-century definition of an *ὑπόστασις*.⁴⁹⁷

This follows if, as Basil's account has it, an individual is nothing more than the universal substance or nature individuated through an individuating property. On this logic, there would then be two individuals in Christ, two individuated or concrete natures (using Pawl's sense of "concrete," see Ch. 5 and below): there is an individual of the human nature, namely, the human nature individuated by the *ιδιότητα* of a particular person (this body and this rational mind), and an individual of the divine nature, individuated by the Son's characteristic property (e.g. only-begottenness).

6.3.1.2 The 4th-Century Apparatus Has No Ontological Ground to Unite Two Natures

We can also see this from another perspective. If we look closer at *ὁμοούσιος* as a term indicating the unity of individuals through the theory of derivative substance, as the conciliar fathers interpreted it, we are again confronted by two individuals in the incarnation. In the case of the Trinity, there is the one God the Father from whom the Son and the Spirit receive identity in essence and reality through derivation; they are individuated by their respective *ιδιότητα*. Similarly, there is one human, Adam, from whom each person receives their essence and is individuated by *ιδιότητα*. Therefore, Christ is God but not the Father, a divine *ὑπόστασις*, and Christ is human but not Adam, a human *ὑπόστασις*. If the *οὐσία* is the fundamental existence in each case individuated by *ιδιότητα*, then on what level are the two natures brought together?⁴⁹⁸ That is, they share neither *ιδιότητα* (the divine *οὐσία* being individuated by

⁴⁹⁷ Cf. Dirk Krausmüller, "A Chalcedonian Conundrum: The Singularity of the Hypostasis of Christ," *Scrinium* 10.1 (2014): 361–82, <https://doi.org/10.1163/18177565-90000104>.

⁴⁹⁸ Cf. Krausmüller, "A Chalcedonian Conundrum."

Christ's eternal begottenness, which does not individuate him *qua* human) nor φύσις. Ontologically, they appear to be two separate things, both in the sense of separate realities (a human nature and a divine nature) and separate individuals (a human individual and a divine individual). The tradition after Chalcedon will propose a solution to this tension that avoids this conclusion, but before we consider this resolution, the problem as I portray it is similar to the Christological proposal offered by Timothy Pawl in his lucid monograph, *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*. Pawl argues that Christ had two "concrete natures," so we should at this time address his position and consider its potential to resolve the problem I am identifying. We will then consider the post-Chalcedonian resolution afterwards.

6.3.1.3 Pawl's Concrete Nature Interpretation

In his monograph, *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*, Timothy Pawl seeks to defend a conjunction of claims he identifies as "conciliar Christology," drawn from the first seven ecumenical councils and the surrounding literature.⁴⁹⁹ We have considered the ontology he proposes to defend his "conciliar Christology" in Chapter 5 (§5.4.3), so the reader is directed there for the details. Pawl is not interested in showing the truth of this conjunction, only defending it against various defeaters. Drawing on the *Tome* of Leo, among other conciliar sources, he argues that the two natures in Christ are "concrete natures," that is, "x is a concrete nature of some type, y, if and only if x is an individual instance of y, and y is an infima species."⁵⁰⁰ Pawl identifies this position as part of conciliar Christology. However, I have argued that Chalcedon considered any position where the incarnation involved two individuals

⁴⁹⁹ Pawl, *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*, 1.

⁵⁰⁰ Pawl, *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*, 34–36.

as heretical; this was Nestorius's position (see Ch. 4; cf. "a dyad of sons"; "two natures... not being severed or cleaved into two *prosopa*" ACO V.34a-b).⁵⁰¹

This is a problem for Pawl because his account of concrete natures is very similar to the 4th and 5th-century understanding of the individual and, therefore, is contrary, I will argue, to the *Definition*. If the identity of Pawl's concrete nature with the Chalcedonian individual, ὑπόστασις or πρόσωπον, can be sustained, then whatever else may be said about the conjunction Pawl argues for, the view that Christ has two concrete natures is problematic as we consider the conceptual apparatus of Chalcedon. Now, Pawl rejects this identification vehemently, yet we will show that considered on the *Definition*'s terms, his account of concrete nature is the *Definition*'s account of the individual (ὑπόστασις or πρόσωπον). We will show the similarities between Pawl's concrete natures and the individual (ὑπόστασις), showing that in light of Chalcedon's understanding of Nestorianism, Pawl's view is Nestorian. However, in the following centuries, a similar position to Pawl's was developed to address the problems raised by the *Definition*, so we will consider this position as articulated by Maximus the Confessor in Sections 6.3.2 – 6.3.3 below.

Pawl himself addresses the charge that his position is "Nestorian," denying that it is: "I have heard more than once in conversation that the Christology I put forward has a 'hint' of Nestorianism, or that it 'flirts' with Nestorianism, or that it does some sort of half-hearted dance with Nestorianism."⁵⁰² The argument to this effect, he claims, is as follows,

On the view I offer, the assumed concrete human nature is too robust. It has too many predicates apt of it; it is too ontologically meaty. On my view, that assumed human nature can aptly be said to hang on a cross. It can be said to

⁵⁰¹ τοῖς τε γὰρ εἰς υἱῶν δυάδα τὸ τῆς οἰκονομίας διασπᾶν ἐπιχειροῦσι μυστήριον ... οὐκ εἰς δύο πρόσωπα μεριζόμενον ἢ διαιρούμενον.

⁵⁰² *In Defense*, 228. For the claim that Leo said such things, see §5.4 above.

think, or will, or do things. But that is simply too much doing for a nature. Things that think, will, and do are *persons*, the objection continues.⁵⁰³

In response to these charges, he answers that he is claiming no more than Cyril and Leo (among others) claimed, so if he is Nestorian, then they are.⁵⁰⁴ However, when I suggest his position is “Nestorian,” I do not intend the charge he outlines here. Instead, I mean very specifically that his position would be recognised as the “Nestorianism” rejected by the Council of Chalcedon, as attested through the authorities cited and the accounts given in the *Acta*.

As we discussed at in Chapter 4 (§4.1), Nestorianism for the Conciliar tradition was the belief that there were two individuals in the incarnation, “two sons,” which shared a mere conjunction or moral union. If Pawl’s claims result in two individuals as would have been interpreted within the ontology of the 4th-5th century Christian discourse, then his position would be “Nestorian.” In Chapter 5 (§5.4.3), I argued that the conciliar tradition presented by the *Acta* does not share the same categories as Pawl. Instead, a nature is a subsistent reality, and an individual is an instantiation of that reality through one or several distinguishing features. An ὑπόστασις or πρόσωπον is this, an individual instance of a species. This is not Pawl’s view.

At first glance, Pawl’s view resembles one interpretation of Aristotle, where a concrete nature is the fundamental reality or substance, οὐσία.⁵⁰⁵ However, Pawl distinguishes his

⁵⁰³ Pawl, *In Defense*, 228.

⁵⁰⁴ Pawl, *In Defense*, 229.


⁵⁰⁵ Pawl, *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*, 58–63. Cf. Aristotle *Cat* 1b.25-2a.4, 2a.10-19, 2b.15-3a.1. There is some transformation of terminology, but Nestorius’ Bazaar reflects the hylomorphism of *Metaphysics* with the language of *Categories*. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* 7.10; Charlotte Witt, “Hylomorphism in Aristotle,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 84.11 (1987): 673–79; Gail Fine, “Plato and Aristotle on Form and Substance,” *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*.29 (209) (1983): 27; Constantinos Athanopoulos, “Ousia in Aristotle’s *Categories*,” *Logique et Analyse* 53.210

concrete natures from ὑπόστασις, the latter being subsistent as is Aristotle's primary οὐσία and the former not being necessarily so. Because Christ's human concrete nature depends on the divine concrete nature, it is not itself a ὑπόστασις. This is how Pawl would deny two ὑποστάσεις or persons (a person is an ὑπόστασις of a rational nature according to Pawl) in the incarnation.⁵⁰⁶ A concrete nature, therefore, is able to subsist in something else and is, as a nature, not self-subsisting. However, it is individuated independent of its insubsistence (because it is a concrete not an abstract nature that subsists in a ὑπόστασις concrete nature). Therefore, we can identify the abstract nature with the universal, the concrete nature with the particular, and the ὑπόστασις with the individual made actual or subsistent. An abstract nature needs something to become a concrete nature, namely, an ιδιότης (as employed by the 4th-century fathers for the individuating marks), and the concrete nature needs something to subsist, which Maximus the Confessor will call a τρόπος, or mode of being (see Figure 6; for Maximus's view, see §6.3.2 below).

(2010): 211–43; Jonathan Barnes, “Metaphysics,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 91; Nestorius, *Bazaar*, 25.

⁵⁰⁶ Pawl, *In Defense*, 56-57, cf. 32-33.

Figure 6 – The 4th Century and Pawl's Views of Individuation



When Pawl's account of the incarnation is read within the 4th Century framework, which framework lacks the distinction between a nature and subsistence, that is, where a nature itself is subsistent so that an individuated nature is simultaneously a subsisting nature, Pawl's claim that both of Christ's natures are concrete (or individuated) is identical with the view attributed to Nestorius. That is, if οὐσία or φύσις describes a subsisting reality that is always instantiated, but the instantiations of which are merely that very reality with individuating marks, then the presence of a φύσις with individuating marks equals an individual. Thus, where there are two natures with individuating marks, which are concrete natures on Pawl's account, there are two individuals. Because, on the 4th century view, subsistence is a property of a nature and not something that may be added to a nature, the latter of which Pawl argues for (a ὑπόστασις being a concrete nature [nature plus individuating marks] made subsistent), the

presence of a nature with individuating marks is already a subsisting, concrete thing—that is, it is a *ὑπόστασις* and *προσώπον* according to 4th century tradition upheld by Chalcedon. Thus, in the categories used by the conciliar tradition, the claim that Christ is two individuals of respective natures is a claim of plural *ὑποστάσεις*.

However, as we considered in sections 4.4 and 5.4.3, and now in this chapter, the conceptual needs of the incarnation require an alteration to the ontological apparatus inherited from Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory Nazianzus. Without altering the 4th-century apparatus, the view Timothy Pawl presents runs into the charge of Nestorianism; however, though it holds up the 4th Century tradition for the interpretation of its key terminology, the *Definition* itself suggests that altering this apparatus is necessary. Without categories such as Pawl proposes (namely, the differences between concrete and abstract natures and between a concrete nature and a subsistent individual), the tension we identified above results. In the centuries after Chalcedon, theologians revised the conceptual apparatus they used to account for the incarnation: in doing so, they articulated something close to Pawl's view. An excellent example of a theologian who did this was Maximus the Confessor. For both Pawl and Maximus universality is the common essence taken as or conceived of as universal: it is not a self-subsisting reality, as the 4th-century theologians held.⁵⁰⁷ This position was developed extensively by the Neo-Chalcedonians, using the terminology and concepts they inherited from the 4th and 5th-century tradition. By considering this position as articulated by one of its principal defenders, Maximus the Confessor, we can test its potential to resolve the conceptual tension introduced by the conceptual needs of the Trinity and the Incarnation. Maximus's position is similar enough to Pawl's to facilitate an engagement with both, but Maximus'

⁵⁰⁷ Cf. Walter Leszl, "Knowledge of the Universal and Knowledge of the Particular in Aristotle," *The Review of Metaphysics* 26, no. 2 (1972): 28; Maximus the Confessor, *Th. Pol.* 14.

ontology is closer to those used by the fathers of the 4th and 5th centuries, so it will more readily avail itself to our purposes of engaging with their apparatuses.

6.3.2 Towards a Resolution

To uphold the anti-Nestorian insistence that there is neither separation nor differentiation, that Son is not cleaved into two πρόσωπα, something must budge. Bracketing the tradition and previous clauses of the *Definition* for the moment, the emphasis placed upon the unity of ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον opens the door to interpret these terms as indicators not merely of an individuated universal but as the individuating reality, a solution we introduced at Section 4.4 above. That is, an individual thing may not be a ὑπόστασις, namely, an οὐσία plus ιδιότητα. Instead, an individual may be an ὑπόστασις that instantiates an οὐσία. The language of the *Definition* lends credence to this interpretation, with the “distinctive property” (ιδιότητος) of each nature “coming together” (συντρεχούσης) “into” (εἰς) one ὑπόστασις. This could, perhaps, be read compositionally, as “coming together *as* one ὑπόστασις,” yet, that properties, not the natures themselves, come together argues against that possibility. Instead, it more readily yields an interpretation suitable for inherence, that they come together into one ὑπόστασις. However, before we consider the solutions proposed by Maximus and Pawl, which suit the “inherence” language, we will consider the compositional account more closely.

6.3.2.1 Compositional Accounts

One possible account of composition, which we briefly considered in Section 4.4 above (esp. Fig. 5), is to treat ὑπόστασις as “ιδιότης,” as an individuating property, interpreted as that which unifies both natures in Christ. There is a composite because the whole that is Christ is composed of both natures united through the same individuating properties. However, this account proves to be inadequate. If this were the case, then the distinguishing features would be shared by both

natures. In addition to raising the problem of two concrete natures (see §4.4), this would lead to the conclusion, for example, that God had a body (see §6.3.3.2). Bipartite exegesis would no longer perform its function, at least not regarding individuating properties such as a rational mind and body. That is, if all individual properties (that is, all properties characterising this individual and not this nature) inhered simultaneously in both natures, providing a unifying bridge between them, then all individual predicates (Jesus suffered, Jesus has this body and that mind, etc.) would be true of both natures: they would not be true of Jesus because of or with reference to this or that nature. Because “this body” is a property that unites both natures, it would be true of both natures and, thus, both natures would be embodied. This would result in contradiction with reference to the divine nature (characterised as it is by incorporeality) and, given that an individual is a οὐσία individuated by a ιδιότης, would result in two individuals.

Thus, an ὑπόστασις may have ιδιότητα, but it cannot be made identical with them within the parameters furnished by the Definition, nor can it merely describe an οὐσία with inhering ιδιότητα (i.e. the 4th century view discussed above). If the phrase of the *Definition* is read compositionally and this sort of composition is rejected (two natures individuated by the same ιδιότητα), there remains an alternative but equally unsatisfactory account of composition. Adopting Basil’s account of individuation, that the one substantial being of a Deity or Humanity is instantiated by the addition of inhering properties, we could suppose that both natures are individuated. Here, ὑπόστασις would refer to the composite whole consisting of both individuated natures, with no other ontological grounds for unity (such as Pawl’s subsistence). This is exactly the position attributed to Nestorius by the conciliar tradition and, apart from the ontological revisions made by Maximus and the Neo-Chalcedonians (and, more recently, Timothy Pawl), the only unity permitted would be a “moral union,” one of mere agreement or union in a will (see §§4.1-4.4; 6.3.1.1).

6.3.2.2 An Account of Inherence

Rejecting these accounts of composition for the hypostatic union, we are left with the interpretation that there is something that exists independent of οὐσία, into which two οὐσίαι can “come together.” As Cyril’s letters directed us with the support of Leo’s *Tome*, a reading of οὐσία as abstract, as essence, without the connotations of subsistent reality or substance, makes significant headway towards the resolution of this tension. On the abstract account, we are merely dealing with the logic of the natures, thus precluding the metaphysical thesis of derivation. When we move from the abstract to the concrete, to the metaphysics, without the metaphysical baggage of the derivation theory, a ὑπόστασις may be treated as the fundamental reality in which an οὐσία inheres, alongside the ιδιότητα. This satisfies the logical demands of the abstract function given to οὐσία and φύσις. The *Definition* actually appears to take this abstraction even further, making φύσις as it is found in Christ’s one ὑπόστασις only a distinctive property (ιδιότης).

This would be the theory espoused by several post-Chalcedonian theologians, both Monophysite and Chalcedonian.⁵⁰⁸ Maximus the Confessor shall suffice as an example of this solution. Maximus taught that every created thing existed before the creation as a λόγος (an “account”) in the Divine Logos.⁵⁰⁹ At the creation, God gives being (εἶναι) to these accounts

⁵⁰⁸ Zachhuber surveys several of these figures in *The Rise*, pts. 2 & 3.

⁵⁰⁹ *Amb. Io.* 7.19; 10.89; 15.5-6; 42.14. Cf. Vladimir Cvetković, “‘All in All’ (1 Cor 15:28): Aspects of the Unity Between God and Creation According to St Maximus the Confessor,” *Analogia* 2.1 (2017): 15–16; Vladimir Cvetković, “Re-Interpreting Tradition: Maximus the Confessor on Creation in Ambigua Ad Ioannem,” in *Questioning the World. Greek Patristic and Byzantine Question and Answer Literature*, ed. Bram Bemulder and Peter Van Deun, Lectio 11 (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2021); Grigory Benevich, “God’s Logoi and Human Personhood in St Maximus the Confessor,” *Studi Sull’Oriente Cristiano* 13.1 (2009): 148; Andrew Louth, *Maximus the Confessor*, The Early Church Fathers (London; New York: Routledge, 1996), 59; Torstein Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology of St. Maximus the Confessor*, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 132; Brian Edward Daley, ed., “Maximus the Confessor and

through the addition of a τρόπος, the account of being or, as Andrew Louth glosses it, “the way they are.”⁵¹⁰ The τρόπος, the element of subsistence or being in a thing, is aligned with ὑπόστασις and προσώπον in Maximus’ work.⁵¹¹

Maximus aligns λόγος with οὐσία and φύσις. For example, he will say that “the nature—on the one hand—has the common account of being [τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον κοινὸν ἐπέχει], but the hypostasis is, in addition, self-subsisting [τὸν τοῦ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ εἶναι]”; “the nature, on the one hand, only has the account of the species [εἰδους λόγον], but the hypostasis is, in addition, that which indicates the someone [τοῦ τινός ἐστι δηλωτική].”⁵¹² In *Opusculum* 10, he states,

For it is as being something [τι] but not as someone [τις] that each of us primarily [προηγουμένως] operates [ἐνεργεῖ]; that is, as a human [ὡς ἄνθρωπος]. But by being a someone, such as Paul or Peter, he gives form to the mode of operation [τὸν τῆς ἐνεργείας σχηματίζει τρόπον] (with more or less intensity) as he determines [τυποῦμενος] this or that way according to his informed judgement [κατὰ γνώμην]. Thus, it is by the mode [ἐν τῷ

John of Damascus on the Trinity,” in *The Holy Trinity in the Life of the Church*, Holy Cross Studies in Patristic Theology and History (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014), 92.

⁵¹⁰ Andrew Louth, *Maximus the Confessor*, The Early Church Fathers (London; New York: Routledge, 1996), 59. Cf. Torstein Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology of St. Maximus the Confessor*, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 132; Brian E. Daley, ed., “Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus on the Trinity,” in *The Holy Trinity in the Life of the Church*, Holy Cross Studies in Patristic Theology and History (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014), 92. Cf. *Ep.* 15B, PG 91 552B; *Amb. Io.* 7.19; *Q. Thal.* 60; Maximos Constatas, “Maximus the Confessor, Dionysius the Areopagite, and the Transformation of Christian Neoplatonism,” *Analogia* 2.1 (2017): 7; Emma Brown Dewhurst, “How Can We Be Nothing?: The Concept of Non-Being in Athanasius and Maximus the Confessor,” *Analogia* 2.1 (2017): 33; Timur Shchukin, “Matter as a Universal: John Philoponus and Maximus the Confessor on the Eternity of the World,” *Scrinium* 13.1 (2017): 382, <https://doi.org/10.1163/18177565-00131p23>.

⁵¹¹ “Aligned” is an intentionally ambiguous word indicating the overlap but not identity between two critical sets of vocabulary in Maximus’ work; see the discussion below on the relationship between these sets of words. Louth, *Maximus the Confessor*, 59. Cf. Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology of St. Maximus the Confessor*, 132; Daley, “Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus on the Trinity,” 92.

⁵¹² *Op.* 23 (PG91:264A-B). Cf. *Ep.* 12 (PG91:484a-b); *Ep.* 15 (PG91:560b); *Op.* 20 in (PG91:137a); Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology*, 128; Demetrios Bathrellos, *The Byzantine Christ: Person, Nature, and Will in the Christology of Saint Maximus the Confessor*, The Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 104, 109–10.

τρόπῳ] that the changeability of the persons [τῶν προσώπων] is made known, according to activity; but by the account [τῷ λόγῳ], the unchangeability of the nature [τῆς φυσικῆς] is made known according to its operations [ἐνεργείας].⁵¹³

The λόγος of each thing was a particularised universal, for it contained the individuating properties of each thing.⁵¹⁴ It was only potential until it received actuality through a τρόπος.⁵¹⁵ To account for the presence of two natures in Christ, Maximus argued that both natures are individuated in the one ὑπόστασις of the Divine Son; both the human and divine λόγοι of Christ were individuated by the same τρόπος.⁵¹⁶ However, this individuation was asymmetrical. To achieve this, he adopts the term ἐνυπόστατος, which he explains in *Opusculum* 16,

That the nature is not without hypostasis [ἀνυπόστατον] does not mean that it is a hypostasis but that it is hypostatized [ἐνυπόστατον], lest it be understood as an accident [συμβεβηκός] in thought alone but rather really contemplated as a form [εἶδος]. So also that the hypostasis is not without ousia does not mean that it is an ousia, but that it is present ousiatically [ἐνούσιον], lest we conceive this [hypostasis] as a bare property [ιδίωμα] but rather with that to which the properties [ιδίωμα] are proper [κυρίως]. Therefore, as the hypostatized [τὸ ἐνυπόστατον] appears there as something subsistent [τὸ ἐνύπαρκτον]—now, subsistence [ἐνύπαρκτον] is the essential [τὸ οὐσιώδους] and natural [φυσικῆς] participation in

⁵¹³ *Op.* 10, PG91:137a.

⁵¹⁴ *Ep.* 15B, PG 91 552B; *Amb. Io.* 7 (PG 91:1077C lns 1-10; 1081A ln.8 – 1081B ln. 8). Cf. Benevich, “God’s Logoi,” 146.

⁵¹⁵ *Amb. Io.* 7 (PG 91:1077C lns 1-10; 1081A ln.8 – 1081B ln. 8); 10 (PG 91:1177C); 15 (PG 91:1217AB); 42 (PG 91 1328C-D). Cf. Vladimir Cvetković, “‘All in All’ (1 Cor 15:28): Aspects of the Unity Between God and Creation According to St Maximus the Confessor,” *Analogia* 2.1 (2017): 15–16; Vladimir Cvetkovic, “Re-Interpreting Tradition: Maximus the Confessor on Creation in Ambigua Ad Ioannem,” *Questioning the World. Greek Patristic and Byzantine Question and Answer Literature* (2021); Grigory Benevich, “God’s Logoi and Human Personhood in St Maximus the Confessor,” *Studi Sull’Oriente Cristiano* 13.1 (2009): 148.

⁵¹⁶ Nicholas Madden, “Composite Hypostasis in Maximus Confessor,” in *StPat* 27 (Louvain, 1993), 188; Bathrellos, *The Byzantine Christ*, 104, 108–11; Tollefsen, *The Christocentric Cosmology*, 130–31.

existence—so also the actuality [τὸ ἐνεργὸν] (that is, the activity [ἐνεργητικὸν]) signifies the proper [κυρίως] ability.⁵¹⁷

As is commonly accepted, ἐν in ἐνυπόστατος is not a spatial “in” but is the opposite of the alpha-privative: ἐνυπόστατος is opposed to ἀνυπόστατος.⁵¹⁸ For Maximus, no “who” existed apart from a “what”—a ὑπόστασις was always ἐνούσιος—but no “what” existed apart from a “who,” it always had existence in a thing, a “who”—it was always ἐνυπόστατος.⁵¹⁹ However, this did not mean that every οὐσία *was* a ὑπόστασις, which would lead to the Nestorian claim of two ὑποστάσεις in the union. Instead, a single ὑπόστασις could individuate two οὐσίαι.

Though “enhypostatisation renders the human nature of Christ individual, it does not mean that he assumes an individual.”⁵²⁰ Instead, the single ὑπόστασις of the incarnate Christ is that of the divine Son; the Son hypostatizes a human nature so that it is individuated but not a separate individual. In this case, both natures, or accounts (λόγοι), share a τρόπος, a mode of being. This is similar to the second compositional account given above, where two

⁵¹⁷ τὸ μὴ ἀνυπόστατον, οὐχ ὑπόστασιν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ποιεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἐνυπόστατον· ἵνα μὴ ὡς συμβεβηκὸς ἐπινοία μόνῃ λαμβάνηται, ἀλλ’ ὡς εἶδος πραγματικῶς θεωρῇται. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀνούσιον, οὐκ οὐσίαν ποιεῖ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἀλλ’ ἐνούσιον παριστᾷ, ἵνα μὴ ψιλὸν ἰδίωμα ταύτην, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἰδίωμα κυρίως γνωρίζωμεν. Ὡς περ οὖν ἐκεῖ τὸ ἐνυπόστατον δηλοῖ τὸ ἐνύπαρκτον· ἐνύπαρκτον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ οὐσιώδους καὶ φυσικῆς μετέχον ὑπάρξεως· οὕτω κἀνταῦθα τὸ ἐνεργὸν ἡγοῦν ἐνεργητικὸν, τὸ ἐνδύναμον σημαίνει κυρίως. *Op.* 16 in PG 91, 205AB.

⁵¹⁸ The use of the term by Leontius of Byzantium has been much discussed. The conclusion there are relevant for Maximus use of the terminology. Brian Edward Daley, “‘A Richer Union’: Leontius of Byzantium and the Relationship of Human and Divine in Christ,” in *StPat* 24 (Leuven: Peeters, 1993), 239–65; Grillmeier and Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition Vol. 2, Part Two*, 194–96; F LeRon Shults, “A Dubious Christological Formula from Leontius of Byzantium to Karl Barth,” *TS* 57.3 (1996): 431–46; U. M. Lang, “Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos: Church Fathers, Protestant Orthodoxy and Karl Barth,” *JTS* 49.2 (1998): 630–57, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jts/49.2.630>; Matthias Gockel, “A Dubious Christological Formula?: Leontius of Byzantium and the Anhypostasis-Enhypostasis Theory,” *JTS* 51.2 (2000): 515–32; Benjamin Gleede, *The Development*; Zachhuber, *The Rise*, 196–201.

⁵¹⁹ Bathrellos, *The Byzantine Christ*, 111. Nicholas Madden, “Composite Hypostasis,” 184. Cf. Bathrellos, *The Byzantine Christ*, 108–10.

⁵²⁰ Madden, “Composite Hypostasis,” 188–89.

particularised natures (Maximus's λόγοι) come together into one whole; however, Maximus's category of ἐνυπόστατος enables him to explain the unity of these two natures and how there are not two individuals. For Maximus, a nature plus ιδιότης is not sufficient to be an ὑπόστασις, a subsistent individual, for this is merely the principle (λογός) for an individual's quiddity, not an individual itself. An individual is properly a ὑπόστασις, but all ὑποστάσεις are *ousiatic* (ἐνούσιος), are characterised by a λογός. Yet a single ὑπόστασις or τρόπος may actualise two ουσίαι, accounting for both the unity and individuality sought by the *Definition*. Adopting this resolution, we could identify the ὑπόστασις as the individual and fundamental reality which gives being to an inherent and otherwise non-subsisting φύσις, though that φύσις may itself be an individual nature (Maximus's position) or an inhering common nature.

6.3.3 Problems with this Resolution

This resolution achieves much. Both natures may be held together without actual separation or difference in a single ὑπόστασις, and the natures undergo no change or mixture as they are given being together into a single, subsistent individual. Moreover, bipartite exegesis appears to be preserved, for the predicates are made according to the single ὑπόστασις based on potentialities furnished by the φύσεις (e.g. Christ suffers κατὰ σάρκα because the flesh is able to suffer). The language of "begotten" can be made κατὰ each respective nature of the one ὑπόστασις.

So far as the Christological purposes of Chalcedon go, the abstract interpretation of nature and the corresponding shift in the locus of being that was suggested from reading the *Definition* in light of Cyril's letters as supported by Leo's *Tome* (from φύσις as substance to ὑπόστασις) appears to address the concerns raised concerning Nestorius and Eutyches. Against Nestorius, both natures are held together with true unity, together in one subsistent reality, and

they furnish predicates for the same logical subject. Against Eutyches, both natures remain distinct and unmixed. However, the challenge of Apollinarianism may not be fully answered. That is, a difficulty emerges when the implications of whole human nature, body and soul, are investigated. One is either forced to adopt a dual ὑποστάσεις view such as that attributed to Nestorius, which overcomes potential contradictions by holding the properties of each nature at a distance in the respective divine or human individual, or, rejecting this position, one is left with a contradiction.

6.3.3.1 Contradiction Results

Κατὰ predication as used in the conciliar tradition we are discussing requires that the natures be united in one ὑπόστασις but kept separate from one another. The Godhead cannot be predicated with predicates appropriate to the humanity, lest contradiction ensues (e.g. the Godhead is both passible and impassible) or the Father, for example, suffers (if “suffering” is predicated of the deity as universal, then all individuals possessing that universal share that predicate).⁵²¹ Now, this would not be the case if natures were treated as concrete, not universal, yet this raises its own issues, as we have discussed above (§6.3.1.3) and consider further below (§6.3.3.2). If we reject any account of predication that results in two individual or “concrete” natures on Pawl’s terminology (which we identified at §§4.1-4.4, 6.3.1.3 as the conciliar account of Nestorianism), then the needs of the conciliar conceptual apparatus lead to the attribution of contradictory predicates to the incarnate Son. Now, Pawl has admirably shown

⁵²¹ This assumes, as seems appropriate to the literature of this time, that “impassible” and “passible” are complementary predicates. They speak of opposing possibilities, to be unable to be affected and to be able to be affected, respectively. As Pawl puts it, “*s* is passible just in case it is possible that at least one other thing causally affect *s*”; “*s* is impassible just in case it is not the case that it is possible that at least one other thing causally affect *s*.” His revised truth condition for passibility and impassibility relies on an ontology of concrete natures which we have already rejected for Chalcedon (§6.3.1.3 above). Pawl, *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*, 190–91.

how a logical contradiction can be avoided within a broader “conjunction” of conciliar claims that permits two concrete natures in Christ and doesn’t include the particular conceptual needs of the 4th-century conciliar tradition as we have discussed them.⁵²² However, our argument has a different basis than Pawl’s; I am arguing that once concrete natures are ruled out as a possible conceptual apparatus for the *Definition of Chalcedon* and when the conceptual needs of the 4th-century interpretation of Nicaea are considered, a contradiction ensues.

On the conciliar account of partitive exegesis, Christ must have a mind and body κατὰ σάρκα (“according to the flesh”), not κατὰ θεότητα (“according to the Godhood”). However, to avoid the Nestorian implication of two individuals (discussed above at §§4.1-4.4 and 6.3.1), the ὑπόστασις itself must be embodied (cf. Cyril, *Second Letter*, §2d). That is, we have already seen that this body and that mind are ιδιότης in Basil’s sense of the word: they distinguish this individual from that one (§6.3.1). The account of individuation given in the 4th-century tradition is that the substance of God or humanity is individuated by the addition of ιδιότης, so each individual is the universal substance plus an individuating property: if this body and that mind inhered in the human nature, then Christ would be one human individual, an ὑπόστασις, independent of the divine substance and the Son’s ιδιώματα (which would themselves compose another ὑπόστασις). Thus, if the ιδιότης were to inhere in Christ’s humanity, then we must interpret it as a particular or a “concrete” nature; analogously, we would need to interpret the Godhead in the same manner, resulting in two individuals in Christ. To avoid this conclusion, this body and that mind must inhere in the ὑπόστασις “because of” (κατά) the ἀνθρωπότης.

⁵²² Pawl, *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*. Cf. Charles J. Kelly, “The God of Classical Theism and the Doctrine of the Incarnation,” *Int J Philos Relig* 35.1 (1994): 8–10, <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01540517>.

This maintains, with Maximus, that the ὑπόστασις is the ground of individuation for both natures. However, another problem arises at this point.

Before we address this problem, Maximus' position brings us to this same place but with a slightly circuitous route. As noted above, Maximus' λόγοι are, in a sense, individuated before receiving hypostatic existence, yet they are merely the principles for a subsistent individual: until they are realised with the addition of a τρόπος, they have no being. This has important implications in the case of "this mind and that body." In this case, before being granted being, a human λόγος is the principle for an individual with its characteristic body and a mind, but it does not itself have a physical body and a rational mind, for it is not yet a person in the sense of a pre-existent soul or mind, nor is it physically subsistent, as a body would render it.⁵²³ The particular λόγος in this case is the principle for the realisation of this body and this mind over against that body and that mind, associated with a different λόγος. This principle is realised with the addition of a tropos, resulting in a subsistent individual (ὑπόστασις) with this body and this mind. Thus, when actualised by a τρόπος, the λόγος results in this individual, the ὑπόστασις having this body and this mind; the λόγος itself does not itself become enfleshed and come to possess a rational mind, the ὑπόστασις does. Therefore, whether the human φύσις hypostatically existent in the incarnation is a particular φύσις or the universal φύσις, a body and a human mind are attributed to the ὑπόστασις, the subsistent thing. This is where the problem emerges.

To be human is to be embodied (has a σῶμα, see §6.3.1), yet God is incorporeal (ἄσώματον) or spiritual (among other things, an implication of simplicity and immutability)

⁵²³ Cf. Q. Thal. 60.9.

(John 4:24).⁵²⁴ Cyril claims that God is incorporeal (ἀσώματον) and, therefore, impassible (ἀπαθὲς), thus Christ could not suffer in his incorporeal divinity (*Second Letter*, 2c).⁵²⁵ As we have established already, that humanity is embodied means that every human individual has a body: the nature entails certain properties (this or that body) in individuals. Divine incorporeality means that every divine individual will have the property “incorporeal,” as every divine individual will be “light.”⁵²⁶ The logic here is slightly different in these two cases: incorporeality is not individuating as corporeality is. The former is an ἰδιότης only in the sense of a distinctive property of the nature; the latter is an ἰδιότης in both senses, for to be corporeal is a distinct mark of humanity, but actually being corporeal implies the possession of this body, an ἰδιότης in the individuating sense. The presence of the property “incorporeality” does not make a divine individual, but “this body” is individuating, being a necessary metaphysical constituent of a human ὑπόστασις. So, the implication identified above for “body,” where this incorporeality must inhere in the ὑπόστασις not the φύσις, does not follow for the Godhead; “incorporeality” is a property of the Godhead itself. However, a contradiction still obtains between the human and divine natures as it concerns being bodied or unbodied (see the discussion below).

The contradiction obtains between the states permitted and actually found in the one Christ. To be “incorporeal” in the sense we are using for the Godhead is the complement of “embodied” or “corporeal,” for it denies to the subject the state of having a physical body. That the nature is incorporeal means that any individual of that nature, the subject of predicate statements, cannot be corporeal. To be corporeal states that the individual has a body and,

⁵²⁴ E.g. Basil, *Spirit* IX.22; Athanasius *Inc.* 8; *Decr.* III.10, 11; V.24; *C. Ari.* 1 V.15.

⁵²⁵ οὐχ ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου παθόντος εἰς ἰδίαν φύσιν ἢ πληγὰς ἢ διατρήσεις ἡλῶν ἢ γοῶν τα ἕτερα τῶν τραυμάτων (ἀπαθὲς γὰρ τὸ θεῖον, ὅτι καὶ ἀσώματον).

⁵²⁶ Addressing comparable predicates, see Basil *Ep.* 52.3, *Eun.* 1.19.

therefore, cannot be incorporeal; as Senor puts the problem, “it is impossible that a thing have a property and its logical complement.”⁵²⁷ As we have seen thus far, the interpretive approach given by the *Acta* results in a conceptual apparatus where the two natures, humanity and the divinity, are individuated in one individual; as such, the one ὑπόστασις is both the individual human and the individual God. Therefore, what obtains or may not obtain in the individual because of the human or divine nature (such as this or that body because of humanity) obtains in the one individual, Jesus. To say Jesus is embodied κατὰ σάρκα means that the one ὑπόστασις has a body, is corporeal, because it is genuinely human.

Incorporeality, being a property of the divine nature (the properties of which are true for each individual that truly has that nature), is a property of each person or individual of the Godhead. Basil draws out this logic as it applies this to the case of the Godhead, “whatever idea of light is attributed [ἀποδοῖ] to the Father, this will equally apply [ἀρμόσει] to the Son also.”⁵²⁸ Therefore, to say that Jesus is “incorporeal” κατὰ θεότητα in this instance governs what can be said, and thus be true of, the individual, as κατὰ σάρκα in the case of corporeality dictated what is true of the individual. Leo speaks of each nature accomplishing what is proper to it, by which “accomplishing” indicates the operations and states that are realised in the individual according to the nature (see §5.4.2-3). If predication is made to the ὑπόστασις, then it follows that **(1)** “the ὑπόστασις itself is embodied because (κατά) it has a human nature” (see above), and **(2)** “the ὑπόστασις itself cannot be embodied because it is incorporeal according to (κατά) the divine nature.” From **(1)** and **(2)**, it follows that **(3)** “the embodied ὑπόστασις is unembodied.” This contradiction results from the solution proposed above to the conceptual tension identified in Chalcedon, where both natures inhere in a subsistent thing and furnish

⁵²⁷ Thomas D Senor, “The Compositional Account of the Incarnation,” *Faith and Philosophy* 24.1 (2007): 52, 56-60, 62-69.

⁵²⁸ Ep. 52.3. Cf. *Eun.* 1.19.

predicates for it. On the assumptions of the conceptual apparatus required by the conciliar tradition we have been tracing, κατὰ predication does not provide a solution to this contradiction, at least not in the case of corporeality/incorporeality.

According to our argument above, the use of κατὰ in (1) and (2) does not mitigate the contradiction; the use of the κατὰ τῆς θεότητος and κατὰ τῆς σαρκός fail to hold both propositions at a distance from one another. Because κατὰ in (1) is causal, it answers to the question, “why does the ὑπόστασις have a body?” That is, it presupposes that the ὑπόστασις as a ὑπόστασις has a body, thus (1) results. To maintain the logical force of κατὰ predication as maintained by Cyril and others (e.g. to show how Jesus can be passible and impassible), one must give a different interpretation to the κατὰ predications (Pawl thoroughly discusses the possibilities) and, to accommodate the different uses κατὰ predication, postulate a concrete nature, where some properties or all properties predicated with κατὰ inhere in the respective nature.⁵²⁹

As we have already seen and will consider again from another angle below, the latter move results in severe problems: having two “concrete natures” or two individuals separate from one another is the view the *Acta* and the conciliar tradition attributes to Nestorius (§§4.1-4.4, 6.3.1). Furthermore, it has significant implications for the apparatus employed in the 4th-century conciliar interpretation of Nicaea (see §6.3.3.2 below). Timothy Pawl has shown that given enough flexibility to adjust the conceptual apparatus employed, the contradiction indicated above can be avoided.⁵³⁰ However, we have already shown that the conceptual apparatus at Chalcedon does not have sufficient flexibility to permit Pawl’s solution, namely, the presence of two concrete natures in Christ. We can continue to show this by addressing the

⁵²⁹ See Pawl, *In Defense*, 117-151, 152-178; Senor, “The Compositional Account,” 62–69.

⁵³⁰ Pawl, *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*, 117–51, 227–31.

ramifications of the views posited by Pawl and Maximus for the conciliar conceptual apparatus of the 4th century.

6.3.3.2 The Trinitarian Solutions of the 4th Century Are No Longer Valid

Perhaps the most significant issue with the concrete nature position, as discussed above, is its effect on the conciliar tradition. Another example of post-Chalcedonian theology illustrates this point. If we follow the solutions employed by Pawl or Maximus, the central claims of the 4th-century account of how the Word could be truly Divine while there was only one God are no longer sustainable..⁵³¹ The history of Trinitarian theology yields alternative accounts of these same claims, yet the moves that appear to be necessary to sustain the claim that the Word is truly Divine and that there is only one God would not have been acceptable in centuries we are considering. For this reason, the solutions employed by Pawl and Maximus to resolve Christological issues invalidate the 4th-century account of these two claims and leave no room to reassert these claims within the frameworks of 4th and 5th century theological discourse. The first way to bypass this conclusion would be to reject what I have identified as the 4th-century account of the Son's divinity and unity with the Father. Though he does not explicitly mention this account, Pawl, in his essay *Conciliar Trinitarianism*, considers the relationship between the Divine persons and the divine nature, concluding that more work needs to be done "on what exactly the relation is between the divine persons and the divine nature."⁵³² Rejecting the 4th-century apparatus would be tantamount to rejecting the Nicene Creed, given the identification the 5th century fathers made between the Creed and its key interpreters: they point to these

⁵³¹ It is important to note that though similar, Pawl's view is able to avoid the problem discussed in §6.3.3.1, yet in doing so, it wouldn't be able to avoid the charge of Nestorianism. The problem discussed here is raised for both Pawl and Maximus' position.

⁵³² Timothy Pawl, "Conciliar Trinitarianism, Divine Identity Claims, and Subordination," *TheoLogica* 4.2 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v4i2.23593>, 13.

fathers, such as Athanasius and Basil, to explain the terminology they were employing in their own works. Patrick Gray has argued that in later centuries, theologians re-interpreted the tradition to fit their contemporary understanding, simultaneously revising their own prior beliefs and those of their authorities while denying the change and expressing complete continuity.⁵³³ However, this does not present itself as a satisfactory solution. The second way to bypass the conclusion that the inherence account of Christ's two natures overturns the 4th century account of the Trinity is to reject the premise that the ontological apparatus developed to account for the incarnation is applicable to the Trinity or, more specifically, that the conceptual apparatus employed for humanity is applicable to God and vice versa. It is by this premise that we will attempt to draw out Trinitarian implications for Pawl and Maximus' account of the incarnation. This was exactly the move made by Maximus the confessor, who rejected that human unity-in-plurality was a sufficient analogy for the Divine unity-in-plurality (*Car.* 2.29).⁵³⁴ Nevertheless, this remains a problem for our discussion of the conceptual apparatus of the Definition of Chalcedon because this premise is critical to the theological accounts they provided for the Trinity and the Incarnation, as discussed throughout this thesis. Throughout the tradition leading up to Chalcedon, the conceptual apparatus employed for God, especially as articulated to account for the Trinitarian unity-in-plurality, is applied to account for humanity and vice versa—a “Divine-Human Analogy” or a “Trinitarian-Christological univocity,” the latter term being Jordan Daniel Wood's way of describing the phenomenon in the Neo-Chalcedonians and Maximus the Confessor.⁵³⁵ This is reinforced by the juxtaposition

⁵³³ Gray, “Covering the Nakedness.”

⁵³⁴ See Rutherford, “Maximus the Confessor's Use”; Grigory Benevich, “Maximus Confessor's Polemics against Tritheism and His Trinitarian Teaching,” *ByzZ* 105.2 (2012).

⁵³⁵ Wood, *The Whole Mystery of Christ*, 27, 44; James Rutherford, “Maximus the Confessor's Use of the Divine-Human Analogy and the Niceno-Chalcedonian Tradition,” *Phronema* 38.1 (2023).

of both apparatuses in Chalcedon's dual consubstantiality formula. Because of this Divine-Human analogy, the conceptual apparatus formulated to account for the unity of humanity and divinity in the incarnation has a knock-on effect for one's account of the Trinity. For Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory, God the Father was the one God; the Son and the Spirit were God because they partook organically of his being and from there derived their essence (see Ch. 3 above). This was their solution to account for Christ's genuine divinity and the unity of God; if the divine-human analogy is followed, the model of inherence adopted by Pawl and Maximus as a solution to the problem of Christ's two natures problematises this account in three ways.

First, the Divine οὐσία shared by the three persons can no longer be God the Father. For Maximus, the divine οὐσία is necessarily ἐνυπόστατος (just as every ὑπόστασις is ἐνούσιον): an οὐσία is not self-subsistent but subsists as a ὑπόστασις. The Father, therefore, has the Divine οὐσία in the same manner as the Son and the Spirit have it. This seems to be the way Pawl discusses the relation of the Divine persons and nature in the essay, "Conciliar Trinitarianism." If the persons have the Divine οὐσία in the same way, they are ἀδελφά or collateral, a position Athanasius explicitly denied. The reason that Athanasius (and others) rejected the claim that the persons were collateral was that there would then be three Gods: they secured the claim that there was one God by claiming that "God" properly referred to the subsistent divinity who was the Father, the Spirit and Son being "God" because this subsistent nature was communicated to them without division or separation. If each person was a substance, or a subsisting concrete nature, having subsistence and being "an individual instance of the Divinity," then the 4th century approach to denying "Three Gods" by maintaining a single subsistent reality of the Godhead fails. This would be the case if φύσις is treated as the essence which inheres in something in order to have subsistent reality; it would be a distinct reality in each case because it is given separate existence into three separate subsistent individuals. The

individuals would now have the ontological status which the 4th-century fathers sought to attribute to the Divinity, namely, substantial being. In Aristotle's sense of the term, the three persons would be *πρῶται ουσίαι*. There would be three things that are God, three divine substances; therefore, there would be three Gods. This is the exact conclusion drawn by John Philoponus, among others, in the 6th-century tri-theism controversy.⁵³⁶

Grillmeier concludes from one text "that Philoponus is meticulously following the Cappadocian doctrine of hypostasis to its conclusion, in the case of the Trinity as also of the unity in Christ."⁵³⁷ Once *ὑπόστασις* has become identified with the subsistent reality in the incarnation, then the definition of *ὑπόστασις* as individual does nothing to mitigate the charge "three Gods," as it did for Basil and others when they granted substantial reality to the single nature or *οὐσία* of Divinity. Within Miaphysite theology, which already use *φύσις* in a concrete manner, the *ὑπόστασις* became identified with the "individual nature."⁵³⁸ A nature, for Philoponus, is that which is indistinguishable from another and "exists in every individual (*ἀτόμων*)" (*Dia* IV:16). That this nature is in this one and not that one particularizes it to an individual, so it is not merely common: "Every nature (*φύσις*), therefore, is what it is not in *one* way only, but in a double one" (VII:22).⁵³⁹ A nature is common taken as that which is shared by all individuals but particular in that it exists in this individual and not that one. There are, therefore, three natures and three Gods as the divine nature exists in the three *ὑποστάσεις*.

⁵³⁶ Erismann, "The Trinity"; Zachhuber, *The Rise*, 145–69; Ehrhardt, *Christ in Christian Tradition Vol. 2, Part Three*, 268–80; Grillmeier and Hainthaler, *Christ in Christian Tradition Vol. 2, Part Four*, 107–46.

⁵³⁷ Ehrhardt, *Christ in Christian Tradition Vol. 2, Part Three*, 279.

⁵³⁸ Ibid.

⁵³⁹ Translated in Ehrhardt, *Christ in Christian Tradition Vol. 2, Part Three: The Churches of Jerusalem and Antioch from 451 to 600*, 278.

Now, someone may, at this point, avoid that conclusion by positing that the φύσις is a transcendent reality, an οὐσία that exists apart from its instantiations. However, on this reading, the one God would be different from and more than the three persons: the one God would be the Form of Divinity by which the three are God. This position was adamantly rejected by Basil and others, being one of the many reasons they originally hesitated about the term ὁμοούσιος.⁵⁴⁰

Therefore, not only would a conceptual apparatus that posits that Christ's two natures were both individuated natures (Pawl's concrete natures; Maximus' λόγοι) come uncomfortably close to the view Chalcedon attributed to Nestorius, namely, two independent realities held in a loose union, but it also fails to keep the properties of Christ separate, resulting in contradictory predicates ("Christ's embodied ὑπόστασις is unembodied"), and undercuts the 4th-century account of Trinitarian unity. It is not clear how this position would avoid the charge of tri-theism, and if it could, its solution would look drastically different from the Trinitarian theology of ὁμοούσιος developed by Athanasius and others. The Trinitarian solution developed in the 4th century would no longer be valid, for the divine φύσις has no independent reality.

6.4 CONCLUSION

In this thesis we have asked the question, what is the conceptual apparatus employed in the *Definition of Chalcedon* as read according to the interpretive strategies furnished by the Acts of Chalcedon? In this chapter, we brought our readings of Athanasius, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, the conciliar letters of Cyril, and Leo's *Tome* to bear on the *Definition* and have

⁵⁴⁰ Cf. *Ep.* 361.

confirmed the presence of and elucidated the conceptual tensions identified by Lacoste and Zachhuber. Employing the account of the one and the many adopted by the conciliar fathers in the 4th century to the problem of Christology as debated in the 5th century yields unacceptable conclusions, two individuals (instantiations of the nature) in a vague union, which was the position the council was eager to deny as “Nestorian.” However, modifying the conceptual apparatus to accommodate the concerns of the Christological debates negated the value of this apparatus for the 4th-century problems it was developed to address, namely, the unity of the three persons of the Godhead. That is, Maximus’ incarnational ontology was sufficient to account for most of the concerns addressed at Chalcedon (except, I argued, embodiment), yet it did so at the cost of the 4th-century Trinitarian ontology: no longer could the imminent, real universal be claimed as the subsistent reality organically present among all individuals of a genus. Not only is it the case, as Jordan Daniel Woods claims, “Were there no strict correlation of nature with commonality and hypostasis with property, the Christian doctrine of God as Trinity would implode,” but so also were there no strict correlation of commonality with substance and particularity with the individuation of that same substantial reality through an individuating property.⁵⁴¹

Thus, there does not appear to be one conceptual apparatus in the *Definition*: the 4th-century conceptual apparatus alluded to with the technical terminology and sources cited by the *Definition* cannot uphold the claims made by the definition, namely that Christ is truly consubstantial with God and humanity and yet is one individual (ὑπόστασις or πρόσωπον). To account for the incarnation, an alternate apparatus is required; Cyril’s conciliar letters and Leo’s *Tome* move us towards this apparatus, yet once it is adopted, the critical issues with

⁵⁴¹ Wood, *The Whole Mystery of Christ*, 27.

which 4th-century theologians wrestled are no longer able to be answered. Instead of one conceptual apparatus accounting for the theological concerns of the 4th and 5th centuries, namely, the Trinity and the incarnation, it seems that Chalcedon conceals two conceptual apparatuses close enough in appearance to employ the same terminology, relying on similar assumptions about the universal and the particular, yet different enough to yield no clear *via media*, no solution that equally upholds the concerns for which these apparatuses were introduced.

Chapter 7 – Conclusion

For nearly 1500 years, the language of Christology has been shaped by the idiom of the Council of Chalcedon (451) and its landmark definition of the Christian faith, but it is harder to identify the influence of Chalcedon's conceptual apparatus on Christology after 451. Part of the problem with tracing Chalcedon's influence in this dimension is to identify the conceptual apparatus of the *Definition of Chalcedon*. In this thesis, we set out to do so. We have paid particular attention to the concepts of universality and particularity, namely, what it means for Jesus, who is genuinely human, to be God and what it means for the Son, who is genuinely divine, to be human. Immediately the question arose as to how we would conduct such an investigation: how would we identify the *Definition's* conceptual apparatus? We attempted to answer this question in Chapter 2, situating the *Definition* as part of the officially published *Acta* of Chalcedon. A close reading of this document revealed three interpretive strategies by which we could approach the *Definition*. First, the *Definition* (treated as a part of the officially published *Acta*) was to be interpreted as an exposition of the authoritative and sufficient Nicene Creed; second, the *Definition* was to be read through the lens of authoritative fathers, among whom Athanasius, Basil of Caesarea, and Gregory of Nazianzus stood out as pre-eminent; third, the *Definition* was to be interpreted by Cyril's two conciliar letters with the support of Leo's *Tome*. Having set out the interpretive parameters of our investigation, we then undertook the task of using these strategies to answer our question.

As it concerns our question, the first and second strategies coalesce into one, so we began by investigating the universal and the particular as expressed by key terminology, such as ὁμοούσιος, οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, and πρόσωπον and their synonyms, in the works of Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory. Performing this investigation in Chapter 3, we argued that

when these three are read together as presenting a conciliar interpretation of Nicaea, a consistent picture emerges; there is a shared understanding of the relationship between the universal (the substance or nature) and the individual as that of a series where the first member is the source from which all others derive and from which they share an identical essence: there is one οὐσία of God and of man which all the divine persons and human persons, respectively, derive and receive their essence. There is unbroken continuity and, thus, true unity between the head member and all individuals. In the Godhead, the first member is the Father, the One God.

Turning to the conciliar letters of Cyril and Leo's *Tome* in Chapters 4 and 5, we argued that the universal continued to be understood in part as definitional (or abstract), with certain properties that obtain in all individuals with the same essence, yet the derivative component was not as strong, if present at all. Instead, the question of Christ's two natures appeared to push the argument of Cyril and Leo towards the abstract or logical side of the discussion, focusing on how one could maintain two natures and avoid contradiction in giving an account of the incarnation. The discussion between Cyril and the Antiochenes introduced the dual substantiality formula that several contemporary authors have flagged as problematic.⁵⁴² Thus, at the end of Chapter 5, Cyril's account of the incarnation in these two letters, as read with the support of Leo's *Tome*, pointed to a different conceptual apparatus than that used in the 4th century. This apparatus used the same key terminology as the 4th-century conciliar apparatus and was built upon a similar understanding of the universal and the particular, yet it developed the logical or abstract side of the 4th-century apparatus apart from the concrete side. In doing so, the understanding of the ontological individual and its nature needed to change significantly from what was held in the 4th century. Thus, the *Definition* appears to incorporate two

⁵⁴² Lacoste, "Homousios et Homoousios"; Zachhuber, *The Rise*, 103–111.

conceptual apparatuses, that of the conciliar fathers and that which begins to be developed in Cyril and Leo's letters, without a clear strategy for their reconciliation.

Considering the *Definition* itself in Chapter 6, the need for both apparatuses was apparent. On the one hand, the Nicene and Constantinopolitan Creeds and the *Definition*'s claim that Christ was consubstantial with the Father required the 4th-century apparatus so that true Trinitarian unity could be upheld and the claim that there were three Gods be denied. However, answering Eutyches and Apollinaris (as understood by the council) required the articulation of two natures that were understood in the same way, for the 4th-century understanding of the Godhead was developed on analogy with the nature of humanity. The logical accounts of Cyril and Leo, with the frequent use of *κατά* predication, were required to uphold the parallelism of the two natures and their presence in a single individual. We explored how these apparatuses might be brought together, but this revealed a significant incompatibility. If we begin with 4th-century apparatus and attempt to account for the Chalcedonian account of dual natures, that Christ had two natures and was both consubstantial with God and consubstantial with man, the presence of two natures implied two individuals in the one Christ without a sufficient ground for their unity. If we were to begin with Cyril and Leo, *κατά* predication or bi-partite exegesis is not able to avoid the individuation of both of Christ's natures apart from one another (two individuals in the union). However, their letters and the *Definition* offer a trajectory that is developed into a full-fledged ontology as we find in Maximus the Confessor and the Neo-Chalcedonians.

We then explored this trajectory, looking at a robust response to this tension, that worked out among Miaphysites and Chalcedonians in the following centuries. In this view, the *ὑπόστασις* was identified as the fundamental reality in which *ιδιότης* and *φύσις* inhere. Though this apparatus furnished an ontology sufficient to account for Cyril and Leo's abstract

understanding of the two natures and could account for Chalcedon's claim that Christ was one individual with two natures, this account could not resolve certain contradictory predicates (the resolution of this problem requiring an account too similar to Nestorius) and implied the countability of the nature instantiated as three persons (i.e. tritheism). So far as the parameters of this investigation permit a conclusion, it appears that Zachhuber and Lacoste were correct to identify an ontological tension at the heart of the *Definition*. It employs two conceptual apparatuses that are not reconcilable, yet neither on its own is sufficient to uphold both Nicaea and Chalcedon.

7.1 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS STUDY

Our argument offers several contributions to the current discussion of Chalcedon and Patristic theology more broadly. On the one hand, we have integrated the arguments of several writers to situate the *Definition* within the *Acta* as one part of a larger literary work. In doing so, we have elucidated the interpretive parameters laid forth in this literary work. It is not clear who, if anyone, received the *Definition* in this manner, yet expounding the *Definition* as part of the *Acta* considered as a literary work contributes to our understanding of the *Acta* as a tool of imperial power wielded by Marcian along with Anatolius of Constantinople. We have also established a basis for which to compare alternative traditions of the *Definition*'s reception in contrast with the official Imperial presentation. So far as the Imperial interpretation of Chalcedon is concerned, the claims by various authors that Chalcedon represents merely a regulatory rule of language or a linguistic boundary accompanied by a "‘riddle’ of negatives" cannot be sustained: not only is it articulated in ontologically loaded language, but the sources

presented for the *Definition*'s interpretation also go to great lengths explaining this language ontologically.⁵⁴³

More significantly, we have substantiated the intuition in the arguments of Zachhuber, Lacoste, and McCormack that there is a tension in the *Definition*, yet in doing so, we have shown that Lacoste and McCormack have not accurately diagnosed the problem, and we have elaborated the kernel identified by Zachhuber. There does appear to be tension in the *Definition of Chalcedon*, and it turns out to be as significant as Zachhuber suggests. Within the confines of this thesis, we have argued that Chalcedon represents the collision of two conceptual apparatuses, one which leaves the philosophical articulation of the Christian theology attempted in the 4th and 5th centuries on the horns of a dilemma. Chalcedon presented two horns facing the subsequent generation of theologians: they could, on the one hand, hold firmly to the interpretation of ὁμοούσιος expressed by Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory and be faced with various Christological problems, or, on the other hand, they could reinterpret ὁμοούσιος in light of the incarnation and find the 4th-centuries problems of reconciling the oneness of God with the plurality of persons remerge. It is the second horn that was chosen by Maximus and his contemporaries.

Finally, this conclusion has implications for the project of ressourcement as it has been practised by Protestant Evangelicals in these first decades of the 21st century.⁵⁴⁴ If the conclusion of this thesis holds true, namely, that the 4th-century conceptual apparatus created

⁵⁴³ Norris, "Chalcedon Revisited," 140–58; Sarah Coakley, "What Does Chalcedon Solve," 160–61.

⁵⁴⁴ Many authors could be cited in this regard, but of particular relevance are Hans Boersma, *Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011); Craig A. Carter, *Contemplating God with the Great Tradition: Recovering Trinitarian Classical Theism* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2021); Steven J. Duby, *Jesus and the God of Classical Theism: Biblical Christology in Light of the Doctrine of God* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2022).

problems when it was applied to the incarnation, then it is not so simple a proposition to reach back to the 4th century and adopt its ontology as a solution to contemporary problems in theology and philosophy. That is, if we assume that the theological claims of Nicaea and Chalcedon are non-negotiable, which the Protestant Evangelicals in question do, namely, that God is three and one, true unity with true plurality, and that Christ is entirely and fully God and entirely and fully human, then adopting the 4th-century ontological account of the Trinity appears to threaten the latter theological claim. The picture that emerges is not that of a definitive Christian philosophy in either the 4th or 5th centuries but of a philosophy or conceptual apparatus *in situ*. Instead of finding a definitive articulation of a philosophy robust enough to account for the breadth of the Scriptural teaching and Christian theology, we encounter theologians and clergy wrestling with the Bible and received tradition within their philosophical milieu, critically engaging with the sources on all fronts. We witness the back-and-forth of conceptual development as Christians weighed and refined various positions across two centuries without arriving at a definitive Christian philosophy. Ressourcement that ignores this fact risks unwinding 1500 years of Christian engagement with theological doctrine and ontology and beginning anew where Chalcedon left off in the 5th century, on the horns of the 4th-century Trinitarian tradition and the doctrine of the incarnation. However, ressourcement that is willing to engage with Scripture alongside the 4th and 5th-century theologians, letting them provide the reader with alien eyes to view Scripture, theology, and reality has much to commend itself. Such an approach opens up the riches of 4th and 5th-century theological discourse in dialogue with the philosophical paradigms dominant in the contemporary world and the faithful witness of Christians in the intermediary years.

Finally, the conclusion of this thesis suggests several other avenues for further research. Performing an interpretation of the *Definition of Chalcedon* within the Greek Acts invites an interpretation of the *Definition* within the Latin Acts, with a resulting comparison of the

respective conclusions. Possible resolutions to the tension of Chalcedon may also be explored, both within the parameters of the *Definition* itself and, perhaps, offering an account that attains the goals of Nicaea and its interpreters without the apparatus they employed, using one sufficient for the needs of Chalcedon, or offering an account of Chalcedon that attains its goals with an apparatus such as that used by Nicaea. The conclusion of this thesis could also be further tested by considering the reception of Chalcedon in the following centuries, seeing if this tension illuminates the post-Chalcedonian debates. Johannes Zachhuber's monograph *The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics* has done this in broad strokes, but closer readings of the individuals and debates could be performed.

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Appendix 1 – A Working Translation of Cyril’s Second Letter to Nestorius⁵⁴⁵

A copy of the epistle written from the God-beloved bishop of Alexandria, Cyril, to Nestorius, in the month of Michir in the 13th indiction [that is, February 430].⁵⁴⁶

(1.a)⁵⁴⁷ I have learned that some have been gossiping⁵⁴⁸ concerning my character before your holiness, doing so often. In particular, they await the opportune time at official synods,⁵⁴⁹ and, perhaps even intending to delight your ears, they also send out ill-considered⁵⁵⁰ utterances. They have not been wronged but have been convicted and this uprightly, one because he did wrong to the blind and poor, another as one who drew the sword against his mother, a third—who has always had such a reputation as no one would wish upon even their worst enemies—stole someone else’s gold with the help of a servant girl.

(1.b) Nevertheless, the word of such people does not mean much to me,⁵⁵¹ lest I extend the measure of the short stature which I possess beyond the master and teacher or even above

⁵⁴⁵ Text at ACO I.240; ACO 2.1.1 pp. 104-106.

⁵⁴⁶ See ACO 2.1.1 p. 104.

⁵⁴⁷ The critical text printed by Eduard Schwartz in ACO 1.1.1, pp. 25-28, has a greeting, “To the most devout and God-loving minister Nestorius, Cyril sends greetings in the Lord” [Trans. Matthew R. Crawford].

⁵⁴⁸ Καταφλυαρέω: Chattering repetitiously; continuous speech often with negative connotations. Perhaps, “Have been making disparaging claims.”

⁵⁴⁹ τὰς τῶν ἐν τέλει συνόδους; ἐν τέλει may mean “pertaining to those in office,” as it appears to here, so “synods of those in authority.”

⁵⁵⁰ ἀβουλήτος usually means “involuntary,” but that does not fit the context. The related word ἀβούλος, means “ill-advised” or “thoughtlessly” (cf. ἀβούλευτος). McGuckin goes with “groundless,” in McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*.

⁵⁵¹ Lit. “the word of such people is not much to me.” οὐ πολλὸς τῶν τοιούτων ὁ λόγος ἐμοί.

the fathers. For it is impossible to escape the malice⁵⁵² of the wicked, however one might choose to live. As for them, who have “mouths full of bitterness and cursing” [Rom 3:14], they will have to give an account to the judge of all things, but I will once again turn to what is particularly concerning to me. I urge you even now, as a brother in Christ, to undertake teaching [τῆς διδασκαλίας τὸν λόγον] and thinking concerning the faith with all carefulness for the sake of the people. I urge you to give thought that it is unbearable “to cause even one of the least of those who believe in Christ to stumble”; doing so will earn indignation [Matt 18:6].⁵⁵³ And if indeed the number of those grieved is so many, how do we not stand in need of the utmost skill? Yes, for is it not necessary to remove with prudence⁵⁵⁴ the scandal and to restore the healthy account of the faith for those seeking the truth?⁵⁵⁵ But this will happen—and most correctly so—if, when we encounter the teaching of the holy fathers concerning many things, we would endeavour to occupy ourselves with these things and, “by testing ourselves if we are in the faith” [2 Cor 13:5]—according to what is written—we would very diligently conform our thinking to their correct teachings and blameless doctrines.

(2.a) Accordingly, the great and holy synod said that the only-begotten Son himself, born from God the Father according to nature, true God from true God, the light that is from the light, through whom the Father made all things, descended, became incarnate, became a

⁵⁵² σκαιότης often has the sense of either clumsiness or awkwardness (cf. σκαιός), but also may have the sense “mischievousness” or “impropriety.” Here, it refers to the ill intentions of the wicked, so “malice” works well.

⁵⁵³ ὅτι τὸ σκανδαλίσαι καὶ μόνον ἓνα τῶν μικρῶν τῶν πιστεύοντων εἰς Χριστὸν ἀφόρητον ἔχει τὴν ἀγανάκτησιν. “To scandalise even one of the least of those who believes in Christ is unbearable, he has indignation.” Most translations of this line are quite free, but they read ἀφόρητον as an attributive adjective (FSA) with τὴν ἀγανάκτησιν. E.g. McGuckin translates it, “will fall under the unbearable anger (of God).” However, the syntax suggests a different interpretation. ἀφόρητον is the anarthrous predicate coordinate with τὸ σκανδαλίσαι, creating two asyndeton clauses, a verbless clause followed by a verbal clause which implies “he who does this.” McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*, 263.

⁵⁵⁴ ἐμφρόνως, on analogy with ἀφρόνως, ἄφρων, and ἔμφρων.

⁵⁵⁵ This sentence (“Yes...”) is part of the previous sentence in Greek, a purpose clause, πρὸς γε τὸ δεῖν....

man, suffered, rose on the third day, and ascended into the heavens.⁵⁵⁶ We must also follow these words and teachings, reflecting on what is meant that the Word from God became incarnate and became a man.

(2.b) For we do not say that the nature of the Word became flesh by being altered, nor again that he was changed into a whole man, one from a soul and a body, but rather that the Word became a man, uniting to himself in his person [καθ' ὑπόστασιν] in an ineffable and incomprehensible manner flesh ensouled with a rational soul, and was called the son of man.⁵⁵⁷ This was not according to the will alone or his good pleasure, nor again as with the addition of a façade [πρόσωπου] alone.⁵⁵⁸ We also say that⁵⁵⁹ though the two natures brought together in a true union are different, one Christ and son is from both, not in a manner such that the difference of the natures is done away because of the union, but rather they accomplish for us one lord and Christ and son from both divinity and humanity through the ineffable and inexpressible combination into a union.

(2.c) For this reason it is said—even though he has his existence from eternity and was born from the father—that he was born also according to flesh from a woman, not as though his divine nature received the beginning of being [τοῦ εἶναι] in the holy virgin and certainly not that it necessarily needed for its own sake a second generation after the one from the Father (for this is both useless and ignorant to say that the one who existed before all ages and is co-

⁵⁵⁶ αὐτὸν τὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ πατρὸς κατὰ φύσιν γεννηθέντα υἱὸν μονογενῆ, τὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ Θεὸν ἀληθινόν, τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐκ τοῦ φωτός, τὸν δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα πεποίηκεν ὁ πατήρ, κατελθεῖν σαρκωθῆναι ἐνανθρωπῆσαι παθεῖν ἀναστῆναι τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἀνελθεῖν εἰς τοὺς οὐρανούς.

⁵⁵⁷ “Person” not in the sense of a subjective self but a thing or individual. See our discussion of ὑπόστασις above.

⁵⁵⁸ Πρόσωπον for Cyril has a significantly different sense than it would for Nestorius. For Nestorius (at least in his later reflections) πρόσωπον refers to the manner in which something appears, not necessarily an illusion. For Cyril, πρόσωπον probably has the more pejorative sense that by which something presents itself, i.e. not as it actually is. The addition of μόνος confirms that the view Cyril is ruling out involves façade and not reality.

⁵⁵⁹ καί, continuing the affirmations introduced by φαμέν.

eternal with the Father needs a second beginning of his existence), but since he came from a woman for us and for our salvation, uniting humanity to himself in his person [καθ' ὑπόστασιν], he is in this way [ταύτηι τοι] said to be born in a fleshy manner.⁵⁶⁰ For an ordinary man was not first born from the holy virgin, nor has the Word come down upon him in this way; but being so united from his mother's womb, he is said to have undergone a fleshy birth, appropriating to himself the birth of his own flesh. In this way we also say that he suffered and rose, not as though God the Word suffered in his own nature scourging nor piercing of nails, nor therefore any other sufferings (for the divinity is impassible because it is also incorporeal), but since what became his own body suffered these things, again he is said to suffer on our behalf. For the impassible one was in the suffering body. In this same manner we also consider the manner of his death. For the Word of God, on the one hand, is immortal according to nature, and incorruptible and life and life-giving, but since—again—his own body “by God's grace,” in the words of Paul, “tasted death on our behalf” [Heb 2:9], it is said that he suffered death on our behalf, not as though when he entered into the experience of death this experience reached into his nature (for it is madness to say or think this) but that, as I just said, his flesh tasted death. Once again, in the very same way, “his resurrection” is said of his flesh being raised, not as though he fell into corruption—may it never be—but that, once again, his body was raised.

(2.d) In this manner, we confess one Lord and Christ, not as though we worship a man along with the Word—lest the appearance of separation be introduced by saying “with.” But we worship as one and the same because his body is not other than the Word's; it is with this body that he sits in council with the Father, not—once again—as though two sons are sitting in council, but as one according to the union with the flesh. But if we reject the union in his person [καθ' ὑπόστασιν] either as incomprehensible or without commending feature, we end

⁵⁶⁰ See fn. 534 on “in his person.”

up saying “two sons,” for it is necessary to delimit everything and so, on the one hand, to say that the man, properly speaking, was honoured with the designation of son and, on the other, properly speaking—once again—the Word from God naturally possessed sonship in name and propriety. Therefore, one must not divide the one Lord Jesus Christ into two sons. But to hold this in no way benefits the right account of faith, even if some invoke a “union of *prosopa*.”⁵⁶¹ For the scriptures do not say that “The Word united to himself a human *prosopon*,” but that “he became flesh” [John 1:14]. But the Word “becoming flesh” means nothing other than that like us he “partook of flesh and blood” [Heb 2:14], making our body his own and came forth as a man from a woman, not discarding his being as God and being born from God the Father, but even when he took to himself flesh he remained as he was.

(3) The accurate account of the faith maintains this everywhere. This is the manner we find the holy fathers to have thought; in this way, they had the courage to call the holy virgin “God-bearer,” not as though the nature [φύσις] of the Word or his divinity took a beginning from the holy virgin but as the holy body was born from her rationally ensouled, to which the Word is united in his person [καθ’ ὑπόστασιν] and so is said to be born according to the flesh. I write these things even now out of love found in Christ, exhorting you as a brother and fellow witness before Christ and the elect angels to both think and teach these things in order that the peace of the churches would be preserved and that bond of harmony and love would remain unbroken among the priests of God.

⁵⁶¹ Πρόσωπον is often translated “person,” but this is not correct. Πρόσωπον could refer to an individual but not with the connotations of the modern “person.”

Appendix 2 – A Working Translation of Cyril’s Letter to John of Antioch⁵⁶²

A letter written to the most God-beloved bishop of Antioch, John, from the most sacred bishop of Alexandria, Cyril, concerning peace.

(1a) Let the heavens rejoice and the earth cry out with gladness, for the dividing wall of partition has been destroyed, the source of grief has ceased, and the cause of all discord has been removed because Christ the saviour of us all arbitrated peace to his churches, and the most pious and God-beloved emperors called us to this. These, having become most excellent emulators of ancestral piety, guard the right faith immovable and unshakeable in their own souls, showing exceptional care on behalf of the holy churches, so that they may have glorious renown forever and display their own kingdom as most praiseworthy. To them, the Lord of Hosts himself has also distributed good things with a rich hand and has granted them to prevail over those who have set themselves in opposition, and he has given victory. For he does not lie when he says, “‘As I live,’ says the Lord, ‘I will honour the one honouring me’” [1 Sam 2:30].⁵⁶³

(1b) Therefore, when my lord the God-beloved fellow bishop and brother Paul arrived in Alexandria, we were filled with gladness, and rightly so, that such a man was acting as a mediator and undertaking to engage in labours beyond his strength in order that he might defeat the ill-will of the Devil, that those separated might be joined together, and that by removing

⁵⁶² ACO 1.246; 2.1.1 pp. 107-111.

⁵⁶³ McEnerney and Price and Gaddis miss the Semitic idiom here: “I live” is a reference to the oath formula (“As the Lord lives, may He do so and more also if I do not ...”). McEnerney translates it, “I live, says the Lord.” Cyril of Alexandria, *Letters 1-50*, 147; *CChal* 1:178. Cf. McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria*, 343.

the stumbling blocks causing separation he would crown the churches among us and among you with like-mindedness and peace.⁵⁶⁴ In what way they were divided, it is needless to speak, but rather I think it is necessary to think and speak concerning those things which are proper for this season of peace. Therefore, we were delighted [ἡδομαι] upon the successful encounter of the previously mentioned, most-pious man who for some reason perhaps thought that he would have no small struggle to persuade us of the need to gather the churches for peace, to suppress the laughter of the heterodox, and also to blunt the sting of the Devil's malice. But he found us ready for this so that no one had to endure any labour at all. For we remembered our saviour saying, "my peace I give to you; my peace I leave with you" [John 14:27], and we have also learned to say in our prayers, "Lord, our God, give us peace, for you have given us all things" [Isa 26:12], so that if anyone should come to partake of the peace provided by God, he would not lack anything good. But we have now become firmly convinced that the dissension that has obtained is utterly superfluous and not opportune for the churches because my lord the most God-beloved bishop Paul put forth a paper with this inscrutable confession of faith and confirmed that it was composed by your holiness and the God-beloved bishops of that place. Here is the document, placed in this epistle of mine with its exact words,

(2a) Now, concerning the virgin Theotokos and the manner of the *enanthropation* [ἐνανθρωπήσεως] of the unique Son of God, this is the way we think and speak, necessarily without invention⁵⁶⁵ but with full exposition,⁵⁶⁶ as we have it, having received it from above, from both the divine scriptures and from the tradition of the holy fathers, concerning which we will speak briefly, adding nothing whatsoever to the faith explicated by the holy fathers at Nicaea. For as we have previously said, it is sufficient for

⁵⁶⁴ The parallelism is difficult here, as indicated by the divergences between McEnerney and McGuckin. However, if we read the series beginning with καὶ τὰ μετὰξὺ and ending with ὁμονοίαι as a verbless clause with an implied to-be subjunctive, the result is 4 parallel purpose clauses: that they might be defeated, that they might be joined, that there might be like-mindedness, and that the churches might be crowned.

⁵⁶⁵ Οὐκ ἐν προσθήκης μέρει, "Not by the function of addition"

⁵⁶⁶ ἐν πληροφορίας εἶδει, "By the form of fullness"

all knowledge of piety and the condemnation of all disreputable heresy. We will speak without boldly grasping at what is unattainable but with the confession of our weakness and shutting off those desiring to be puffed up⁵⁶⁷ with what we think to be beyond man.

(2b) Therefore, we confess our Lord Jesus Christ, the unique Son of God, perfect God and perfect man, from a rational soul and body, born from the Father before all ages according to his divinity, but in the last days he was born for us and for our salvation from the virgin Mary according to his humanity. He is consubstantial with the Father according to divinity and consubstantial with us according to humanity. For a unity of two natures has come about; for which reason we confess one Christ, one Son, one Lord. According to this conception of unity without confusion, we confess that the holy virgin is Theotokos because God the Word became incarnated and became human, and from the moment she conceived, he united to himself the temple received from her. However, we know that theological men consider the apostolic and gospel sayings concerning the Lord to be common, as pertaining to one individual⁵⁶⁸ but distinguish them as they pertain to two natures, reckoning those that are divine according to the divinity of Christ and those that are humble according to his humanity.

(3a) Encountering these holy sayings of yours and realising that we think the same (for there is “one Lord, one faith, and one baptism” [Eph 4:5]), we glorified God the saviour of us all, rejoicing with one another that the churches both with us and with you have a faith that agrees with the inspired scriptures and the tradition of our holy fathers. And since I inquired of certain people who are accustomed to finding fault, who buzz around in the manner of wild wasps and spit out distressing words against me as if I were saying that the holy body of Christ came down from heaven and not from the holy virgin, I thought it necessary to say a little about this to them.

⁵⁶⁷ McEnerney has “to intrude” and McGuckin, “to criticize us.” Ἐπιφύεσθαι appears to be a passive infinitive from ἐπιφύω which is either an intensified form of φύω or, retaining the prepositional force, it means “to beget or grow on.” Hence, to “grow themselves on/with” or “to be puffed up.” The word appears in 2 Maccabees 4:47 with the sense of “clinging to” (though “growing in” would also fit the context).

⁵⁶⁸ Πρόσωπον. Here it is not being used in the pejorative sense with which Cyril used it in his *Second Letter to Nestorius* nor, apparently, with the same technical force as Nestorius. It is in this more generic usage that the term will be used at Chalcedon. As the “individual,” it is used in the same way as ὑπόστασις in Cyril’s *Second Letter*.

(3b) O foolish people, who know only how to slander, how have you been turned away from knowledge into this and thought such an absurd thing? For it was necessary—clearly necessary—to think that (generally speaking) all that has been waged by us on account of the faith is because we have maintained that the Holy Virgin is Theotokos. But if we said that the holy body of Christ, the saviour of us all, was born from heaven and not from her, how then could she possibly be thought to be Theotokos? For whom has she borne at all unless it is true that she has given birth to Emmanuel according to the flesh? Therefore, they have earned scorn for themselves who talk such nonsense about me. For the blessed prophet Isaiah does not lie when he says, “Behold, the virgin will conceive and give birth to a son, and they will call his name Emmanuel, which is translated ‘God with us’” [Isa. 7:14]. And the holy Gabriel spoke in a wholly true manner to the blessed virgin when he said, “Do not be afraid, Mary, for you have found favour before God, and behold, you will conceive and will bear a son, and you will call his name Jesus, for he will save his people from their sins” [Luke 1:30-31]. And whenever we say “from heaven” and our Lord Jesus Christ is “from above,” we do not say such things as if to say his holy flesh came down “from above” and “from heaven.” Rather, we are following the divinely inspired Paul, who clearly proclaimed, “The first man is dust from the earth, but the second man (the Lord) is from heaven” [1 Cor. 15:47]. We recall the Saviour himself also saying, “No one has gone up into heaven except he who came down from heaven, the Son of Man” [John 3:13], yet he had been born according to the flesh, as I just said, from the holy virgin. However, since God the Word, coming down “from above” and “from heaven,” “has emptied himself, taking on the form of a servant” [Phil. 2:7], and has been called the Son of Man after remaining what he was [μετὰ τοῦ μένειν ὁ ἦν], that is, God (for he is unchangeable and unalterable according to nature), so he is said to “come down from heaven” as already being conceived of as one with his own flesh and is also called a “man from heaven,” being perfect in deity and the same one perfect in humanity, as also being known in one individual

[πρόσωπον]. For “there is one Lord Jesus Christ,” even if the difference of natures from which we say the ineffable union was wrought is clearly perceived.⁵⁶⁹

(4) Now, let your holiness deign to curb those saying that there was a “mixture,” “compound,” or “composition” of God the Word with the flesh. For it is likely that some babble these things regarding me, as if I have thought or said them. However, I am so far removed from thinking such things that I consider those who think that “a shadow of turning” [Jam. 1:17] can be experienced by the nature of God the Word to be wholly insane. For he remains what he is, and he never changes, but he is not even capable of ever being changed or of changing. All of us confess that the Word of God is impassible in this way, even if the sufferings that happened in his flesh are apparent—he being the one who, with the utmost wisdom, ordered the mystery, allotting it in himself.⁵⁷⁰ In the very same way, all-wise Peter also said, “Because Christ suffered on our behalf in the flesh” [1 Pet. 4:1], not in the nature of his unspeakable divinity. For, in order that he would be believed to be the saviour of everything, according to the economy appropriated in himself—as I have said—he bears the sufferings of his own flesh, as was proclaimed beforehand through the voice of the prophet, speaking for him, “I gave my back for scourging, and my cheeks for blows; I did not turn my face from the shame of their spitting” [Isa 50.6].

⁵⁶⁹ “It is not unknown.”

⁵⁷⁰ ἀπαθῆ δὲ πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον ὑπάρχειν ὁμολογοῦμεν ἅπαντες, καὶ εἰ πανσόφως αὐτὸς οἰκονομῶν τὸ μυστήριον ἑαυτῷ προσνέμων ὀρῶιτο τὰ τῇ ἰδίᾳ σαρκὶ συμβεβηκότα πάθη. Contrast the translation of McGuckin and McEnerney. McGuckin has, “all of us confess that the divine Word is impassible, even if in his all-wise economy of the mystery he is seen to attribute to himself the sufferings that befall his own flesh.” McEnerney has, “Everyone of us confesses that the Word of God is, moreover, impassible, even though he himself is seen arranging the dispensation of the mystery all-wisely by assigning to himself the sufferings that happened in his own body.” It is awkward to read the nominative participles in the manner they do. However, if we take the neuter plural “sufferings” as the subject of the verb, then the participles form a nominative absolute clause (he...). This explains the upfront placing of αὐτὸς and makes perfect sense of the context, emphasizing the transcendence of the Word while juxtaposing ἀπαθῆ with πάθη.

(5) Let your holiness be persuaded, and let none of the others doubt, that we follow the teaching of the holy fathers in everything, especially those of the blessed and everywhere-honoured Athanasius, our father, praying earnestly that we would not be moved at all from him. I would have set forth many passages from them, confirming my own words from them, had I not feared the length of the letter, lest it be somehow tedious for this reason. But in no way do we permit the defined faith or the symbol of faith from the holy fathers gathered at Nicaea in critical times to be shaken by anyone. Nor do we even permit either ourselves or others to change a word laid down there or to go beyond even one syllable, remembering the one who said, “Do not move an everlasting boundary marker that your fathers set” [Prov 22.28]. For it was not these who were speaking, but rather the Spirit of the God and Father, who proceeds from him and is not other than the Son according to the definition of his essence [τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον]. So, for this reason, the words of the holy mystagogues⁵⁷¹ are believed by us.⁵⁷² Moreover, in the Acts of the Apostles it is written, “When they came to Mysia, they tried to go into Bithynia, but the Spirit of Jesus did not permit them” [Acts 16:7]. And the divinely inspired Paul also wrote in a letter, “those who are in the flesh are not able to please God, but you are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if indeed the Spirit of God dwells in you. But if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not his” [Rom 8:8-9]. But whenever one of those accustomed to turning from the straight ways twists my sayings to what seems right for them, let not your holiness wonder at this, knowing that those from every heresy collect occasions for their own errors from the God-breathed Scriptures, corrupting those things spoken through the Holy Spirit rightly for their own evil, pouring unquenchable flames upon their own heads. Now, since we have learned that some have published the letter of our everywhere-praised

⁵⁷¹ Used for a spiritual teacher; among Christians, it is used for a Christian teacher.

⁵⁷² ἡμῶς taken as an adverbial accusative.

father Athanasius to the blessed Epictetus, corrupting it though it is orthodox, by doing so causing harm to many, we have for this reason sent to your holiness the proper copies made from ancient copies we have with us, which are free from error, thinking of what would be useful and even indispensable to the brothers and sisters.

Appendix 3 – A Working Translation of Leo’s Tome⁵⁷³

Leo [Bishop of Rome] to the beloved brother, Flavian.

(1) After reading your love’s letter (about which we were surprised that it was so late) and examining closely the order of the record of the proceedings that happened under the bishops’ oversight, with some difficulty, we know of what sort is the scandal that arose among you against the health of the faith, and those things that formerly appeared to be hidden are now clear to us. For this reason, Eutyches, who was thought to be worthy of honour with the title of presbyter, has been shown to be a great idiot and extremely unlearned, so that even what was spoken by the prophet applies to him, “he did not desire to understand doing good; he studied unrighteousness upon his bed” [Ps. 36:4]. Indeed, what could be more unrighteous than to think impious things and not to yield to those who think soundly and are wiser? Into this foolishness fall those who, when hindered by some obfuscating obstacle from knowing the truth, do not have recourse to the voice of the prophetic voice, to writings of the apostles, nor to the authority of the gospels but to themselves and thus show themselves to be teachers of deceit, because they have not been teachers of the truth. For what sort of education has he received from the divine books of the Old and New Covenants who does not even follow the introductory parts of the Creed? And what is uttered throughout the entire world by the voices of everyone being regenerated, is this not yet grasped by the mind of this old man?

⁵⁷³ ACO 2.1.1 pp. 10-20.

(2a) Being ignorant, therefore, of what he ought to know concerning God the Word's *enanthropation* [ἐνανθρωπήσεως],⁵⁷⁴ and not being willing to engage with the breadth of the divine scriptures that he would become worthy of the light of knowledge therefrom, he ought to have at least with careful listening attended to⁵⁷⁵ that common and not discordant confession, which the whole multitude of the faithful confess, that he would himself believe “in God the Father Almighty, and in Jesus Christ His only Son, our Lord, who was born from the Holy Spirit and the virgin Mary,” three declarations by which the machinations of nearly every heresy are destroyed. For when God is believed to be both “almighty” and “Father,” the Son is also revealed to be co-eternal with him, differing from the Father in nothing, since he is God from God, Almighty from Almighty, being born Co-Eternal from the Eternal, not later in time, not lesser in power, not unlike in glory, not separate in substance [οὐσία]. The same eternal, unique son of the eternal Father was born from the Holy Spirit and the virgin Mary, which temporal birth neither subtracted from his divine and eternal birth nor added anything to it but emptied its entire self in order to save deceived humanity,⁵⁷⁶ in order that he might also defeat death and strike down the Devil, who has control over death, with his own power. For we would not have been able to defeat the author of sin and death, except that he took up our nature and made it his own, which sin was not able to sully, nor death restrain. Therefore, he has been manifestly conceived from the Holy Spirit in the womb of the virgin mother, who thus brought

⁵⁷⁴ Leo has the Old Roman Creed in view here. The Latin of the *Tome* has “incarnation.” In the Greek Nicene Creed, it uses the word for incarnation and this word, for becoming man; Κατελθόντα καὶ σαρκωθέντα καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα.

⁵⁷⁵ “Made for himself,” set oneself to labour with regard to; Price and Gaddis have, “made his own.” The Latin has *recepisset*. *CChal* 2:15.

⁵⁷⁶ This line is difficult; the “temporal birth” is the subject throughout; what it means for the temporal birth to expend itself entirely is not clear. Price and Gaddis have “emptied the whole of itself,” which does not appear much clearer. *CChal* 2:16.

him forth with her virginity preserved, just as she also conceived with her virginity remaining pure.

(2b) However, if he was unable to draw undefiled understanding from this most pure fount of the Christian faith because he overshadowed the shining light of the truth for himself by his own blindness, he could have at least subjected himself to the teaching of the Evangelists. Yes, since Matthew said, “The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, son of David, son of Abraham” [Matt 1:1], he could have also sought the instruction of the apostolic preaching. And when he read in the epistle to the Romans, “Paul, the servant of Jesus Christ, who was called an apostle set apart for the Gospel of God, which was announced beforehand through his prophets in the Holy Scriptures concerning his son who came to be from the seed of David according to the flesh” [Rom 1:1-3], he could move his pious attention in the same way to the prophetic books. And finding the promise of God to Abraham, which says “by your seed all the nations will be blessed” [Gen 22:18], so that he would have not doubt concerning the proper meaning of this term “the seed,” he could have also followed the apostle who said, “The promises were spoken to Abraham and to his seed. He does not say, ‘and to seeds,’ as for many, but as for one; ‘and to your seed,’ which is Christ” [Gal 3:16]. And he could also have held to the preaching of Isaiah through internal listening, which says, “Behold, the virgin will conceive, and she will give birth to a son, and they will call his name Emmanuel, which means, ‘God with us’” [Isa 7:14]. And also, had he faithfully read the words of the same prophet, “A child has been born to us, a son has been given to us, his authority will be upon his shoulders, and they will call his name Angel of Great Counsel, Mighty God, Powerful, Ruler of Peace, Father of the Coming Age” [Isa 9:6], he should not have vainly spoken so as to say the Word became flesh in such a way that Christ born from the virgin had the form of man, but he did

not have the truth of his mother's body.⁵⁷⁷ Or did he perhaps think, because of this, that the Lord Christ did not have our nature, because the angel sent to the blessed Mary said, "The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Most High will overshadow you; for this reason, the holy thing born from you will also be called the Son of God" [Luke 1:35], as if because the virgin's conception came by an act of divine workmanship, that the flesh of the one conceived was not of the nature of the one conceiving? But that generation, which is uniquely wonderful and wonderfully unique, is not understood in this way, such that on account of the novelty of the generation the propriety of the race be cast out. For though the Holy Spirit produced the fruitfulness of the virgin, he received the truth of the body from a body, and Wisdom having built a house for herself, the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, that is, in this body which he received from a human and which he animated [ἐνεψύχωσεν] with the spirit of rational life.

(3) Accordingly, the properties [ιδιότητος] of each nature being preserved and united in one person [πρόσωπου], lowliness was taken up by divinity, impotence by power, mortality by immortality, and to pay the debt owed by our nature, the divine nature was united to the passible nature, in order that—this being suitable as our cure—the one and the same, being the mediator between God and humans, the man Jesus Christ, would both be able to die from the one and also be unable to die from the other. Therefore, true God was born in the unmixed and perfect nature of a true human, whole in what is his and whole in what is ours. But we say "ours" with reference to what the creator set down in us from the beginning and what he received again to renew; for those things which the deceiver brought in addition (and the man

⁵⁷⁷ Cf. ACO I.522

being deceived sinned) did not have a trace on the Saviour.⁵⁷⁸ Nor did he, because he assumed a share in human weakness, for this reason also become a sharer in our sin. For he received the form of a servant without filth of any sin, exalting humanity but not diminishing the divinity, since that emptying on account of which the invisible procured visibility for himself and the maker and lord of all things chose to become one among humanity is a compassionate condescension not the deficiency of power. Therefore, remaining in the form of God—he who made man—he became a human in the form of a servant. For each nature preserves without lack its own properties, and just as the form of God did not destroy the form of the servant, thus the forming of the servant did not lessen the form of God. For since the Devil was boasting that the man, deceived by his deceit, deprived of the divine gifts, and stripped of the good things of immortality by death, had come under a weighty sentence of death, and he found some comfort from fellowship with he who would become the betrayer, since God also, his justice demanding this, changed his own sentence concerning the man, whom he had prepared for so great an honour, there was need of the dispensation of the ineffable mystery, in order that the changeless God, whose will is not able to be deprived of its natural kindness, with an ineffable mystery might accomplish the first administration of his own piety concerning us and in order that the man who came into sin by the maliciousness of diabolical wickedness would not be destroyed contrary to the purpose of God. Thus, the Son of God, descending from the heavenly throne and, not being removed from the glory of the Father, came forth into this humble state of the world, being born with a new order and with a new birth. With a new order because being invisible in what belongs to himself, he became visible in what is before us [ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν];⁵⁷⁹ being incomprehensible, he desired to condescend; remaining before the

⁵⁷⁸ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς ἄνθρωπος ἥμαρτεν “the man ... sinned.” The translator has mistranslated the Latin *admisit*, which, as Price and Gaddis observe, here ought to mean “admit.” *CChal* 2:18.

⁵⁷⁹ *CChal* 2:18, “became visible at our level.”

ages, he began to be from time; as lord of everything, he received the form of a servant, obscuring the greatness of his own divinity; and the impassible God did not despise to become a passable man, nor the immortal to submit to the laws of death. Being born with a new birth because the immaculate virginity did not know passion but furnished the material of the flesh. The nature of the lord came forth from the mother, not sin; nor is it the case that since the generation in the Lord Jesus Christ being born from the womb of the virgin is something wonderful, his nature, for this reason, is not like ours. For he, being true God, is also true man. And there is no falsehood in this union while both together are with one another, both the humility of man and the greatness of God. For just as God in mercy did not endure change, so the man was not destroyed by the greatness of the divine worth.

(4a) For each form operates in communion with the other according to what is its own, the Word effecting that which is the Word's and the body accomplishing that which is the body's; one of these shines through the wonders, but the other has collapsed under the abuses. Just as the Word is irremovable from equality with the Father's glory, so the body has not abandoned the nature of our race; for one and the same is truly the Son of God and truly a son of man, God inasmuch as, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" [John 1:1], but human inasmuch as, "The Word become flesh and dwelt among us" [John 1:14]; God inasmuch as "through him all things came to be and apart from him not one thing came to be" [John 1:3], but human inasmuch as "he came to be from a woman, he came to be under the law" [Gal 4:4]. The incarnating birth is an exhibition of the human nature, but the virgin birth is a sign of the divine power. The infancy of the infant is known through the thrift of the swaddling clothes, but the greatness of his majesty is revealed through the voices of the angels. This one whom Herod profanely schemes to kill is like persons just born; however, it is the Lord of all things whom the magi rejoice to worship with supplication. But when he comes for the baptism of his forerunner John, that he would not

escape notice because the divinity was hidden by the veil of the flesh, the voice of the Father shouting from heaven said, “This is my beloved son, in whom I am well pleased” [Matt 3:17]. Therefore, he whom the devil’s craftiness tempts as a man, the rank of angels serves this one as God. For to hunger and thirst, to be weary and sleep is confessedly human, but that five loaves would satisfy five thousand persons and that the Samaritan woman would freely receive living water, of which there would be thirst no longer to her who drew it, and to walk upon the waves of the sea without feet getting plunged in, and having rebuked the swelling waves to calm a storm, this is without question of God. Therefore, (to leave aside many things) as it is not of the same nature to weep with a compassionate disposition for the friend who has died and to raise the one who was about to live again at a verbal command, the mound of an already four-day old tomb being scattered, or to be hung on a cross and to shake all the heavenly bodies, they being changed from day to night, or to be driven through with nails and to open the doors of paradise at the faith of the robber; so, it is not of the same nature to say “I and the Father are one” [John 10:30] and to say, “The Father is greater than I” [John 14:28]. For though there certainly is one person of God and humanity in the Lord Jesus Christ, nevertheless, that from which the abuse is common in each is one thing and that from which the glory has become common is another. For from us he has humanity, which is less than the Father, but from the Father he has divinity equal with the Father.

(4b) Therefore, on account of this unity of the person that ought to be thought in each nature, we also acknowledge that the son of man descended from heaven when the Son of God received the body from the same virgin from whom he was born, and again the Son of God is said to have been crucified and buried when he suffered these things not in the very divinity that in which he is the unique son, co-eternal, and consubstantial with the Father, in the weakness of the human nature. Wherefrom we all confess in the Creed the unique son of God was crucified and buried according to that apostolic saying, “For if they knew, they would not

have crucified the Lord of glory” [1 Cor 2:8]. But when our same Lord and Saviour trains the faith of his own disciples with questions, “‘Who,’ he said, ‘do the people say, I, the Son of Man, am?’” [Matt 16:13] And these answering that various people had various opinions; he said, “Who do you say that I am? I, the Son of Man whom you have clearly seen both in the form of a servant and the weakness of a body, who do you say I am?” [Matt 16:15] Whence the blessed Peter, inspired by God and through his own confession about to become salvation to all nations, said, “You are the Christ, the Son of the living God” [Matt 16:16] and was worthily declared to be blessed from the Lord and he from drew from the archetypical rock the solidity of both virtue and appellation. Whom through a revelation of the Father confessed the same one to both Son of God and Christ, since one of these taken apart from the other was unprofitable for salvation, and it was equally dangerous to believe the Lord Jesus Christ to be God alone apart from man or man alone apart from God. Now, after the Lord’s resurrection, which was clearly of his genuine body, since no other was raised except the one who was crucified and died, what else happened during the course of his 40 days than that the things of our faith might be cleansed from every fog? For dialoguing with his own disciples, spending time and eating with them, he allowed himself to be handled with the utmost detail and curiosity with their touch, who stricken with doubt, for this reason he condescended and, though the doors were locked, he went into the disciples. With his own breath he gave the Holy Spirit and, granting the light of knowledge, he uncovered the secrets of the divine Scriptures. Again, the same showed wounds of his side and the marks of the nails and the signs of the recent suffering, saying, “Touch me, see that a spirit does not have flesh and bones, as you see that I have” [Luke 24:39], so that the identifying mark [ιδιότης] of both the divine and the human nature might be known to have remained undivided in him, and in this way we would learn that this Word is not what the flesh is, but we confess one Son of God to be both the Word and the Flesh.

(5a) Of which faith in the mystery this Eutyches is lacking, and he ought to be held to have no share in it, who does not recognise our nature in the only son of God, neither because of the lowliness of the humanity nor because of the glory of the resurrection, nor did he fear the statement of the blessed apostle and evangelist John, who said, “Every spirit that does not confess Jesus Christ to have come from God in the flesh and every spirit who divides Jesus Christ is not from God, and this one is the Antichrist” [1 John 4:2-3]. What is it to divide Jesus except to separate the human nature from him and to try to make vain the mystery through which alone we are saved through intemperate fictions? But the one laying down the fog concerning the nature of the body of Christ necessarily also be deranged with equal blindness concerning his suffering. For if he does not also consider the crucifixion of the Lord a lie, and in no wise doubts that the suffering he received in behalf of the salvation of the world was real, then let him [also] acknowledge the flesh of the one whose death he acknowledges, and let him not deny that the same is a man of our flesh, who he knows to be passible, since the denial of the true body is also the denial of the suffering of the body. If, therefore, he accepts the Christians’ faith and does not close his own ears to the preaching of the Gospel, let him examine of what nature was hung upon the wood of the cross, being driven through with nails; and when the side of that which was fixed to the cross was opened through the soldier’s spear, let him consider from where the blood and water flowed so that the church of God might be watered with the bath and the cup. And let him hear also the blessed apostle Peter preaching that the washing of the Spirit comes through the sprinkling of the blood of Christ—and let him not skim the words of the same apostle when he says, “knowing that it was not with corruptible silver or gold that you were redeemed from you’re the fruitless course of life inherited from your fathers but with the costly blood as if from a holy and spotless Lamb, Jesus Christ” [1 Pet 1:18-19]. And let him not also resist the witness of the blessed apostle John when he says, “And the blood of Jesus the Son of God cleanses us from all sin” [1 John 1:7], and again,

This is the victory that has conquered the world, our faith. Who is the one who conquered the world if not the one who believes that Jesus is the Son of God? This is the one coming through the water and blood of Jesus Christ, not in water alone, but in water and blood; and the Spirit is the one bearing witness, since the Spirit is the truth. For there are three who bear witness, the Spirit and the water and the blood, and these three are one. [1 John 5:4-8]

That is, the Spirit of sanctification, the blood of redemption, and the water of baptism, which three are one and remain indivisible. Not one of them is separated from their own union since the catholic church lives and advances in this faith in order that it would not be believed that the humanity is without the true divinity nor that the divinity is without the true humanity.

(5b) Moreover, when Eutyches answered the statement in your hearing, saying, “I profess our Lord to be from two natures before the union, but after the union I profess one nature.”⁵⁸⁰ I marvel that such an absurd and perverse profession was not thought reprehensible, with no censure from the judges, and such a foolish word came and went as though what was heard offended no one, when it is ungodly in the same way to say that the only Son of God is from two natures before the *enanthropation* (ἐνανθρωπήσεως) as it is unlawful to maintain that there is one nature in him after the Word became flesh. Lest Eutyches hold that this which was spoken is right or tolerable, since he was restrained by no judgment from any of you, we ask the exactness of your love, most precious brother, that if through the mercy of God the details of this matter would be brought to a resolution, the ignorance of the unlearned man would also be cleansed from this corruption in his thinking. Therefore, he, as the minutes show, was beginning well to withdraw from his own opinion, when being closed in by your judgment, he agreed that he would say what he had not said before, and to acquiesce in that faith to which he had formerly been a stranger. But when he would not concede to agree on the impious

⁵⁸⁰ Cf. ACO I.527.

doctrine to be anathematised, your brotherhood knew that he remained in his own heretical opinion and was worthy to receive the sentence of deposition. For which reason, if he grieves truly and profitably and if even though late, nevertheless, if he recognises that episcopal authority has been exercised over him out of necessity, or if he would see to a full apology so to condemn all the things he wickedly thought with a clear word in person, and also with his own signature, then the mercy concerning the one corrected, however much is shown, will not be worthy of condemnation, since our Lord, the true and good shepherd who laid down his life on behalf of his sheep and who came to save and not destroy the souls of humans, desires us to be imitators of his own goodness, that justice should chasten sinners but the mercy of compassion should by no means drive away those who repent. For then, truly then, would the truth of the faith be vindicated with good fruit, when even by the initiators of the impiety, their own heresy is condemned.

Now, that every matter would be accomplished rightly and faithfully, we have sent our brothers the bishop Julius and the presbyter Renatus, still also my son Hilarius the deacon, in our place, to whom we have joined Dulcitius our notary, whose faith we have proven, being confident that God's help will be present so that the one who has strayed would be saved, the perversity of his own opinion being condemned.

May God keep you in good health, most beloved brother.

Given on the Ides of June of the consulship of the most illustrious Asturius and Protogenes.

Appendix 4 – A Working Translation of the Definition of Chalcedon

30. The holy, great, and ecumenical synod, according to the grace of God and the decrees of our most pious and Christ-loving emperors, the Augusti Valentinian and Marcian, assembled in the metropolis of Chalcedon in Bithynia, in the martyrion of the holy and victorious martyr, Euphemia, has defined [ὥρισεν] the following decrees [τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα],⁵⁸¹

31. (a.) Our Lord and Saviour the Christ, confirming the knowledge of the faith to his disciples, said, “My peace I give to you; my peace I leave with you,” so that no one would be in conflict with his neighbour over the doctrines of godliness, but that message of the truth would be exhibited the same. But since the evil one does not cease to attack the seed of godliness through his weeds and he is continually inventing new things against the truth, for this reason the master, providing for the human race as is his custom, has roused this godly and most faithful emperor to zeal and has called to himself the leaders of the priesthood everywhere, so that by the operation the grace of Christ, the master of us all, every defilement of falsehood would be dispelled from the flock of Christ and he would fatten it with every offshoot of truth.

(b.) Which, therefore [δὴ],⁵⁸² we have done with a shared judgment [κοινῇ ψήφῳ], expelling the deceitful doctrines but renewing the unerring faith of the fathers, proclaiming the Creed of the 318 to all and endorsing [ἐπιγραψάμενοι] as of the same sort [οἰκεῖους] the fathers who received this collection of godliness, to which are the 150 who gathered after these things in the great Constantinople and the same who set their seal on the same faith. We therefore decree—we ourselves upholding the order and all the decrees of the faith of the holy synod formerly taking place at Ephesus, over which presided the most holy in memory Celestine of Rome and Cyril of Alexandria—on the one hand, that the exposition of the right and spotless faith by the 318 holy and blessed fathers at Nicaea, gathered together by the pious in memory Constantine who was then Emperor, shines forth preeminent and, on the other hand, that the decrees of the 150 holy fathers in Constantinople give support for the uprooting of heresies that then sprung up and the confirmation of the same universal and apostolic faith which is ours.

The Creed of the 318 fathers in Nicaea,

⁵⁸¹ When proposed, the word ὁρός is used for the Definition of Chalcedon. See ACO III.2-8. Here, the verbal form is used with the participle from ὑποτάσσω.

⁵⁸² A marker of transition, not inference.

32. We believe in one God, Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of things both visible and invisible; in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, begotten from the Father before all ages, true God from true God, begotten not made, consubstantial [ὁμοούσιον] with the Father, through whom all things came to be, who on account of us humans and on account of our salvation came down, was incarnated [σάρκωθέντα], became human [ἐνανθρωπήσαντα], suffered, rose again on the third day, ascended into heaven, and is coming to judge the living and the dead; and in the Holy Spirit.

But those who say ‘there was a time when he was not,’ ‘before he was begotten he was not,’ that from things that were not he came to be, or who assert that the Son of God is from a different reality [ὑποστάσεως] or substance [οὐσίας], subject to turning [τρεπτόν], or subject to change [ἀλλοιωτόν], persons such as this the Catholic and Apostolic church anathematises.

Also the same of the 150 holy fathers who assembled in Constantinople,

33. We believe in one God, Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of things both visible and invisible; in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, who was begotten from the Father before all ages, true God from true God, begotten not made, consubstantial [ὁμοούσιον] with the Father, through whom all things came to be, who on account of us humans and on account of our salvation came down, was incarnated [σάρκωθέντα] from the Holy Spirit and the virgin Mary, and became human [ἐνανθρωπήσαντα], who was crucified on our behalf under Pontius Pilate, buried, rose again on the third day, ascended into heaven, sat at the right hand of the Father, and is coming again with glory to judge the living and the dead, whose kingdom will have no end; in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and giver of life, who proceeds [ἐκπορευόμενον] from the Father, who is worshipped and glorified with the Father and Son, who spoke through the prophets; and in one catholic and apostolic church. We confess one baptism for the forgiveness of sins. We await the resurrection of the dead and the life of the coming age. Amen.

34. (a) Thus this wise and saving Creed of divine grace was sufficient for complete knowledge of and confirmation of godliness; for it both thoroughly teaches the complete matter [τὸ τέλειον] concerning the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and it also presents the Lord’s *enanthropation* [ἐνανθρώπησιν] to those who receive it faithfully. But since those who have set their hand to invalidate the message of the truth through their own heresies have given birth to vain discourse, some daring to corrupt the mystery of the Lord’s economy on our behalf and denying the name “Theotokos” to the Virgin, others introducing mixture and confusion and senselessly inventing that there is one nature of the flesh and of the Godhead and indulging in strange speculation that the divine nature of the Only-Begotten is passible through mixture, for this reason, to close off to these all machinations against the truth, this now present holy, great, and ecumenical synod, teaching thoroughly the immovability of the proclamation previously

given, sets forth [ῥηρίσεν] firstly that the faith [πίστιν] of the 318 holy fathers is to remain inviolate. Because of those who made war against the Holy Spirit, it confirms the teaching handed down from the 150 fathers gathered in the imperial city at a later date concerning the substance of the Spirit, which those ones made known to all, not as though they introduced a novelty which was left unsaid [λεῖπον] by their predecessors, instead making clear with written witness their idea of the Holy Spirit against those who were trying to deny his lordship. But because of those who set their hand to corrupt the mystery of the economy and frivolously say with intemperance that the one born from the holy virgin Mary was a mere human, it has accepted the conciliar letters of the blessed Cyril, who was shepherd of the church of Alexandria, both to Nestorius and to those of the Orient as being fitting for both the refutation of Nestorius' madness and the interpretation of the saving Creed for those who with pious zeal seek understanding. To these is also suitably attached, for the confirmation of sound doctrine, the epistle of the president of the great and senior Rome, the most blessed and holy Archbishop Leo, which he wrote to Archbishop Flavian (now among the saints) for the removal of the perversity of Eutyches, since it agrees with the confession of the great Peter and is a universal pillar against those with false beliefs. For it [the Council] sets itself against those who set their hand to tear apart the economy of the mystery into a dyad of sons; it drives from the assembly of the priests those daring to say that the Godhead of the son was passable; it stands against those who conceive of mixture or confusion with the two natures of Christ; it drives out those who deliriously claim that the form of the servant which he took from us for himself was heavenly or from some other substance [οὐσία]; and it anathematizes those who, on the one hand, invent fables concerning the two natures of the Lord before the union and those who, on the other, imagine in vain one after the union.

(b.) Therefore, following the holy fathers, we all harmoniously teach the confession of one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in Godhead and the same perfect in manhood, the same being truly God and truly human from a rational soul and body, consubstantial with the Father according to the Godhead and consubstantial with us according to the humanity, in every way like us apart from sin, before all ages begotten from the father according to the Godhead but in later days the same for our sake and for our salvation from the virgin Mary Theotokos according to the humanity, one and the same Christ, the Son, Lord, and Only-Begotten, made known in two natures without mixture, without change, without division, and without separation, the differences of the natures in no way being removed on account of the union, but rather the individual property [ιδιότητος] of each nature being preserved and coming together [συντρεχούσης] into one *prosopon* [πρόσωπον] and one *hypostasis* [ὑπόστασις], not being severed or cleaved into two *prosopa* [πρόσωπα], but one and the same Son, Only-

Begotten, God, Word, Lord, Jesus Christ, as the prophets formerly and Jesus Christ himself taught us concerning him and the Creed of the fathers has handed down to us.⁵⁸³

(c.) Therefore, these things being formed in every way carefully and diligently, the holy and ecumenical synod has decreed [ὁρίσεν] that it is not permissible for anyone to bring forth another faith [πίστιν] or, therefore, to write, compose, think, or teach otherwise.⁵⁸⁴ But those who dare to set forth another faith or, therefore, to produce or teach or pass on another creed [σύμβολον] to those desiring to turn to the knowledge of the truth from Hellenism, from Judaism, or, therefore, from whatever sort of heresy, consequently these, whether they are bishop or clerics, bishops are to be estranged [ἀλλοτρίους εἶναι] from the episcopate and clerics from their office [κλήρου], and if they be monks or laypersons, they are to anathematised.

35. After the reading of the definition [ὅπου], all the most devout bishops shouted, “This is the faith of the fathers. Let the metropolitans subscribe now! Let them subscribe now, with the rulers present. Let not the things well defined receive delay. This is the faith of the apostles. To this all of us agree. We all think in this way.”

The most magnificent and glorious officials said, “The things that are composed by the holy fathers and pleasing to everyone will be shown [δῆλος] to the divine highness.”

⁵⁸³ Following *CChal* II.204, “Son, ..., Jesus Christ” is interpreted as a string of adjectives, not several adjectival phrases. Without articles, conjunctions, or punctuation, there is no reason to agree with Gerald O’Collins [2002] that it should be translated “Son and *only-begotten God the Word*, Lord Jesus Christ”; O’Collins [2009] “Son, Only-Begotten, God [the] Word, lord Jesus Christ”; or with Anthony Baxter, “Son, Only-begotten, divine Word, the Lord Jesus Christ.” Gerald O’Collins, *Interpreting Jesus*, 182; Gerald O’Collins, *Christology*, 197; Anthony Baxter, “Chalcedon and the Subject in Christ,” 9.

⁵⁸⁴ γούν is postpositive, so its placement suggests that the latter three infinitives are to be grouped together, rather than the division of *CChal*.